Another explanation for the senate: The anti-federalists, John Adams, and the natural aristocracy

Polity

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 247-271

  Ellenbogen, Paul D ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0030525162     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3235302     Document Type: Article

References (67)

1. 1. See, for example, Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berrey, and Jerry Goldman, The Challenge of Democracy: Government in America, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), p. 75; Stephen J. Wayne, G. Calvin Mackenzie, David M. O'Brien, and Richard L. Cole, The Politics of American Government: Foundations, Participation, and Institutions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 38-42; Steven E. Frantzich and Stephen L. Percy, American Government: The Political Game (Madison: Brown and Benchmark Publishers, 1994), p. 34; Paul E. Johnson, Gary J. Miller, John H. Aldrich, David W. Rohde, and Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., American Government: People, Institutions, and Policies, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), p. 43; Robert L. Lineberry, George C. Edwards III, and Martin P. Wattenberg, Government in America: People, Politics, and Policy, 6th ed. (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), p. 49; Thomas E. Patterson, The American Democracy, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1994), pp. 34-35.
2. 1. See, for example, Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berrey, and Jerry Goldman, The Challenge of Democracy: Government in America, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), p. 75; Stephen J. Wayne, G. Calvin Mackenzie, David M. O'Brien, and Richard L. Cole, The Politics of American Government: Foundations, Participation, and Institutions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 38-42; Steven E. Frantzich and Stephen L. Percy, American Government: The Political Game (Madison: Brown and Benchmark Publishers, 1994), p. 34; Paul E. Johnson, Gary J. Miller, John H. Aldrich, David W. Rohde, and Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., American Government: People, Institutions, and Policies, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), p. 43; Robert L. Lineberry, George C. Edwards III, and Martin P. Wattenberg, Government in America: People, Politics, and Policy, 6th ed. (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), p. 49; Thomas E. Patterson, The American Democracy, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1994), pp. 34-35.
3. 1. See, for example, Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berrey, and Jerry Goldman, The Challenge of Democracy: Government in America, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), p. 75; Stephen J. Wayne, G. Calvin Mackenzie, David M. O'Brien, and Richard L. Cole, The Politics of American Government: Foundations, Participation, and Institutions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 38-42; Steven E. Frantzich and Stephen L. Percy, American Government: The Political Game (Madison: Brown and Benchmark Publishers, 1994), p. 34; Paul E. Johnson, Gary J. Miller, John H. Aldrich, David W. Rohde, and Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., American Government: People, Institutions, and Policies, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), p. 43; Robert L. Lineberry, George C. Edwards III, and Martin P. Wattenberg, Government in America: People, Politics, and Policy, 6th ed. (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), p. 49; Thomas E. Patterson, The American Democracy, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1994), pp. 34-35.
4. 1. See, for example, Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berrey, and Jerry Goldman, The Challenge of Democracy: Government in America, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), p. 75; Stephen J. Wayne, G. Calvin Mackenzie, David M. O'Brien, and Richard L. Cole, The Politics of American Government: Foundations, Participation, and Institutions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 38-42; Steven E. Frantzich and Stephen L. Percy, American Government: The Political Game (Madison: Brown and Benchmark Publishers, 1994), p. 34; Paul E. Johnson, Gary J. Miller, John H. Aldrich, David W. Rohde, and Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., American Government: People, Institutions, and Policies, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), p. 43; Robert L. Lineberry, George C. Edwards III, and Martin P. Wattenberg, Government in America: People, Politics, and Policy, 6th ed. (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), p. 49; Thomas E. Patterson, The American Democracy, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1994), pp. 34-35.
5. 1. See, for example, Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berrey, and Jerry Goldman, The Challenge of Democracy: Government in America, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), p. 75; Stephen J. Wayne, G. Calvin Mackenzie, David M. O'Brien, and Richard L. Cole, The Politics of American Government: Foundations, Participation, and Institutions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 38-42; Steven E. Frantzich and Stephen L. Percy, American Government: The Political Game (Madison: Brown and Benchmark Publishers, 1994), p. 34; Paul E. Johnson, Gary J. Miller, John H. Aldrich, David W. Rohde, and Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., American Government: People, Institutions, and Policies, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), p. 43; Robert L. Lineberry, George C. Edwards III, and Martin P. Wattenberg, Government in America: People, Politics, and Policy, 6th ed. (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), p. 49; Thomas E. Patterson, The American Democracy, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1994), pp. 34-35.
6. 1. See, for example, Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berrey, and Jerry Goldman, The Challenge of Democracy: Government in America, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), p. 75; Stephen J. Wayne, G. Calvin Mackenzie, David M. O'Brien, and Richard L. Cole, The Politics of American Government: Foundations, Participation, and Institutions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 38-42; Steven E. Frantzich and Stephen L. Percy, American Government: The Political Game (Madison: Brown and Benchmark Publishers, 1994), p. 34; Paul E. Johnson, Gary J. Miller, John H. Aldrich, David W. Rohde, and Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., American Government: People, Institutions, and Policies, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), p. 43; Robert L. Lineberry, George C. Edwards III, and Martin P. Wattenberg, Government in America: People, Politics, and Policy, 6th ed. (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), p. 49; Thomas E. Patterson, The American Democracy, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1994), pp. 34-35.
7. 2. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library, 1961), #62:377. Rossiter says that #62 is probably written by Madison.
8. 3. Adams's argument appears in A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, Against the Attack of M. Turgot, in His Letter to Dr. Price, Dated the Twenty-Second Day of March, 1778, hereafter cited by volume and page number from John Adams, The Works of John Adams, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1850-56). The Defense appears in Works IV:282-VI:220. Volume I of the Defense appeared shortly before the beginning of the Constitutional Convention.
9. 3. Adams's argument appears in A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, Against the Attack of M. Turgot, in His Letter to Dr. Price, Dated the Twenty-Second Day of March, 1778, hereafter cited by volume and page number from John Adams, The Works of John Adams, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1850-56). The Defense appears in Works IV:282-VI:220. Volume I of the Defense appeared shortly before the beginning of the Constitutional Convention.
10. 3. Adams's argument appears in A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, Against the Attack of M. Turgot, in His Letter to Dr. Price, Dated the Twenty-Second Day of March, 1778, hereafter cited by volume and page number from John Adams, The Works of John Adams, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1850-56). The Defense appears in Works IV:282-VI:220. Volume I of the Defense appeared shortly before the beginning of the Constitutional Convention.
11. 4. Federalist #51:323-24.
12. 5. Here I follow the formulation of Herbert J. Storing, What the Antifederalists Were For: The Political Thought of the Opponents of the Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 39-40.
13. 6. Storing, What the Antifederalists Were For, pp. 9-10.
14. 7. Some Anti-Federalists, notably Patrick Henry, objected to the Preamble's beginning "We the people. . . ," arguing that the States were the contracting parties to the Constitution. Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 5.16.1 [4 June 1788].
15. 8. Complete Anti-Federalist 2.8.25 [Federal Farmer III].
16. 9. Complete Anti-Federalist 2.6.43 [Cato VI].
17. 10. Federalist #39, passim.
18. 11. Complete Anti-Federalist 2.9.42 [Brutus III].
19. 12. Complete Anti-Federalist 2.8.97 [Federal Farmer VII].
20. 13. Complete Anti-Federalist 2.8.97 [Federal Farmer VII].
21. 14. Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 6-7. I have tried to show that for both Adams and the Anti-Federalists, many aristocrats were not good or moral, or propertied, but rather politically adept and hence dangerous.
22. 15. Complete Anti-Federalist 2.8.97 [Federal Farmer VII]. As Nedelsky notes, the Federalists had a "class-based" understanding of the people's capacity to govern and they "wanted the elite to rule." But Adams and the Anti-Federalists expected that the elite would rule no matter how much the people's competence was developed. Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism, p. 7.
23. 15. Complete Anti-Federalist 2.8.97 [Federal Farmer VII]. As Nedelsky notes, the Federalists had a "class-based" understanding of the people's capacity to govern and they "wanted the elite to rule." But Adams and the Anti-Federalists expected that the elite would rule no matter how much the people's competence was developed. Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism, p. 7.
24. 16. Melancton Smith, speaking in the New York Ratifying Convention, against the Constitution, responded to Chancellor Livingston's accusation that he is an aristocrat by admitting that it is true, not, as Livingston thinks, because everyone in a republic is an aristocrat, but because being a natural aristocrat is perfectly respectable. Smith cites "the honorable John Adams" in support of this point, and goes on to argue that an aristocratic Senate is necessary to check the democratic House. 6.12.22; 30 and note 23.
25. 17. Complete Anti-Federalist 2.8.170 [Federal Farmer XIII].
26. 18. Complete Anti-Federalist 2.8.170 [Federal Farmer XIII].
27. 19. Complete Anti-Federalist 6.1.29 [Cincinnatus IV].
28. 20. Complete Anti-Federalist 3.4.1 (emphasis in the original).
29. 21. Complete Anti-Federalist 3.4.2 (emphasis in the original).
30. 22. Complete Anti-Federalist 3.4.3 (emphasis in the original).
31. 23. Complete Anti-Federalist 3.16.3-5.
32. 24. Complete Anti-Federalist 2.7.48 (emphasis in the original).
33. 24. Complete Anti-Federalist 5.12.4 [18 Jan. 1788]. Another Anti-Federalist, A Farmer, has a better understanding of Adams's plan, but it is clear that both authors conceive of the Senate in Adams's terms, as a repository of the natural aristocracy.
34. 26. Complete Anti-Federalist 3.16.3.
35. 27. Complete Anti-Federalist 3.16.4.
36. 28. Article I, §4; Complete Anti-Federalist 3.16.4-5.
37. 29. For example, Aristocrotis objects to the Senators' six-year terms as well as the two-year terms of the Representatives. To him, both terms are too long, and, combined with the ability of both Houses to fix the time, place, and manner of elections, will result in a denial of popular rights.
38. 30. Article I, §8; Complete Anti-Federalist 4.8.1.
39. 31. Politics 4.1-6.
40. 32. Farrand, I.517, 518 [July 2] (emphasis in the original); Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism, pp. 81; 86, 89; 92.
41. 33. Poplicola says that "absolute monarchies and hereditary aristocracies are much the same, so far as the people whom they govern, are affected. By gazing at the splendor of a monarch, or a nobility, and being well accustomed to military tyranny, they bow to their yoke and bear it as patiently as their brother-oxen." Complete Anti-Federalist 4.11.4.
42. 34. Complete Anti-Federalist 5.1.29 (emphasis in the original).
43. 35. Complete Anti-Federalist 5.1.31 (emphasis in the original); cf. Adams, Works IV: 398.
44. 35. Complete Anti-Federalist 5.1.31 (emphasis in the original); cf. Adams, Works IV: 398.
45. 36. Federalist #57:350.
46. 37. Federalist #63:387-389.
47. 38. Adams's and Jefferson's quarrel on this topic not only caused a personal rift between the two men; it also put them in two opposed parties, the Republicans and the Federalists.
48. 39. See Federalist #40, passim.
49. 40. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, I.151-2.
50. 41. Gouverneur Morris insisted that the Senate should be a "checking branch"; to accomplish this it "must have great personal property, it must have the aristocratic spirit; it must love to lord it thro' pride." He also thought that the Senate should be independent of democratic choice, and permanent, as well as unpaid. Morris went so far as to suggest that the "members [of the Senate] being independt. & for life, may be taken as well from one place as from another." The Senate should not represent the States; this would be "going back to mere treaty." Instead, the Senate should be designed so as to check the people and control the rich. Otherwise, the rich "will have the same effect here as elsewhere if we do not by such a Govt. keep them within their proper sphere. We should remember that the people never act from reason alone. The rich will take advantage of their passions and make these the instruments for oppressing them." Farrand, 1.511-512 [July 2]. Nedelsky says that "Madison's plans for representing property through suffrage or apportionment became irrelevant" when the Convention decided the Senate should represent the States. However, the "capacity of the Senate to protect property remained an objective, to be achieved by the small size of the body and the length of the term.quot; Morris does not believe that the interests of the rich few and the poor many can be compromised but must be balanced: "Morris's plan for the legislature was to institutionalize class conflict in the two houses of Congress: the House was to be a democratic branch exclusively reserved for the people and the Senate an overly aristocratic body composed of the rich." For Morris, the appropriate solution to the likely attempts by the rich to oppress the poor "was to isolate the rich [in the Senate] to identify them as having interests separate from and threatening to the people." Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism, pp. 57 (emphasis in the original), 79, 80. I hope to have shown how Adams and the Anti-Federalists would agree, but would extend the definition of aristocracy to include not only wealth but also any characteristic which would distinguish the few from the many.
51. 42. Farrand, II:284.
52. 43. Farrand, II:286.
53. 44. Farrand, II:512 [September 5].
54. 45. Farrand, II:513 [September 5]. See also II:515, where Mason further objects to giving the Senate the power to appoint the President.
55. 46. Farrand, II:522-4.
56. 47. Farrand, III:33.
57. 48. Adams, Works IV:276.
58. 49. Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 6 June 1787. Papers of James Madison, Robert J. Rutland, et al., eds. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1962-), X:29-30.
59. 50. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 17 Oct. 1788. Papers of James Madison, XI:296.
60. 51. For an account of this incident, see Merrill D. Peterson's Adams and Jefferson: A Revolutionary Dialogue (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1976), pp. 56-59.
61. 52. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 12 May 1791. Papers of James Madison, XIV:22. Madison refers to Adams's Discourses on Davila, which appear in Works VI: 221-403.
62. 52. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 12 May 1791. Papers of James Madison, XIV:22. Madison refers to Adams's Discourses on Davila, which appear in Works VI: 221-403.
63. 52. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 12 May 1791. Papers of James Madison, XIV:22. Madison refers to Adams's Discourses on Davila, which appear in Works VI: 221-403.
64. 53. Reverend James Madison, a cousin of the author of the Federalist, clearly conceived of the Defense as an anti-republican tract, designed to reintroduce European social orders into America. Reverend Madison believed that Congress, in writing the Northwest Ordinance, had "adopted the Adamic idea," presumably mixed and balanced government. Reverend James Madison to James Madison, 11 June 1787; 1 Aug. 1787. Papers of James Madison X:44-46, 121. See also Reverend James Madison to James Madison, 15 Aug. 1789, XII:338.
65. 53. Reverend James Madison, a cousin of the author of the Federalist, clearly conceived of the Defense as an anti-republican tract, designed to reintroduce European social orders into America. Reverend Madison believed that Congress, in writing the Northwest Ordinance, had "adopted the Adamic idea," presumably mixed and balanced government. Reverend James Madison to James Madison, 11 June 1787; 1 Aug. 1787. Papers of James Madison X:44-46, 121. See also Reverend James Madison to James Madison, 15 Aug. 1789, XII:338.
66. 54. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 23 and 27 June 1791, Papers of James Madison, XIV:36, 38.
67. 55. James Madison (and James Monroe), "For Dunlap's American Daily Advertiser," 20 Oct. 1792, Papers of James Madison, XIV:388.