Monolog vs. dialog in costly bilateral communication

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 431-443

  Kofman, Fred ^a   Ratliff, James D ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Costly communication; Dialog; Monolog; Theory of teams

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030525216     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(96)00885-2     Document Type: Article

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