Why should disclosure rules subsidize informed traders?

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 417-431

  Georgakopoulos, Nicholas L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030527017     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00035-X     Document Type: Article

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