Predation, "rationality," and judicial somnambulance

University of Cincinnati Law Review

Volumn 64, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 811-870

  Adams, Walter ^a,b   Brock, James W ^c  

^a TRINITY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c MIAMI UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030535149     PISSN: 00096881     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. VÁCLAV HAVEL, OPEN LETTERS 16 (Paul Wilson ed., 1991).
2. H.L. Mencken, Hymn to the Truth, in THE IMPOSSIBLE H.L. MENCKEN 618 (Marion Elizabeth Rogers ed., 1991).
3. For a lucid and unusually persuasive articulation of the "recoupment" standard in predation cases, see Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Trumping the Areeda-Turner Test: The Recoupment Standard in Brooke-Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 559 (1994).
4. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984).
5. Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 318 (1981).
6. Notable proponents of the New Learning theory include circuit judges Robert Bork, Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Sidney Winter. See generally BORK, supra note 3, at 98-101; Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 3-15; SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 939-40 (1979).
7. Notable proponents of the New Learning theory include circuit judges Robert Bork, Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Sidney Winter. See generally BORK, supra note 3, at 98-101; Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 3-15; SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 939-40 (1979).
8. Notable proponents of the New Learning theory include circuit judges Robert Bork, Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Sidney Winter. See generally BORK, supra note 3, at 98-101; Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 3-15; SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 939-40 (1979).
9. HENRY R. SEAGER & CHARLES A. GULICK, JR., TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS 150 (1929); ELIOT JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 124 (1922).
10. HENRY R. SEAGER & CHARLES A. GULICK, JR., TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS 150 (1929); ELIOT JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 124 (1922).
11. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 156-57 (1911); SEAGER & GULICK, supra note 34, at 150.
12. Malcolm R. Burns, Outside Intervention in Monopolistic Price Warfare: The Case of the "Plug War" and the Union Tobacco Company, 56 Bus. HISTORY REV. 33, 42 (1982) . The businesses absorbed into the Continental Tobacco Company also had substantial operations in the production of smoking tobacco, and the consolidation thus significantly raised American's share of this latter branch to in excess of 50 percent. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS, Part I, supra note 38, at 386.
13. Malcolm R. Burns, Outside Intervention in Monopolistic Price Warfare: The Case of the "Plug War" and the Union Tobacco Company, 56 Bus. HISTORY REV. 33, 42 (1982) . The businesses absorbed into the Continental Tobacco Company also had substantial operations in the production of smoking tobacco, and the consolidation thus significantly raised American's share of this latter branch to in excess of 50 percent. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS, Part I, supra note 38, at 386.
14. Malcolm R. Burns, New Evidence on Predatory Price Cutting, 10 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 327, 327-29 (1989).
15. Malcolm R. Burns, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 J. POL. ECON. 266, 269 (1986).
16. RICHARD B. TENNANT, The Cigarette Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 239-41 (Adams ed., 4th ed. 1971). This pattern of uniform pricing is illustrated by Table XI, infra.
17. Stephen J. Adler & Alix M. Freedman, Tobacco Suit Exposes Ways Cigarette Firms Keep the Profits Fat, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1990, at A5.
18. William S. Comanor & H.E. Frech III, Predatory Pricing and the Meaning of Intent, 38 ANTITRUST BULL., Summer 1993, at 293, 296.
19. For a comprehensive survey of these theoretical models and their implications for the rationality of predation, see Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
20. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 380 (1988).
21. Randall Smith, Biggest Buyout Ever Finishes as Flop for KKR and Dozens of Large Investors, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1995, at A3.
22. Edmund Faltermayer, The Deal Decade: Verdict on the '80s, FORTUNE, Aug. 26, 1991, at 58.
23. Toni Mack, It's Time to Take Risks, FORBES, Oct. 6, 1986, at 125-26.
24. Laurie P. Cohen & Thomas F. O'Boyle, LTV, Dragged Down by Steel Subsidiary, Struggles to Survive, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1986, at 1.
25. The Trouble With Mergers, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 1994, at 13.
26. F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869, 890 (1976).
27. W.T. SEDGWICK & H.W. TYLER, A SHORT HISTORY OF SCIENCE 222 (1917).