The lawyer as caregiver: Child client's competence in context

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 64, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 1473-1503

  Margulies, Peter ^a,b,c  

^a St Thomas University

^b Center for Language and Brain

^c Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030557540     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (191)

1. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
2. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
3. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
4. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
5. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
6. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
7. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
8. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
9. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
10. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
11. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
12. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
13. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
14. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fam. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
15. See Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 86-87.
16. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentially, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The literature on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolving Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983 (1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender stereotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
17. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentially, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The literature on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolving Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983 (1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender stereotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
18. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentially, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The literature on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolving Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983 (1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender stereotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
19. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentially, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The literature on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolving Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983 (1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender stereotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
20. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentially, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The literature on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolving Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983 (1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender stereotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
21. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentially, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The literature on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolving Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983 (1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender stereotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
22. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentially, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The literature on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolving Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983 (1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender stereotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
23. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentially, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The literature on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolving Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983 (1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender stereotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
24. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentially, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The literature on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolving Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983 (1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender stereotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
25. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentially, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The literature on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolving Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983 (1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender stereotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
26. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentially, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The literature on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolving Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983 (1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender stereotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
27. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentially, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The literature on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolving Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983 (1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender stereotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
28. Lawyers should presume, however, that both senior citizens and people with mental disabilities are competent. For commentary on competence and attorney-client relationship, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 Hastings L.J. 769 (1992); Stanley S. Herr, Representations of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 609 (1990); David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454; Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1073, 1073-76 (1994) [hereinafter Access, Connection, and Voice]; Linda F. Smith, Representing the Elderly Client and Addressing the Question of Competence, 14 J. Contemp. L. 61 (1988); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515. This Article's argument is consistent with the view that child clients who express a preference are also presumptively competent. That presumption should inform, but not preclude, client-lawyer conversation about the reasons underlying client preferences, and the consequences of client decisions.
29. Lawyers should presume, however, that both senior citizens and people with mental disabilities are competent. For commentary on competence and attorney-client relationship, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 Hastings L.J. 769 (1992); Stanley S. Herr, Representations of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 609 (1990); David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454; Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1073, 1073-76 (1994) [hereinafter Access, Connection, and Voice]; Linda F. Smith, Representing the Elderly Client and Addressing the Question of Competence, 14 J. Contemp. L. 61 (1988); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515. This Article's argument is consistent with the view that child clients who express a preference are also presumptively competent. That presumption should inform, but not preclude, client-lawyer conversation about the reasons underlying client preferences, and the consequences of client decisions.
30. Lawyers should presume, however, that both senior citizens and people with mental disabilities are competent. For commentary on competence and attorney-client relationship, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 Hastings L.J. 769 (1992); Stanley S. Herr, Representations of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 609 (1990); David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454; Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1073, 1073-76 (1994) [hereinafter Access, Connection, and Voice]; Linda F. Smith, Representing the Elderly Client and Addressing the Question of Competence, 14 J. Contemp. L. 61 (1988); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515. This Article's argument is consistent with the view that child clients who express a preference are also presumptively competent. That presumption should inform, but not preclude, client-lawyer conversation about the reasons underlying client preferences, and the consequences of client decisions.
31. Lawyers should presume, however, that both senior citizens and people with mental disabilities are competent. For commentary on competence and attorney-client relationship, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 Hastings L.J. 769 (1992); Stanley S. Herr, Representations of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 609 (1990); David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454; Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1073, 1073-76 (1994) [hereinafter Access, Connection, and Voice]; Linda F. Smith, Representing the Elderly Client and Addressing the Question of Competence, 14 J. Contemp. L. 61 (1988); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515. This Article's argument is consistent with the view that child clients who express a preference are also presumptively competent. That presumption should inform, but not preclude, client-lawyer conversation about the reasons underlying client preferences, and the consequences of client decisions.
32. Lawyers should presume, however, that both senior citizens and people with mental disabilities are competent. For commentary on competence and attorney-client relationship, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 Hastings L.J. 769 (1992); Stanley S. Herr, Representations of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 609 (1990); David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454; Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1073, 1073-76 (1994) [hereinafter Access, Connection, and Voice]; Linda F. Smith, Representing the Elderly Client and Addressing the Question of Competence, 14 J. Contemp. L. 61 (1988); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515. This Article's argument is consistent with the view that child clients who express a preference are also presumptively competent. That presumption should inform, but not preclude, client-lawyer conversation about the reasons underlying client preferences, and the consequences of client decisions.
33. Lawyers should presume, however, that both senior citizens and people with mental disabilities are competent. For commentary on competence and attorney-client relationship, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 Hastings L.J. 769 (1992); Stanley S. Herr, Representations of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 609 (1990); David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454; Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1073, 1073-76 (1994) [hereinafter Access, Connection, and Voice]; Linda F. Smith, Representing the Elderly Client and Addressing the Question of Competence, 14 J. Contemp. L. 61 (1988); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515. This Article's argument is consistent with the view that child clients who express a preference are also presumptively competent. That presumption should inform, but not preclude, client-lawyer conversation about the reasons underlying client preferences, and the consequences of client decisions.
34. In areas such as abortion, courts have approved special procedures for minors that individually assess decision-making capacity. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-44 (1979). Contract law presumes minors incompetent to make contracts. See John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 8-1 (3d ed. 1987).
35. The law requires, for example, that a next friend or guardian ad litem represent the interests of a minor child in custody and child welfare proceedings. See Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
36. See Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children's Rights, 16 Nova L. Rev. 711, 716 (1992). For a thoughtful analysis of adolescent decision making, see Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 L. & Hum. Behav. 221 (1995).
37. See Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children's Rights, 16 Nova L. Rev. 711, 716 (1992). For a thoughtful analysis of adolescent decision making, see Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 L. & Hum. Behav. 221 (1995).
38. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the
39. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
40. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
41. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
42. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
43. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
44. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
45. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
46. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
47. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
48. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
49. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
50. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
51. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
52. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
53. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
54. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
55. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
56. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
57. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
58. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
59. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the relationship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2499-2505 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990). The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as disempowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, - Trenzas, - Y - Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discussing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature). For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
60. See Fitzgerald, supra note 3, at 97-98.
61. See Federle, Reconceiving Rights, supra note 3, at 985; Federle, Resolving Custody Disputes, supra note 3, at 1527-34; Jan E. Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices - What's an Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1101, 1107 (1994).
62. See Federle, Reconceiving Rights, supra note 3, at 985; Federle, Resolving Custody Disputes, supra note 3, at 1527-34; Jan E. Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices - What's an Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1101, 1107 (1994).
63. See Federle, Reconceiving Rights, supra note 3, at 985; Federle, Resolving Custody Disputes, supra note 3, at 1527-34; Jan E. Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices - What's an Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1101, 1107 (1994).
64. This conception of competency resembles nuanced conceptions of the client's goals in an attorney-client relationship. Also, client goals do not come ready-made, but instead are a product of dialogue and interaction between attorney and client. See Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 128-34 (1993).
65. Of course, the lawyer also has an obligation to assess critically each of these perspectives, particularly the social service professional's assertion of expertise. See Chambers, supra note 3, at 484; Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727, 760-68 (1988).
66. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. For an analysis of race in constructing competence in special education, see Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
67. See generally Stanley Fish, Is There A Text In This Class? (1980) (discussing the importance of "interpretive community"). Of course, shared norms in any interpretive community may subordinate persons or groups within that community. Cf. Drucilla Cornell, "Convention" and Critique, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 679 (1986) (critiquing Fish); David Luban, Fish v. Fish or, Some Realism About Idealism, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 693 (1986) (same); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 639 (1990) (same). Because of this risk of subordination, those assessing competency should follow substantive presumptions, and receive training, designed to reduce invidious biases in competency assessments.
68. See generally Stanley Fish, Is There A Text In This Class? (1980) (discussing the importance of "interpretive community"). Of course, shared norms in any interpretive community may subordinate persons or groups within that community. Cf. Drucilla Cornell, "Convention" and Critique, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 679 (1986) (critiquing Fish); David Luban, Fish v. Fish or, Some Realism About Idealism, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 693 (1986) (same); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 639 (1990) (same). Because of this risk of subordination, those assessing competency should follow substantive presumptions, and receive training, designed to reduce invidious biases in competency assessments.
69. See generally Stanley Fish, Is There A Text In This Class? (1980) (discussing the importance of "interpretive community"). Of course, shared norms in any interpretive community may subordinate persons or groups within that community. Cf. Drucilla Cornell, "Convention" and Critique, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 679 (1986) (critiquing Fish); David Luban, Fish v. Fish or, Some Realism About Idealism, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 693 (1986) (same); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 639 (1990) (same). Because of this risk of subordination, those assessing competency should follow substantive presumptions, and receive training, designed to reduce invidious biases in competency assessments.
70. See generally Stanley Fish, Is There A Text In This Class? (1980) (discussing the importance of "interpretive community"). Of course, shared norms in any interpretive community may subordinate persons or groups within that community. Cf. Drucilla Cornell, "Convention" and Critique, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 679 (1986) (critiquing Fish); David Luban, Fish v. Fish or, Some Realism About Idealism, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 693 (1986) (same); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 639 (1990) (same). Because of this risk of subordination, those assessing competency should follow substantive presumptions, and receive training, designed to reduce invidious biases in competency assessments.
71. See Standards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings §§ 2.7, 2.12 (Am. Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1995) [hereinafter Academy Standards]. The Reporter for the Academy Standards, Prof. Martin Guggenheim, has been the most trenchant critic of the movement toward appointment of counsel for children in custody and child welfare cases. See Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 125.
72. Thor v. Superior Ct., 855 P.2d 375, 381-83 (Cal. 1993).
73. Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, in Child, Parent, and State 460, 464 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994).
74. See Federle, Resolving Custody Disputes, supra note 3, at 1527-34.
75. See id. at 1523-24.
76. See Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80 (discussing capacity of senior citizens).
77. See Mary P. Koss et al., Understanding The Perpetrator and the Victim: Who Abuses and Who is Abused, in No Safe Haven: Male Violence Against Women at Home, at Work, and in The Community 19, 23-27, 34-38 (American Psychological Ass'n 1994); Beth Weitzman et al., Predictors of Shelter Use Among Low-Income Families: Psychiatric History, Substance Abuse, and Victimization, 82 Am. J. Pub. Health 1547, 1547 (1992).
78. See Mary P. Koss et al., Understanding The Perpetrator and the Victim: Who Abuses and Who is Abused, in No Safe Haven: Male Violence Against Women at Home, at Work, and in The Community 19, 23-27, 34-38 (American Psychological Ass'n 1994); Beth Weitzman et al., Predictors of Shelter Use Among Low-Income Families: Psychiatric History, Substance Abuse, and Victimization, 82 Am. J. Pub. Health 1547, 1547 (1992).
79. Feminist accounts of epistemology stress experience. See Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1642 (1991). So do prudentialist accounts of judgement which view experience as promoting moderation and tempering radicalism. See Kronman, supra note 11, at 222-25. But see Margulies, Progressive Lawyering, supra note 8, at 1146 (arguing that Kronman's account does not hold true for marginalized groups with no stake in the status quo).
80. Feminist accounts of epistemology stress experience. See Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1642 (1991). So do prudentialist accounts of judgement which view experience as promoting moderation and tempering radicalism. See Kronman, supra note 11, at 222-25. But see Margulies, Progressive Lawyering, supra note 8, at 1146 (arguing that Kronman's account does not hold true for marginalized groups with no stake in the status quo).
81. See Scott et al., supra note 7, at 224-26. These studies, however, took place under laboratory conditions which do not capture the nuances of real-world decision-making. Id. at 226.
82. Id. at 227-28.
83. Id. at 233-34.
84. This is also the premise of clinical legal educators, who argue that experience in representing clients and working in communities offers knowledge which is unavailable though the perusing of appellate opinions in traditional law school casebooks. See Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care Into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1181-82 (1992); Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1642-54 (1991); Minna Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 185, 194 (1989); Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judgment, supra note 8, at 704-05; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731, 1739-42 (1993); see generally Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in the Clinical Relationship, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 115 (1993) (discussing the relationship between clinical professors and their students); Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980) (discussing Yale Law School's clinical program).
85. This is also the premise of clinical legal educators, who argue that experience in representing clients and working in communities offers knowledge which is unavailable though the perusing of appellate opinions in traditional law school casebooks. See Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care Into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1181-82 (1992); Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1642-54 (1991); Minna Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 185, 194 (1989); Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judgment, supra note 8, at 704-05; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731, 1739-42 (1993); see generally Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in the Clinical Relationship, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 115 (1993) (discussing the relationship between clinical professors and their students); Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980) (discussing Yale Law School's clinical program).
86. This is also the premise of clinical legal educators, who argue that experience in representing clients and working in communities offers knowledge which is unavailable though the perusing of appellate opinions in traditional law school casebooks. See Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care Into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1181-82 (1992); Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1642-54 (1991); Minna Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 185, 194 (1989); Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judgment, supra note 8, at 704-05; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731, 1739-42 (1993); see generally Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in the Clinical Relationship, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 115 (1993) (discussing the relationship between clinical professors and their students); Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980) (discussing Yale Law School's clinical program).
87. This is also the premise of clinical legal educators, who argue that experience in representing clients and working in communities offers knowledge which is unavailable though the perusing of appellate opinions in traditional law school casebooks. See Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care Into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1181-82 (1992); Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1642-54 (1991); Minna Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 185, 194 (1989); Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judgment, supra note 8, at 704-05; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731, 1739-42 (1993); see generally Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in the Clinical Relationship, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 115 (1993) (discussing the relationship between clinical professors and their students); Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980) (discussing Yale Law School's clinical program).
88. This is also the premise of clinical legal educators, who argue that experience in representing clients and working in communities offers knowledge which is unavailable though the perusing of appellate opinions in traditional law school casebooks. See Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care Into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1181-82 (1992); Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1642-54 (1991); Minna Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 185, 194 (1989); Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judgment, supra note 8, at 704-05; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731, 1739-42 (1993); see generally Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in the Clinical Relationship, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 115 (1993) (discussing the relationship between clinical professors and their students); Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980) (discussing Yale Law School's clinical program).
89. This is also the premise of clinical legal educators, who argue that experience in representing clients and working in communities offers knowledge which is unavailable though the perusing of appellate opinions in traditional law school casebooks. See Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care Into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1181-82 (1992); Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1642-54 (1991); Minna Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 185, 194 (1989); Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judgment, supra note 8, at 704-05; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731, 1739-42 (1993); see generally Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in the Clinical Relationship, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 115 (1993) (discussing the relationship between clinical professors and their students); Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980) (discussing Yale Law School's clinical program).
90. This is also the premise of clinical legal educators, who argue that experience in representing clients and working in communities offers knowledge which is unavailable though the perusing of appellate opinions in traditional law school casebooks. See Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care Into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1181-82 (1992); Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1642-54 (1991); Minna Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 185, 194 (1989); Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judgment, supra note 8, at 704-05; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731, 1739-42 (1993); see generally Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in the Clinical Relationship, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 115 (1993) (discussing the relationship between clinical professors and their students); Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980) (discussing Yale Law School's clinical program).
91. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile 111 (Everyman ed. 1911).
92. Of course, we must also always be mindful that our view of what constitutes a "mistake" necessarily is a function of our own assumptions and biases. When decisions some think unwise stem from cultural differences, such as a decision to pursue a course of home schooling rich in religion, rather than a secular public education, the First Amendment often requires respect for that decision. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
93. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 3-84 (1958). To the extent that all clients are part of a web of relationships, lawyers should always take connection into account.
94. Scott et. al., supra note 7, at 229-30.
95. See Fitzgerald, supra note 3, at 81.
96. See Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 116-17. It is tempting to define one's role in such a way, because the risks are much less palpable, particularly in the child welfare context. No children's advocate wants to be on the front page of the newspaper if a child returned to her parents subsequently dies from abuse. Cases of children removed from parents, by contrast, are routine - they do not make the front page even though they cause the break-up of families. The natural bias for children's advocates is to act in a way which minimizes the first, more visible risk, even if it also maximizes family break-ups. See Davis & Barua, supra note 3, at 142-43.
97. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1, at 1163-72.
98. See Lucy S. McGough, Child Witnesses 25-26 (1995) (citing an experiment which demonstrates that children and adults focus on different elements of an event, which although different are both highly relevant).
99. See Federle, Reconceiving Rights, supra note 3, at 1011-15.
100. See Steven L. Winter, The "Power" Thing (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (offering a post-modern, "four-dimensional" view of power informed by the thought of Michel Foucault).
101. See Martin Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 82-85; see, e.g., Academy Standards, supra note 15, § 2.2 (advocating for a rebuttable presumption that children above the age of twelve are competent).
102. The most vigorous support for the mature minor standard in the context of lawyering for children comes from commentators who view such lawyering as a threat to parents' rights. See, e.g., Jonathan O. Hafen, Children's Rights And Legal Representation - The Proper Roles of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 423 (1993) (arguing that a parent's right to control litigation involving young children should be protected). Representation of very young children increases this threat because lawyers in this situation may discount the connections young children have developed with parents and instead impose their own values. See Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 154. This Article argues, however, that a lawyer who takes seriously the possibility of learning something from a very young child client will present less risk of disrupting connections. While it is tempting to not even talk to younger children, see Wizner & Berkman, supra note 1, at 333, particularly the very young, this seems to run counter to studies which suggest that even infants are taking in information, and giving it out, at a spectacular rate. An advocate who accepts an assignment in a custody case should be grateful for any information she can find. The fact that the child may have seen many other adults in connection with a judicial proceeding, such as social workers and psychologists, does not oust the lawyer from her role. If other professionals have been sensitive, another intervention will not be unduly intrusive. If the other professionals have been insensitive, the lawyer will have an opportunity to prove that some people in the judicial system are different.
103. See Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory, and Law, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 763, 777-80 (1993).
104. See id. at 774-75.
105. See Scott, supra note 7, at 224.
106. Cf. Allen E. Buchanan & Dan W. Brock, Deciding For Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making 51-57 (1989) (opting for more contextualized view of capacity); Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements 108-27 (1995) (discussing critical scholars' unpacking of the dichotomy between substance and process); Michael R. Flick, The Due Process of Dying, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1121, 1127-34 (1991) (casting doubt on whether the concept of autonomy has a stable meaning); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 Md. L. Rev. 213, 213 (1991) (same).
107. Cf. Allen E. Buchanan & Dan W. Brock, Deciding For Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making 51-57 (1989) (opting for more contextualized view of capacity); Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements 108-27 (1995) (discussing critical scholars' unpacking of the dichotomy between substance and process); Michael R. Flick, The Due Process of Dying, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1121, 1127-34 (1991) (casting doubt on whether the concept of autonomy has a stable meaning); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 Md. L. Rev. 213, 213 (1991) (same).
108. Cf. Allen E. Buchanan & Dan W. Brock, Deciding For Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making 51-57 (1989) (opting for more contextualized view of capacity); Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements 108-27 (1995) (discussing critical scholars' unpacking of the dichotomy between substance and process); Michael R. Flick, The Due Process of Dying, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1121, 1127-34 (1991) (casting doubt on whether the concept of autonomy has a stable meaning); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 Md. L. Rev. 213, 213 (1991) (same).
109. Cf. Allen E. Buchanan & Dan W. Brock, Deciding For Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making 51-57 (1989) (opting for more contextualized view of capacity); Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements 108-27 (1995) (discussing critical scholars' unpacking of the dichotomy between substance and process); Michael R. Flick, The Due Process of Dying, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1121, 1127-34 (1991) (casting doubt on whether the concept of autonomy has a stable meaning); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 Md. L. Rev. 213, 213 (1991) (same).
110. See Academy Standards, supra note 15, §§ 2.1-2.2.
111. Id. § 2.2 cmt. (emphasis added).
112. Id. (quoting Lois A. Weithorn, Involving Children in Decisions Affecting Their Own Welfare, in Children's Competence to Consent 245, 248 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983).
113. Id.
114. Id. The Academy Standards also recommend that the lawyer assess the child's ability "to appreciate the consequences of each alternative course of action." Id. Here, too, one can only assess that ability if one has a substantive interpretation of what those consequences might be.
115. Id.
116. See Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1085-87 (discussing analogous situation involving senior citizens).
117. For a sensitive discussion about representation of criminal defendants with backgrounds in the juvenile justice system, see Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 433 (1995).
118. Criminal defense lawyers invoking this rationale may, however, develop conflicts of interest with their clients. Conflicts can occur, for example, when a criminal defendant wishes to cooperate with a government investigation, but his lawyer refuses to facilitate such cooperation because of an antiprosecution perspective, concerns about professional reputation, or pressures from third parties paying the lawyer's fees. See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 69, 111-26 (1995) (identifying various situations where conflicts arise between defense attorneys and their clients).
119. The attorney cannot be a bystander with questionably competent clients; she must be a participant, seeking to bolster competence through conversation and exposure of the client to peer groups and professional resources. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (discussing the value of peer groups).
120. See Wizner & Berkman, supra note 1, at 331.
121. See William James, Pragmatism, in Pragmatism And Four Essays From The Meaning of Truth 43 (Ralph B. Perry ed. 1955) ("To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve . . . .").
122. Many schools of thought consider experience an essential component of knowledge. For example, this concept is fundamental to pragmatism and feminism. See, e.g., Sandra Harding, Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is "Strong Objectivity"?, in Feminist Epistemologies 49, 55 (Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter eds., 1993) ("[W]omen's experience is the 'grounds' of feminist knowledge . . . .").
123. See John Dewey, Experience and Education 35 (1938).
124. For an incisive analysis of regret, see Kronman, supra note 11, at 74-87 (1993).
125. See David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood 55 (1993).
126. Of course it is correct that the lawyer affects the adult's life chances no matter what the lawyer does. Nevertheless, this truism should not obscure the fact that some chances will prejudice those life chances more than others. Making such judgments about prejudice to life chances is something lawyers for children are not only permitted, but required, to do. Any other view is either disingenuous, or else intolerably thin in its assessment of the lawyer's role. Some might assert that the dilemmas confronting lawyers representing children occur primarily in the custody and child welfare context, not in delinquency proceedings. In delinquency proceedings, they argue, a lawyer is basically doing what any criminal defense lawyer does, except with younger clients. The lawyer is not called upon or expected to be an officer of the court, as is often formally or informally the case in custody or child welfare matters. Yet this argument for the difference in delinquency is not entirely convincing. It is not convincing because children, particularly if this is their first proceeding, lack the experience to decide whether or not they want to take a plea, and to evaluate the consequences of doing so. Going to a juvenile detention facility or a court-ordered placement can have a lasting effect on the child which the child cannot predict, but which the lawyer can because of her experience. The result of such a sentence may be an education in the wrong direction - an education in alienation and distrust. A lawyer should be allowed to persist in negotiations and motion practice to seek a dismissal of delinquency proceedings, even if the child wishes to plead. In particular, if the child's rationale for wishing to plead is that he wants to "get it over with," the lawyer should consider whether the child, some years in the future, would be happy or sad that the lawyer took some more time to negotiate, and ultimately procured a dismissal. A child's tolerance for boredom and ambiguity may be much less than an adult's, but the child's preference, if acted upon mechanically by the lawyer, will nonetheless affect the adult. In this context, as in the custody or child welfare context, the lawyer for a child really has at least two clients: the child today, and the future adult whose life will be irrevocably changed by the decision in which the lawyer is involved. The lawyer must consider the interests of "both" clients.
127. See David Luban, Lawyers and Justice 344-47 (1988).
128. See Buchanan & Brock, Deciding For Others, supra note 42, at 238-39.
129. See Scott, supra note 7, at 234 n.7.
130. Let us assume that the girl's parents agree with her, that the hospital commences a child welfare proceeding, and that the court appoints a lawyer to represent the girl.
131. See Stefan, supra note 39, at 792-96.
132. See id.
133. See generally Mary P. Koss et al., The Prevalence of Intimate Violence, in No Safe Haven: Male Violence Against Women At Home, At Work, and In the Community 41 (1994) (discussing pervasiveness of domestic violence).
134. Cf. Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1041, 1074-77 (1991) (discussing case law involving domestic violence and custody decisions).
135. Id. at 1055-57.
136. See Wizner & Berkman, supra note 1, at 345.
137. The exception in cases of extreme harm derives support from two factors: irreversibility of decision making and combatting exploitation.
138. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1983) [hereinafter Model Rules].
139. See id. Rule 1.14.
140. See Winter, The Power Thing, supra note 36.
141. There may be times when dealing with children of doubtful competence that consultation with a diagnostician (in the face of the client's refusal) is necessary to deal with an emergency.
142. See, e.g., Robert Wuthnow, Sharing The Journey 1-31 (1994) (analyzing support groups); Stacy Brustin, Expanding Our Vision of Legal Services Representation - the Hermanas Unidas Project, 1 Am. U.J. Gender & L. 39, 43-44 (1993) (discussing mutual aid among Latina survivors of domestic violence in Washington, D.C.); Betty H. Morrow, A Grass-Roots Feminist Response to Intimate Violence in the Caribbean, 17 Women's Stud. Int'l Forum 579 (1994) (analyzing role of Women's Coalition of St. Croix in fighting domestic violence). Mutual aid groups differ widely in the mix of therapeutic and political discourses which they practice. Arguably, a therapeutic discourse of mutual aid risks turning public problems into private ones, while a political discourse risks insensitivity to the affective needs of victims. For critical analysis of support groups, see Wendy Kaminer, I'm Dysfunctional, You're Dysfunctional (1992) and Linda Alcoff & Laura Gray, Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?, 18 Signs 260 (1993).
143. See, e.g., Robert Wuthnow, Sharing The Journey 1-31 (1994) (analyzing support groups); Stacy Brustin, Expanding Our Vision of Legal Services Representation - the Hermanas Unidas Project, 1 Am. U.J. Gender & L. 39, 43-44 (1993) (discussing mutual aid among Latina survivors of domestic violence in Washington, D.C.); Betty H. Morrow, A Grass-Roots Feminist Response to Intimate Violence in the Caribbean, 17 Women's Stud. Int'l Forum 579 (1994) (analyzing role of Women's Coalition of St. Croix in fighting domestic violence). Mutual aid groups differ widely in the mix of therapeutic and political discourses which they practice. Arguably, a therapeutic discourse of mutual aid risks turning public problems into private ones, while a political discourse risks insensitivity to the affective needs of victims. For critical analysis of support groups, see Wendy Kaminer, I'm Dysfunctional, You're Dysfunctional (1992) and Linda Alcoff & Laura Gray, Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?, 18 Signs 260 (1993).
144. See, e.g., Robert Wuthnow, Sharing The Journey 1-31 (1994) (analyzing support groups); Stacy Brustin, Expanding Our Vision of Legal Services Representation - the Hermanas Unidas Project, 1 Am. U.J. Gender & L. 39, 43-44 (1993) (discussing mutual aid among Latina survivors of domestic violence in Washington, D.C.); Betty H. Morrow, A Grass-Roots Feminist Response to Intimate Violence in the Caribbean, 17 Women's Stud. Int'l Forum 579 (1994) (analyzing role of Women's Coalition of St. Croix in fighting domestic violence). Mutual aid groups differ widely in the mix of therapeutic and political discourses which they practice. Arguably, a therapeutic discourse of mutual aid risks turning public problems into private ones, while a political discourse risks insensitivity to the affective needs of victims. For critical analysis of support groups, see Wendy Kaminer, I'm Dysfunctional, You're Dysfunctional (1992) and Linda Alcoff & Laura Gray, Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?, 18 Signs 260 (1993).
145. See, e.g., Robert Wuthnow, Sharing The Journey 1-31 (1994) (analyzing support groups); Stacy Brustin, Expanding Our Vision of Legal Services Representation - the Hermanas Unidas Project, 1 Am. U.J. Gender & L. 39, 43-44 (1993) (discussing mutual aid among Latina survivors of domestic violence in Washington, D.C.); Betty H. Morrow, A Grass-Roots Feminist Response to Intimate Violence in the Caribbean, 17 Women's Stud. Int'l Forum 579 (1994) (analyzing role of Women's Coalition of St. Croix in fighting domestic violence). Mutual aid groups differ widely in the mix of therapeutic and political discourses which they practice. Arguably, a therapeutic discourse of mutual aid risks turning public problems into private ones, while a political discourse risks insensitivity to the affective needs of victims. For critical analysis of support groups, see Wendy Kaminer, I'm Dysfunctional, You're Dysfunctional (1992) and Linda Alcoff & Laura Gray, Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?, 18 Signs 260 (1993).
146. See, e.g., Robert Wuthnow, Sharing The Journey 1-31 (1994) (analyzing support groups); Stacy Brustin, Expanding Our Vision of Legal Services Representation - the Hermanas Unidas Project, 1 Am. U.J. Gender & L. 39, 43-44 (1993) (discussing mutual aid among Latina survivors of domestic violence in Washington, D.C.); Betty H. Morrow, A Grass-Roots Feminist Response to Intimate Violence in the Caribbean, 17 Women's Stud. Int'l Forum 579 (1994) (analyzing role of Women's Coalition of St. Croix in fighting domestic violence). Mutual aid groups differ widely in the mix of therapeutic and political discourses which they practice. Arguably, a therapeutic discourse of mutual aid risks turning public problems into private ones, while a political discourse risks insensitivity to the affective needs of victims. For critical analysis of support groups, see Wendy Kaminer, I'm Dysfunctional, You're Dysfunctional (1992) and Linda Alcoff & Laura Gray, Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?, 18 Signs 260 (1993).
147. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1, at 1183.
148. See generally Dewey, supra note 56.
149. The lawyer must also be willing to try alternative methods for communicating with the child which depart from the traditional lawyer's office interview approach. Interviews at the child's home, or at McDonald's, are useful strategies. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1, at 1160-62 & n.163.
150. For a discussion of a simulation which explores dilemmas encountered by professionals in child welfare proceedings, see Jean Koh Peters, Jose and Sarah's Story: The Usefulness of Roleplay in an Ethically-Based Evaluation of the Present and Future Family Court, 21 Pac. L.J. 897 (1990).
151. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1, at 1169 n.205 (discussing different criteria attorneys might consider when assessing a child's preference for placement).
152. In some settings, such as child placement cases within the purview of the Indian Child Welfare Act, courts must weigh supplying material abundance less heavily than conserving cultural heritage.
153. Evidence suggests that some attorneys consider the issue of remarriage when making decisions for a child they deem to be incompetent. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1, at 1169 n.205.
154. See Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 Law & Sexuality 133, 157-61 (1991). For a discussion of sexual orientation and custody, see Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 Geo. L.J. 459 (1990). Cf. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protections for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 511 (1992) (using narrative to explore the interaction of gender, sexual orientation, and the law).
155. See Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 Law & Sexuality 133, 157-61 (1991). For a discussion of sexual orientation and custody, see Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 Geo. L.J. 459 (1990). Cf. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protections for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 511 (1992) (using narrative to explore the interaction of gender, sexual orientation, and the law).
156. See Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 Law & Sexuality 133, 157-61 (1991). For a discussion of sexual orientation and custody, see Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 Geo. L.J. 459 (1990). Cf. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protections for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 511 (1992) (using narrative to explore the interaction of gender, sexual orientation, and the law).
157. See Academy Standards, supra note 15, § 2.7 (prohibiting a lawyer from even advocating a position).
158. See id. § 2.7 cmt.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 39-71 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the contextual approach uses substantive values to assess a child's competency).
162. See Kronman, supra note 11, 128-34; Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1759, 1769-70 (1993).
163. See Academy Standards, supra note 15, § 2.4 cmt.
164. See id. (indicating that if counsel is ineffective in persuading client, then counsel must zealously advocate client's wishes).
165. That this delegation to another decision maker is central to the Academy's concerns is plain from the Commentary's refusal to permit even guardians ad litem, typically appointed expressly to safeguard the child's best interests, to express an opinion in custody proceedings. Academy Standards, supra note 15, § 3.2 & cmt. Guardians ad litem do not have role problems, as attorneys with impaired clients do, with staking out their own positions; guardians ad litem are appointed expressly to stake out such positions. Indeed, the Academy Commentary also urges that guardians ad litem not only be attorneys, but also be selected from the ranks of social workers and psychologists. To the extent that the objection with attorneys speaking out is that they lack the expertise to determine what is best for the child, the objection should not hold for social workers and psychologists, unless one believes that all expertise is overblown and tends to undermine parental authority. See Fineman, supra note 12, at 735 (arguing that social service professionals systematically discount maternal interests in custody litigation).
166. See Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting Professional Service on the Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. Legal Educ. 43, 52-53 (1991); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 737, 741-43 (1988).
167. See Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting Professional Service on the Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. Legal Educ. 43, 52-53 (1991); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 737, 741-43 (1988).
168. Professor Guggenheim, the Reporter for the Academy Standards, has previously suggested, for legitimate reasons, that the entire notion of court-appointed advocates for children in custody disputes is counter-productive. There are good reasons for this position: court-appointed advocates for children can disregard children's connections with parents; apply invidious biases; and allow judges to escape responsibility for decisions. See Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 135-43; see also Mlyniec, supra note 1, at 9-10 (stating that "[t]he advocate seemingly makes the ultimate decisions regarding what is the child's best interest"). Curbing or eliminating lawyers for children, however, significantly increases the power of matrimonial lawyers. Life for matrimonial lawyers would be much easier if they did not have to worry about the "wild card" of an advocate for children who may disagree with them about the outcome of the case. A little inconvenience may be just what matrimonial lawyers need, however, in light of their tendency, amply documented in a well-known empirical study, see Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 93, at 741-43, for putting their own convenience ahead, not only of the welfare of the children involved in custody disputes, but also of the wishes, needs, and emotions of their own clients. While one does not want to unduly generalize about matrimonial lawyers, some of whom in my experience are exceptionally thoughtful about gender issues and other matters important to custody disputes, the Sarat and Felstiner study is a sobering look at a cross-section of behavior within the matrimonial bar. Other lawyers, including poverty lawyers, have been criticized for similar behavior which places professional power over client welfare. See Alfieri, Reconstrutive Poverty Law, supra note 8, at 2146-47. One does not need to single out matrimonial lawyers to appreciate that reducing the power of an advocate for children just gives the other advocates more authority, and that sound policy must take this factor into account.
169. See Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in On Narrative 1, 3 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1981).
170. Judges are the best example of the corollary of this statement, namely, that the substantive position one takes necessarily influences how one recounts facts. The statement of facts in any judge's opinion will differ, depending on the result which the judge reaches. The judge will include some facts, and omit others, depending on how she decides the case. For instance, Justice Cardozo found it unnecessary to include the name of Mrs. Palsgraf in the body of his opinion in that notable case. See John T. Noonan, Persons and Masks of The Law 111 (1976).
171. See Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 108-09.
172. Id. at 108.
173. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799, 877 n.338 (1992) (citing commentaries on this issue).
174. Prohibiting a lawyer for an incompetent child from stating a position will also frustrate another goal set out in the Academy Standards: the promotion of settlement. Negotiating with an advocate who refuses to take a position does not foster settlement, but instead magnifies uncertainty. At some point in settlement, parties need to have the opportunity to ask each other, "What are your goals and interests?" Negotiating with someone who lacks the authority to answer that question is difficult, if not impossible. Cf. Jonathan M. Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of Negotiation: Can Good Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 863 (1987) (discussing theories of negotiation).
175. While voice is always a plural concept - with many voices contributing, even within a single person, see Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, supra note 8, at 2485; Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judgment, supra note 8, at 709-16 - the values of connection and education are especially salient with children.
176. While voice is always a plural concept - with many voices contributing, even within a single person, see Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, supra note 8, at 2485; Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judgment, supra note 8, at 709-16 - the values of connection and education are especially salient with children.
177. See generally Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1 (advocating a generalized or "lawyer for the situation" role for attorneys representing a child clients).
178. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976). Because of the importance of connection, a lawyer for a child must take into account the interests of the child's family. For analysis of the lawyer's responsibility in representing groups, see generally Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1103 (1992); John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 11 Cornell L. Rev. 825 (1992); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
179. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976). Because of the importance of connection, a lawyer for a child must take into account the interests of the child's family. For analysis of the lawyer's responsibility in representing groups, see generally Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1103 (1992); John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 11 Cornell L. Rev. 825 (1992); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
180. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976). Because of the importance of connection, a lawyer for a child must take into account the interests of the child's family. For analysis of the lawyer's responsibility in representing groups, see generally Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1103 (1992); John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 11 Cornell L. Rev. 825 (1992); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
181. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976). Because of the importance of connection, a lawyer for a child must take into account the interests of the child's family. For analysis of the lawyer's responsibility in representing groups, see generally Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1103 (1992); John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 11 Cornell L. Rev. 825 (1992); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
182. See Model Rules, supra note 71, Rule 1.14 cmt.; cf. Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1093-98 (discussing de facto guardian concept in context of elder law). But see Tremblay, supra note 8, at 1435-45 (taking a critical view of the de facto guardian approach).
183. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1, at 1146-50.
184. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
185. See Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 138-43.
186. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Function in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1975, at 226, 282-83.
187. This factor is phrased in terms of commitment of time so that a lawyer cannot view a parent's mere financial commitment as dispositive. Stressing a time commitment allows the lawyer to avoid the issues of class bias raised earlier. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
188. For examples of this kind of negotiation with parents in a custody proceeding, see Wizner & Berkman, supra note 1, at 334-43.
189. Proponents of the restrictive view would agree that counseling is called for in this situation. See Academy Standards, supra note 15, § 2.4 cmt.
190. When a lawyer determines that a child lacks capacity, she should proceed as the Model Rules permit, as a de facto guardian. She may seek appointment as a guardian ad litem, although we should view this as a formal conferral of legitimacy, not as any guarantee that the child's interests will be more effectively or authentically represented. Although a lawyer who is also a guardian ad litem experiences a conflict of interest, this conflict is no greater than other possible solutions to decision-making issues, such as naming another person as the guardian ad litem. A lawyer who is also the guardian ad litem will be more likely to spend time speaking with the client and obtain guidance when necessary. When another person is appointed as the guardian ad litem, the lawyer is likely to spend more time speaking with the guardian ad litem, and less time with the client. In addition, the lawyer's need to maintain credibility with the court is a more effective check on abuse than any of the largely nominal checks on the guardian ad litem's authority. But see Tremblay, supra note 8, at 1435-45 (asserting value of legal checks on guardian's authority). This arrangement also means the child has one person, not two, to communicate with, which gives the child more opportunity to influence decisions. As a legal services lawyer who has done much work in this area says, the lawyer should strive, in terms of legal formalities, to be "as close as possible to the child."
191. This Article's use of this hypothetical should not obscure the fact that many children will desire the involvement and discipline provided by the mother in the scenario. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1, at 1169 n.207.