The business politicians: Reflections from a study of political corruption

Journal of Law and Society

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 73-94

  Della Porta, Donatella ^a   Pizzorno, Alessandro ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORENCE   (Italy)

^b EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030527166     PISSN: 0263323X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1410468     Document Type: Article

References (73)

1. J. Brice, Modern Democracies (1991) vol. II, 523.
2. The classical critical works on democracy, Mosca and Pareto, both place the emphasis on the necessary connection between corruption and a parliamentary regime. Particularly eloquent citations can be found in S. Belligni, 'Corruzione e scienza politica: una riflessione agli inizi' (1987) 3 Teoria Politica 61-88, see 63 ff.
3. In other words, even quite normal and legal actions can create inequalities of access to the services of the State. Thus, a law favouring, let us say, the recruitment of persons disabled in war in public offices creates an inequality of access. Or, a law favouring fiscal exemptions for investments in certain areas of a country favours those willing to invest there. Analogously, one could argue that the 'unwritten law' of the bribe favours whoever is willing to pay a certain sum to obtain certain enactments. The difference between the two types of inequality would then be reduced to 'written/unwritten', that is, 'public/not public', in other words, the violation of the principle of transparency already indicated. In reality, the difference is not solely between open and concealed inequality but between inequality which is justifiable and foreseeable (after the enactment) as opposed to individual arbitrariness. These considerations lead to a rejection of the paradoxical and hasty assertion in Lombardi (F. Lombardi, 'La corruzione come momento d'allocazione delle risorse' (1990) 17 Sociologia del Diritto 197) that corruption is a way of introducing certainty into relations between bureaucracy and citizens. Bribery can bring efficiency and certainty in one area of relations only by increasing the uncertainty and inefficiency of the rest of the system. The link between corruption and alterations in the right of equality is implicitly placed at the centre of the problem of corruption by M. Centorrino, 'Ma quanto èmoderna la corruzione politica' (1988) 4 Politica ed Economia 22-4. A clear analysis of the forms of resource distribution actuated through the law, and their effects, intended or otherwise, in altering the relative position of social groups is to be found in G. Corso, 'Lo Stato come dispensatore di beni. Tecniche giuridiche ed effetti' (1990) 17 Sociologia del Diritto 109-32.
4. In other words, even quite normal and legal actions can create inequalities of access to the services of the State. Thus, a law favouring, let us say, the recruitment of persons disabled in war in public offices creates an inequality of access. Or, a law favouring fiscal exemptions for investments in certain areas of a country favours those willing to invest there. Analogously, one could argue that the 'unwritten law' of the bribe favours whoever is willing to pay a certain sum to obtain certain enactments. The difference between the two types of inequality would then be reduced to 'written/unwritten', that is, 'public/not public', in other words, the violation of the principle of transparency already indicated. In reality, the difference is not solely between open and concealed inequality but between inequality which is justifiable and foreseeable (after the enactment) as opposed to individual arbitrariness. These considerations lead to a rejection of the paradoxical and hasty assertion in Lombardi (F. Lombardi, 'La corruzione come momento d'allocazione delle risorse' (1990) 17 Sociologia del Diritto 197) that corruption is a way of introducing certainty into relations between bureaucracy and citizens. Bribery can bring efficiency and certainty in one area of relations only by increasing the uncertainty and inefficiency of the rest of the system. The link between corruption and alterations in the right of equality is implicitly placed at the centre of the problem of corruption by M. Centorrino, 'Ma quanto èmoderna la corruzione politica' (1988) 4 Politica ed Economia 22-4. A clear analysis of the forms of resource distribution actuated through the law, and their effects, intended or otherwise, in altering the relative position of social groups is to be found in G. Corso, 'Lo Stato come dispensatore di beni. Tecniche giuridiche ed effetti' (1990) 17 Sociologia del Diritto 109-32.
5. In other words, even quite normal and legal actions can create inequalities of access to the services of the State. Thus, a law favouring, let us say, the recruitment of persons disabled in war in public offices creates an inequality of access. Or, a law favouring fiscal exemptions for investments in certain areas of a country favours those willing to invest there. Analogously, one could argue that the 'unwritten law' of the bribe favours whoever is willing to pay a certain sum to obtain certain enactments. The difference between the two types of inequality would then be reduced to 'written/unwritten', that is, 'public/not public', in other words, the violation of the principle of transparency already indicated. In reality, the difference is not solely between open and concealed inequality but between inequality which is justifiable and foreseeable (after the enactment) as opposed to individual arbitrariness. These considerations lead to a rejection of the paradoxical and hasty assertion in Lombardi (F. Lombardi, 'La corruzione come momento d'allocazione delle risorse' (1990) 17 Sociologia del Diritto 197) that corruption is a way of introducing certainty into relations between bureaucracy and citizens. Bribery can bring efficiency and certainty in one area of relations only by increasing the uncertainty and inefficiency of the rest of the system. The link between corruption and alterations in the right of equality is implicitly placed at the centre of the problem of corruption by M. Centorrino, 'Ma quanto èmoderna la corruzione politica' (1988) 4 Politica ed Economia 22-4. A clear analysis of the forms of resource distribution actuated through the law, and their effects, intended or otherwise, in altering the relative position of social groups is to be found in G. Corso, 'Lo Stato come dispensatore di beni. Tecniche giuridiche ed effetti' (1990) 17 Sociologia del Diritto 109-32.
6. Gambetta talks of 'identification costs' which the broker has to support (D. Gambetta, 'Anatomia della tangente' (1988) 4 Meridiana 237-47). These, on the other hand, are only a form of the more general category of transaction costs.
7. The Italian term is particularly specific and eloquent. The literature in English uses more generic terms such as broker or sometimes middleman. A recent study explicitly dedicated to one manifestation of this kind of figure is P. Oldenberg, 'Middlemen in Third-World Corruption: Implications of an Indian Case' (1987) 39 World Politics 508-35. A good analysis of the methodological problems associated with the concept of political mediation is M. Calise, Il sistema D.C. (1978) 98 ff.
8. The Italian term is particularly specific and eloquent. The literature in English uses more generic terms such as broker or sometimes middleman. A recent study explicitly dedicated to one manifestation of this kind of figure is P. Oldenberg, 'Middlemen in Third-World Corruption: Implications of an Indian Case' (1987) 39 World Politics 508-35. A good analysis of the methodological problems associated with the concept of political mediation is M. Calise, Il sistema D.C. (1978) 98 ff.
9. P. Reuter in an unpublished paper on the mafia.
10. The possession of 'pre-political' resources such as organizing ability, which many of these people show right from the start of their careers, should not be considered an exception. It can be derived either from character traits or from their original position in a group, subculture or friendship network. Generally, such initial capital is not put at risk by the subsequent activity of the business politician but on the contrary, valorized.
11. A. Mastropaolo, 'Parlamenti e parlamentari negli anni ottanta' (1990) 20 Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 58-9.
12. For more information, see D. della Porta, Lo scambio occulto. Casi di corruzione politico in Italia (1992) chs. 2 and 9.
13. Ilio Mungai's role as broker in the bribery scandal concerning the contract for constructing the magistrate's court of Viareggio illustrates this well. Mungai - not a member of any political party - saw to the collection of the payoffs and their distribution to the adjudicating commission, the local federation and the national administrative secretariat of the PSI (A. Vannucci, 'La realtà economics della corruzione. Analisi di un caso' (1992) 34 Stato e mercato 63-95.
14. The Florentine judges, for example, described one of the accused as a man of a thousand trades, ex-restaurant owner, unlicensed estate agent, 'broker' (Tribunale di Firenze (Tribunal of Florence), Sentenza in prima istanza del tribunale penale, n. 407 RS 1986, p. 24), officially unemployed but with millions in the bank and in bonds. Another, they described as a segnalatore di pratiche (literally, someone who signals, or indicates, dossiers).
15. It can be noted that privileged information is particularly easy to obtain in environments where bribery is 'institutionalized', where small groups of entrepreneurs with privileged and frequent contacts with politicians are formed. In the present research it was observed that corruption appears to be facilitated by the existence of stable contacts between administrators and the private parties, such as the building contractors in Savona or the pharmaceutical representatives in Catania. On this point, see, also, J.A. Gardiner and T.R. Lyman, Decisions for Sale. Corruption and Reform in Land Use and Building Regulations (1978) part III.
16. The function of power networks in stabilizing contacts between the criminal world and the legitimate power have also been discussed in relation to other forms of crime. Characteristic of these networks is that they aggregate around 'voluntary associations with very varied, completely legal, declared goals (the sharing of acquaintances and contacts, charity, legitimate lobbying, the promotion of cultural and religious values, etc.), but which accentuate the reserved, semi-secret character of their membership's identities and activities' (P. Arlacchi, 'Saggio sui mercati illegali (1988) 29 Rassegna italiana di sociologia 420).
17. Eight of the accused in the Savonese case were affiliates of masonic lodges (Tribunale di Savona (Tribunal of Savona), Sentenza-ordinanza di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento, n. 141/81 ARGGI 1984, pp. 120, 160-172) and three in the Florentine case Tribunale di Firenze (Tribunal of Florence) Sentenza-ordinanza di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento n. 380/83A 1984, p. 6 and Sentenza-ordinanza di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento n. 212/84A 1987, p. 56).
18. Eight of the accused in the Savonese case were affiliates of masonic lodges (Tribunale di Savona (Tribunal of Savona), Sentenza-ordinanza di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento, n. 141/81 ARGGI 1984, pp. 120, 160-172) and three in the Florentine case (Tribunale di Firenze (Tribunal of Florence) Sentenza-ordinanza di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento n. 380/83A 1984, p. 6 and Sentenza-ordinanza di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento n. 212/84A 1987, p. 56).
19. Eight of the accused in the Savonese case were affiliates of masonic lodges (Tribunale di Savona (Tribunal of Savona), Sentenza-ordinanza di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento, n. 141/81 ARGGI 1984, pp. 120, 160-172) and three in the Florentine case Tribunale di Firenze (Tribunal of Florence) Sentenza-ordinanza di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento n. 380/83A 1984, p. 6 and Sentenza-ordinanza di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento n. 212/84A 1987, p. 56).
20. Cited in G. Bocca, 'Ruba compagno ruba ordind la banda Teardo' La Repubblica, 8 September 1983.
21. N. Bozzo, Rapporta N. 425/53 diprot. 1983, 15 February 1984, 30.
22. Trib. Savona, op. cit., n. 14.
23. Compare M. Caciagli et al., Democrazia cristiana e potere nel Mezzogiorno. Il sistema democristiano a Catania (1977) ch. VII.
24. In another context, it has been observed that the criminal also seeks protection from the politician. For instance, according to Landesco, gangsters in the United States of America depended on political protection for their criminal activities. Therefore, they had a vital interest in the success of those candidates they believed favourably disposed towards them (J. Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago (1968) 183).
25. The preliminary sentence on the Savona case also cites twelve other cases of attacks on construction sites between 1980 and 1983, the authors of which remain unknown. (Trib. Savona, op. cit., n. 14.)
26. G. Baget Bozzo, 'Il "principe" della Liguria' La Repubblica, 28-9 July 1985.
27. F. Coisson, 'Avanti Savona' L'Espresso, 26 June 1983.
28. That networking activity absorbs a good part of politicians' time has also been confirmed for Germany (see E.K. Scheuch and U. Scheuch, Cliquen, Klügel und Karrieren (1992) 50-2).
29. For example, see A.P. Frognier, 'Corruption and Consociational Democracy: First Thoughts on the Belgian Case' (1986) 1 Corruption and Reform 143-8, on Belgium.
30. In Il Secolo d'Italia, 17 April 1985.
31. A. Carlucci, Tangentomani. Storie, affari e tuttiii documenti sui barbari che hanno saccheggiato Milano (1992) 118-19.
32. Both traditional notable clientelism, with localized patron-client relations, and client networks linked to broad institutional contexts were therefore present: to use Eisenstadt and Roniger's definition, both patron brokerage and organizational clientelistic brokerage (S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, Patrons, Clients and Friends. Interpersonal Ralations and Structure of Trust in Society (1984)). On clientele management by corrupt politicians, compare D. della Porta, and A. Vannucci, Corruzione politica e amministrazione pubblica. Risorse, meccanismi, attori (1995).
33. Both traditional notable clientelism, with localized patron-client relations, and client networks linked to broad institutional contexts were therefore present: to use Eisenstadt and Roniger's definition, both patron brokerage and organizational clientelistic brokerage (S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, Patrons, Clients and Friends. Interpersonal Ralations and Structure of Trust in Society (1984)). On clientele management by corrupt politicians, compare D. della Porta, and A. Vannucci, Corruzione politica e amministrazione pubblica. Risorse, meccanismi, attori (1995).
34. Trib. Savona, op. cit., n. 14, p. 148.
35. Bocca, op. cit., n. 15, p. 9.
36. A. Pizzorno, 'La corruzione nel sistema politico' in della Porta, op. cit., n. 9, pp. 11-74.
37. In particular, it has been observed of the Italian magistracy that, in apparent contradiction to an organizational structure which gives ample guarantees of independence to judges, 'a strong tendency has emerged for contacts and connections to develop between magistrates and the political world, the political parties and between currents within the judiciary and parties or party factions' (C. Guarnieri, 'Magistratura e politica: il caso italiano' (1991) 21 Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico 25-6). The flourishing of well-paid 'extra-judicial appointments' together with the relevance of party or factional connections in career evolution might explain 'the long and tormented course of penal investigations regarding politicians or public administrators' (id, p. 26). Concerning the pressure to which a number of judges engaged in corruption trials have been subjected, see the testimony of one of the examining magistrates in the trial of the Savonese group (M. Del Gaudo, La toga strappata (1992) especially 32-40). ,
38. In particular, it has been observed of the Italian magistracy that, in apparent contradiction to an organizational structure which gives ample guarantees of independence to judges, 'a strong tendency has emerged for contacts and connections to develop between magistrates and the political world, the political parties and between currents within the judiciary and parties or party factions' (C. Guarnieri, 'Magistratura e politica: il caso italiano' (1991) 21 Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico 25-6). The flourishing of well-paid 'extra-judicial appointments' together with the relevance of party or factional connections in career evolution might explain 'the long and tormented course of penal investigations regarding politicians or public administrators' (id, p. 26). Concerning the pressure to which a number of judges engaged in corruption trials have been subjected, see the testimony of one of the examining magistrates in the trial of the Savonese group (M. Del Gaudo, La toga strappata (1992) especially 32-40). ,
39. In particular, it has been observed of the Italian magistracy that, in apparent contradiction to an organizational structure which gives ample guarantees of independence to judges, 'a strong tendency has emerged for contacts and connections to develop between magistrates and the political world, the political parties and between currents within the judiciary and parties or party factions' (C. Guarnieri, 'Magistratura e politica: il caso italiano' (1991) 21 Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico 25-6). The flourishing of well-paid 'extra-judicial appointments' together with the relevance of party or factional connections in career evolution might explain 'the long and tormented course of penal investigations regarding politicians or public administrators' (id, p. 26). Concerning the pressure to which a number of judges engaged in corruption trials have been subjected, see the testimony of one of the examining magistrates in the trial of the Savonese group (M. Del Gaudo, La toga strappata (1992) especially 32-40). ,
40. F. Cazzola, Della corruzione (1988).
41. Compare della Porta, op. cit., n. 9, pp. 272-80. On the evolution of political scandals, compare L.W. Sherman, Scandal and Reform (1978).
42. Compare della Porta, op. cit., n. 9, pp. 272-80. On the evolution of political scandals, compare L.W. Sherman, Scandal and Reform (1978).
43. G. Lerner, 'Il metodo Teardo ' L'Espresso, 16 October 1983.
44. La Nazione, 27 February 1986.
45. Cited in L'Unità, 3 August 1985. A similar defensive line was taken by the accused in the other two cases. For Catania see, for example, Interrogation of Gioacchino Platania, 28 December 1987, and Interrogation of Natale Rapisarda, 2 December 1987, in Tribunale di Catania (Tribunal of Catania), Sentenza istruttoria di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento n. 3755/87 (Rapporti giudiziari 1196/88E) 1988. In the Florence case, too, the existence of bribes was denied 'unless by the supposed bribe,' as one of the defence lawyers put it, 'is meant a form of funding for a political party which, however reprehensible, should certainly not be qualified as corruption' (Cited in La Nazione, 1 July 1989).
46. Cited in L'Unità, 3 August 1985. A similar defensive line was taken by the accused in the other two cases. For Catania see, for example, Interrogation of Gioacchino Platania, 28 December 1987, and Interrogation of Natale Rapisarda, 2 December 1987, in Tribunale di Catania (Tribunal of Catania), Sentenza istruttoria di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento n. 3755/87 (Rapporti giudiziari 1196/88E) 1988. In the Florence case, too, the existence of bribes was denied 'unless by the supposed bribe,' as one of the defence lawyers put it, 'is meant a form of funding for a political party which, however reprehensible, should certainly not be qualified as corruption' (Cited in La Nazione, 1 July 1989).
47. Cited in L'Unità, 3 August 1985. A similar defensive line was taken by the accused in the other two cases. For Catania see, for example, Interrogation of Gioacchino Platania, 28 December 1987, and Interrogation of Natale Rapisarda, 2 December 1987, in Tribunale di Catania (Tribunal of Catania), Sentenza istruttoria di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento n. 3755/87 (Rapporti giudiziari 1196/88E) 1988. In the Florence case, too, the existence of bribes was denied 'unless by the supposed bribe,' as one of the defence lawyers put it, 'is meant a form of funding for a political party which, however reprehensible, should certainly not be qualified as corruption' (Cited in La Nazione, 1 July 1989).
48. Cited in L'Unità, 3 August 1985. A similar defensive line was taken by the accused in the other two cases. For Catania see, for example, Interrogation of Gioacchino Platania, 28 December 1987, and Interrogation of Natale Rapisarda, 2 December 1987, in Tribunale di Catania (Tribunal of Catania), Sentenza istruttoria di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento n. 3755/87 (Rapporti giudiziari 1196/88E) 1988. In the Florence case, too, the existence of bribes was denied 'unless by the supposed bribe,' as one of the defence lawyers put it, 'is meant a form of funding for a political party which, however reprehensible, should certainly not be qualified as corruption' (Cited in La Nazione, 1 July 1989).
49. Cited in L'Unità, 3 August 1985. A similar defensive line was taken by the accused in the other two cases. For Catania see, for example, Interrogation of Gioacchino Platania, 28 December 1987, and Interrogation of Natale Rapisarda, 2 December 1987, in Tribunale di Catania (Tribunal of Catania), Sentenza istruttoria di rinvio a giudizio in procedimento n. 3755/87 (Rapporti giudiziari 1196/88E) 1988. In the Florence case, too, the existence of bribes was denied 'unless by the supposed bribe,' as one of the defence lawyers put it, 'is meant a form of funding for a political party which, however reprehensible, should certainly not be qualified as corruption' (Cited in La Nazione, 1 July 1989).
50. L'Unità, 16 March 1985.
51. On this point also, the cases examined here do not appear anomalous. For example, in a chapter on the life John Poulson, Doig discusses the ability shown by the English entrepreneur, implicated in a scandal of notable dimensions, in building up personal contacts, satisfying demands and doing favours and generally showing himself affable and friendly (A. Doig, Corruption and Misconduct in Contemporary British Politics (1984)). Significantly, generosity and loyalty towards friends have been described as characteristic of the American city bosses of the beginning of the century (H. Zink, City Bosses in the United States: A Study of Twenty Municipal Bosses (1930) 18-21).
52. On this point also, the cases examined here do not appear anomalous. For example, in a chapter on the life John Poulson, Doig discusses the ability shown by the English entrepreneur, implicated in a scandal of notable dimensions, in building up personal contacts, satisfying demands and doing favours and generally showing himself affable and friendly (A. Doig, Corruption and Misconduct in Contemporary British Politics (1984)). Significantly, generosity and loyalty towards friends have been described as characteristic of the American city bosses of the beginning of the century (H. Zink, City Bosses in the United States: A Study of Twenty Municipal Bosses (1930) 18-21).
53. According to this study, the moment judicial proceedings begin the individuals involved are forced to reclassify their earlier behaviour, elaborating justifications (or 'neutralizations'): see S. Chibnall and P. Saunders, 'Words Apart: Notes on the Social Reality of Corruption' (1977) 28 Brit. J. of Sociology 141.
54. Cited in R. Leone, 'Tra risanamento e normalizzazione. Inchiesta sutta situazione della DC a Catania' La Sicilia, 6, 8, 11 and 20 November 1988. It should be specified that this friendship is 'instrumental', that is, where each member of a diad acts as a potential connection to individuals outside it, as opposed to 'emotive', which supposes a relationship between ego and other which satisfies the emotional requirements of both (see E. Wolf, 'Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Society' in The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, ed. M.P. Banton (1966) 10).
55. Cited in R. Leone, 'Tra risanamento e normalizzazione. Inchiesta sutta situazione della DC a Catania' La Sicilia, 6, 8, 11 and 20 November 1988. It should be specified that this friendship is 'instrumental', that is, where each member of a diad acts as a potential connection to individuals outside it, as opposed to 'emotive', which supposes a relationship between ego and other which satisfies the emotional requirements of both (see E. Wolf, 'Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Society' in The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, ed. M.P. Banton (1966) 10).
56. For example, in the Savona trial one defendant's lawyer stated: 'You say that he bought votes from Calabrian gangsters? Even if it were true that he gave 100 million [lire] to Marciano, he did not commit a crime: find me a law which forbids the buying of votes' (L'Unità, 3 August 1985).
57. For Italy at least, the cases studied here do not appear anomalous. Cazzola, concluded a quantitative study on local public bodies: 'the scarcity of "institutional-administrative" careers might lead us to conclude that in recent years there has been a kind of "improvisation" in power.' (F. Cazzola, Periferici intergrati. Chi, dove, quando nelle amministrazioni comunali (1991) 114-15.)
58. According to the data collected by G. Bettin and A. Magnier (in Il consigliere comunale (1989), especially 114 and 131), 27 per cent of town councillors in Italy are public employees, while in the South a full 37 per cent are permanently employed in the public administration.
59. M. Weber, Politik als Beruf (1919).
60. Alfio Mastropaolo (op. cit., n. 8, pp. 58-9) has recently distinguished two further connotations of the category of 'professional politician'. The first is based on 'time' dedicated to politics, referring to 'long distance' politicians, that is, those remaining in politics over a long period and who therefore have to give up their private occupations (for example, D. Herzog, Politische Karriere. Selektion und Professionalisierung politischen Führungsgruppen (1975), revisited recently by Scheuch and Scheuch, op. cit., n. 23). The second concentrates on political 'technicians', individuals who have acquired 'skills' in either party management (party bureaucrats), accumulation of power (Schumpeterian entrepreneur) or particular policies (single-area party experts). Empirical research has underlined the diffusion of 'technokratisch denkender' politicians (H.-U. Derlien and R. Mayntz, Einstellungen der politisch-administrativen Elite des Bundesrepublik Deutschlands (1988)).
61. Alfio Mastropaolo (op. cit., n. 8, pp. 58-9) has recently distinguished two further connotations of the category of 'professional politician'. The first is based on 'time' dedicated to politics, referring to 'long distance' politicians, that is, those remaining in politics over a long period and who therefore have to give up their private occupations (for example, D. Herzog, Politische Karriere. Selektion und Professionalisierung politischen Führungsgruppen (1975), revisited recently by Scheuch and Scheuch, op. cit., n. 23). The second concentrates on political 'technicians', individuals who have acquired 'skills' in either party management (party bureaucrats), accumulation of power (Schumpeterian entrepreneur) or particular policies (single-area party experts). Empirical research has underlined the diffusion of 'technokratisch denkender' politicians (H.-U. Derlien and R. Mayntz, Einstellungen der politisch-administrativen Elite des Bundesrepublik Deutschlands (1988)).
62. Alfio Mastropaolo (op. cit., n. 8, pp. 58-9) has recently distinguished two further connotations of the category of 'professional politician'. The first is based on 'time' dedicated to politics, referring to 'long distance' politicians, that is, those remaining in politics over a long period and who therefore have to give up their private occupations (for example, D. Herzog, Politische Karriere. Selektion und Professionalisierung politischen Führungsgruppen (1975), revisited recently by Scheuch and Scheuch, op. cit., n. 23). The second concentrates on political 'technicians', individuals who have acquired 'skills' in either party management (party bureaucrats), accumulation of power (Schumpeterian entrepreneur) or particular policies (single-area party experts). Empirical research has underlined the diffusion of 'technokratisch denkender' politicians (H.-U. Derlien and R. Mayntz, Einstellungen der politisch-administrativen Elite des Bundesrepublik Deutschlands (1988)).
63. Alfio Mastropaolo (op. cit., n. 8, pp. 58-9) has recently distinguished two further connotations of the category of 'professional politician'. The first is based on 'time' dedicated to politics, referring to 'long distance' politicians, that is, those remaining in politics over a long period and who therefore have to give up their private occupations (for example, D. Herzog, Politische Karriere. Selektion und Professionalisierung politischen Führungsgruppen (1975), revisited recently by Scheuch and Scheuch, op. cit., n. 23). The second concentrates on political 'technicians', individuals who have acquired 'skills' in either party management (party bureaucrats), accumulation of power (Schumpeterian entrepreneur) or particular policies (single-area party experts). Empirical research has underlined the diffusion of 'technokratisch denkender' politicians (H.-U. Derlien and R. Mayntz, Einstellungen der politisch-administrativen Elite des Bundesrepublik Deutschlands (1988)).
64. In agreement not only with Hirschman (A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970)) but also Jon Elster when he says: 'Although it is hard to prove, I believe that the variation in corruption across countries is explained largely by the degree of public-spiritedness of their officials and not by the cleverness of institutional design' (J. Elster, The Cement of Society (1989) 158). A typical expression of the opposite position, which considers 'public spiritedness', and therefore moral cost, irrelevant is to be found in Gambetta, according to whom 'the "natural" distribution of the probability of breaking [but perhaps he intended to say propensity to break] the law of a population is a standard one' (op. cit., n. 4, p. 240). Such an assertion is either irrelevant or false. It is irrelevant for proving the hypothesis by which variations in the degree of public spiritedness, across time or from country to country, explain variations in corruption: it is the absolute values of the former, not its distribution, which must be calculated in this case. It is false, gratuitous or at best folklore if it implies that the level of public spiritedness does not vary from country to country or from one historical period to another.
65. In agreement not only with Hirschman (A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970)) but also Jon Elster when he says: 'Although it is hard to prove, I believe that the variation in corruption across countries is explained largely by the degree of public-spiritedness of their officials and not by the cleverness of institutional design' (J. Elster, The Cement of Society (1989) 158). A typical expression of the opposite position, which considers 'public spiritedness', and therefore moral cost, irrelevant is to be found in Gambetta, according to whom 'the "natural" distribution of the probability of breaking [but perhaps he intended to say propensity to break] the law of a population is a standard one' (op. cit., n. 4, p. 240). Such an assertion is either irrelevant or false. It is irrelevant for proving the hypothesis by which variations in the degree of public spiritedness, across time or from country to country, explain variations in corruption: it is the absolute values of the former, not its distribution, which must be calculated in this case. It is false, gratuitous or at best folklore if it implies that the level of public spiritedness does not vary from country to country or from one historical period to another.
66. In agreement not only with Hirschman (A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970)) but also Jon Elster when he says: 'Although it is hard to prove, I believe that the variation in corruption across countries is explained largely by the degree of public-spiritedness of their officials and not by the cleverness of institutional design' (J. Elster, The Cement of Society (1989) 158). A typical expression of the opposite position, which considers 'public spiritedness', and therefore moral cost, irrelevant is to be found in Gambetta, according to whom 'the "natural" distribution of the probability of breaking [but perhaps he intended to say propensity to break] the law of a population is a standard one' (op. cit., n. 4, p. 240). Such an assertion is either irrelevant or false. It is irrelevant for proving the hypothesis by which variations in the degree of public spiritedness, across time or from country to country, explain variations in corruption: it is the absolute values of the former, not its distribution, which must be calculated in this case. It is false, gratuitous or at best folklore if it implies that the level of public spiritedness does not vary from country to country or from one historical period to another.
67. Pizzorno, op. cit., n. 30, p. 54.
68. For the distinction between diffuse and specific support, see D. Easton, 'A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support' (1975) 26 Brit. J. of Sociology 435-57.
69. This refers to the definition of Parisi and Pasquino, according to whom in the vote of exchange there is a 'service performed within a relation of exchange which foresees another in return'; in the vote of identification, on the other hand, 'more than the impression of a choice . . . [there is] a statement of belonging'; finally, in the vote of opinion there is 'a choice which takes the programmes presented by the competing parties as the grounds for selection'. (A. Parisi and G. Pasquino, 'Relazioni partiti-elettori e lipi di voto ' in Il Sistema Politico Italiano, ed. G. Pasquino (1985) 79-83).
70. G. Pasquino, La repubblica del cittadini ombra (1991) 49.
71. As far as the Italian political system is concerned, Mastropaolo has spoken of an inflated number of professional politicians (A. Mastropaolo, 'Scambio politico e ceto politico '(1987) 27 Democrazia e Diritto 27-62).
72. For this distinction, see A. Pizzorno, 'I due poteri del partiti (1971) 2 Politica del Diritto 64-97.
73. As a consequence of either the predominant morality in society or of the particular structural position an association or party finds itself in, and the constraints which derive therefrom.