The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927: The British Preparation for the Conference, December 1926 to June 1927

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 104-121

  Kuramatsu, Tadashi ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030549674     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402399608437628     Document Type: Article

References (91)

1. D. Carlton, 'Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927', Political Science Qtly 83/4 (Dec. 1968) p.573. One of the Cabinet ministers at the time wrote of the Conference in his memoir that it marked 'the bankruptcy of diplomacy'. E. Percy, Some Memories (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode 1958) p. 142.
2. D. Carlton, 'Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927', Political Science Qtly 83/4 (Dec. 1968) p.573. One of the Cabinet ministers at the time wrote of the Conference in his memoir that it marked 'the bankruptcy of diplomacy'. E. Percy, Some Memories (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode 1958) p. 142.
3. Carlton, pp.573-98; S. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars Vol.I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929 (London: Collins 1968) pp.498-516; B. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929: Attitudes and Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1984) pp.65-76; D. Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (London: Pinter 1989) pp.119-39. On the other side of the Atlantic, there are several PhD theses bearing 'the Geneva Conference' in their titles including the most detailed of all, W. Trimble, 'The United States Navy and the Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, 1927' [unpub. PhD Thesis] (U. of Colorado 1974). For a more recent study of the Conference see, R. Fanning, 'The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarray' in B. McKercher (ed.) Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-1939 (Westport, CT: Praeger 1992) pp.105-28. On the Japanese side, see S. Asada, 'From Washington to London, 1921-1930' in E. Goldstein and J. Maurer (eds.) The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (London: Frank Cass 1994) pp. 147-91.
4. Carlton, pp.573-98; S. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars Vol.I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929 (London: Collins 1968) pp.498-516; B. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929: Attitudes and Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1984) pp.65-76; D. Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (London: Pinter 1989) pp.119-39. On the other side of the Atlantic, there are several PhD theses bearing 'the Geneva Conference' in their titles including the most detailed of all, W. Trimble, 'The United States Navy and the Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, 1927' [unpub. PhD Thesis] (U. of Colorado 1974). For a more recent study of the Conference see, R. Fanning, 'The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarray' in B. McKercher (ed.) Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-1939 (Westport, CT: Praeger 1992) pp.105-28. On the Japanese side, see S. Asada, 'From Washington to London, 1921-1930' in E. Goldstein and J. Maurer (eds.) The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (London: Frank Cass 1994) pp. 147-91.
5. Carlton, pp.573-98; S. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars Vol.I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929 (London: Collins 1968) pp.498-516; B. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929: Attitudes and Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1984) pp.65-76; D. Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (London: Pinter 1989) pp.119-39. On the other side of the Atlantic, there are several PhD theses bearing 'the Geneva Conference' in their titles including the most detailed of all, W. Trimble, 'The United States Navy and the Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, 1927' [unpub. PhD Thesis] (U. of Colorado 1974). For a more recent study of the Conference see, R. Fanning, 'The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarray' in B. McKercher (ed.) Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-1939 (Westport, CT: Praeger 1992) pp.105-28. On the Japanese side, see S. Asada, 'From Washington to London, 1921-1930' in E. Goldstein and J. Maurer (eds.) The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (London: Frank Cass 1994) pp. 147-91.
6. Carlton, pp.573-98; S. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars Vol.I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929 (London: Collins 1968) pp.498-516; B. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929: Attitudes and Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1984) pp.65-76; D. Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (London: Pinter 1989) pp.119-39. On the other side of the Atlantic, there are several PhD theses bearing 'the Geneva Conference' in their titles including the most detailed of all, W. Trimble, 'The United States Navy and the Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, 1927' [unpub. PhD Thesis] (U. of Colorado 1974). For a more recent study of the Conference see, R. Fanning, 'The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarray' in B. McKercher (ed.) Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-1939 (Westport, CT: Praeger 1992) pp.105-28. On the Japanese side, see S. Asada, 'From Washington to London, 1921-1930' in E. Goldstein and J. Maurer (eds.) The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (London: Frank Cass 1994) pp. 147-91.
7. Carlton, pp.573-98; S. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars Vol.I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929 (London: Collins 1968) pp.498-516; B. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929: Attitudes and Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1984) pp.65-76; D. Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (London: Pinter 1989) pp.119-39. On the other side of the Atlantic, there are several PhD theses bearing 'the Geneva Conference' in their titles including the most detailed of all, W. Trimble, 'The United States Navy and the Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, 1927' [unpub. PhD Thesis] (U. of Colorado 1974). For a more recent study of the Conference see, R. Fanning, 'The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarray' in B. McKercher (ed.) Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-1939 (Westport, CT: Praeger 1992) pp.105-28. On the Japanese side, see S. Asada, 'From Washington to London, 1921-1930' in E. Goldstein and J. Maurer (eds.) The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (London: Frank Cass 1994) pp. 147-91.
8. Carlton, pp.573-98; S. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars Vol.I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929 (London: Collins 1968) pp.498-516; B. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929: Attitudes and Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1984) pp.65-76; D. Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (London: Pinter 1989) pp.119-39. On the other side of the Atlantic, there are several PhD theses bearing 'the Geneva Conference' in their titles including the most detailed of all, W. Trimble, 'The United States Navy and the Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, 1927' [unpub. PhD Thesis] (U. of Colorado 1974). For a more recent study of the Conference see, R. Fanning, 'The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarray' in B. McKercher (ed.) Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-1939 (Westport, CT: Praeger 1992) pp.105-28. On the Japanese side, see S. Asada, 'From Washington to London, 1921-1930' in E. Goldstein and J. Maurer (eds.) The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (London: Frank Cass 1994) pp. 147-91.
9. Hugh Gibson, a US rep. at Geneva and who drafted Coolidge's invitation, even 'hinted disapproval' of the British 'for having made so much of the Coolidge Conference'. Cecil to Chamberlain, 12 April 1927, Austen Chamberlain Papers, Birmingham U. Library, (hereafter, AC) 54/78.
10. M.03056/26: Classification and Limitations of Warships, 21 Dec. 1926, ADM1/8699/118. Admiralty Papers, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), Kew.
11. Cf. ADM1/8683/131: Naval Disarmament Conference and ADM116/2311: Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation 1926.
12. Beatty's handwritten comment, 29 Dec. 1926, M.03056/26, ADM1/8699/118.
13. Memo by the Sea Lords for consideration by the Board, 24 Jan. 1927, ADM167/ 76/2286.
14. A foreword to the Memo to the Board, 24 Jan. 1927, Ibid.
15. A foreword to the Memo to the Board, 24 Jan. 1927, Ibid.
16. Board Minutes, 27 Jan. 1927, ADM 167/75/2286. The present author's emphasis.
17. Because 'it is of the utmost importance that no leakage should take place . . . so at present there is only one copy issued'. Bridgeman to Cecil, 8 Feb. 1927, Cecil Papers, British Library, (hereafter, CP) MS51098.
18. Chamberlain to Cecil, 3 Feb. 1927 and Cecil to Baldwin, 4 Feb. 1927, Baldwin Papers, Cambridge U. Library, 130. See also, Bridgeman to M. C. Bridgeman [his mother], 24 Feb. 1927, P. Williamson (ed.), The Modernisation of Conservative Politics: The Diaries and Utters of William Bridgeman 1904-1935 (London: Historians' Press 1988) p.203.
19. The invitations were already despatched to the respective embassies on 3 Feb. 1927; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter, FRUS) 1927 Vol.I, pp.1-5.
20. The meeting also included Earl Balfour, the Lord President of the Council, and Leo Amery, the Sec. of State for Colonies and Dominion Affairs; Cabinet Conclusions, 10(27)1 of 16 Feb. 1927, CAB23/54, Cabinet Papers, PRO, Kew.
21. A typescript of note by Cecil on Coolidge's proposal, 14 Feb. 1927, CP, MS51121. Cecil prepared this note for the meeting and arranged for it to be circulated beforehand to the PM, Chamberlain, Churchill and Bridgeman; B.C. Henty [private sec. to Cecil] to N. Leslie [Asst Sec. to CID], 14 Feb. 1927 and T. Jones [Dep. Sec. to CID] to Henty, 15 Feb. 1927, CP, MS51098.
22. Minutes of the 15th Meeting of CID Sub-Committee, 11 Feb. 1927, CAB16/72. This meeting was held despite of Bridgeman's request to postpone it until the decision by Cabinet ministers on the Admiralty proposal. Bridgeman to Cecil, 8 Feb. 1927 and Cecil to Bridgeman, 9 Feb. 1927, CP, MS51098.
23. Memo by A. Cadogan, 11 Feb. 1927, W1052/61/98, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (hereafter, DBFP), Ser.IA Vol.III (London: HMSO 1970) pp.566-8.
24. Note by Villiers, 12 Feb. 1927, W1088/61/98, FO371/12660, Foreign Office Papers, PRO, Kew.
25. Memo by R.H. Campbell, 12 Feb. 1927, W1052/61/98, DBFP, Ser.IA Vol.III, pp.568-71.
26. Note by A. Chamberlain, 14 Feb. 1927, W1052/61/98, FO371/12660.
27. When US Adm. Hilary P. Jones visited in London in March 1927, Bridgeman suggested London for the possible location of the Conference. At the same meeting Jones 'was somewhat surprised' that Bridgeman and Field were 'apparently very keen on having a conference'; Jones to Wilbur [US Sec. of Navy], 9 March 1927, Box 11, Disarmament Series, Records of the General Board, Record Group 80, National Archives, Washington DC (hereafter RG80). Leo Amery, also recorded in his diary that 'Willie [Bridgeman] . . . [was] anxious to get away from it [the Geneva disarmament conference] and suggesting its transfer to London.' J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.) The Leo Amery Diaries Vol.I: 1896-1929 (London: Hutchinson 1980) p.499.
28. Barnes and Nicholson, p.496.
29. Winston Churchill, who later played a major part in breaking up the Conference by refusing any concession to the Americans, at this stage did not oppose the Disarmament Conference itself. He rather welcomed the Admiralty's proposal temporarily to postpone the 1927 programme of three cruisers due to begin in Feb. 1927 in conjunction with convening the Conference; See, M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill Vol.V Companion Part I Documents: The Exchequer Years 1922-1929 (London: Heinemann 1979) pp.935-7.
30. Cabinet Conclusions, 10(27)1 of 16 Feb. 1927, CAB23/54. In the last paragraph it was added to accommodate Cecil that 'the relationship of such a Conference to the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva would require careful adjustment'.
31. Bridgeman inquired the US Ambassador in London Alanson B. Houghton whether 'the President had in mind a conference open for free discussion' and stated that 'it was essential'. Houghton to Kellogg, 24 Feb. 1927, FRUS, 1927 Vol.I, pp.20-1. The present author's emphasis.
32. Cabinet Conclusions, 10(27)1 of 16 Feb. 1927, CAB23/54. Later in view of urgency it was decided to give the proposed reply to the US without waiting until all Dominion replies were received. See Lord Birkenhead [Sec. of State for India] to Lord Irwin [Viceroy of India], 3 Mar. 1927, No.83, Halifax Collection, India Office Library, MS Eur C152/8.
33. A. Chamberlain to Howard, 19 Feb. 1927, W1303/61/98, FO371/12660. Eventually Chamberlain handed a reply to Houghton, US Ambassador in London, on 25 Feb. intimating it should be kept confidential until 28 Feb. when Chamberlain read it in the House of Commons; W1581/61/98, FO371/12661; FRUS, 1927 Vol.I, pp.22-3.
34. Percy (note 1) p. 142.
35. Richardson (note 2) p. 121.; McKercher (note 2) p.62. Their interpretation of the event, in which the refusal of France and Italy to accept the invitation was 'less than favourable' to the British government who were seeking 'a possible means of escape' was unfounded, since it was decided to accept the invitation before France and Italy replied.
36. Richardson (note 2) p. 121.; McKercher (note 2) p.62. Their interpretation of the event, in which the refusal of France and Italy to accept the invitation was 'less than favourable' to the British government who were seeking 'a possible means of escape' was unfounded, since it was decided to accept the invitation before France and Italy replied.
37. K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld 1969) p.369. Although this book's account of the Geneva Conference is full of factual mistakes and misinterpretation, they are at least right on this point.
38. French reply to the Coolidge proposal, 15 Feb. 1927, FRUS, 1927 Vol.I, pp. 10-3; Italian reply, 21 Feb. 1927, Ibid., pp. 14-6.
39. French reply to the Coolidge proposal, 15 Feb. 1927, FRUS, 1927 Vol.I, pp. 10-3; Italian reply, 21 Feb. 1927, Ibid., pp. 14-6.
40. Japan accepted the invitation on 19 Feb, and she suggested that the meeting should take place on a date not earlier than 1 June; Ibid., pp. 13-4.
41. Japan accepted the invitation on 19 Feb, and she suggested that the meeting should take place on a date not earlier than 1 June; Ibid., pp. 13-4.
42. A. Chamberlain was in Geneva attending the League meeting.
43. Cecil, still keen to preserve the League scheme of general disarmament, added to this draft that the discussions of the Preparatory Commission must continue in order that we may see 'how if possible that conference can be fitted in to the larger question of disarmament'. Draft by Bridgeman and Cecil, 8 Mar. 1927, W1871/61/98, FO371/12661. This draft is also in DBFP incorporated in a telegram to Washington, but the editors wrongly attribute its handwriting to Baldwin instead of Bridgeman. This is apparent from the fact that the covering letter to the Foreign Office attached to it was written and signed by Baldwin and its handwriting is different from the one in the draft. See DBFP, Ser.IA Vol.III, p.581, No.345 n.3.
44. Memo by the Plans Div. 13 Feb. 1925, PD02164/25, ADM1/8683/131. The emphasis is original.
45. Cabinet Conclusions, 48(26)2 of 28 July 1926, CAB23/53.
46. The fact that the answer was drafted by Bridgeman and circulated only to Baldwin and Cecil without Cabinet discussion meant that there was no doubt about British participation in the Conference regardless of the participation of France and Italy. See n.28. The only previous occasion on which the issue of a possible three-power conference was raised was when Bridgeman suggested at the CID 'that a Conference between America, Japan and England should take place in London' in case France and Italy refused to take part. CID Minutes, 222nd Meeting, 4 March 1927, CAB2/5.
47. At the Conference France was represented by an 'informateur' and Italy by an 'observer.' For the character of 'informateur', see, A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1927 (London: Oxford UP 1929) p.39 n.1.
48. FRUS, 1927 Vol.I, p.4.
49. Barnes and Nicholson (note 20), p.503. For Villiers's account of this meeting, see W3040/ 61/98, FO371/12664. The telegram is in DBFP, Ser.IA Vol.III, pp.588-9.
50. Howard to A. Chamberlain, 6 April 1927, W3123/61/98, FO371/12665.
51. Cecil to A. Chamberlain, 12 April 1927, AC54/78. In his PhD thesis. Brode argues that Coolidge quickly lost interest in the Conference when it changed its character from what he originally intended, and thus allowed naval people to dominate during the Conference; M. Brode, 'Anglo-American Relations and the Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927' [unpub. PhD Thesis] (U. of Alberta 1972) pp.62, 113-14.
52. The session lasted from 21 March to 26 April 1927.
53. Even when the Draft was approved at the CID, 'very few of us really lik[ed] it though in the end we sanctioned the draft . . . but with some hope that nothing would come of it all.' Barnes and Nicholson (note 20) p.499.
54. Cecil went so far as to ask Adm. Aubrey Smith, the representative of the Admiralty at the League, 'not to send to the Admiralty any expression of opinion without first showing it to me'. Cecil to Aubrey Smith, 9 April 1927, CP, MS51099.
55. Minute by the Admiralty, [nd], 1927, W3235/61/98, FO371/12665.
56. Salisbury to Cecil, 16 April 1927, CP, MS51086.
57. Cecil to Baldwin, 6 April 1927, Baldwin Papers 130. This can be seen as a precursor of his resignation after the Geneva Conference.
58. S. Ball (ed.), Parliament and Politics in the Age of Baldwin and Macdonald: Diaries of Sir Cuthbert Headlam, 1924-35 (London: Historians' Press 1992) p. 126.
59. A foreword to the memo to the Board, 24 Jan. 1927, ADM167/76/2286.
60. Barnes and Nicholson (note 20) p.499.
61. Note by Egerton, 8 April 1927, M.01052/27, ADM1/8715/188. The emphasis is original.
62. Unsigned minute, ibid.
63. Ibid., Note by Bridgeman, 14 & 21 April 1927. According to Gregory's account of the conversation, it was Bridgeman who 'thought that it would be a great mistake to disclose our intentions beforehand, as it would give the Japanese and Americans time to get up their case before it was convenient to us'. For this tactics, Chamberlain commented that 'prima facié I agree.' Minute by Gregory and note by Chamberlain, 21 April 1927, W3670/61/98, FO371/12666.
64. Signed by three Naval Staffs, 6 May 1927, M.01052/27, ADM 1/8715/188. Pound succeeded Dreyer in April 1927.
65. Bridgeman to A. Chamberlain, 3 June 1927, AC54/54. Chamberlain replied negatively.
66. Handwritten comment by Bridgeman, 25 and 26 April 1927, M.01510/27, ADM1/ 8715/188.
67. Cecil to Noel-Baker, 29 Aug. 1927, NBKR9/89, Noel-Baker Papers, Churchill Archives Centre. Copy of the letter is in CP, MS51106. However, Cecil himself did not object to these tactics. See n.50.
68. Note by Egerton, 17 Feb. 1927, PD02773/27, ADM1 16/3371.
69. Memo by the Naval Staff, CID 808-B, 14 April 1927, CAB4/16.
70. Handwritten comment by Beatty, 19 March 1927, PD02807/27, ADMI 16/3371.
71. When the memo was first submitted to the Sea Lords, the numbers reached by the calculation were 79 (of which 54 were for trade defence) for the British Empire, 50 (25 for trade defence) for the US and 22 (7 for trade defence) for Japan. Subsequently the numbers were rounded down to give 70 to the Royal Navy, the number which they had been insisting upon for several years. Memo by the Plans Div., 17 March 1927, ibid.
72. Memo by the Plans Div.: Limitation of Armaments; Submarines and Destroyers, 10 March, PD02800/27, ibid. The emphasis is original.
73. Memo by the Naval Staff, 14 April 1927, CID 808-B, CAB4/16. See also, Memo by the Plans Div., 6 May 1927, P.D.02832/27, ADM1/8715/188.
74. Pound to Keyes, 17 June 1927, P.G. Halpern (ed.) The Keyes Papers Vol.II 1919-1938 (London: Allen & Unwin 1980) pp.220-1.
75. Ironically the only person who expressed doubt about the Admiralty's insistence on 70 cruisers was Churchill, who allied himself with the Admiralty during the Conference and largely contributed to its breakdown.
76. For reasons of secrecy full particulars of the proposals and minutes of the meeting were not circulated until the opening of the Conference in June. CID memorandum 808-B, CAB4/ 16; CID Minutes, 227th Meeting, 20 May 1927, CAB2/5. For the Bridgeman's account of the meeting, see Bridgeman to M.C. Bridgeman, 20 May 1927, Williamson, p.204; and for Amery's more critical account, see Barnes and Nicholson (note 20) p.507.
77. Cabinet Conclusions, 34(27)3 of 25 May 1927, CAB23/55.
78. R.H. Bacon, The Life of John Rushworth Earl Jellicoe (London: Cassell 1936) p.496.
79. Cecil to A. Chamberlain, 17 June 1927, AC54/86.
80. Memorandum by Churchill, 29 June 1927, CP189(27), CAB24/187.
81. Speech at the Lord Mayor's Dinner to the Bankers and Merchants of London at Mansion House, 12 July 1927, Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Vol.I, CHARTWELL9/ 81.
82. Hankey to Baldwin, 28 July 1927, Baldwin Papers 230.
83. Japanese delegates to Foreign Minister [Tanaka], 24? July [received on 25 July] 1927, Nihon gaiko bunsho: junevu kaigun gunbiseigen kaigi [Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy: The Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, held at Geneva from June 20th to August 4th, 1927], (Tokyo: Gaimusho 1982) pp.201-4.
84. Hankey to Balfour, 29 June 1927, Balfour Papers, British Library, MS49704. A copy of this letter was also sent to Baldwin. See, Hankey to Baldwin, 29 June 1927, Baldwin Papers 130. In the margin of this letter, Churchill, on 1 July, signed 'I agree.'
85. W.S. Chalmers, The Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty (London: Hodder 1951) p.414.
86. A. Chamberlain to Baldwin, 12 Sept. 1927, Baldwin Papers 129.
87. Under Sec. of State for War and Legal Adviser at the Foreign Office, respectively.
88. McKercher (note 2) pp. 176-94.
89. Richardson (note 2) p. 139.
90. Memo on Further Limitation of Naval Armament, Part I (b), G.B.No.438, Serial No. 1347-1(a), 21 April 1927, Box 15, RG80, p.6. Original emphasis.
91. Kaigunsho Fukukan [Navy Ministry adjutant], Gunshukukaigi shotetsuzuki [Procedural Matters Relating to Arms Limitation Conferences], nd [but possibly compiled in 1929/30 by Capt. (later Adm.) Mineichi Koga, chief Navy Ministry adjutant], Enomoto Collections, Military History Dept, Nat. Inst. for Defence Studies, Tokyo. The author is indebted to Cdr Ryusuke Yokoyama of the Maritime Self-Defence Force for his assistance with this document.