Private participation in the enforcement of WTO law: The new EC trade barriers regulation

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 299-318

  Bronckers, Marco C E J ^a  

^a Trenité Van Doorne   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030530264     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (77)

1. For instance, the EC Council of Ministers declared at the time it ratified the WTO agreements: "Whereas, by its nature, the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, including the Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts." See Council Decision 94/800, O.J. 1994, L 336/1.
2. See the Commission's proposal to the Council of 29 Nov. 1963, Bulletin No. 1-1964 (Supplement 30).
3. See Bronckers, "Private response to foreign unfair trade practices - United States and EEC Complaint Procedures", 6 Northwestern Journ. of Int. Law and Business (1984), 651, 671-674.
4. See Bronckers, id., at 674-677.
5. See Bronckers, id., at 677-686.
6. See Bronckers, id., at 716-721.
7. See Art. 10(2) and (3) Council Reg. 2641/84, O.J. 1984, L 252/1. See Steenbergen, "The New Commercial Policy Instrument", 22 CML Rev. 421-439; Bronckers, op. cit. at 723-751. On further differences between US law and EC law see Mavroidis, Handelspolitische Abwehrmechanismen der EWG und der USA und Ihre Vereinbarkeit mit den GATT-regeln (Verlagsgesellschaft Internationales Recht, Stuttgart, 1993).
8. See Art. 10(2) and (3) Council Reg. 2641/84, O.J. 1984, L 252/1. See Steenbergen, "The New Commercial Policy Instrument", 22 CML Rev. 421-439; Bronckers, op. cit. at 723-751. On further differences between US law and EC law see Mavroidis, Handelspolitische Abwehrmechanismen der EWG und der USA und Ihre Vereinbarkeit mit den GATT-regeln (Verlagsgesellschaft Internationales Recht, Stuttgart, 1993).
9. See Art. 10(2) and (3) Council Reg. 2641/84, O.J. 1984, L 252/1. See Steenbergen, "The New Commercial Policy Instrument", 22 CML Rev. 421-439; Bronckers, op. cit. at 723-751. On further differences between US law and EC law see Mavroidis, Handelspolitische Abwehrmechanismen der EWG und der USA und Ihre Vereinbarkeit mit den GATT-regeln (Verlagsgesellschaft Internationales Recht, Stuttgart, 1993).
10. Bronckers, "The potential and limitations of the Community's New Trade Policy Instrument", in Demaret, Bourgeois & Van Bael (Eds.), Trade Laws of the European Community and the United States in a Comparative Perspective (College of Europe, Bruges, 1992), pp. 133-164, with references to other literature.
11. See O.J. 1986, C 25/20.
12. See O.J. 1987, L 117/18.
13. See GATT, 36th Supp. BISD 345 (1990).
14. See O.J. 1987, C 136/3.
15. See O.J. 1988, L 123/51.
16. See the critique of Alexander, "Indonesian Copyright Law as 'Illicit Commercial Practices'", (February 1988) Bar European News 8-9. For a rebuttal see Bourgeois, "EC Rules against 'Illicit Trade Practices' - Policy Cosmetics or International Law Enforcement?", 1988 Annual Proceedings Fordham Corporate Law Institute (1989), Chapt. 6, at 6-11 note 41 and 6-13/14; Bronckers, supra note 8, at 152-154.
17. See the critique of Alexander, "Indonesian Copyright Law as 'Illicit Commercial Practices'", (February 1988) Bar European News 8-9. For a rebuttal see Bourgeois, "EC Rules against 'Illicit Trade Practices' - Policy Cosmetics or International Law Enforcement?", 1988 Annual Proceedings Fordham Corporate Law Institute (1989), Chapt. 6, at 6-11 note 41 and 6-13/14; Bronckers, supra note 8, at 152-154.
18. See O.J. 1991, C 189/26.
19. See O.J. 1996, L 11/7 (the case had been transferred meanwhile to the new Trade Barriers Regulation).
20. See O.J. 1991, C 40/18.
21. See O.J. 1993, L 166/45.
22. See O.J. 1993, C 235/4.
23. Unfortunately, the Commission never published this decision.
24. See O.J. 1989, L 30/67.
25. See Council Reg. 3286/94, O.J. 1994, L 249/71.
26. See Art. 2(2) Reg. 2641/84.
27. See Art. 2(1) Reg. 3286/94.
28. See Art. 2(2) Reg. 3286/94. But see infra text at note 42 (excluding certain international trade rules from the TBR's scope).
29. Compare, id., with Art. XXIII (1) GATT.
30. See Petersmann, "Violation and non-violation complaints in public international trade law", 34 German Yearbook of International Law (1992), 175, at 196-228.
31. See Bourgeois, supra note 14, at 6-13. See also case 70/87, Fediol IV, [1989] ECR 1781, para 42 (where the Court misread the relevant GATT provisions, Art. XXIII (1)(b) and (c), as setting forth only procedural rules).
32. See Art. 26 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
33. See Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Clarendon Press, 1986) pp. 156-157.
34. See Art. 2(1) Reg. 3286/94.
35. See Art. XXIII (1)(c) GATT 1994 and Appendix 1 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.
36. See Art. 2(2) Reg. 3286/94.
37. See Art. 2(5) and (6) Reg. 3286/94.
38. See Weiss, "The General Agreement on Trade in Services 1994", 32 CML Rev. 1177-1225.
39. See Bronckers, "The impact of TRIPS: Intellectual property protection in developing countries", 31 CML Rev., 1245-1281.
40. See the Indonesian sound recordings case.
41. See the Japanese harbour fees case.
42. See Opinion 1/94, [1994] ECR I-5267. See Bourgeois, "The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: An Echternach Procession", 32 CML Rev. 763-787.
43. See Art. 22(3) WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.
44. See Kuyper, "The New WTO Dispute Settlement System: The impact on the Community", in Bourgeois, Berrod & Gippini-Fournier (Eds.), The Uruguay Round Results: A European Lasers' Perspective (PIE 1995), pp. 87 et seq. at 99-100.
45. See Art. 4(1) Reg. 3286/94. Some observers have dismissed this limitation too lightly as mere "cosmetics". See Beekmann, "The 1994 Revised Commercial Policy Instrument of the European Union", 19 World Competition (1995) 53, at 68.
46. The Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Slovenia are WTO members. Applicants for WTO membership are: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
47. At last count the Community had concluded Europe agreements with Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania and Slovenia. The EC had concluded Partnership agreements with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, and the Ukraine. The EC had concluded a Trade and Cooperation agreement with Albania. To the extent no other agreement is in force the Trade and Cooperation agreement of 1989 between the EC and the Soviet Union is still relevant regarding former USSR countries. See further Maresceau and Montaguti, "The relations between the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: A legal appraisal", 32 CML Rev., 1327-1367.
48. Cf. Art. 4(1) with 3(1) Reg. 3286/94.
49. See Art. 2(4) Reg. 3286/94.
50. In that case, the individual complainant will normally also have demonstrated, as must any complainant under the TBR, that a formal investigation is in the Community interest. See Art. 8(1) Reg. 3286/94, discussed, infra, at note 61.
51. See Art. 12(1) Reg. 3286/94.
52. For an early critique see Bronckers, supra note 3, at 735-740.
53. See Art. 12(2) and (3) Reg. 3286/94.
54. Some changes to the decision-making process under the NCPI were introduced in 1994. See Council Regulation 522/94, O.J. 1994, L 66/10.
55. See Art. 13(2) Reg. 3286/94. Assuming the Commission has proposed that the Council take retaliatory measures in affirmative vote, a qualified majority of Member States carrying 62 votes is required. Pursuant to the weighted voting system, the following number of votes are currently allocated: Belgium 5; Denmark 3; Germany 10; Greece 5; Spain 8; France 10; Ireland 3; Italy 10; Luxembourg 2; Netherlands 5; Austria 4; Portugal 5; Finland 3; Sweden 4; United Kingdom 10. See Art. 15 of the Act of Accession as amended by Art. 8 of Council Decision 95/1, adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of new Member States to the European Union, O.J. 1995, L 1/1.
56. This can be deduced from case C-327/91, France v. Commission, [1994] ECR I-3641. See Burrows, "No general external relations competence for the Commission", 20 EL Rev. (1995), 210-213.
57. At least 10 Member States have to vote for reversal, and they also have to carry 62 votes or more. On the weighted voting system see, supra, note 52.
58. See Art. 13 and 14 Reg. 3286/94. Such decision may be challenged in Court. See infra text at notes 61-63.
59. This is the formal title of Reg. 3286/94.
60. See Council Decision 93/350, O.J. 1993, L 144/21.
61. See ECJ, Fediol IV, supra, note 28.
62. See Art. 6(1) Reg. 2641/84.
63. See e.g. Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI/SAMI, [1983] ECR 801. For a critical review of this case law see Petersmann, "Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities", 20 CML Rev. 397-437.
64. See Art. 8(1) Reg. 3286/94.
65. See case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, [1994] ECR I-4973.
66. See e.g. case C-174/87, Ricoh v. Council, [1992] ECR I-1335, para 68.
67. See Art. 22(2) and (6) WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.
68. Cf. Art. 21(1) Council Reg. 3283/94, O.J. 1994, L 349/1.
69. Given that few countries currently are party to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, the third country threat may be consistent with its international obligations. The parties to this plurilateral agreement of the WTO are Canada, the European Community, Israel, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland and the United States. Demands for accession have been received from Aruba and Liechtenstein, while Australia and New Zealand are examining the possibility of joining (status of summer 1995).
70. See generally, Micklitz & Reich (Eds.), Public Interest Litigation before the European Courts (Nomos, forthcoming). For a critical analysis of this case law see also Waelbroeck & Verheyden, "Les conditions de recevabilité des recours en annulation des particuliers contre les actes normatifs communautaires", 31 CDE (1995), 399-441.
71. See generally, Micklitz & Reich (Eds.), Public Interest Litigation before the European Courts (Nomos, forthcoming). For a critical analysis of this case law see also Waelbroeck & Verheyden, "Les conditions de recevabilité des recours en annulation des particuliers contre les actes normatifs communautaires", 31 CDE (1995), 399-441.
72. See generally Petersmann, "The Dispute Settlement of the World Trade Organization and the evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948", 31 CML Rev. 1157-1244.
73. Previously, in its almost 50 years of existence, the GATT authorized retaliation only once. See GATT 1st Supp. BISD 32 and 62 (1953) (authorizing the Netherlands to retaliate against US restrictions on dairy products).
74. See Art. 22(2) and (6) WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. This may be different in respect of "non-violation" complaints. See Art. 26 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.
75. See Art. 1(1) Reg. 3286/94.
76. See, supra, note 54.
77. See, supra, note 52.