The nonemptiness of the f-core of a game without side payments

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 245-258

  Kaneko, Mamoru ^a,b   Wooders, Myrna Holtz ^c  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA   (Japan)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030539228     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01247105     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69: 9-15
2. Hammond P, Kaneko M, Wooders MH (1989) Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities. Journal of Economic Theory 49: 113-134
3. Kaneko M (1982) The central assignment game and the assignment markets. Journal of Mathematical Economics 10: 205-232
4. Kaneko M, Wooders MH (1986) The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions; the model and some results. Mathematical Social Sciences 12: 105-137
5. Kaneko M, Wooders MH (1989) The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies. Journal of Economic Theory 49:135-168
6. Royden HL (1963) Real analysis. MacMillan Publishing Co
7. Shapley LS, Shubik M (1972) The assignment game I: The core. International Journal of Game Theory 1: 111-130
8. Shapley LS, Shubik M (1966) Quasi-cores in a monetary economy with non-convex preferences. Econometrica 34: 805-827
9. Wooders MH ( 1983) The epsilon core of a large replica game. Journal of Mathematical Economics 11: 277-300