Typographica: The medium and the medieval-to-modern transformation

Review of International Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 29-56

  Deibert, Ronald J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0030556674     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0260210500118443     Document Type: Article

References (211)

1. Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New York, 1956), p. 43.
2. Harold A. Innis, The Bias of Communications (Toronto, 1964), p. 3.
3. John Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity In International Relations', International Organization, 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 139-40.
4. James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton, 1990).
5. Mark Zacher, 'The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple', in James Rosenau and Ernst Otto-Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 58-101.
6. Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (Boston, 1993).
7. Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York, 1973).
8. See David Harvey, The Conditions of Postmodernity (Oxford, 1989); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of Global Capitalism (London, 1985); and Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York, 1984).
9. See David Harvey, The Conditions of Postmodernity (Oxford, 1989); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of Global Capitalism (London, 1985); and Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York, 1984).
10. See David Harvey, The Conditions of Postmodernity (Oxford, 1989); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of Global Capitalism (London, 1985); and Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York, 1984).
11. See J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis, 1984); and Barry Smart, Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies (New York, 1992).
12. See J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis, 1984); and Barry Smart, Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies (New York, 1992).
13. Ruggie, 'Territoriality', pp. 143-4.
14. See Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York, 1957); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1974); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, 1981); William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1984);
15. See Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York, 1957); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1974); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, 1981); William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1984);
16. See Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York, 1957); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1974); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, 1981); William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1984);
17. See Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York, 1957); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1974); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, 1981); William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1984);
18. and Daniel Deudney, 'Dividing Realism: Security Materialism vs. Structural Realism on Nuclear Security and Proliferation', Security Studies, 2, nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993).
19. See Peter Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', International Organization, 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 1-35; and Joshua Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, 1993).
20. See Peter Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', International Organization, 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 1-35; and Joshua Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, 1993).
21. Paul Heyer, Communications and History: Theories of Media, Knowledge and Civilization (New York, 1988), p. xiii.
22. Ibid., p. xiv.
23. See, for examples, Thomas C. Sorenson, The World War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York, 1968); Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, 2nd edn (New York, 1973); J. A. Emerson Vermaat, 'Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movements', Problems of Communism (Nov.-Dec. 1982), pp. 43-56; Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier (eds.), Propaganda and Communication in World History (Honolulu, 1980); John Martin, International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control (Gloucester, 1970); W. Phillips Davidson, 'Political Communications as an Instrument of Foreign Policy', Public Opinion Quarterly, 27 (1963), pp. 28-36.
24. See, for examples, Thomas C. Sorenson, The World War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York, 1968); Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, 2nd edn (New York, 1973); J. A. Emerson Vermaat, 'Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movements', Problems of Communism (Nov.-Dec. 1982), pp. 43-56; Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier (eds.), Propaganda and Communication in World History (Honolulu, 1980); John Martin, International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control (Gloucester, 1970); W. Phillips Davidson, 'Political Communications as an Instrument of Foreign Policy', Public Opinion Quarterly, 27 (1963), pp. 28-36.
25. See, for examples, Thomas C. Sorenson, The World War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York, 1968); Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, 2nd edn (New York, 1973); J. A. Emerson Vermaat, 'Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movements', Problems of Communism (Nov.-Dec. 1982), pp. 43-56; Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier (eds.), Propaganda and Communication in World History (Honolulu, 1980); John Martin, International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control (Gloucester, 1970); W. Phillips Davidson, 'Political Communications as an Instrument of Foreign Policy', Public Opinion Quarterly, 27 (1963), pp. 28-36.
26. See, for examples, Thomas C. Sorenson, The World War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York, 1968); Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, 2nd edn (New York, 1973); J. A. Emerson Vermaat, 'Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movements', Problems of Communism (Nov.-Dec. 1982), pp. 43-56; Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier (eds.), Propaganda and Communication in World History (Honolulu, 1980); John Martin, International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control (Gloucester, 1970); W. Phillips Davidson, 'Political Communications as an Instrument of Foreign Policy', Public Opinion Quarterly, 27 (1963), pp. 28-36.
27. See, for examples, Thomas C. Sorenson, The World War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York, 1968); Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, 2nd edn (New York, 1973); J. A. Emerson Vermaat, 'Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movements', Problems of Communism (Nov.-Dec. 1982), pp. 43-56; Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier (eds.), Propaganda and Communication in World History (Honolulu, 1980); John Martin, International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control (Gloucester, 1970); W. Phillips Davidson, 'Political Communications as an Instrument of Foreign Policy', Public Opinion Quarterly, 27 (1963), pp. 28-36.
28. See, for examples, Thomas C. Sorenson, The World War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York, 1968); Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, 2nd edn (New York, 1973); J. A. Emerson Vermaat, 'Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movements', Problems of Communism (Nov.-Dec. 1982), pp. 43-56; Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier (eds.), Propaganda and Communication in World History (Honolulu, 1980); John Martin, International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control (Gloucester, 1970); W. Phillips Davidson, 'Political Communications as an Instrument of Foreign Policy', Public Opinion Quarterly, 27 (1963), pp. 28-36.
29. William Dorman and Mansour Farhang, The US Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference (Berkeley, 1987); Alan Rachlin, News as Hegemonic Reality: American Political Culture and the Framing of News Accounts (New York, 1988); Robert M. Entman, 'Framing US Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incident', Journal of Communication, 41 (Autumn 1991), pp. 6-27. For 'frame analysis', see Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Boston, 1974).
30. William Dorman and Mansour Farhang, The US Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference (Berkeley, 1987); Alan Rachlin, News as Hegemonic Reality: American Political Culture and the Framing of News Accounts (New York, 1988); Robert M. Entman, 'Framing US Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incident', Journal of Communication, 41 (Autumn 1991), pp. 6-27. For 'frame analysis', see Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Boston, 1974).
31. William Dorman and Mansour Farhang, The US Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference (Berkeley, 1987); Alan Rachlin, News as Hegemonic Reality: American Political Culture and the Framing of News Accounts (New York, 1988); Robert M. Entman, 'Framing US Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incident', Journal of Communication, 41 (Autumn 1991), pp. 6-27. For 'frame analysis', see Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Boston, 1974).
32. William Dorman and Mansour Farhang, The US Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference (Berkeley, 1987); Alan Rachlin, News as Hegemonic Reality: American Political Culture and the Framing of News Accounts (New York, 1988); Robert M. Entman, 'Framing US Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incident', Journal of Communication, 41 (Autumn 1991), pp. 6-27. For 'frame analysis', see Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Boston, 1974).
33. M. Arlen, Living Room War (New York, 1969).
34. Karl Deutsch, 'Mass Communication and the Loss of Freedom in National Decision-Making: A Possible Research Approach to Interstate Conflict', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (1957), pp. 200-11; John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication (London, 1969); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976); Jacob Berkovitch, 'Third Parties in Conflict Management: The Structure and Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations', International Journal, 40 (Autumn 1985), pp. 736-52.
35. Karl Deutsch, 'Mass Communication and the Loss of Freedom in National Decision-Making: A Possible Research Approach to Interstate Conflict', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (1957), pp. 200-11; John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication (London, 1969); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976); Jacob Berkovitch, 'Third Parties in Conflict Management: The Structure and Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations', International Journal, 40 (Autumn 1985), pp. 736-52.
36. Karl Deutsch, 'Mass Communication and the Loss of Freedom in National Decision-Making: A Possible Research Approach to Interstate Conflict', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (1957), pp. 200-11; John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication (London, 1969); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976); Jacob Berkovitch, 'Third Parties in Conflict Management: The Structure and Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations', International Journal, 40 (Autumn 1985), pp. 736-52.
37. Karl Deutsch, 'Mass Communication and the Loss of Freedom in National Decision-Making: A Possible Research Approach to Interstate Conflict', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (1957), pp. 200-11; John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication (London, 1969); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976); Jacob Berkovitch, 'Third Parties in Conflict Management: The Structure and Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations', International Journal, 40 (Autumn 1985), pp. 736-52.
38. J. M. Mitchell, International Cultural Relations (London, 1986).
39. Oran Young, The Intermediaries (Princeton, 1967); Charles Lockhard, Bargaining in International Conflicts (New York, 1979); Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures (Washington, 1991).
40. Oran Young, The Intermediaries (Princeton, 1967); Charles Lockhard, Bargaining in International Conflicts (New York, 1979); Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures (Washington, 1991).
41. Oran Young, The Intermediaries (Princeton, 1967); Charles Lockhard, Bargaining in International Conflicts (New York, 1979); Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures (Washington, 1991).
42. John R. Wood and Jean Seers, Diplomatic: Ceremonial and Protocol (New York, 1970); Raymond Cohen, Theatre of Power: The Art of Diplomatic Signalling (London, 1987); James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford, 1987).
43. John R. Wood and Jean Seers, Diplomatic: Ceremonial and Protocol (New York, 1970); Raymond Cohen, Theatre of Power: The Art of Diplomatic Signalling (London, 1987); James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford, 1987).
44. John R. Wood and Jean Seers, Diplomatic: Ceremonial and Protocol (New York, 1970); Raymond Cohen, Theatre of Power: The Art of Diplomatic Signalling (London, 1987); James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford, 1987).
45. For a useful overview, see Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies (Toronto, 1989).
46. See Stephen Gill (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge 1993).
47. Hamid Mowlana, Global Information and World Communication: New Frontiers in International Relations (New York, 1986).
48. Thomas McPhail, Electronic Colonialism: The Future of International Broadcasting and Communication, 2nd edn (Beverly Hills, 1987).
49. See K. Nordenstreng and H. I. Schiller (eds.), National Sovereignty and International Communication (Princeton, 1979); C. J. Hamelink, Cultural Autonomy in Global Communications (New York, 1983); and John Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction (Baltimore, 1991).
50. See K. Nordenstreng and H. I. Schiller (eds.), National Sovereignty and International Communication (Princeton, 1979); C. J. Hamelink, Cultural Autonomy in Global Communications (New York, 1983); and John Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction (Baltimore, 1991).
51. See K. Nordenstreng and H. I. Schiller (eds.), National Sovereignty and International Communication (Princeton, 1979); C. J. Hamelink, Cultural Autonomy in Global Communications (New York, 1983); and John Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction (Baltimore, 1991).
52. Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York, 1963); Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, 1966).
53. Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York, 1963); Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, 1966).
54. Walker Connor, 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?', World Politics, 24 (April 1972), pp. 319-55.
55. Donald J. Puchala, 'Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations', in Richard L. Merritt and Bruce M. Russett (eds.), From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honour of Karl W. Deutsch (London, 1981), pp. 145-64.
56. Joshua Meyrowitz, No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behaviour (New York, 1985), p. 15.
57. Ruth Finnegan, Literacy and Orality: Studies in the Technology of Communication (London, 1988).
58. In addition to other works cited in this study, see especially Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy (Toronto, 1962), and Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York, 1964).
59. In addition to other works cited in this study, see especially Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy (Toronto, 1962), and Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York, 1964).
60. See especially Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London, 1982).
61. Heyer attributes the formulation of this distinction to James Carey. See Heyer, Communications and History, p. 126.
62. Harold Innis, Empire and Communications (Toronto, 1986; originally published Oxford, 1950). See also Innis, Bias of Communications. The following overview of Innis is indebted to Heyer's informative overview in Communications and History.
63. Harold Innis, Empire and Communications (Toronto, 1986; originally published Oxford, 1950). See also Innis, Bias of Communications. The following overview of Innis is indebted to Heyer's informative overview in Communications and History.
64. Heyer, Communications and History, p. 115.
65. Innis, Bias of Communications, p. 33.
66. See especially James W. Carey, 'McLuhan and Mumford: The Roots of Modern Media Analysis', Journal of Communication, 31 (Summer 1981).
67. See Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, The Social Construction of Technological Systems (Cambridge, MA, 1989).
68. Innis, Bias of Communications, p. 23.
69. My reading of evolutionary theory is derived mostly from the work of Stephen Jay Gould. See the series of collected essays beginning with Stephen Jay Gould, Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History (New York, 1977). My thanks to Darcy Cutler for help in formulating this analogy.
70. In other words, that modernity or capitalism did not arise in China or Korea as a result of the invention of printing does not falsify medium theory in any way. We would expect unique consequences depending on the social and historical context. That said, however, certain general 'universal' consequences have been observed across cultures as a result of the transition from primitive orality to writing. See Ong, Orality and Literacy; Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society (Cambridge, 1986), and The Interface Between the Written and the Oral (Cambridge, 1987).
71. In other words, that modernity or capitalism did not arise in China or Korea as a result of the invention of printing does not falsify medium theory in any way. We would expect unique consequences depending on the social and historical context. That said, however, certain general 'universal' consequences have been observed across cultures as a result of the transition from primitive orality to writing. See Ong, Orality and Literacy; Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society (Cambridge, 1986), and The Interface Between the Written and the Oral (Cambridge, 1987).
72. In other words, that modernity or capitalism did not arise in China or Korea as a result of the invention of printing does not falsify medium theory in any way. We would expect unique consequences depending on the social and historical context. That said, however, certain general 'universal' consequences have been observed across cultures as a result of the transition from primitive orality to writing. See Ong, Orality and Literacy; Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society (Cambridge, 1986), and The Interface Between the Written and the Oral (Cambridge, 1987).
73. Goody, Interface Between Written and Oral, p. 3.
74. Innis, Bias of Communications, p. 4.
75. Ruggie, 'Territoriality', p. 154.
76. See Mark Hepworth, Geography of the Information Economy (London, 1989).
77. Ruggie, 'Territoriality', p. 157.
78. See Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen (eds.), Historical Social Psychology (Princeton, 1984). 'Imagined communities' is taken from Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 1991).
79. See Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen (eds.), Historical Social Psychology (Princeton, 1984). 'Imagined communities' is taken from Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 1991).
80. Ruggie, 'Territoriality', p. 158.
81. See, for examples, Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York, 1936); Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York, 1967). For an application of social constructivism to international relations, see Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.
82. See, for examples, Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York, 1936); Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York, 1967). For an application of social constructivism to international relations, see Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.
83. See, for examples, Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York, 1936); Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York, 1967). For an application of social constructivism to international relations, see Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.
84. Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (London, 1934).
85. Ibid., p. 15.
86. Ibid., p. 17.
87. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973).
88. This practice of unearthing unconscious boundaries and biases of thought is most often associated with the early work of Foucault. See especially Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York, 1970), and The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New York, 1972).
89. This practice of unearthing unconscious boundaries and biases of thought is most often associated with the early work of Foucault. See especially Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York, 1970), and The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New York, 1972).
90. Robert Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', International Studies Quarterly, 32 (1988), pp. 379-96.
91. Robert Cox, 'Social Forces, States, and World Order', in Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York, 1986), p. 210.
92. Ernest Gellner, Plough, Sword, and Book: The Structure of Human History (Chicago, 1988), p. 12.
93. As Adler puts it, the main components of the international system are treated as if 'suspended in space'. See Emanuel Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress', in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York, 1993), pp. 43-88. For similar views on the ahistorical tendencies of neorealism and neoliberalism, see Wendt, 'Anarchy', pp. 391-6; and Richard K. Ashley, 'Three Modes of Economism', International Studies Quarterly, 27 (1983) Cf. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston, 1979).
94. As Adler puts it, the main components of the international system are treated as if 'suspended in space'. See Emanuel Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress', in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York, 1993), pp. 43-88. For similar views on the ahistorical tendencies of neorealism and neoliberalism, see Wendt, 'Anarchy', pp. 391-6; and Richard K. Ashley, 'Three Modes of Economism', International Studies Quarterly, 27 (1983) Cf. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston, 1979).
95. As Adler puts it, the main components of the international system are treated as if 'suspended in space'. See Emanuel Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress', in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York, 1993), pp. 43-88. For similar views on the ahistorical tendencies of neorealism and neoliberalism, see Wendt, 'Anarchy', pp. 391-6; and Richard K. Ashley, 'Three Modes of Economism', International Studies Quarterly, 27 (1983) Cf. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston, 1979).
96. As Adler puts it, the main components of the international system are treated as if 'suspended in space'. See Emanuel Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress', in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York, 1993), pp. 43-88. For similar views on the ahistorical tendencies of neorealism and neoliberalism, see Wendt, 'Anarchy', pp. 391-6; and Richard K. Ashley, 'Three Modes of Economism', International Studies Quarterly, 27 (1983) Cf. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston, 1979).
97. My formulation of 'ecological holism' is derived mostly from the work of the French Annales school of medieval historians, including Fernand Braudel, Marc Bloch, and more recently Jacques Le Goff. Apart from other works cited in this paper, see especially Fernand Braudel, On History (tr. Sarah Matthews; Chicago, 1980); and Jacques Le Goff, The Medieval Imagination (tr. Arthur Goldhammer; Chicago, 1985).
98. My formulation of 'ecological holism' is derived mostly from the work of the French Annales school of medieval historians, including Fernand Braudel, Marc Bloch, and more recently Jacques Le Goff. Apart from other works cited in this paper, see especially Fernand Braudel, On History (tr. Sarah Matthews; Chicago, 1980); and Jacques Le Goff, The Medieval Imagination (tr. Arthur Goldhammer; Chicago, 1985).
99. On p. 152 of 'Territoriality', Ruggie states the basic ecological holist position that 'material environments strategic behaviour, and social epistemology' are 'irreducible to one another'. See also John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in World Politics: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis, in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism; and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method', in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, 1989). Other examples might include Ernst Haas, 'Words Can Hurt You; or Who Said What to Whom about Regimes' in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983); Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution'; Cox Social Forces, States, and World Order'; and Daniel Deudney's ongoing reconstruction of geopolitical theories, in Pax Atomica; Pl anetary Geopolitics and Republicanism (forthcoming 1995) and 'Bringing Nature Back In: Concepts, Problems, and Trends in Physiopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse', in Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew (eds.), Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics (New York, 1995). While ecological holism shares an obvious commonality with the constructivist theories of Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil and others insofar as both focus on the historical malleability of interests, identities, and institutions, it differs from these approaches by recognizing the full extent to which environmental and technological factors also play a part in shaping human societies. Cf. Wendt, 'Anarchy'; and Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge, 1989). In a footnote (p. 398 in 27), Wendt concedes that some constructivist approaches may be 'oversocialized' when dealing with 'presocial but non determining human needs', but he goes no further in elaborating if and when other 'material' factors beyond neurophysiological traits, like climate or population, would enter into the picture. Of course, the differences between ecological holism and social constructivism are minimal compared to the similarities, especially in contrast to mainstream rationalist approaches, which treat identities and interests as relatively fixed.
100. On p. 152 of 'Territoriality', Ruggie states the basic ecological holist position that 'material environments strategic behaviour, and social epistemology' are 'irreducible to one another'. See also John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in World Politics: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis, in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism; and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method', in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, 1989). Other examples might include Ernst Haas, 'Words Can Hurt You; or Who Said What to Whom about Regimes' in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983); Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution'; Cox Social Forces, States, and World Order'; and Daniel Deudney's ongoing reconstruction of geopolitical theories, in Pax Atomica; Pl anetary Geopolitics and Republicanism (forthcoming 1995) and 'Bringing Nature Back In: Concepts, Problems, and Trends in Physiopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse', in Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew (eds.), Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics (New York, 1995). While ecological holism shares an obvious commonality with the constructivist theories of Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil and others insofar as both focus on the historical malleability of interests, identities, and institutions, it differs from these approaches by recognizing the full extent to which environmental and technological factors also play a part in shaping human societies. Cf. Wendt, 'Anarchy'; and Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge, 1989). In a footnote (p. 398 in 27), Wendt concedes that some constructivist approaches may be 'oversocialized' when dealing with 'presocial but non determining human needs', but he goes no further in elaborating if and when other 'material' factors beyond neurophysiological traits, like climate or population, would enter into the picture. Of course, the differences between ecological holism and social constructivism are minimal compared to the similarities, especially in contrast to mainstream rationalist approaches, which treat identities and interests as relatively fixed.
101. On p. 152 of 'Territoriality', Ruggie states the basic ecological holist position that 'material environments strategic behaviour, and social epistemology' are 'irreducible to one another'. See also John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in World Politics: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis, in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism; and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method', in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, 1989). Other examples might include Ernst Haas, 'Words Can Hurt You; or Who Said What to Whom about Regimes' in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983); Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution'; Cox Social Forces, States, and World Order'; and Daniel Deudney's ongoing reconstruction of geopolitical theories, in Pax Atomica; Pl anetary Geopolitics and Republicanism (forthcoming 1995) and 'Bringing Nature Back In: Concepts, Problems, and Trends in Physiopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse', in Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew (eds.), Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics (New York, 1995). While ecological holism shares an obvious commonality with the constructivist theories of Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil and others insofar as both focus on the historical malleability of interests, identities, and institutions, it differs from these approaches by recognizing the full extent to which environmental and technological factors also play a part in shaping human societies. Cf. Wendt, 'Anarchy'; and Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge, 1989). In a footnote (p. 398 in 27), Wendt concedes that some constructivist approaches may be 'oversocialized' when dealing with 'presocial but non determining human needs', but he goes no further in elaborating if and when other 'material' factors beyond neurophysiological traits, like climate or population, would enter into the picture. Of course, the differences between ecological holism and social constructivism are minimal compared to the similarities, especially in contrast to mainstream rationalist approaches, which treat identities and interests as relatively fixed.
102. On p. 152 of 'Territoriality', Ruggie states the basic ecological holist position that 'material environments strategic behaviour, and social epistemology' are 'irreducible to one another'. See also John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in World Politics: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis, in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism; and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method', in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, 1989). Other examples might include Ernst Haas, 'Words Can Hurt You; or Who Said What to Whom about Regimes' in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983); Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution'; Cox Social Forces, States, and World Order'; and Daniel Deudney's ongoing reconstruction of geopolitical theories, in Pax Atomica; Pl anetary Geopolitics and Republicanism (forthcoming 1995) and 'Bringing Nature Back In: Concepts, Problems, and Trends in Physiopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse', in Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew (eds.), Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics (New York, 1995). While ecological holism shares an obvious commonality with the constructivist theories of Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil and others insofar as both focus on the historical malleability of interests, identities, and institutions, it differs from these approaches by recognizing the full extent to which environmental and technological factors also play a part in shaping human societies. Cf. Wendt, 'Anarchy'; and Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge, 1989). In a footnote (p. 398 in 27), Wendt concedes that some constructivist approaches may be 'oversocialized' when dealing with 'presocial but non determining human needs', but he goes no further in elaborating if and when other 'material' factors beyond neurophysiological traits, like climate or population, would enter into the picture. Of course, the differences between ecological holism and social constructivism are minimal compared to the similarities, especially in contrast to mainstream rationalist approaches, which treat identities and interests as relatively fixed.
103. On p. 152 of 'Territoriality', Ruggie states the basic ecological holist position that 'material environments strategic behaviour, and social epistemology' are 'irreducible to one another'. See also John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in World Politics: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis, in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism; and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method', in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, 1989). Other examples might include Ernst Haas, 'Words Can Hurt You; or Who Said What to Whom about Regimes' in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983); Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution'; Cox Social Forces, States, and World Order'; and Daniel Deudney's ongoing reconstruction of geopolitical theories, in Pax Atomica; Pl anetary Geopolitics and Republicanism (forthcoming 1995) and 'Bringing Nature Back In: Concepts, Problems, and Trends in Physiopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse', in Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew (eds.), Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics (New York, 1995). While ecological holism shares an obvious commonality with the constructivist theories of Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil and others insofar as both focus on the historical malleability of interests, identities, and institutions, it differs from these approaches by recognizing the full extent to which environmental and technological factors also play a part in shaping human societies. Cf. Wendt, 'Anarchy'; and Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge, 1989). In a footnote (p. 398 in 27), Wendt concedes that some constructivist approaches may be 'oversocialized' when dealing with 'presocial but non determining human needs', but he goes no further in elaborating if and when other 'material' factors beyond neurophysiological traits, like climate or population, would enter into the picture. Of course, the differences between ecological holism and social constructivism are minimal compared to the similarities, especially in contrast to mainstream rationalist approaches, which treat identities and interests as relatively fixed.
104. On p. 152 of 'Territoriality', Ruggie states the basic ecological holist position that 'material environments strategic behaviour, and social epistemology' are 'irreducible to one another'. See also John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in World Politics: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis, in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism; and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method', in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, 1989). Other examples might include Ernst Haas, 'Words Can Hurt You; or Who Said What to Whom about Regimes' in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983); Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution'; Cox Social Forces, States, and World Order'; and Daniel Deudney's ongoing reconstruction of geopolitical theories, in Pax Atomica; Pl anetary Geopolitics and Republicanism (forthcoming 1995) and 'Bringing Nature Back In: Concepts, Problems, and Trends in Physiopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse', in Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew (eds.), Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics (New York, 1995). While ecological holism shares an obvious commonality with the constructivist theories of Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil and others insofar as both focus on the historical malleability of interests, identities, and institutions, it differs from these approaches by recognizing the full extent to which environmental and technological factors also play a part in shaping human societies. Cf. Wendt, 'Anarchy'; and Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge, 1989). In a footnote (p. 398 in 27), Wendt concedes that some constructivist approaches may be 'oversocialized' when dealing with 'presocial but non determining human needs', but he goes no further in elaborating if and when other 'material' factors beyond neurophysiological traits, like climate or population, would enter into the picture. Of course, the differences between ecological holism and social constructivism are minimal compared to the similarities, especially in contrast to mainstream rationalist approaches, which treat identities and interests as relatively fixed.
105. On p. 152 of 'Territoriality', Ruggie states the basic ecological holist position that 'material environments strategic behaviour, and social epistemology' are 'irreducible to one another'. See also John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in World Politics: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis, in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism; and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method', in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, 1989). Other examples might include Ernst Haas, 'Words Can Hurt You; or Who Said What to Whom about Regimes' in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983); Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution'; Cox Social Forces, States, and World Order'; and Daniel Deudney's ongoing reconstruction of geopolitical theories, in Pax Atomica; Pl anetary Geopolitics and Republicanism (forthcoming 1995) and 'Bringing Nature Back In: Concepts, Problems, and Trends in Physiopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse', in Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew (eds.), Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics (New York, 1995). While ecological holism shares an obvious commonality with the constructivist theories of Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil and others insofar as both focus on the historical malleability of interests, identities, and institutions, it differs from these approaches by recognizing the full extent to which environmental and technological factors also play a part in shaping human societies. Cf. Wendt, 'Anarchy'; and Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge, 1989). In a footnote (p. 398 in 27), Wendt concedes that some constructivist approaches may be 'oversocialized' when dealing with 'presocial but non determining human needs', but he goes no further in elaborating if and when other 'material' factors beyond neurophysiological traits, like climate or population, would enter into the picture. Of course, the differences between ecological holism and social constructivism are minimal compared to the similarities, especially in contrast to mainstream rationalist approaches, which treat identities and interests as relatively fixed.
106. On p. 152 of 'Territoriality', Ruggie states the basic ecological holist position that 'material environments strategic behaviour, and social epistemology' are 'irreducible to one another'. See also John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in World Politics: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis, in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism; and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method', in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, 1989). Other examples might include Ernst Haas, 'Words Can Hurt You; or Who Said What to Whom about Regimes' in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983); Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution'; Cox Social Forces, States, and World Order'; and Daniel Deudney's ongoing reconstruction of geopolitical theories, in Pax Atomica; Pl anetary Geopolitics and Republicanism (forthcoming 1995) and 'Bringing Nature Back In: Concepts, Problems, and Trends in Physiopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse', in Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew (eds.), Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics (New York, 1995). While ecological holism shares an obvious commonality with the constructivist theories of Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil and others insofar as both focus on the historical malleability of interests, identities, and institutions, it differs from these approaches by recognizing the full extent to which environmental and technological factors also play a part in shaping human societies. Cf. Wendt, 'Anarchy'; and Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge, 1989). In a footnote (p. 398 in 27), Wendt concedes that some constructivist approaches may be 'oversocialized' when dealing with 'presocial but non determining human needs', but he goes no further in elaborating if and when other 'material' factors beyond neurophysiological traits, like climate or population, would enter into the picture. Of course, the differences between ecological holism and social constructivism are minimal compared to the similarities, especially in contrast to mainstream rationalist approaches, which treat identities and interests as relatively fixed.
107. On p. 152 of 'Territoriality', Ruggie states the basic ecological holist position that 'material environments strategic behaviour, and social epistemology' are 'irreducible to one another'. See also John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in World Politics: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis, in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism; and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method', in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, 1989). Other examples might include Ernst Haas, 'Words Can Hurt You; or Who Said What to Whom about Regimes' in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983); Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution'; Cox Social Forces, States, and World Order'; and Daniel Deudney's ongoing reconstruction of geopolitical theories, in Pax Atomica; Pl anetary Geopolitics and Republicanism (forthcoming 1995) and 'Bringing Nature Back In: Concepts, Problems, and Trends in Physiopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse', in Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew (eds.), Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics (New York, 1995). While ecological holism shares an obvious commonality with the constructivist theories of Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil and others insofar as both focus on the historical malleability of interests, identities, and institutions, it differs from these approaches by recognizing the full extent to which environmental and technological factors also play a part in shaping human societies. Cf. Wendt, 'Anarchy'; and Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge, 1989). In a footnote (p. 398 in 27), Wendt concedes that some constructivist approaches may be 'oversocialized' when dealing with 'presocial but non determining human needs', but he goes no further in elaborating if and when other 'material' factors beyond neurophysiological traits, like climate or population, would enter into the picture. Of course, the differences between ecological holism and social constructivism are minimal compared to the similarities, especially in contrast to mainstream rationalist approaches, which treat identities and interests as relatively fixed.
108. This division does not imply temporal precedence of one over the other. In fact, the changes described here occur at different pulses and intervals, some evolving more slowly than others. Moreover, they are interdependent in the sense that changes in one sphere reinforce those in another.
109. It is common for international relations theorists to compare different 'worlds' across time which are, for the most part, geographically, politically, economically, and culturally bounded. For discussion of these themes, see Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (New York, 1992); Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford, 1984); Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester, 1977).
110. It is common for international relations theorists to compare different 'worlds' across time which are, for the most part, geographically, politically, economically, and culturally bounded. For discussion of these themes, see Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (New York, 1992); Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford, 1984); Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester, 1977).
111. It is common for international relations theorists to compare different 'worlds' across time which are, for the most part, geographically, politically, economically, and culturally bounded. For discussion of these themes, see Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (New York, 1992); Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford, 1984); Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester, 1977).
112. For various discussions, see Robert Cox, 'Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', in Rosenau and Otto-Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government; and Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York, 1977). See also the notes that follow.
113. For various discussions, see Robert Cox, 'Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', in Rosenau and Otto-Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government; and Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York, 1977). See also the notes that follow.
114. Robert Cox, 'Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for Europe', in Stephen Gill (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge, 1993), p. 259.
115. Ruggie, 'Territoriality', p. 152.
116. Umberto Eco, Travels in Hyper Reality (New York, 1983), p. 73.
117. Jacques Le Goff, Medieval Civilization (Oxford, 1988), p. 95.
118. Ibid., p. 137.
119. See Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, 1957).
120. Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London, 1955), pp. 19-20.
121. See Le Goff, Medieval Civilization, p. 96.
122. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 26.
123. See especially, Goody, Logic of Writing.
124. Gellner, Plough, Sword, and Book, p. 71.
125. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 14. This belief was more the case during the early Middle Ages, gradually becoming a contested site from the twelfth century onwards with the spread of literacy, as evidenced by the debate between nominalists and realists of the time. For a more thorough treatment of these issues, see Brian Stock, Listening for the Text: On the Uses of the Past (Baltimore, 1990).
126. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 14. This belief was more the case during the early Middle Ages, gradually becoming a contested site from the twelfth century onwards with the spread of literacy, as evidenced by the debate between nominalists and realists of the time. For a more thorough treatment of these issues, see Brian Stock, Listening for the Text: On the Uses of the Past (Baltimore, 1990).
127. A number of telling anecdotes which nicely illustrate the revered status of the 'Book' in the Middle Ages are provided by Marc Drogin in Biblioclasm: The Mythical Origins, Magic Powers, and Perishability of the Written Work (Princeton, 1989). For example, it was widely held among medieval Christians that the alphabet was a gift from God. In writing it out, it was customary to begin with a cross, 'because all knowledge began with God' (p. 24). Written words were also widely held to have quasi-magical powers, as evidenced by the herbal medicine called 'the holy salve', in which the person making the concoction is instructed to write the words, 'Matthew, Mark, Luke and John' (p. 38). There are also many cases in which the text itself is attributed metaphysical powers, as in the Crusader's practice of wearing a parchment scroll beneath the coat of mail to ensure protection.
128. Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 15-16.
129. For discussion, see Rosamond McKitterick, The Carolingians and the Written Word (New York, 1989), pp. 167-8.
130. See Norman Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Ages (New York, 1993) pp. 149-53; and Giovanni Miccoli, 'Monks', in Jacques Le Goff (ed.), Medieval Callings (Chicago, 1987), p. 43.
131. See Norman Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Ages (New York, 1993) pp. 149-53; and Giovanni Miccoli, 'Monks', in Jacques Le Goff (ed.), Medieval Callings (Chicago, 1987), p. 43.
132. Innis makes the connection between the rise of Islam and the cut-off of papyrus exports to the West. See Innis, Empires and Communications, p. 117.
133. Innis, Bias of Communications, p. 48.
134. Cantor, Civilization of the Middle Ages, p. 153. This is not to say that medieval monks did not transmit many important classical works; just that a form of censorship was involved in selecting which texts would be transmitted and which would not.
135. M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 1993),
136. Leonard M. Dudley, The Word and the Sword: How Technologies of
137. Cantor, Civilization of the Middle Ages, p. 153.
138. Georges Duby, 'The Diffusion of Cultural Patterns in Feudal Society', Past and Present, 39 (April 1968), p. 4.
139. See Brian Stock, The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton, 1993), pp. 35, 60-1.
140. Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, vol. 1 (Chicago, 1961), p. 80.
141. Ibid.
142. Initially, the Church was enthusiastic about the printing press, using it as a tool in its anti-Turkish polemics. As a reflection of this, it is somewhat ironic that the first dated printed product from Gutenberg's workshop was an indulgence. See Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformation in Early Modern Europe, vol. I (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 317, 375.
143. See Geoffrey Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy (London, 1968), pp. 194-5.
144. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 39.
145. Le Goff, Medieval Civilization, p. 148.
146. Lucien Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin, The Coming of the Book: The Impact of Printing, 1450-1800 (London, 1976), p. 288.
147. See Mark U. Edwards, Printing, Propaganda, and Martin Luther (Los Angeles, 1994).
148. This was evidenced by the fact that it was Rome which felt the need to formulate the Index Librorium Prohibitorum at the Council of Trent. It should be pointed out that the Church's opposition to print was by no means exclusive or permanent In fact, the word 'propaganda' has its origins in 1622 when a printing press was established in Rome primarily for that purpose. See Eisenstein, Printing Press, p. 326. By 1622, however, the monopoly over written information had long been breached.
149. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 40.
150. The way print facilitated scientific exchanges along these lines is thoroughly documented by Eisenstein, Printing Press, vol. II.
151. Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton, 1970). See also Clanchy, From Memory.
152. Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton, 1970). See also Clanchy, From Memory.
153. Strayer, On Medieval Origins, p. 13.
154. This was a fairly regular pattern in the Middle Ages, as evidenced by the dissolution of the Carolingian and Ottonian dynasties, for example. In Poggi's words, medieval political rule 'possessed an inherent tendency to shift the seat of effective power, the fulcrum of rule, downward toward the lower links in the chain of lord-vassal relations'. Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford, 1970), p. 26.
155. Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, 1986). See also David Buisseret (ed.), Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe (Chicago, 1992), for the use of printed maps by centralizing state monarchs in surveillance of territorial spaces; and Carmen Luke, Pedagogy, Printing and Protestantism: The Discourse on Childhood (New York, 1989), for the relationship between printing and standardized public education as a tool of the early modern 'disciplinary' state.
156. Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, 1986). See also David Buisseret (ed.), Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe (Chicago, 1992), for the use of printed maps by centralizing state monarchs in surveillance of territorial spaces; and Carmen Luke, Pedagogy, Printing and Protestantism: The Discourse on Childhood (New York, 1989), for the relationship between printing and standardized public education as a tool of the early modern 'disciplinary' state.
157. Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, 1986). See also David Buisseret (ed.), Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe (Chicago, 1992), for the use of printed maps by centralizing state monarchs in surveillance of territorial spaces; and Carmen Luke, Pedagogy, Printing and Protestantism: The Discourse on Childhood (New York, 1989), for the relationship between printing and standardized public education as a tool of the early modern 'disciplinary' state.
158. Noteworthy in this respect is Clanchy's thesis that expanding literacy and the increased secular use of writing in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in England was a consequence of centralized governance and bureaucratic growth: 'that lay literacy grew out of bureaucracy'. Clanchy, From Memory, p. 19. Here, Clanchy reminds us that social forces in favour of bureaucratization had emerged prior to printing, indeed, may have been at least partially responsible for its emergence.
159. See Wallerstein, Modern World System.
160. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 144. It is no coincidence that certain defining features of capitalism - the multinational corporation and the stock exchange, to name but two - were developed in the United Provinces of the Netherlands, a region which, unlike the south of Europe during the same period, had energetically encouraged widespread dissemination of print and literacy among the populace. See Dudley, Word and Sword, pp. 139-79.
161. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 144. It is no coincidence that certain defining features of capitalism - the multinational corporation and the stock exchange, to name but two - were developed in the United Provinces of the Netherlands, a region which, unlike the south of Europe during the same period, had energetically encouraged widespread dissemination of print and literacy among the populace. See Dudley, Word and Sword, pp. 139-79.
162. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York, 1933).
163. See David Kaufer and Kathleen M. Carley, Communication at a Distance: The Influence of Print on Socio-cultural Organization and Change (Princeton, 1993), p. 5; Goody, Logic of Writing; and Clanchy From Memory, p. 263. For the use of printed newspapers in facilitating early modern commercial transactions, see John J. McCusker and Cora Gravesteijn, The Beginnings of Commercial and Financial Journalism: The Commodity Price Currents, Exchange Rate Currents, and Money Currents of Early Modern Europe (Amsterdam, 1991).
164. See David Kaufer and Kathleen M. Carley, Communication at a Distance: The Influence of Print on Socio-cultural Organization and Change (Princeton, 1993), p. 5; Goody, Logic of Writing; and Clanchy From Memory, p. 263. For the use of printed newspapers in facilitating early modern commercial transactions, see John J. McCusker and Cora Gravesteijn, The Beginnings of Commercial and Financial Journalism: The Commodity Price Currents, Exchange Rate Currents, and Money Currents of Early Modern Europe (Amsterdam, 1991).
165. See David Kaufer and Kathleen M. Carley, Communication at a Distance: The Influence of Print on Socio-cultural Organization and Change (Princeton, 1993), p. 5; Goody, Logic of Writing; and Clanchy From Memory, p. 263. For the use of printed newspapers in facilitating early modern commercial transactions, see John J. McCusker and Cora Gravesteijn, The Beginnings of Commercial and Financial Journalism: The Commodity Price Currents, Exchange Rate Currents, and Money Currents of Early Modern Europe (Amsterdam, 1991).
166. See David Kaufer and Kathleen M. Carley, Communication at a Distance: The Influence of Print on Socio-cultural Organization and Change (Princeton, 1993), p. 5; Goody, Logic of Writing; and Clanchy From Memory, p. 263. For the use of printed newspapers in facilitating early modern commercial transactions, see John J. McCusker and Cora Gravesteijn, The Beginnings of Commercial and Financial Journalism: The Commodity Price Currents, Exchange Rate Currents, and Money Currents of Early Modern Europe (Amsterdam, 1991).
167. See Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974); Michael Mann, Sources of Social Power, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1986); and Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge, 1990).
168. See Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974); Michael Mann, Sources of Social Power, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1986); and Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge, 1990).
169. See Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974); Michael Mann, Sources of Social Power, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1986); and Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge, 1990).
170. Ruggie, 'Territoriality', p. 157.
171. Louis Dumont, Essays in Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective (Chicago, 1986), p. 62.
172. Ibid., p. 23.
173. See Jacques Le Goff, Intellectuals in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1993).
174. John Lyon, The Invention of the Self: The Hinge of Consciousness in the Eighteenth Century (Carbondale, 1978), p. 37.
175. Richard K. Ashley, 'Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 17 (1988), p. 230.
176. Dumont, Essays in Individualism, p. 73.
177. As quoted ibid., pp. 74-5.
178. Lyon, Invention of the Self, p. 67.
179. Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 133.
180. Ibid., p. 131.
181. Henry John Chaytor, From Script to Print: An Introduction to Medieval Vernaculars (London, 1945), p. 1.
182. Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 131.
183. Febvre and Martin, Coming of the Book, p. 261.
184. Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 133.
185. For an extensive discussion, see Roger Chartier, 'The Practical Impact of Print', in Philippe Aries and Georges Duby (eds.), A History of Private Life, vol. III (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 111-59.
186. Ibid., p. 125.
187. Finnegan, Literacy and Orality, p. 28.
188. Chartier, 'Practical Impact of Print', p. 111.
189. Ruggie, 'Territoriality', p. 158.
190. For discussion, see Orest Ranum, 'The Refuges of Intimacy', and Jean Marie Goulemot, 'Literary Practices: Publicizing the Private', both in Aries and Duby (eds.), History of Private Life.
191. For discussion, see Orest Ranum, 'The Refuges of Intimacy', and Jean Marie Goulemot, 'Literary Practices: Publicizing the Private', both in Aries and Duby (eds.), History of Private Life.
192. Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 131.
193. Ruggie, 'Territoriality', p. 159.
194. Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, p. 241.
195. Edward W. Soja, The Political Organization of Space, Resource Paper No. 8, Association of American Geographers (Washington, 1971), p. 9.
196. R. B. J. Walker, Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge, 1993), p. 129.
197. Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, p. 245.
198. McLuhan, Understanding Media, p. 157.
199. Donald Lowe, A History of Bourgeois Perception (Chicago, 1982), p. 26.
200. Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Message (New York, 1967), p. 49.
201. Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 127.
202. For a discussion, see Bernard Guenee, States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe (Oxford, 1985), pp. 50-65.
203. Chaytor, From Script, p. 22.
204. Febvre and Martin, Coming of the Book, p. 319.
205. Chaytor, From Script, p. 34.
206. Febvre and Martin, Coming of the Book, p. 319.
207. Chaytor, From Script, p. 45.
208. Ibid., p. 46.
209. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 46.
210. Ibid., p. 26.
211. McLuhan, Gutenberg Galaxy, p. 260.