How different are social choice functions: A rough sets approach

Quality and Quantity

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 87-99

  Fedrizzi, Mario ^a   Kacprzyk, Janusz ^b   Nurmi, Hannu ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

^b SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE   (Poland)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030542097     PISSN: 00335177     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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2. Kelly, J. S. (1988). Social Choice Theory. Berlin: Springer.
3. Merrill, S. (1988). Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
4. Nurmi, H. (1987). Comparing Voting Systems. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
5. Nurmi, H. (1988a). Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes. Theory and Decision 25: 193-208.
6. Nurmi, H. (1988b). Inferential modes in applying social choice theory. In B. R. Munier and M. F. Shakun (eds.), Compromise, Negotiation and Group Decision. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
7. Nurmi, H. (1992). An assessment of voting system simulations. Public Choice 73: 459-187.
8. Pawlak, Z. (1982). Rough Sets: International Journal of Information and Computer Sciences 11: 341-356.
9. Pawlak, Z. (1991). Rough Sets: Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Data. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
10. Pawlak, Z. (n.d.). Anatomy of Conflicts. Manuscript.
11. Plott, C. R. (1976). Axiomatic social choice theory: an overview and interpretation. American Journal of Political Science 20: 511-596.
12. Richelson, J. (1979). A comparative analysis of social choice functions I, II, III: a summary. Behavioral Science 24: 355.
13. Riker, W. H. (1982). Liberalism against Populism. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
14. Schwartz, T. (1986). The Logic of Collective Choice. New York: Columbia University Press.
15. Straffin, P. D. (1980). Topics in the Theory of Voting. Boston: Birkhäuser.