Rediscovering reasonable rationality in institutional analysis

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 31-57

  Nørgaard, Asbjørn Sonne ^a  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030544006     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb00640.x     Document Type: Review

References (80)

1. Alchain, A. & Demsetz, H. (1986) [1972]. Production, information costs, and economic organization, pp. 111-134 in L. Putterman (ed.), The economic nature of the firm. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
2. Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. 2nd rev. edn. London: Verso.
3. Baumgartner, F.R. & Jones, B.D. (1993). Agendas and instability in American politics. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
4. Buchanan, J.M. (1979). Natural and artifactual man, pp. 93-112 in What should economists do?. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
5. Bruun, F. (1994). Research note: Hegelian garbage cans, Journal of Theoretical Politics 6(1): 119-127.
6. Chai, S.-K. & Wildavsky, A. (1994). Culture, rationality, and violence, pp. 159-174 in D.J. Coyle and R.J. Ellis (eds.), Politics, policy & culture. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
7. Christensen, J.G. & Nannestad, P. (1992). The institutions of the welfare state: Hierarchical governance, client responsiveness, and institutional autonomy - A research programme, Aarhus: Department of Political Science, Aarhus University.
8. Coase, R. (1988) [1937]. The nature of the firm, pp. 72-85 in L. Putterman (ed.), The economic nature of the firm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. Coyle, D.J. (1994). The theory that would be king, pp. 219-239 in D.J. Coyle & R.J. Ellis (eds.), Politics, policy & culture. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
10. Crozier, M. (1964). The bureaucratic phenomenon. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
11. DiMaggio, P.J. & Powell, W.W. (1991). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields, pp. 63-82 in W.W. Powell & P.J. DiMaggio (eds.), The new insntutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
12. Douglas, M. (1990). Converging on autonomy: Anthropology and institutional economics, pp. 98-115 in O.E. Williamson (ed.), Organization theory: From Chester Barnard to the present and beyond. New York: Oxford University Press..
13. Douglas, M. (1986). How institutions think. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
14. Dunleavy, P.(1991). Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice, New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
15. Ellis, R.J. & Coyle, D.J. (1994). Introduction, pp. 1-14 in D.J. Coyle & R.J. Ellis (eds.), Politics, policy & culture. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
16. Elster, J. (1991). The possibility of rational politics, pp. 115-142 in D. Held (ed.), Political theory today. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
17. Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. New York: Basic Books.
18. Gerth, H.H. & Mills, C.W. (1958). From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. New York: Oxford University Press.
19. Gourevitch, P. (1986). Politics in hard times: Comparative responses to international economic crises. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
20. Grafstein, R. (1988). The problem of institutional constraint, Journal of Politics 50(3): 577-599.
21. Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic man and social structure: The problem of embeddedness, American Journal of Sociology 91(3); 481-510.
22. Hall, P., ed. (1989). The political power of economic ideas: Keynesianism across nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
23. Hall, P. (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: The case of economic policymaking in Britain, Comparative Politics 25: 275-296.
24. Hall, P.A. & Taylor, R.C.R. (1994). Political Science and the Four New Institutionalisms. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1994. Cambridge, MA: Center for European Studies, Harvard University.
25. Heclo, H. (1994). Ideas, institutions, and interests, pp. 366-392 in L.C. Dodd & C. Jillson (eds.), American politics: Approaches and interpretation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
26. Hofstadter, R. (1955). The age of reform: From Bryan to FDR. New York: Vintage Books.
27. Katznelson, I. (1986). Rethinking the silences of social and economic policy, Political Science Quarterly 101: 307-325.
28. Katznelson, I. & Pietrykowski, B. (1991). Rebuilding the American state: Evidence from the 1940s, Studies in American Political Development 5: 301-339.
29. Keohane, R.O. & Hoffmann, S. eds. (1991). The new European Community: Decisionmaking and institutional change. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
30. Knudsen, C. (1993). Modelling rationality, institutions and processes in economic theory, pp. 265-299 in Uskali Mäki et al. (eds.), Rationality, institutions and economic methodology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
31. Krasner, S.D. (1984). Approaches to the state: Alternative conceptions and historical dynamics, Comparative Politics, January 1984: 223-246.
32. Krasner, S.D. (1988). Sovereignty: An institutionalist perspective, Comparative Political Studies 21: 66-94.
33. Laclau,. & Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics. London: Verso.
34. Levi, M. (1988). Of rule and revenue. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
35. March, J.G. & Olsen, J.P. (1976). Ambiguity and choice in organizations. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
36. March, J.G. & Olsen, J.P. (1989). Rediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of politics. New York: The Free Press.
37. Martin, C.J. (1994). Business and the new economic activism: The growth of corporate lobbies in the sixties, Polity 27: 49-76.
38. Meyer, J.W. & Rowan, B. (1983) [1977]. Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony, pp. 21-44 in J.W. Meyer & W.R. Scott (eds.), Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
39. Miller, G.J. (1992). Managerial dilemmas: The political economy of hierarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
40. Miller, G.J. & Hammond, T. (1994). Why politics is more fundamental than economics: Incentive-compatible mechanisms are not credible, Journal of Theoretical Politics 5: 5-26.
41. Mitnick, B., ed. (1993). Corporate political agency: The construction of competition in public affairs. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
42. Moe, T.M. (1984). The new economics of organization, American Journal of Political Science 28: 739-777.
43. Moe, T.M. (1987). Interests, institutions, and positive theory: The politics of the NLRB, Studies in American political development 2: 236-299.
44. Moe, T.M. (1989). The politics of bureaucratic structure, pp. 267-329 in J.E. Chubb & P. E. Peterson (eds.), Can the government govern?. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
45. Moe, T.M (1990a). The politics of structural choice: Towards a theory of public bureaucracy, pp. 116-153 in O.E. Williamson (ed.), Organization theory: From Chester Barnard to the present and beyond. New York: Oxford University Press.
46. Moe, T.M. (1990b). Political institutions: The neglected side of the story, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 213-253.
47. Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton.
48. North, D. (1984). Transaction costs, institutions, and economic history, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140: 7-17.
49. North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
50. North, D. (1993). What do we mean by rationality? Public Choice 77: 159-162.
51. Nørgaard, A.S. (1994). Institutions and post-modernity in IR: The 'new' EC, Cooperation and Conflict 29: 245-287.
52. Oakes, J. (1989). Slavery and Freedom. New York: Alfred Knopf.
53. Olsen, I.P. (1992). Analyzing institutional dynamics. LOS-Senter Særtrvk 92/13, pp. 247-291.
54. Olson, M. (1971). The logic of collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
55. Orren, K. & Skowronek, S. (1994). Beyond the iconography of order: Notes for a 'new institutionalism', pp. 311-330 in L.C. Dodd & C. Jillson (eds.), American politics: Approaches and interpretation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
56. Ostrom, E. (1986). An agenda for the study of institutions, Public Choice 48: 3-25.
57. Ostrom, E. (1991). Rational choice theory and institutional analysis: Toward complementarity, American political Science Review 85: 237-243.
58. Ostrom, V. (1993). Epistemic choice and public choice, Public Choice 77: 163-176.
59. Pierson, P. (1993). When effect becomes cause: Policy feedback and political change, World Politics 45: 595-628.
60. Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
61. Rothstein, B. (1992). Den korporativa staten: interesseorganisationer och statsförvaltning i svensk politik. Stockholm: Norstedts.
62. Scott, W.R. (1992). Organizations: rational, natural, and open systems, 3rd edn. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
63. Shepsle, K.A. (1989). Studying institutions: Some lessons from the rational choice approach, Journal of Theoretical Politic 1: 131-147.
64. Simon, H.A. (1976) [1945]. Administrative Behavior, 3rd edn. New York: Free Press.
65. Skocpol, T. (1985). Bringing the state back in: Strategies of analysis in current research, pp. 3-37 in P.B. Evans et al. (eds.), Bringing the state back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
66. Skowronek, S. (1982). Building a new American state: The expansion of national administrative capacities 1877-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
67. Stone, D. A. (1988). Policy, Paradox and Political Reason. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
68. Thelen, K. & Steinmo, S. (1992). Historical institutionalism in comparative politics, pp. 1-32 in S. Steinmo et al. (eds.), Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
69. Thompson, M., Ellis, R & Wildavsky, A. (1990). Cultural theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
70. Weber, M. (1962). Basic concepts in sociology. New York: Citadel Press.
71. Weber, M. (1971). Makt og byråkrati: Essays om politik og klasse, samfundforskning og verdier. Oslo: Gyldendal.
72. Weir, M. & Skocpol, T. (1985). State structures and the possibilities for a 'Keynesian' response to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States, pp. 107-163 in P.B. Evans et al. (eds.), Bringing the state back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
73. Wildavsky, A. (1987). Choosing preferences by constructing institutions: A cultural theory of preference formation, American Political Science Review 81: 3-21.
74. Wildavsky, A. (1991). The rise of radical egalitarianism. Washington DC: The American University Press.
75. Wildavsky, A. (1994). Why self-interest means less outside of a social context: Cultural contributions to a theory of rational choices, Journal of Theoretical Politics 6: 131-159.
76. Williamson, O.E. (1981). The modern corporation: Origins evolution, attributes, Journal of Economic Literature 19: 1537-1568.
77. Williamson, O.E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: The Free Press.
78. Winch, P. (1958). The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy. London: Routledge & Keegan Paul.
79. Windhoff-Héritier, A. (1991). Institutions, interests, and political choice, pp. 27-51 in Czada & Windhoff-Héritier (eds.), Political choice: Institutions, rules, and the limits of rationality. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
80. Wolfe, A. (1989). Whose keeper? Social science and moral obligation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.