Arendt, Kant, and the politics of common sense

Polity

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 166-191

  Norris, Andrew ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b Department of Rhetoric ^*  (United States)

^c CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030525169     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3235299     Document Type: Article

References (92)

1. 1. Dana Villa, "Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action," Political Theory, 20 (1992): 274ff. Compare Martin Jay, " 'The Aesthetic Ideology' as Ideology: Or What Does it Mean to Aestheticize Politics?" in Force Fields: Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 82-83.
2. 1. Dana Villa, "Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action," Political Theory, 20 (1992): 274ff. Compare Martin Jay, " 'The Aesthetic Ideology' as Ideology: Or What Does it Mean to Aestheticize Politics?" in Force Fields: Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 82-83.
3. 2. Patrick Riley, "Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth, and Politics," in Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Howard Williams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 305ff; Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), particularly chapters four and seven; and Robert Dorstal, "Judging Human Action: Arendt's Appropriation of Kant," The Review of Metaphysics, 17 (1984): 725ff.
4. 2. Patrick Riley, "Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth, and Politics," in Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Howard Williams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 305ff; Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), particularly chapters four and seven; and Robert Dorstal, "Judging Human Action: Arendt's Appropriation of Kant," The Review of Metaphysics, 17 (1984): 725ff.
5. 2. Patrick Riley, "Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth, and Politics," in Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Howard Williams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 305ff; Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), particularly chapters four and seven; and Robert Dorstal, "Judging Human Action: Arendt's Appropriation of Kant," The Review of Metaphysics, 17 (1984): 725ff.
6. 3. Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). Richard Bernstein argues that Arendt does not finally decide between the Kantian account of judgment as contemplation and the Aristotelian account of judgment as the active exercise of phronēsis, with the result that there is a "flagrant contradiction" at the heart of her work. See Bernstein, Philosophical Profiles (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1986), pp. 221 and 234-37.
7. 3. Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). Richard Bernstein argues that Arendt does not finally decide between the Kantian account of judgment as contemplation and the Aristotelian account of judgment as the active exercise of phronēsis, with the result that there is a "flagrant contradiction" at the heart of her work. See Bernstein, Philosophical Profiles (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1986), pp. 221 and 234-37.
8. 4. Bonnie Honig, "The Politics of Agonism: A Critical Response to 'Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action,' by Dana Villa," Political Theory, 21 (1993): 529.
9. 5. Such criticisms have regularly focused on the neo-Kantianism of Rawls's Theory of Justice. See, for instance, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).
10. 5. Such criticisms have regularly focused on the neo-Kantianism of Rawls's Theory of Justice. See, for instance, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).
11. 6. Paul Ricouer, "Action, Story and History: On Re-reading The Human Condition," Salmagundi, 60 (Summer 1983): 61ff. As we shall see, these terms and concepts might better be described, with Heidegger, as "existentials" rather than categories.
12. 7. It is important to note that Arendt's "world" is not merely an aggregation of things within which action can occur. Though enduring objects are necessary if we are to establish and maintain a home for ourselves, no such home would be possible if it did not include action. Here as elsewhere Arendt reveals the influence of Heidegger and Jaspers. Compare Heidegger's discussion of the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood in Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 91-95; and Arendt's characterization of the symbiosis of "Existenz" and communication with Jaspers in "What is Existenz Philosophy?" Partisan Review, 8 (Winter 1946): 52-53.
13. 7. It is important to note that Arendt's "world" is not merely an aggregation of things within which action can occur. Though enduring objects are necessary if we are to establish and maintain a home for ourselves, no such home would be possible if it did not include action. Here as elsewhere Arendt reveals the influence of Heidegger and Jaspers. Compare Heidegger's discussion of the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood in Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 91-95; and Arendt's characterization of the symbiosis of "Existenz" and communication with Jaspers in "What is Existenz Philosophy?" Partisan Review, 8 (Winter 1946): 52-53.
14. 8. Sheldon Wolin, "Hannah Arendt: Democracy and the Political," Salmagundi, 60 (Summer 1983): 6-8.
15. 9. See for instance Plato, Meno, 96d ff.
16. 10. Arendt, "Philosophy and Politics," Social Research, 57 (Spring 1990): 80.
17. 11. Nichomachean Ethics, 1139b20; and compare 1141a25.
18. 12. Notwithstanding his identification of the human being as a laboring animal, Marx in the third volume of Capital explicitly accepts this dichotomy of freedom and "actual material production." He differs from Arendt in that politics for him is concerned with the latter and not the former. See The Marx-Engels Reader, 2d ed., ed. Robert Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 441.
19. 13. See Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking, 1963), pp. 265-66 for a partial list of these exceptions.
20. 14. When Patrick Riley argues that Arendt would reduce the Kantian reflective judge to Shelley's legislating poet, he forgets the depth of her commitment to this category distinction between poiēsis and prāxis. See Riley, "Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth, and Politics," p. 310. Arendt adopts this category distinction from Heidegger. See part one of Dana Villa's Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). While it is ultimately Aristotelian, many argue that Aristotle himself does not consistently maintain it. See, for instance, Reiner Schurmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). But compare Ethics, 1140b6 (where the distinction is made) with 1094a (where Aristotle seems to efface his own distinction) and 1144a5 (where this seeming contradiction is at least arguably resolved).
21. 14. When Patrick Riley argues that Arendt would reduce the Kantian reflective judge to Shelley's legislating poet, he forgets the depth of her commitment to this category distinction between poiēsis and prāxis. See Riley, "Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth, and Politics," p. 310. Arendt adopts this category distinction from Heidegger. See part one of Dana Villa's Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). While it is ultimately Aristotelian, many argue that Aristotle himself does not consistently maintain it. See, for instance, Reiner Schurmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). But compare Ethics, 1140b6 (where the distinction is made) with 1094a (where Aristotle seems to efface his own distinction) and 1144a5 (where this seeming contradiction is at least arguably resolved).
22. 14. When Patrick Riley argues that Arendt would reduce the Kantian reflective judge to Shelley's legislating poet, he forgets the depth of her commitment to this category distinction between poiēsis and prāxis. See Riley, "Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth, and Politics," p. 310. Arendt adopts this category distinction from Heidegger. See part one of Dana Villa's Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). While it is ultimately Aristotelian, many argue that Aristotle himself does not consistently maintain it. See, for instance, Reiner Schurmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). But compare Ethics, 1140b6 (where the distinction is made) with 1094a (where Aristotle seems to efface his own distinction) and 1144a5 (where this seeming contradiction is at least arguably resolved).
23. 15. Philebus, 54.
24. 16. Arendt is adamant that "the whole concept of rule and being ruled . . . was felt [in the Periclean polis] to be prepolitical and to belong to the private rather than the public sphere" (Arendt, The Human Condition [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958], p. 228).
25. 17. The Human Condition, p. 228.
26. 18. See Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969).
27. 19. The Human Condition, p. 184. For a fuller account this non-subjective account of action, in which "identity is the product of action" rather than its source,
28. see Bonnie Honig, "Arendt, Identity, and Difference," Political Theory, 16 (1988): 77-98. Honig correctly, to my mind, attacks Suzanne Jacobitti's effort to derive from Arendt's work a coherent theory of the self as author of its deeds.
29. Compare Jacobitti, "Hannah Arendt and the Will," in the same issue of Political Theory, pp. 53-76.
30. 20. The Human Condition, p. 55.
31. 21. The Human Condition, p. 57.
32. 22. "Philosophy and Politics," p. 80. Arendt here describes the function of doxa with the same language that she uses to describe common sense, indicating their essential unity.
33. 23. Arendt's other criteria of good judgment would probably best be gleaned from a systematic consideration of her own judgments, as she provides, to my knowledge, no extended discussion of what such criteria might be. Lawrence Biskowski has argued convincingly and well that Arendt believes good judgment, like good action, is dedicated to "care for the world" (Biskowski, "Practical Foundations for Political Judgment: Arendt on Action and World," The Journal of Politics, 55 [November 1993], 885). However, though Biskowski claims that this "provides substantive moral and practical content to the theory of judgment" (p. 885), he is unable to be more specific concerning what is enjoined of us. One can only assume that this content will be essentially prohibitive in character. Moreover, given the central role played by common sense in the revelation of the world, it is circular at best to attempt to define the judgments of that sense in terms of the world it makes possible.
34. 24. In his recent book on political judgment, Peter Steinberger complains of Arendt's work that "it is unclear in what precise sense we should understand and accept the claim that judgment (for Arendt) . . . can provide a basis for anything like knowledge or wisdom" (The Concept of Political Judgment [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993], p. 75). But if, as Steinberger's phrasing suggests, the wisdom of good judgment is associated with knowledge, this is simply a claim that Arendt doesn't make. Indeed, Steinberger begins his discussion of Arendt by implicitly acknowledging that this is the case. He notes that, for her, "thought" is unlike cognition and logical reasoning in that it is concerned with "meaning" and not "truth" (p. 64); this will likewise be true of judgment, which he notes is "thought in the service of political action" (p. 65). But three pages later, his readers find Steinberger attributing to Arendt a theory of "knowledge-in-judgment" (p. 68). Steinberger's own philosophical commitment to the view that political judgment requires a philosophical justification thus seems to have led him - without his being aware of it - to misunderstand Arendt's own very different position. Ronald Beiner provides a concise and cogent criticism of Steinberger's refusal to acknowledge the possibility that judgment - in the form of either Aristotelian phronēsis or Kantian Urteilskraft - might be radically freed from the governance of rules, in his review of The Concept of Political Judgment in Political Theory, 22 (1994): 688-92.
35. 24. In his recent book on political judgment, Peter Steinberger complains of Arendt's work that "it is unclear in what precise sense we should understand and accept the claim that judgment (for Arendt) . . . can provide a basis for anything like knowledge or wisdom" (The Concept of Political Judgment [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993], p. 75). But if, as Steinberger's phrasing suggests, the wisdom of good judgment is associated with knowledge, this is simply a claim that Arendt doesn't make. Indeed, Steinberger begins his discussion of Arendt by implicitly acknowledging that this is the case. He notes that, for her, "thought" is unlike cognition and logical reasoning in that it is concerned with "meaning" and not "truth" (p. 64); this will likewise be true of judgment, which he notes is "thought in the service of political action" (p. 65). But three pages later, his readers find Steinberger attributing to Arendt a theory of "knowledge-in-judgment" (p. 68). Steinberger's own philosophical commitment to the view that political judgment requires a philosophical justification thus seems to have led him - without his being aware of it - to misunderstand Arendt's own very different position. Ronald Beiner provides a concise and cogent criticism of Steinberger's refusal to acknowledge the possibility that judgment - in the form of either Aristotelian phronēsis or Kantian Urteilskraft - might be radically freed from the governance of rules, in his review of The Concept of Political Judgment in Political Theory, 22 (1994): 688-92.
36. 25. Arendt, "What is Freedom?" Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin, 1968).
37. 26. Totalitarianism, pp. 352-91.
38. 27. These connections between Arendt's non-instrumental theory of action, her treatment of judgment, and her analysis of totalitarianism have not been sufficiently noted by even her most enthusiastic readers. Bonnie Honig, for instance, insists upon Nietzsche's agonistic individualism because she fears that "Arendt's action in concert risks sliding into mass behavior" ("The Politics of Agonism," p. 532). But Arendt argues that political action requires common sense in order to resist massness: "totalitarian movements are mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals" (Totalitarianism, p. 323; and see pp. 316-17 and 475). Indeed, by neglecting common sense Honig leaves no clue why Arendt would not concur with Nietzsche's own explicit repudiation of the Kantian account of aesthetic judgment as disinterested, impersonal, and universal in scope (The Genealogy of Morals [New York: Vintage, 1967], pp. 103-04).
39. 27. These connections between Arendt's non-instrumental theory of action, her treatment of judgment, and her analysis of totalitarianism have not been sufficiently noted by even her most enthusiastic readers. Bonnie Honig, for instance, insists upon Nietzsche's agonistic individualism because she fears that "Arendt's action in concert risks sliding into mass behavior" ("The Politics of Agonism," p. 532). But Arendt argues that political action requires common sense in order to resist massness: "totalitarian movements are mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals" (Totalitarianism, p. 323; and see pp. 316-17 and 475). Indeed, by neglecting common sense Honig leaves no clue why Arendt would not concur with Nietzsche's own explicit repudiation of the Kantian account of aesthetic judgment as disinterested, impersonal, and universal in scope (The Genealogy of Morals [New York: Vintage, 1967], pp. 103-04).
40. 27. These connections between Arendt's non-instrumental theory of action, her treatment of judgment, and her analysis of totalitarianism have not been sufficiently noted by even her most enthusiastic readers. Bonnie Honig, for instance, insists upon Nietzsche's agonistic individualism because she fears that "Arendt's action in concert risks sliding into mass behavior" ("The Politics of Agonism," p. 532). But Arendt argues that political action requires common sense in order to resist massness: "totalitarian movements are mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals" (Totalitarianism, p. 323; and see pp. 316-17 and 475). Indeed, by neglecting common sense Honig leaves no clue why Arendt would not concur with Nietzsche's own explicit repudiation of the Kantian account of aesthetic judgment as disinterested, impersonal, and universal in scope (The Genealogy of Morals [New York: Vintage, 1967], pp. 103-04).
41. 28. See, for instance, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1975), particularly the second chapter.
42. 29. "On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice,' " Kant: Political Writings, 2d ed., ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 75.
43. 30. "Theory," p. 81.
44. 31. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 177.
45. 32. Michel de Montaigne, In Defense of Raymond Sebond (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1965), pp. 117-18.
46. 33. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 177-79.
47. 34. "Theory," p. 61. There are slight differences. In the account presented in "Theory," "practices" themselves embody rules as a variety of technē. But the two are still aligned by means of an "act of judgment" that is not itself explained in terms of rules or Kantian principles.
48. 35. Though Arendt does not make the argument concerning judgment that I am advancing here, she does argue that "Kant could conceive of action only as acts of the powers-that-be . . . that is, governmental acts" (Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982], p. 60).
49. 36. "Theory," pp. 80-81.
50. 37. "Theory," pp. 78-79. This unanimous will is not that of the populace as a whole, but only of the citizenry. In an ironic confirmation of Arendt's contention that philosophers have confounded the categorical distinctions between action, work, and labor, Kant argues that-be . . . that is, governmental acts" (Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982], p. 60). physical Elements of Justice this distinction is presented as one between "active" and "passive" citizenship. This argument fails to satisfy even Kant himself. See "Theory," p. 78, footnote; and The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 79.
51. 37. "Theory," pp. 78-79. This unanimous will is not that of the populace as a whole, but only of the citizenry. In an ironic confirmation of Arendt's contention that philosophers have confounded the categorical distinctions between action, work, and labor, Kant argues that-be . . . that is, governmental acts" (Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982], p. 60). physical Elements of Justice this distinction is presented as one between "active" and "passive" citizenship. This argument fails to satisfy even Kant himself. See "Theory," p. 78, footnote; and The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 79.
52. 37. "Theory," pp. 78-79. This unanimous will is not that of the populace as a whole, but only of the citizenry. In an ironic confirmation of Arendt's contention that philosophers have confounded the categorical distinctions between action, work, and labor, Kant argues that-be . . . that is, governmental acts" (Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982], p. 60). physical Elements of Justice this distinction is presented as one between "active" and "passive" citizenship. This argument fails to satisfy even Kant himself. See "Theory," p. 78, footnote; and The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 79.
53. 37. "Theory," pp. 78-79. This unanimous will is not that of the populace as a whole, but only of the citizenry. In an ironic confirmation of Arendt's contention that philosophers have confounded the categorical distinctions between action, work, and labor, Kant argues that-be . . . that is, governmental acts" (Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982], p. 60). physical Elements of Justice this distinction is presented as one between "active" and "passive" citizenship. This argument fails to satisfy even Kant himself. See "Theory," p. 78, footnote; and The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 79.
54. 38. The Social Contract, pp. 72-73.
55. 39. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: The University of Minneapolis Press, 1991), p. xxxviii.
56. 40. The Human Condition, pp. 52-53, emphasis added.
57. 41. Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarenton, 1989), 18. Emphasis in original.
58. 42. In her attempt to make Arendt more Kantian, Seyla Benhabib appears to forget this essential distinction between moral and reflective judgment; hence she avers that "intrinsic to Kant's model of 'reflective judgment' may be a conception of rationality and intersubjective validity that would allow us to retain a principled universalist moral standpoint while acknowledging the role of contextual moral judgment in human affairs" ("Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt's Thought," Political Theory, 16 [February 1988]: 41). The phenomenology of moral judgment that she goes on to offer is interesting, but it does not, by definition, make use of Kant's reflective judgment.
59. 43. Critique of Judgment, pp. 82-83.
60. 44. Critique of Judgment, p. 54.
61. 45. "The Crisis in Culture," Between Past and Future, pp. 220-21.
62. 46. It is this change that leads Ronald Beiner to suggest that Arendt "offers not one but two theories of judgment," one in which "judgment is considered from the point of view of the vita activa" and one "beginning in 1970" that emphasizes "spectatorship and [the] retrospective judgment of historians and storytellers" (Ronald Beiner, "Interpretive Essay," Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 91). While it is true that Arendt placed less and less emphasis upon the ontological primacy of the political (particularly, if understandably, in The Life of the Mind),
63. 46. It is this change that leads Ronald Beiner to suggest that Arendt "offers not one but two theories of judgment," one in which "judgment is considered from the point of view of the vita activa" and one "beginning in 1970" that emphasizes "spectatorship and [the] retrospective judgment of historians and storytellers" (Ronald Beiner, "Interpretive Essay," Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 91). While it is true that Arendt placed less and less emphasis upon the ontological primacy of the political (particularly, if understandably, in The Life of the Mind),
64. Beiner's suggestion that one can date a shift in her thinking to anything as precise as 1970 is misleading. As early as "Truth and Politics" (originally published in the February 25, 1967 edition of The New Yorker [Vol. XLHIII]),
65. Arendt argues that "the faculty of judgment" and "impartiality" arise from historical retrospection ("Truth and Politics," Between Past and Future, pp. 262-63).
66. 47. This identification is implicit throughout the Lectures in the very similar language Arendt uses to describe communicability and publicity; it is expressed most directly in the last lecture, where she attributes both communicability and sociability to the presence of others - that is, to a public community.
67. 48. See Lectures, pp. 19-20, where Arendt acknowledges that Kant's tripartite project -the determination of what I should do, what I can hope for, and what I can know - does not allow for the expression of concern for plurality, and subsequently of care for "the world"; and p. 33, where she suggests that, while her reading goes "beyond Kant's self-interpretation," it still remains "within Kant's spirit."
68. 49. A common and seemingly telling objection is that Kant's emphasis on the form of the aesthetic object does not allow one to distinguish between the experience of beholding wallpaper and that of beholding a Poussin.
69. 50. Lectures, p. 10. She refers to this notion throughout the Lectures.
70. 51. Lectures, pp. 40, 42, 49 (emphasis added), and 69 respectively.
71. 52. Kant, "What is Enlightenment?" On History, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 4.
72. 53. Lectures, pp. 73 and 74. This interpretation of Kant is seconded by Villa in "Beyond Good and Evil," p. 296.
73. 53. Lectures, pp. 73 and 74. This interpretation of Kant is seconded by Villa in "Beyond Good and Evil," p. 296.
74. 54. H. W. Cassirer, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Judgment (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1970), pp. 195-96.
75. 55. Critique of Judgment, p. 147. Compare Cassirer, pp. 263-64; and Gilles Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 60.
76. 55. Critique of Judgment, p. 147. Compare Cassirer, pp. 263-64; and Gilles Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 60.
77. 56. Critique of Judgment, p. 84. Robert Dorstal's captious evaluation of Arendt's appropriation of Kant is vitiated by his neglect of the role of the imagination. He argues that "The validity and communicability of . . . reflective judgment . . . rests firmly and explicitly on . . . the faculty of the understanding." If this were so, aesthetic judgment would be determined by concepts, which Kant insists repeatedly it is not. Moreover, there would be no need for a third Critique, as reflective judgment would have been treated in the critique of the understanding, the Critique of Pure Reason. See Dorstal, "Judging Human Action: Arendt's Appropriation of Kant," p. 740.
78. 56. Critique of Judgment, p. 84. Robert Dorstal's captious evaluation of Arendt's appropriation of Kant is vitiated by his neglect of the role of the imagination. He argues that "The validity and communicability of . . . reflective judgment . . . rests firmly and explicitly on . . . the faculty of the understanding." If this were so, aesthetic judgment would be determined by concepts, which Kant insists repeatedly it is not. Moreover, there would be no need for a third Critique, as reflective judgment would have been treated in the critique of the understanding, the Critique of Pure Reason. See Dorstal, "Judging Human Action: Arendt's Appropriation of Kant," p. 740.
79. 56. Critique of Judgment, p. 84. Robert Dorstal's captious evaluation of Arendt's appropriation of Kant is vitiated by his neglect of the role of the imagination. He argues that "The validity and communicability of . . . reflective judgment . . . rests firmly and explicitly on . . . the faculty of the understanding." If this were so, aesthetic judgment would be determined by concepts, which Kant insists repeatedly it is not. Moreover, there would be no need for a third Critique, as reflective judgment would have been treated in the critique of the understanding, the Critique of Pure Reason. See Dorstal, "Judging Human Action: Arendt's Appropriation of Kant," p. 740.
80. 57. This is not to deny that in section six of the second, commonly published, introduction to the third Critique Kant suggests the possibility of a pre-experiential history. But not only is that suggestion, as it stands, incoherent, but the historicization of the faculties that it implies is incompatible with central features of the Kantian project. Compare Yirmiyahu Yovel's discussion of what he calls Kant's "historical antimony" in Kant and the Philosophy of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
81. 58. In her defense of this reading of Kant, Arendt repeatedly turns to section 41 of the third Critique, "The empirical interest in the beautiful." She does so, moreover, without alerting her reader to the context of her references. Hence, she cites Kant's assertion that "the beautiful exists only in society" as evidence for her claim that the nonsubjective element involved in judgments of taste is the presence of a community of spectators. But the line in full reads: "The empirical interest in the beautiful exists only in society." "Her silent omission obscures the sharp distinction Kant draws between the empirical, concept-guided appreciation of the beautiful and the disinterested judgment of taste - a distinction that is fundamental to his aesthetic theory. Compare Lectures, p. 67, and Critique of Judgment, pp. 154-55.
82. 58. In her defense of this reading of Kant, Arendt repeatedly turns to section 41 of the third Critique, "The empirical interest in the beautiful." She does so, moreover, without alerting her reader to the context of her references. Hence, she cites Kant's assertion that "the beautiful exists only in society" as evidence for her claim that the nonsubjective element involved in judgments of taste is the presence of a community of spectators. But the line in full reads: "The empirical interest in the beautiful exists only in society." "Her silent omission obscures the sharp distinction Kant draws between the empirical, concept-guided appreciation of the beautiful and the disinterested judgment of taste - a distinction that is fundamental to his aesthetic theory. Compare Lectures, p. 67, and Critique of Judgment, pp. 154-55.
83. 59. Lectures, p. 69.
84. 60. Lectures, p. 71.
85. 61. Critique of Judgment, pp. 155-53.
86. 62. Lectures, p. 42.
87. 63. Lectures, p. 67.
88. 64. "Interpretive Essay," Lectures, p. 163, note 155.
89. 65. "Interpretive Essay," Lectures, pp. 121-23.
90. 66. Political Judgment, pp. 105 and 113.
91. 67. Sandra and Lewis Hinchman, "In Heidegger's Shadow: Hannah Arendt's Phenomenological Humanism," The Review of Politics, 46 (April 1984): 191 and 197.
92. 68. "What is Existenz Philosophy?" pp. 51 and 53.