The partisan paradox and the U.S. tariff, 1877-1934

International Organization

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 301-324

  Epstein, David ^a   O'Halloran, Sharyn ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030534499     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0020818300028575     Document Type: Review

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