Rights of passage: An analysis of waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 64, Issue 5, 1996, Pages 2425-2453

  Sabo, Stacey ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0030534029     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (235)

1. David Fritze, Baby Sitter Accused in Death Gets Tributes, Ariz. Republic, June 23, 1995, at B1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 281, 284 (1991); Francis B. McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 St. Louis U. L.J. 629, 632 (1994).
7. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 281, 284 (1991); Francis B. McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 St. Louis U. L.J. 629, 632 (1994).
8. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (stating that "[u]pon the motion of the court or of any party, the judge . . . shall conduct a hearing to determine whether to retain jurisdiction"); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 857(A) (West 1995) (providing that "[t]he court on its own motion or on motion of the district attorney may conduct a hearing to consider whether to transfer a child for prosecution to the appropriate court exercising criminal jurisdiction").
9. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-15-34(d)-(e) (1995) (requiring a written report from probation services regarding the juvenile's offense, prior record, prior treatment, demeanor, maturity, and whether the juvenile's and the community's best interests require "legal restraint or discipline" for the juvenile); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(e) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (requiring the judge to consider evidence of the seriousness of the offense, the juvenile's history of response to treatment, "[t]he prior history, character traits, mental maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation").
10. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-806(1)(a) (Supp. 1995) (mandating a finding that "it would be contrary to the best interests of the juvenile or of the public to retain [juvenile court] jurisdiction"); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 419C.349(4) (1995) (mandating a finding "by a preponderance of the evidence that retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of the child and of society").
11. See supra note 9.
12. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(b) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (providing concurrent juvenile and criminal court jurisdiction over certain juveniles); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-805(1) (Supp. 1995) (same); B.C. Code Ann. § 16-2301(3)(A) (1989 & Supp. 1995) (same); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(3)(a)(4)(a), (3)(a)(5)(a)-(b)(I) (West Supp. 1996) (same); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(1) (1994) (same); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 305(B)(3) (West 1995) (same); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.606 (West Supp. 1995) (same); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247 (1993) (same); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(c) (1991) (same); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(c), (e)-(f) (1986 & Supp. 1995) (same).
13. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284-85; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 656. This procedure is also known as "direct file." Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284; Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 507, 521 (1995).
14. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284-85; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 656. This procedure is also known as "direct file." Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284; Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 507, 521 (1995).
15. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284-85; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 632.
16. Frank W. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect With a Crime 158 (1970); see infra note 165 and accompanying text.
17. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 558 (1966).
18. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function Standards Rule 3-1.2(b) (1993) [hereinafter ABA Standards] (stating that "the prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or her functions"). The ABA adopted this third edition of the ABA Standards in 1992. Id. at xii. The Criminal Justice Standards Committee of the ABA initiated the revision of the ABA's second edition in 1988. Id. at xi. Members of all areas of the criminal justice system wrote and revised the final working draft of the ABA Standards, which was approved by the ABA House of Delegates in 1992. Id. at xii. The ABA Standards are meant to represent the consensus of the criminal justice community "about what good, professional practice is and should be" and to serve as "extremely useful standards for consultation by lawyers and judges who want to do 'the right thing' or, as important, to avoid doing 'the wrong thing.'" Id. at xiv.
19. Id. at 3-3.9(a) (stating that "[a] prosecutor should not institute . . . criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause").
20. Ala. Code § 12-15-34.1(a)-(b) (1995); Alaska Stat. § 47.10.010(e) (1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-127(a) (West 1995); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 921(2)(a) (1975 & Supp. 1994), 1010(a) (Supp. 1994); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(h) (1989); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(3)(a)(1), (3)(a)(3), (3)(a)(4)(d), (3)(a)(5)(b)(II), (3)(a)(5)(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(2)(A) (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-22(c)-(d) (1993); Idaho Code § 20-509(1)-(2) (Supp. 1995); III. Ann. Stat. ch. 705, para. 405/5-4(3.1)-(3.2), (6)(a), (7)(a), (8)(a) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-2-1.1(b), (d) (Burns Supp. 1995); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.8(1)(b) (West 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-3611(a), (c) (1995), 38-1636(h) (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 635.020(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 305(A) (West 1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4)(G) (West 1980); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-804(e)(1)-(4) (1995 & Supp. 1995); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 260.015(5)(b), 260.125(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-151(1)(a)-(b), (2) (1993 & Supp. 1995), 43-21-157(9) (Supp. 1995); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.071(9) (Vernon Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-206(3) (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 62.040(1)(b)(1), 62.080(3) (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-B:27 (1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-3(H) (Michie 1995); N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2151.011(B)(1), 2151.26(B) (Anderson Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 7001-1.3(2), 7306-1.1(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1996); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 6322(a) (1982 & Supp. 1995), 6355(e) (1982); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-3(1), -7.1(c) (1994 & Supp. 1995); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-390 (1985 & Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(c) (Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-16(1), 78-3a-25(12) (Supp. 1995); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(b) (1991); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269.6(C) (Michie Supp. 1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv), 13.40.020(14) (West Supp. 1996); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.183 (West Supp. 1995); see Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 419C.364 (1995) (permitting the criminal court judge, in a case involving a waived juvenile aged 16 or older, to order that all further proceedings involving the juvenile will be waived to criminal court without any juvenile court proceedings).
21. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 471, 488 (1987).
22. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 471, 488 (1987).
23. Eric L. Jensen, The Waiver of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Policy Goals, Empirical Realities, and Suggestions for Change, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 173, 181-82 (1994); Guttman, supra note 12, at 521.
24. Eric L. Jensen, The Waiver of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Policy Goals, Empirical Realities, and Suggestions for Change, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 173, 181-82 (1994); Guttman, supra note 12, at 521.
25. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-127(a) (West 1995).
26. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
27. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. Dean J. Champion & G. Larry Mays, Transferring Juveniles to Criminal Courts: Trends and Implications for Criminal Justice 5 (1991); Royce S. Buckingham, The Erosion of Juvenile Court Judge Discretion in the Transfer Decision Nationwide and in Oregon, 29 Willamette L. Rev. 689, 691-92 (1993).
29. Dean J. Champion & G. Larry Mays, Transferring Juveniles to Criminal Courts: Trends and Implications for Criminal Justice 5 (1991); Royce S. Buckingham, The Erosion of Juvenile Court Judge Discretion in the Transfer Decision Nationwide and in Oregon, 29 Willamette L. Rev. 689, 691-92 (1993).
30. Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 5.
31. Id. at 6; Margaret O. Hyde, Juvenile Justice and Injustice 9 (1983); Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report 70 (1995) [hereinafter Juvenile Offenders and Victims]; H. Ted Rubin, Juvenile Justice: Policy, Practice, and Law 35 (1979).
32. Id. at 6; Margaret O. Hyde, Juvenile Justice and Injustice 9 (1983); Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report 70 (1995) [hereinafter Juvenile Offenders and Victims]; H. Ted Rubin, Juvenile Justice: Policy, Practice, and Law 35 (1979).
33. Id. at 6; Margaret O. Hyde, Juvenile Justice and Injustice 9 (1983); Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report 70 (1995) [hereinafter Juvenile Offenders and Victims]; H. Ted Rubin, Juvenile Justice: Policy, Practice, and Law 35 (1979).
34. Id. at 6; Margaret O. Hyde, Juvenile Justice and Injustice 9 (1983); Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report 70 (1995) [hereinafter Juvenile Offenders and Victims]; H. Ted Rubin, Juvenile Justice: Policy, Practice, and Law 35 (1979).
35. Hyde, supra note 26, at 9; Thomas A. Johnson, Introduction to the Juvenile Justice System 1 (1975); Rubin, supra note 26, at 35; see Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 5-6.
36. Hyde, supra note 26, at 9; Thomas A. Johnson, Introduction to the Juvenile Justice System 1 (1975); Rubin, supra note 26, at 35; see Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 5-6.
37. Hyde, supra note 26, at 9; Thomas A. Johnson, Introduction to the Juvenile Justice System 1 (1975); Rubin, supra note 26, at 35; see Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 5-6.
38. Hyde, supra note 26, at 9; Johnson, supra note 27, at 1; Rubin, supra note 26, at 35.
39. Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 5.
40. See id. at 6.
41. Hyde, supra note 26, at 9. In a variety of English cases occurring in the late 1600s and mid-1700s involving ten-year-old juveniles, one boy was sentenced to whipping for theft, another sentenced to death for mutilating and killing another child (although he was later pardoned by the king in return for sea service), a third hanged for burning a child in its cradle, and a fourth hanged for killing his companions. Another juvenile had her hand burned for committing theft. Id. at 8-11.
42. Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 6; Johnson, supra note 27, at 3.
43. Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 6; Hyde, supra note 26, at 21.
44. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 70; see Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 323, 325 (1991).
45. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 70; see Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 323, 325 (1991).
46. See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 34, at 325.
47. Rubin, supra note 26, at 36-37 (quoting Judge Julian M. Mack of Cook County Juvenile Court, Chicago, IL, in 1909).
48. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 71; see, e.g., Buckingham, supra note 24, at 691-92 (stating that the juvenile justice system had a "mission of individualized treatment"); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 691, 709 (1991) (stating that the original purpose of the juvenile justice system emphasized "rehabilitation and the child's 'best interests'"); Forst & Blomquist, supra note 34, at 324-27 (stating that the juvenile justice system "has rested on a philosophy of rehabilitation and individualized justice").
49. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 71; see, e.g., Buckingham, supra note 24, at 691-92 (stating that the juvenile justice system had a "mission of individualized treatment"); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 691, 709 (1991) (stating that the original purpose of the juvenile justice system emphasized "rehabilitation and the child's 'best interests'"); Forst & Blomquist, supra note 34, at 324-27 (stating that the juvenile justice system "has rested on a philosophy of rehabilitation and individualized justice").
50. One author has broken down the juvenile justice system's philosophy into five elements, namely: (1) the superior rights of the state; (2) the individualization of justice; (3) the status of delinquency (which protects children from the stigma of the criminal label); (4) an informal, noncriminal procedure; and (5) a rehabilitative and protective rather than punishment-oriented approach. Johnson, supra note 27, at 11-12 & n.27 (citing Robert G. Caldwell, The Juvenile Court: Its Development and Some Major Problems, in Juvenile Delinquency: A Book of Readings 362-63 (Rose Giallombardo ed., 1966)).
51. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 281. This belief in the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders likely stems from the post-sixteenth-century recognition of a fundamental difference between adults and children. See Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 70.
52. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 281.
53. Id. at 281 (stating that "rehabilitative treatment and protective supervision traditionally have been the preferred responses to juvenile misbehavior"); Hyde, supra note 26, at 21 ("[I]n Cook County, Chicago, Illinois, the child who had offended the law ceased to be a criminal and had the status of a child who needed care, protection, and discipline. . . . [Offenders became wards of the state and the emphasis was on treatment rather than on punishment.").
54. Patricia M. Wald, Introduction to the Juvenile Justice Process: The Rights of Children and the Rites of Passage, in Child Psychiatry and the Law 9, 9 (Diane H. Schetky & Elissa P. Benedek eds., 1980). But see Hyde, supra note 26, at 3, 22, 28-29 (suggesting that juveniles placed in training homes or otherwise incarcerated are likely to become hardened delinquents after fraternizing with the other residents).
55. Wald, supra note 42, at 9.
56. See id.
57. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 70.
58. Id.; Allison Boyce, Note, Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial Discretion and Walker v. State, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 985, 987 (1994).
59. Id.; Allison Boyce, Note, Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial Discretion and Walker v. State, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 985, 987 (1994).
60. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 70-71. But see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that juveniles facing incarceration had the right in adjudicatory hearings to notice, to counsel, to confrontation of their accusers, and to protection against self-incrimination).
61. Living with Gault, Time, Aug. 4, 1967, at 68, 68 [hereinafter Living with Gault].
62. See infra part I.C.
63. See, e.g., Boyce, supra note 46, at 987 (stating that "advocates of the juvenile system attacked the lack of procedures in juvenile proceedings"); Crisis in Juvenile Courts, U.S. News & World Rep., Mar. 24, 1969, at 62, 63 [hereinafter Crisis] (noting that prior to the Supreme Court's holding in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), some juvenile court judges "were sending children away - for their 'own good' - to institutions for longer terms than would have been imposed on adults committing the same offense . . . often . . . on the basis of hearsay evidence" (quoting Chief Judge Florence M. Kelley of the New York State Family Court)).
64. See, e.g., Boyce, supra note 46, at 987 (stating that "advocates of the juvenile system attacked the lack of procedures in juvenile proceedings"); Crisis in Juvenile Courts, U.S. News & World Rep., Mar. 24, 1969, at 62, 63 [hereinafter Crisis] (noting that prior to the Supreme Court's holding in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), some juvenile court judges "were sending children away - for their 'own good' - to institutions for longer terms than would have been imposed on adults committing the same offense . . . often . . . on the basis of hearsay evidence" (quoting Chief Judge Florence M. Kelley of the New York State Family Court)).
65. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
66. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
67. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
68. See id. at 543-44.
69. Id. at 545-46.
70. Id. at 548.
71. See id. at 552.
72. Id. at 553.
73. Id. at 554.
74. Id. at 561-63. In the Kent Appendix, the Supreme Court enumerated eight "determinative factors" for the judge's consideration in making the waiver decision. Id. at 565-67. These factors include: the seriousness and violence of the offense; whether it was committed against person or property; whether probable cause exists; the desirability of trying the entire case in one court (when some of the defendants are adults and thereby outside juvenile court jurisdiction); the juvenile's personal circumstances; her prior record, if any; public safety; and juvenile's likelihood of rehabilitation. Id. at 566-67.
75. Id. at 554.
76. Id. at 555.
77. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
78. Id. at 4.
79. Id. at 5.
80. Id. at 7.
81. Id. at 7-8. Had an adult committed the offense, she would have been subject to a maximum sentence of only two months in jail or a $50 fine. Id. at 8-9.
82. See id. at 10-11, 13-14.
83. Id. at 28.
84. Id. at 33-34.
85. Id. at 36.
86. Id. at 56.
87. Id. at 55.
88. Id. at 13.
89. Id. at 17.
90. Id. at 21.
91. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
92. Id. at 368.
93. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
94. Id. at 541.
95. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (observing that in juvenile court, "there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children"); Living with Gault, supra note 48, at 68 ("By incorporation of constitutional safeguards [in the] system, individualized justice can become a reality." (quoting Denver, CO, juvenile court Judge Ted Rubin)).
96. Wald, supra note 42, at 9.
97. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 71; see also Hercules Al Cavalier, Juvenile Courts and Delinquents, Catholic World, May 1955, at 110, 111 (positing that "[n]ot only is common sense and parental experience disregarded in Juvenile Court proceedings, but the constitutional rights of the youthful offenders and the safeguards of due process of law are ignored"); Youth Crime-Some Suggested Treatments, U.S. News & World Rep., Nov. 15, 1965, at 46, 46 (criticizing "the cloak of secrecy wrapped around . . . youthful criminals by the protection of the juvenile philosophy").
98. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 71; see also Hercules Al Cavalier, Juvenile Courts and Delinquents, Catholic World, May 1955, at 110, 111 (positing that "[n]ot only is common sense and parental experience disregarded in Juvenile Court proceedings, but the constitutional rights of the youthful offenders and the safeguards of due process of law are ignored"); Youth Crime-Some Suggested Treatments, U.S. News & World Rep., Nov. 15, 1965, at 46, 46 (criticizing "the cloak of secrecy wrapped around . . . youthful criminals by the protection of the juvenile philosophy").
99. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 71; see also Hercules Al Cavalier, Juvenile Courts and Delinquents, Catholic World, May 1955, at 110, 111 (positing that "[n]ot only is common sense and parental experience disregarded in Juvenile Court proceedings, but the constitutional rights of the youthful offenders and the safeguards of due process of law are ignored"); Youth Crime-Some Suggested Treatments, U.S. News & World Rep., Nov. 15, 1965, at 46, 46 (criticizing "the cloak of secrecy wrapped around . . . youthful criminals by the protection of the juvenile philosophy").
100. See, e.g., An Even Bigger Crime Explosion?, U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 7, 1968, at 16,16 ("Is rampant crime . . . only the prelude to an even bigger explosion, as last year's 1 million or more U.S. delinquents move into adulthood in years ahead?"); Crisis, supra note 50, at 62 ("Across the nation, juvenile justice is moving into its biggest overhaul since the turn of the century."); The Explosion in Teen-Age Crimes, U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 9, 1967, at 74, 74 ("Deep worry is developing . . . over juvenile delinquency that seems to be getting out of hand across the United States.").
101. See, e.g., An Even Bigger Crime Explosion?, U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 7, 1968, at 16,16 ("Is rampant crime . . . only the prelude to an even bigger explosion, as last year's 1 million or more U.S. delinquents move into adulthood in years ahead?"); Crisis, supra note 50, at 62 ("Across the nation, juvenile justice is moving into its biggest overhaul since the turn of the century."); The Explosion in Teen-Age Crimes, U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 9, 1967, at 74, 74 ("Deep worry is developing . . . over juvenile delinquency that seems to be getting out of hand across the United States.").
102. Crisis, supra note 50, at 62.
103. Commentators debate whether crime rates have actually increased or whether the police are simply making more arrests. Compare McCarthy, supra note 6, at 636 (asserting that "by almost any measure, juvenile crime has been on the increase during the past decade [1984-1994]") with Guttman, supra note 12, at 508 (positing that "research does not support the notion that juveniles are committing more violent crimes today nor that they commit a larger proportion of crime [than do adults]"). John Wilson, acting administrator of the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, maintains that the proportion of juveniles committing violent crimes has remained constant since 1965, with juveniles committing "one out of every eight violent crimes," and that "less than half of one percent of all 10-17 year-olds in the United States were arrested for a violent offense." Treatment of Juveniles in the Criminal Justice System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-14 (1994) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of John J. Wilson).
104. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 282; Guttman, supra note 12, at 515 (footnotes omitted); Coming: Tougher Approach to Juvenile Violence, U.S. News & World Rep., June 7, 1976, at 65, 65 (criticizing the juvenile courts for "neither punish[ing] juvenile criminals nor reform[ing] or help[ing] them") [hereinafter Tougher Approach]; Upsurge in Violent Crime by Youngsters, U.S. News & World Rep., July 17, 1978, at 55, 55 (declaring that "[v]ast reforms are urgently needed in the juvenile-justice system in order to deal with an alarming spiral of violent crimes committed by teen-agers").
105. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 282; Guttman, supra note 12, at 515 (footnotes omitted); Coming: Tougher Approach to Juvenile Violence, U.S. News & World Rep., June 7, 1976, at 65, 65 (criticizing the juvenile courts for "neither punish[ing] juvenile criminals nor reform[ing] or help[ing] them") [hereinafter Tougher Approach]; Upsurge in Violent Crime by Youngsters, U.S. News & World Rep., July 17, 1978, at 55, 55 (declaring that "[v]ast reforms are urgently needed in the juvenile-justice system in order to deal with an alarming spiral of violent crimes committed by teen-agers").
106. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 282; Guttman, supra note 12, at 515 (footnotes omitted); Coming: Tougher Approach to Juvenile Violence, U.S. News & World Rep., June 7, 1976, at 65, 65 (criticizing the juvenile courts for "neither punish[ing] juvenile criminals nor reform[ing] or help[ing] them") [hereinafter Tougher Approach]; Upsurge in Violent Crime by Youngsters, U.S. News & World Rep., July 17, 1978, at 55, 55 (declaring that "[v]ast reforms are urgently needed in the juvenile-justice system in order to deal with an alarming spiral of violent crimes committed by teen-agers").
107. See, e.g., Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 282 (noting that "[d]ramatic increases in juvenile crime in the 1970s" created public clamor "for the adoption of punishment-oriented policies and practices" (footnotes omitted)); Charles E. Springer, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 397, 398 (1991) (proposing a "rehabilitated juvenile court" that would "administer[] real justice in its traditional retributive" sense); Tougher Approach, supra note 87, at 65 (censuring the juvenile courts for not punishing juvenile offenders).
108. See, e.g., Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 282 (noting that "[d]ramatic increases in juvenile crime in the 1970s" created public clamor "for the adoption of punishment-oriented policies and practices" (footnotes omitted)); Charles E. Springer, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 397, 398 (1991) (proposing a "rehabilitated juvenile court" that would "administer[] real justice in its traditional retributive" sense); Tougher Approach, supra note 87, at 65 (censuring the juvenile courts for not punishing juvenile offenders).
109. Guttman, supra note 12, at 515 (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Tougher Approach, supra note 87, at 65 (relating that under proposed juvenile court reforms, "[c]ourts would deal more harshly with violent juvenile criminals"); Crisis, supra note 50, at 62 (noting that "[a]cross the nation . . . [t]here are growing signs of a sterner philosophy than has prevailed in the past when it comes to dealing with youthful troublemakers").
110. See, e.g., J.W. Brown, Juvenile Justice Overhaul; Prosecutor to Say If Adult Trial Needed, Ariz. Republic, Nov. 15, 1995, at Al (detailing the Romley/Foreman juvenile justice proposal, including a provision for prosecutorial waiver allowing prosecutors "to decide whether young defendants will be tried as adults"); Laurence Hammack, Poll at Odds with Allen Panel's Stance on 'Young Thugs', Roanoke Times, Oct. 14, 1995, at C1 (stating that Virginia's Governor Allen planned a juvenile court reform which would allow prosecutors "to seek adult trials for juveniles younger than fourteen"); Doris Sue Wong, Many Agree Serious Juvenile Cases Require Court Changes, Boston Globe, Sept. 12, 1995, at 18 (explaining plans by Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger and Governor Weld to eliminate transfer hearings altogether).
111. See, e.g., J.W. Brown, Juvenile Justice Overhaul; Prosecutor to Say If Adult Trial Needed, Ariz. Republic, Nov. 15, 1995, at Al (detailing the Romley/Foreman juvenile justice proposal, including a provision for prosecutorial waiver allowing prosecutors "to decide whether young defendants will be tried as adults"); Laurence Hammack, Poll at Odds with Allen Panel's Stance on 'Young Thugs', Roanoke Times, Oct. 14, 1995, at C1 (stating that Virginia's Governor Allen planned a juvenile court reform which would allow prosecutors "to seek adult trials for juveniles younger than fourteen"); Doris Sue Wong, Many Agree Serious Juvenile Cases Require Court Changes, Boston Globe, Sept. 12, 1995, at 18 (explaining plans by Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger and Governor Weld to eliminate transfer hearings altogether).
112. See, e.g., J.W. Brown, Juvenile Justice Overhaul; Prosecutor to Say If Adult Trial Needed, Ariz. Republic, Nov. 15, 1995, at Al (detailing the Romley/Foreman juvenile justice proposal, including a provision for prosecutorial waiver allowing prosecutors "to decide whether young defendants will be tried as adults"); Laurence Hammack, Poll at Odds with Allen Panel's Stance on 'Young Thugs', Roanoke Times, Oct. 14, 1995, at C1 (stating that Virginia's Governor Allen planned a juvenile court reform which would allow prosecutors "to seek adult trials for juveniles younger than fourteen"); Doris Sue Wong, Many Agree Serious Juvenile Cases Require Court Changes, Boston Globe, Sept. 12, 1995, at 18 (explaining plans by Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger and Governor Weld to eliminate transfer hearings altogether).
113. Since 1978, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin have passed laws enlarging the pool of juveniles who may be sent to criminal court. United States General Accounting Office, Juvenile Justice: Juveniles Processed in Criminal Court and Case Dispositions 19 & n.16 (1995) [hereinafter GAO Report].
114. Ala. Code § 12-15-34 (1995); Alaska Stat. § 47.10.060 (1995); Ariz. R. Juv. P. 12, 14 (Supp. 1995); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-806 (Supp. 1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-127(b) (West 1995); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1010(b)-(c) (1975 & Supp. 1994); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(a) (1989 & Supp. 1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(2) (West Supp. 1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-39 (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-22(a)-(c) (1993); Idaho Code § 20-508 (Supp. 1995); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 705, para. 405/5-4 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-2-4 (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1995); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.45 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1636 (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 635.020, 640.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 & Supp. 1994); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 857 (West 1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4) (West 1980 & Supp. 1995); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-817 (1995); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 61 (Law, Co-op. 1994); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.4 (West 1993); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.125 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157 (1993 & Supp. 1995); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.071 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-206 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 62.080 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-B:24 (1994 & Supp. 1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-26 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (1995); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-34 (1991 & Supp. 1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.26 (Anderson 1994 & Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 7303-4.3(B) (West Supp. 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 419C.349, 419C.352 (1995); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6355 (1982); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-7 (1994), 14-1-7.1 (1994 & Supp. 1995); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-7-430(3)-(6) (Law. Coop. 1985 & Supp. 1995), 20-7-430(9) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 26-11-4 (1992 & Supp. 1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134 (1991 & Supp. 1995); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25 (1992 & Supp. 1995); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5506 (1991); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269.1 (Michie Supp. 1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.110 (West 1993); W. Va. Code § 49-5-10 (1995 & Supp. 1995); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.18 (West Supp. 1995); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237 (1986 & Supp. 1995).
115. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(a) (Michie Supp. 1995) (vesting the juvenile court with exclusive jurisdiction when the case involves a juvenile who was: (1) younger than 14 when the alleged delinquent act occurred; (2) younger than 16 when she allegedly engaged in a nonviolent felony or who is not a habitual juvenile offender; (3) younger than 18 when she allegedly engaged in conduct constituting an adult misdemeanor); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(d) (1986 & Supp. 1995) (vesting the juvenile court with exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving juveniles under age 13 who allegedly committed felonies or misdemeanors punishable by more than six months of imprisonment).
116. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (providing that the judge or "any party" may move for a waiver hearing); Idaho Code § 20-508(2) (Supp. 1995) (stating that the prosecutor, judge, or juvenile may institute a waiver hearing).
117. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (declaring that "there is no place in our system of law" for making the waiver determination "without effective assistance of counsel"). But see Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 71 (noting that in some jurisdictions, "attorneys for the State and the youth are not considered essential to the operation of the system, especially in less serious cases").
118. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 561 (holding that "an opportunity for a hearing which may be informal, must be given the child prior to entry of a waiver order").
119. See infra text accompanying notes 98-101.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 99-103.
121. Thirty-eight jurisdictions provide such considerations in their judicial waiver statutes. Ala. Code § 12-15-34(d) (1995); Ariz. R. Juv. P. 14(c), (d)(1), (e) (Supp. 1995); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(e) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-806(3)(b) (Supp. 1995); Del, Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1010(c) (Supp. 1994); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(e) (1989 & Supp. 1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(2)(c) (West Supp. 1996); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-22(b) (1993); Idaho Code § 20-508(8) (Supp. 1995); III. Ann. Stat. ch. 705, para. 405/5-4(3)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-2-4(b)-(f) (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1995); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.45(7) (West 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1636(e) (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.010(2)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 & Supp. 1994); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 862(A)(2) (West 1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4)(D) (West Supp. 1995); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-817(d) (1995); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 61 (Law. Co-op. 1994); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.4(4) (West 1993); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157(5) (1993 & Supp. 1995); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.071(6) (Vernon Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-206(1)-(2) (1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-B:24(I) (Supp. 1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-26(a)(1)-(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-34(1)-(3) (Supp. 1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.26(C)(1)-(2) (Anderson Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 7303-4.3(B) (West Supp. 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 419C.349(4) (1995); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6355(a) (1982); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-7.1 (1994 & Supp. 1995), 14-1-7.2 (1994); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 26-11-4 (1992 & Supp. 1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(b) (1991 & Supp. 1995); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f) (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25(4) (Supp. 1995); W. Va. Code § 49-5-10(g) (Supp. 1995); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.18(5) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237(b) (1986 & Supp. 1995). Many of the criteria for consideration in these judicial waiver statutes are similar to the eight "determinative factors" enumerated by the Supreme Court in its Appendix to Kent v. United States. See 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966); supra note 60.
122. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(2)(c) (West Supp. 1996).
123. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.4(4) (West 1993).
124. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (1995) (leaving the waiver decision solely to the judge's discretion after a hearing and a finding of probable cause, except in the case of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269.1(A)(4) (Michie Supp. 1995) (requiring a hearing before any transfer from juvenile court but not requiring a consideration of mitigating circumstances in all hearings); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5506(d) (1991) (stating that after the hearing, "the court may consider, among other matters" seven mitigating factors (emphasis added)).
125. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-15-34(f) (1995) (requiring that the court set forth in writing its reasons for a transfer); B.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(d) (1989 & Supp. 1995) (requiring that a statement of the judge's reasons for the waiver accompany the order); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.45(8) (West 1994) (requiring that the court "make and file written findings" of "its reasons for waiving its jurisdiction").
126. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(h) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (stating that "[a]ny party may appeal from [the judge's] order granting or denying the transfer of a case"); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(2)(e) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that the judge's waiver order shall be reviewable upon appeal).
127. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(b) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-805(1) (Supp. 1995); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2301(3)(A) (1989 & Supp. 1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(3)(a)(4)(a), (3)(a)(5)(a)-(b)(I) (West Supp. 1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(1) (1994); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 305(B)(3) (West 1995); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.606 (West Supp. 1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247 (1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(c) (1991); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(c), (e)-(f) (1986 & Supp. 1995).
128. See infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
129. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284-85; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 632. Concurrent jurisdiction exists when both the juvenile and criminal courts are competent to try the alleged offender. Some commentators term this mechanism "direct file." GAO Report, supra note 91, at 5; Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284.
130. See ABA Standards, supra note 16, 3-3.4, -3.9.
131. See GAO Report, supra note 91, at 5; Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284-85; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 632.
132. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-805 (Supp. 1995).
133. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 1995). Arkansas courts also have concurrent jurisdiction over 14- and 15-year-old juveniles who have allegedly committed the adult felonies of murder in the first or second degree, aggravated robbery, battery in the first or second degree, possession of a handgun on school property, aggravated assault, terroristic act, unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, any felony committed with a firearm, soliciting a minor to join a criminal street gang, criminal use of prohibited weapons, or a felony attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit capital murder, murder in the first or second degree, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, rape, or battery in the first degree. Id. The courts also have concurrent jurisdiction in two other situations where the juvenile is 14 and has committed a felony involving a handgun or a felony after having been adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent three times in the preceding two years for acts that would have been felonies if committed by an adult. Id. § 9-27-318(b)(3)-(4).
134. Id. § 9-27-318(b)(1).
135. Id. § 9-27-318(b)(2).
136. Id. § 9-27-318(b)(1). Florida's prosecutorial waiver statute is similar to Arkansas's in terms of its age and offense categories. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(3)(a)(4)(a), (3)(a)(5)(a)-(b)(I) (West Supp. 1996).
137. D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2301(3)(A) (1989 & Supp. 1995).
138. La. Child. Code Ann. art. 305(B) (West 1995); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.606 (West Supp. 1995).
139. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(1) (1994). The criminal court, however, has exclusive jurisdiction over 13- to 17-year-old juveniles charged with murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sexual battery, or armed robbery if committed with a firearm. Id. § 15-11-5(b)(2)(A).
140. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(c) (1991). Offenses that cannot be directly filed in criminal court include arson causing death, assault and robbery with a dangerous weapon or causing bodily injury, aggravated assault, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, or nighttime burglary of sleeping apartments. Id.
141. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
142. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 558 (1966).
143. See supra note 105.
144. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276 (1993); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-203(f)(iii), 14-6-237(b) (1986 & Supp. 1995). In Nebraska, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction or when the juvenile is under age 16, the prosecutor shall consider: (1) The type of treatment such juvenile would most likely be amenable to; (2) whether there is evidence that the alleged offense included violence or was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner; (3) the motivation for the commission of the offense; (4) the age of the juvenile and the ages and circumstances of any others involved in the offense; (5) the previous history of the juvenile, including whether he or she had been convicted of any previous offenses or adjudicated in juvenile court, and, if so, whether such offenses were crimes against the person or relating to property, and other previous history of antisocial behavior, if any, including any patterns of physical violence; (6) the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his or her home, school activities, emotional attitude and desire to be treated as an adult, pattern of living, and whether he or she has had previous contact with law enforcement agencies and courts and the nature thereof; (7) whether there are facilities particularly available to the juvenile court for treatment and rehabilitation of the juvenile; (8) whether the best interests of the juvenile and the security of the public may require that the juvenile continue in custody or under supervision for a period extending beyond his or her minority and, if so, the available alternatives best suited to this purpose; and (9) such other matters as the county attorney deems relevant to his or her decision. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276 (1993). Though Nebraska requires the prosecutor to consider mitigating circumstances, the statutory language skews the consideration towards the best interests of the community, not the child. Wyoming's prosecutorial waiver statute requires a prosecutor to consider similar "determinative factors" only when the case falls within the juvenile and criminal courts' concurrent jurisdiction and the juvenile is 17. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(f)(iii) (1986 & Supp. 1995). Again, however, the balancing of interests favors "the protection of the community." Id. § 14-6-237(b)(i). These considerations are: (i) The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the community required waiver; (ii) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner; (iii) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted; (iv) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one (1) court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime; (v) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of [her] home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living; (vi) The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with the law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions; (vii) The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if [she] is found to have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the juvenile court. Id. § 14-6-237(b)(i)-(vii).
145. Those five situations are: (1) violations of municipal ordinances; (2) misdemeanors for which the maximum penalty is less than six months of imprisonment; (3) cases in which the juvenile has reached age 17; (4) cases in which the juvenile has reached age 14 and is charged with a violent felony; (5) cases in which the juvenile has reached age 14, is charged with a felony, and has previously been twice adjudicated delinquent for committing adult crimes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(f)(i)-(v) (1986 & Supp. 1995). Only in the third circumstance must a prosecutor consider mitigating factors before she decides where to file the case. Id. § 14-6-203(f)(iii).
146. Id. § 14-6-237(b) (Supp. 1995).
147. See, e.g., Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 818-19 (Wyo. 1995) (stating that Wyoming prosecutors have discretion to determine what charges to file and to choose the court in which to file those charges); Myers v. District Court, 518 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo. 1974) (en bane) (holding that because "a prosecutor has constitutional power to exercise [her] discretion in deciding which of several possible charges to press in a prosecution," she may properly choose the court in which to file those charges); Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 87 (stating that "[s]tate appellate courts have taken the view that prosecutorial discretion is equivalent to the routine charging decisions made in criminal cases").
148. See generally Miller, supra note 14, at 151-345 ("Part IV: Discretion and the Charging Decision"). The ABA Standards set out similar considerations for choosing not to institute criminal proceedings: (b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising his or her discretion are: (i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty; (ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense; (iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular offense or the offender; (iv) possible improper motives of a complainant; (v) reluctance of the victim to testify; (vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others; and (vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction. ABA Standards, supra note 16, at 3-3.9(b)(i)-(vii).
149. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that a prosecutor "refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause." Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8(a) (1994). Similarly, the ABA Standards require probable cause to institute criminal proceedings. ABA Standards, supra note 16, at 3-3.9(a). In the same vein, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility advises prosecutors to "use restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute." Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1981).
150. See ABA Standards, supra note 16, at 3-3.9(a).
151. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 295; see ABA Standards, supra note 16, at 3-3.9(b)(ii).
152. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 299.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 301.
155. See GAO Report, supra note 91, at 5; Guttman, supra note 12, at 521.
156. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284; Feld, supra note 19, at 488; see GAO Report, supra note 91, at 5.
157. Ala. Code § 12-15-34.1(a)-(b) (1995); Alaska Stat. § 47.10.010(e) (1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-127(a) (West 1995); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 921(2)(a) (1975 & Supp. 1994), 1010(a) (Supp. 1994); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(h) (1989); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(3)(a)(1), (3)(a)(3), (3)(a)(4)(d), (3)(a)(5)(b)(II), (3)(a)(5)(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(2)(A) (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-22(c)-(d) (1993); Idaho Code § 20-509(1)-(2) (Supp. 1995); III. Ann. Stat. ch. 705, para. 405/5-4(3.1)-(3.2), (6)(a), (7)(a), (8)(a) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-2-1.1(b), (d) (Burns Supp. 1995); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.8(1)(b) (West 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-3611(a), (c) (1995), 38-1636(h) (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 635.020(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 305(A) (West 1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4)(G) (West 1980); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-804(e)(1)-(4) (1995 & Supp. 1995); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 260.015(5)(b), 260.125(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-151(1)(a)-(b), (2) (1993 & Supp. 1995), 43-21-157(9) (Supp. 1995); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.071(9) (Vernon Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-206(3) (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 62.040(1)(b)(1), 62.080(3) (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-B:27 (1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-3(H) (Michie 1995); N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2151.011(B)(1), 2151.26(B) (Anderson Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 7001-1.3(2), 7306-1.1(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1996); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 6322(a) (1982 & Supp. 1995), 6355(e) (1982); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-3(1), -7.1(c) (1994 & Supp. 1995); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-390 (1985 & Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(c) (Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-16(1), 78-3a-25(12) (Supp. 1995); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(b) (1991); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269.6(C) (Michie Supp. 1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv), 13.40.020(14) (West Supp. 1996); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.183 (West Supp. 1995); see Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 419C.364 (1995) (permitting the criminal court judge, in a case involving a waived juvenile aged 16 or older, to order that all further proceedings involving the juvenile will be waived to criminal court without any juvenile court proceedings).
158. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284.
159. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-15-34.1(a) (1995) (stating that "any person who has attained the age of 16 years at the time of the conduct charged and who is charged with the commission of any act or conduct, which if committed by an adult would constitute [a capital offense], shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of juvenile court but shall be charged, arrested, and tried as an adult"); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 7001-1.3(1), 7306-1.1(A) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that "[a]ny person sixteen (16) . . . years of age who is charged with murder . . . shall be considered as an adult" and thus automatically subject to criminal court jurisdiction).
160. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-127(a) (West 1995) (excluding juveniles 14 and older charged with capital or serious felonies); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(2)(A) (1994) (excluding juveniles 13 and older charged with murder or other violent felonies).
161. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4)(G) (West 1980) (stating that "[i]n all prosecutions for subsequent crimes, any person bound over and convicted as an adult shall be proceeded against as if [she] were an adult"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-8:27 (1994) (requiring that "[a]ny minor who has been tried and convicted as an adult shall henceforth be treated as an adult"); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 13.04.030 (1)(e)(iv), 13.40.020 (West Supp. 1996) (stating that the adult criminal courts have "exclusive original jurisdiction" when the juvenile is 16 or 17, has committed a violent offense, and has a criminal history of "[o]ne or more prior serious violent offenses," "two or more prior violent offenses," or "three or more of any combination of" certain felonies, vehicular assault, and manslaughter in the second degree).
162. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
163. See Feld, supra note 37, at 701, 708; Guttman, supra note 12, at 522.
164. Guttman, supra note 12, at 521; see Feld, supra note 37, at 701. Of course, prosecutors still determine how to charge the juvenile. Jensen, supra note 20, at 181.
165. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (stating that either party or the court may ask for a reverse waiver hearing); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1011(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994) (permitting the Attorney General to reverse waive a juvenile case or the juvenile to petition the court for reverse waiver).
166. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1011(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(2)(B) (1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.010(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 & Supp. 1994); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157(8) (Supp. 1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 62.080(3) (Michie Supp. 1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-B:25 (1994 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 190.71, 210.43 (McKinney 1993); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 7306-1.1(E) (West Supp. 1996); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 6322(a) (1982 & Supp. 1995); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(a)-(b) (1991); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 970.032 (West Supp. 1995).
167. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1011(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.010(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 & Supp. 1994); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157(8) (Supp. 1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(d) (Supp. 1995); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.08 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269.4 (Michie Supp. 1995); W. Va. Code § 49-5-10(j) (Supp. 1995).
168. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-261 (1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(c) (1991); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237(g) (1986 & Supp. 1995).
169. See supra note 144.
170. See supra note 145.
171. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
172. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
174. See supra notes 58-63, 69, 74-76 and accompanying text.
175. United States v. Bland, 412 U.S. 909, 911 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
176. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276 (1993); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-203(f)(iii), -237(b) (1986 & Supp. 1995).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
179. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1003 (Utah 1995) (stating that Utah's prosecutorial waiver statute "does not indicate what characteristics of the
180. See supra part I.B.
181. See supra part I.A.
182. Prosecutorial waiver is difficult to review meaningfully due to the lack of written reasons for the waiver and the protected nature of prosecutorial discretion. See Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 72; infra note 165 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
184. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-261 (1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505 (1991); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237(g) (1986 & Supp. 1995).
185. GAO Report, supra note 91, at 66.
186. The only prosecutorial waiver jurisdictions that statutorily guarantee the right to appeal are Arkansas, Nebraska, Vermont, and Wyoming. See supra note 162.
187. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); see also Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise [of prosecutorial] discretion . . . .").
188. See infra part III.A.2.
189. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 803 S.W.2d 502, 505-06 (Ark. 1991) (stating that the party seeking to transfer the defendant has the burden of proof); State v. Buelow, 587 A.2d 948, 950 (Vt. 1990) (stating that the party petitioning the court for reverse waiver to juvenile court when she has been statutorily excluded therefrom has the burden of proof; because legislative and prosecutorial waiver are similar, prosecutorial waiver likely places the burden of proof on the juvenile as well); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237(g) (1986 & Supp. 1995) (stating that, after a reverse waiver hearing initiated by either party or the judge, the criminal court judge may transfer the matter if she finds it "more properly suited to disposition" in juvenile court; presumably, the juvenile would have to persuade the judge to make this finding). But see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-261 (1993) (stating that a juvenile's petition for reverse waiver will be granted after the presentation of evidence by both parties at a hearing "unless a sound basis exists for retaining jurisdiction").
190. This presumes, of course, that the prosecutor or the judge institutes the waiver proceeding. If the juvenile herself petitions the court for waiver, she bears the burden of proof. See supra note 167. But see S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 26-11-10 (Supp. 1995) (stating that when the juvenile is 16 or older and charged with a violent or serious felony, she must rebut the presumption that juvenile court jurisdiction should be waived in order to avoid judicial waiver).
191. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-54 (1966).
192. See, e.g., In re R.D., 574 A.2d 160, 163 (Vt. 1990) (stating that juvenile proceedings for transfer from criminal to juvenile court are not confidential).
193. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
194. Cf. Hearings, supra note 86, at 10 (stating that juveniles commit only one out of eight violent crimes).
195. Boyce, supra note 46, at 995-96.
196. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
197. Id. at 553.
198. See Russell v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214, 1216-17 (8th Cir. 1976); Myers v. District Court, 518 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo. 1974) (en bane).
199. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
200. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1003 (Utah 1995) (stating that selecting a charge and selecting the trial forum are two different functions); supra text accompanying note 109.
201. 901 P.2d at 1003.
202. 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995).
203. Id. at 1002-04. But cf. Chapman y. State, 385 S.E.2d 661, 663 (Ga. 1989) (holding that prosecutors may both charge a juvenile and choose the forum in which to file her case because "the initial option to select a forum when concurrent jurisdiction exists belongs to the litigant").
204. 901 P.2d at 1002-03.
205. Id. at 1003.
206. Id.
207. Id. (second emphasis added).
208. Id.; see supra note 165 and accompanying text.
209. Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1003.
210. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility, supra note 127, EC 7-13.
211. See T. Kenneth Moran & John L. Cooper, Discretion and the Criminal Justice Process 53 (1983).
212. See William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. 539, 540-41 (1986).
213. Id. at 567.
214. Barry C. Feld, supra note 37, at 701-02; Guttman, supra note 12, at 521-22; Martin J. O'Hara, Note, Is It a Crime to Live in Public Housing? A Proposal to the Illinois General Assembly to Amend the Automatic Transfer Statute, 27 J. Marshall L. Rev 855, 864 (1994).
215. Barry C. Feld, supra note 37, at 701-02; Guttman, supra note 12, at 521-22; Martin J. O'Hara, Note, Is It a Crime to Live in Public Housing? A Proposal to the Illinois General Assembly to Amend the Automatic Transfer Statute, 27 J. Marshall L. Rev 855, 864 (1994).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 161-70.
218. See id.
219. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
220. Id. at 554.
221. See Moran & Cooper, supra note 189, at 84.
222. See id. at 85 (stating that a judge's authority in the courtroom is given to her "in the name of protecting the rights of the accused").
223. See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 1 & 3 (1990).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102; see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 565-67 (1966) (advocating consideration of eight potentially mitigating factors in judicial waiver hearings).
225. See, e.g., Model Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 200, Canon 1(A) (stating that "[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society").
226. See supra text accompanying notes 99, 127-28.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
228. Id.
229. See supra part I.A.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04; Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 301.
231. See Rubin, supra note 26, at 186-87 (advocating the initiation of all juvenile cases in juvenile court with a judicial waiver proviso); Boyce, supra note 46, at 1008-09 (same).
232. See supra parts III.A.1, III.A.2.
233. See supra part III.A.3.
234. See supra part III.B.
235. See supra parts I.A, I.B., III.C.