Instincts as reflex choice: Does loss of temper have strategic value?

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 335-356

  Morrison, William G ^a  

^a WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Asymmetric encounters; Evolutionary stability; Loss of temper; Reflex choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030527230     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(96)00878-5     Document Type: Article

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