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Volumn 31, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 419-429

Asymmetric learning and the wage/productivity relationship

Author keywords

Labor market signalling; Wage determination

Indexed keywords


EID: 0030529098     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(96)00884-0     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (7)

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