Constitutional structures and regime performance in 18 industrialized democracies: A test of Olson's hypothesis

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 87-104

  Crepaz, Markus M L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030538023     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb00643.x     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. Andeweg, R.B. & Bakema, B. (1994). The Netherlands: Ministers and cabinet policy, pp. 56-72 in Laver & Schofield (eds.), Cabinet ministers and parliamentary government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Alchian,. (1950). Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory, Journal of Political Economy 58: 211-221.
3. Alvarez, R.M, Garrett, G. & Lange, P. (1991). Government partisanship, labor organization, and macroeconomic performance, American Political Science Review 85: 539-556.
4. Arrow, K. (1951). Social choice and individual values. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
5. Barker, E. (1942). Reflections on government. Cambridge: Oxford University Press.
6. Bates, R.H. (1988). Contra contractarianism: Some reflections on the new institutionalism. Politics & Society 16: 387-401.
7. Baylis, A.T (1989). Governing by committee, collegial leadership in advanced societies. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
8. Cameron, D.R. (1978). The expansion of the public economy: A comparative analysis, American Political Science Review 72: 1243-1261.
9. Cameron, D.R. (1984). Social democracy, corporatism, labour quiescence and the representation of economic interests in advanced capitalist society, pp. 143-178 in J.J. Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and conflict in contemporary capitalism, London: Oxford University Press.
10. Crepaz, M.M.L. (1992). Corporatism in decline? An empirical analysis of the impact of corporatism on macroeconomic performance and industrial disputes in 18 industrialized democracies, Comparative Political Studies 25: 139-168.
11. Duverger, M. (1963). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. New York: Wiley.
12. De Swaan, A. (1973). Coalition theories and cabinet formations: A study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
13. The Economist, 1 May 1993.
14. Elections since 1945: A worldwide reference compendium (1989). London: Longmans.
15. Finer, S.E. (1980). The changing British party system, 1945-1979. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
16. Garrett, G. & Lange, P. (1989). Government partisanship and economic performance: When and how does 'who governs' matter?, Journal of Politics 51: 676-693.
17. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1992. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
18. Hibbs, D.A. (1977). Political parties and macroeconomic policy, American Political Science Review 71: 1467-1487.
19. Hicks, A. & Swank, D. (1992). Politics, institutions, and welfare spending in industrialized democracies 1960-1982, American Political Science Review 86: 658-674.
20. Jankowski, R. (1993). Responsible, irresponsible, and Westminster parties: A theoretical and empirical evaluation, British Journal of Political Science 23: 107-129.
21. Katz, R.S. (1980). A theory of parties and electoral systems. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
22. Katzenstein, P. (1985). Small states in world markets. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
23. Kirschen, E.S. (1964). Economic policy in our time. Amsterdam North Holland.
24. Lange, P. & Geoffrey G. (1985). The politics of growth: Strategic interaction and economic performance in the advanced industrial democracies 1974-1980, Journal of Politics 47: 792-827.
25. Laver, M. & Shepsle, K.A. eds. (1994). Cabinet ministers and parliamentary government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26. Laver, M. & Schofield, N. (1990). Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
27. Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
28. Lijphart, A. (1984a). Democracies, patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
29. Lijphart, A. (1984b). Measures of cabinet durability: A conceptual and empirical evaluation. Comparative Political Studies 17: 265-279.
30. Lijphart, A. (1988). The political consequences of electoral laws 1945-85: A critique, reanalysis, and update of Rae's classic study'. Presented at the XIVth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, 28 August to 1 September 1988, Washington, DC.
31. Lijphart, A. (1993). Constitutional choices for new democracies, pp. 146-158 in L. Diamond and M.F. Plattner (eds.), The global resurgence of democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Appeared originally in the Journal of Democracy, Winter 1991.
32. Lijphart, A. & M.M.L. Crepaz (1991). Corporatism and consensus democracy in eighteen countries: Conceptual and empirical linkages. British Journal of Political Science 21: 235-246.
33. OECD Economic Surveys (various editions).
34. OECD Economic Outlook (various editions).
35. Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. Economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
36. Olson, M. (1986a). An Appreciation of the tests and criticisms, pp. 65-85 in Scandinavian Political Studies 9: 65-85.
37. Olson, M. (1986b). A theory of the incentives facing political organizations: Neo-corporatism and the hegemonic state, International Political Science Review 7: 165-189.
38. Powell, B. (1982). Contemporary democracies. Participation, stability, and violence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
39. Powell, W.W. & DiMaggio, P.J., eds. (1991). The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
40. Pratt, J.W. & Zeckhauser, R.J. (1985). Principals and agents: The structure of business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
41. Pryor, F.L. (1988). Corporatism as an economic system: a review essay, Journal of Comparative Economics 12: 317-344.
42. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
43. Riker, W. (1962). The theory of political coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
44. Robertson, D. (1984). Adversary politics, public opinion and electoral cleavages, pp. 214-241 in D. Kavanagh & G. Peele (eds.), Comparative government and politics. Essays in honour of S.E. Finer. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
45. Rogowski, R. (1987). Trade and the variety of democratic Institutions, International Organization 41: 203-215.
46. Schmidt, M. (1992). Politisches System und Politikfelder - Westliche Industrieländer. München: Beck Verlag.
47. Schmidt, M. (1982). Does corporatism matter? Economic crisis, politics and rates of unemployment in capitalist democracies in the 1970s, pp. 237-258 in G. Lehmbruch & P. Schmitter (eds.), Patterns of corporatist policy-making. London: Sage Publications.
48. Schott, K. (1984). Policy, power and order. The persistence of economic problems in capitalist states. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
49. Shepsle, K. (1979). Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models, American Journal of Political Science 23: 27-60.
50. Shepsle, K.A. (1989). Studying institutions. Some lessons from the rational choice approach, Journal of Theoretical Politics 1: 131-147.
51. Shepsle, K. & Weingast, B. (1987). The institutional foundations of committee power, American Political Science Review 81: 85-104.
52. Strom, K. (1990). Minority government and majority rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
53. Strom, K. & Leipart, J.Y. (1993). Policy, institutions, and coalition avoidance: Norwegian governments 1945-1990, American Political Science Review 87: 870-887.
54. Swank, D. (1992). Politics and the structural dependence of the state in democratic capitalist nations. American Political Science Review 86: 38-54.
55. Taagepera, R. & Shugart, M.S. (1989). Seats and votes. The effects and determinants of political systems. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
56. Taylor, M. & Laver, M. (1973). Government coalitions in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research 1: 205-248.
57. Timmermans, A. (1994). Cabinet ministers and policy making in Belgium: the impact of coalition constraints, pp. 106-124 in Laver & Schofield (eds.), Cabinet ministers and parliamentary government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
58. Woldendorp, J., Keman, H. & Budge, I. (1993). Political data 1945-1990: Party government in 20 democracies, European Journal of Political Research 24: 1 (special issue).
59. Zukin, S. & DiMaggio P., eds., (1990). Structures of capital: The social organization of the economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.