The corruption of politics and the politics of corruption: An overview

Journal of Law and Society

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-17

  Nelken, David ^a,b   Levi, Michael ^c  

^a CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b Macerata University   (Italy)

^c CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030525158     PISSN: 0263323X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1410464     Document Type: Review

References (48)

1. See the excellent recent survey in D. della Porta and Y. Mény, 'Democrazia e corruzione: verso un'analisi comparata' in Corruzione e Democrazia, eds. D. della Porta and Y. Mény (1995) 225-45.
2. While corrupt agreements do not always necessarily constitute fraud in the legal sense, leading economic approaches to corruption tend to use language which can be easily related back to criminology. Economists talk of a black market in property rights and of illegal forms of 'rent seeking' and argue that corruption usually involves 'fraud by an "agent" who sells what is not his to sell by making an alliance at the expense of a third party, "the victim(s)".' (See id.)
3. J.-M. Bouissou, 'La corruzione in Giappone: un sistema di redistribuzione?' in id., pp. 157-83.
4. It is often assumed the traditional implies consensual, but what local people actually feel about their leaders' receipt of substantial gifts is seldom researched. Ethnic tensions being what they are, we would predict that group membership would affect tolerance levels.
5. See, for example, D. Nelken, 'White-Collar Crime' in The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, eds. M. Maguire, R. Morgan, and R. Reiner (1994) 355-93.
6. Corruption may unambiguously harm economic development, where the head of state simply embezzles a large proportion of GDP and state assets, as appears to have been the case in countries as diverse as the Phillipines and Zaire.
7. See, for example, W. Seibel, 'Costruzione dello stato e etica pubblica in Germania' in della Porta and Mény, op. cit., n. 1, 107-35, and Ruggiero in this volume.
8. See M. Levi and A. Pithouse, Victims of White-Collar Crime: the Social and Media Construction of Corporate Fraud (forthcoming, 1996).
9. P. Heywood, 'Dalla dittatura alla democrazia: le mutevoli forme della corruzione in Spagna' in della Porta and Mény, op. cit., n. 1, pp. 87-107.
10. Spanish financial scandals include the brother of the former Deputy Prime Minister (who resigned to reduce political damage), and the politically appointed former head of the Guardia Civil, Luis Roldan, who was extradited back to Spain and who, as we write, awaits trial for allegedly embezzling funds for his personal use from the same covert intelligence 'pot' allegedly used to pay mercenaries for the assassinations.
11. Once people have discretionary control over such non-transparent funds, it is easy for them to divert a portion for their own use: this was alleged of Colonel (and almost Senator) Oliver North in relation to the secret funds used to supply the Contras during the Reagan Presidency.
12. Heywood, op. cit., n. 9.
13. Seibel, op. cit., n. 7.
14. See the comments on insider dealing of M. Clarke, Business Crime: Its Nature and Control (1990) 162.
15. See C. Sumner, The Sociology of Deviance: an Obituary (1994).
16. See D. della Porta and A. Vannucci, Corruzione Politica e Amministrazione Pubblica (1994).
17. See the analysis of the media in white-collar crime cases in Levi and Pithouse, op. cit., n. 8.
18. E.V. Currie, 'Crimes without victims, witchcraft and its control in Renaissance Europe' (1968) 3 Law and Society Rev. 7-32.
19. See, for example, D. Nelken (ed.), (1995) 4:4 Social and Legal Studies, special issue entitled Legal Culture, Diversity and Globalisation.
20. Though in October 1995, Parliament voted - against the official Conservative party line - to adopt the Nolan Committee proposals to reduce conflicts of interest, probably because the majority finally realised that the public did not share their lofty view of themselves, and because they judged that Labour would be able to make political capital out of their refusal.
21. E. Halevy-Etzioni, 'Comparing Semi-corruption among Parliamentarians in Britain and Australia' in Comparative Methodology, ed. E. Oyen (1990) 113-33.
22. D. della Porta, Lo Scambio Occulto: Casi di Corruzione politica in Italia (1992).
23. D. Nelken, 'Whom can you trust? The future of Comparative Criminology' in The Futures of Criminology, ed. D. Nelken (1994) 220-44.
24. S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, Patrons, Clients and Friends (1984).
25. P. Sztompka, 'Conceptual Frameworks in Comparative Inquiry: Divergent or Convergent' in Globalization, Knowledge and Society, eds. M. Albrow and E. King (1990).
26. How much impact prosecutions have on corruption levels may be questioned in the light of even as sensational a set of prosecutions and scandalization as Watergate and the resignation of President Nixon under threat of impeachment.
27. See, for example, R. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (1988), and White in this volume.
28. Boissou, op. cit., n. 3.
29. There are implications here for corruption and 'new Labour' in Britain.
30. See, for example, A. Block, Masters of Paradise (1990).
31. E. Sutherland, The Professional Thief (1937).
32. Those of a postmodern disposition may not see the issue as relevant, since assessing the plausibility of different accounts has no inherent meaning. There are, of course, biases built into law itself, particularly in relation to chains of responsibility in organizational contexts.
33. D. Riesman, Folded Lies (1979).
34. See C. Fijnaut and G. Marx (eds.), Undercover: Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective (1995); M. Levi, The Investigation, Prosecution and Trial of Serious Fraud (1993); G. Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America (1987).
35. See C. Fijnaut and G. Marx (eds.), Undercover: Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective (1995); M. Levi, The Investigation, Prosecution and Trial of Serious Fraud (1993); G. Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America (1987).
36. See C. Fijnaut and G. Marx (eds.), Undercover: Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective (1995); M. Levi, The Investigation, Prosecution and Trial of Serious Fraud (1993); G. Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America (1987).
37. Quite apart from any political interference and careerism, organizational practices - for example, a focus on minimizing investigative costs and risks of acquittal - may lessen the chances of prestigious figures being prosecuted in complex organizational corruption cases, since they may not touch the money directly. Unless they get careless - as does happen - senior figures are normally harder to connect.
38. It should not be thought that this is solely the prerogative of Third World nations - see White in this volume. President Nixon made considerable use both of the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service in this regard: see Block, op. cit., n.30.
39. See J. Andvig, 'Corruption in the North Sea oil industry: Issues and assessments' (1995) 23 Crime, Law and Social Change 289-313. The United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office, rather than the police, successfully dealt with one major case of this kind.
40. See Levi, op. cit., n.34.
41. See articles by Fairchild, Corns and Lenihan in (1994) 27 Australian and New Zealand J. of Criminology 111-73.
42. See the classic study by J. Katz, 'The social movement against white-collar crime' in Annual Review of Criminology, eds. E. Bittner and S. Messenger (1980) vol. 2.
43. See, more generally, Levi, op. cit., n. 34.
44. We doubt that H.M. Customs and Excise knew when they initially prosecuted Ordtech or Matrix-Churchill that their exports were known by the MI5 and some parts of the DTI to be arms components. In an ironic sense, the fact that these prosecutions took place at all may illustrate the relative autonomy of customs investigators and prosecutors from government.
45. See Levi and Pithouse, op. cit., n. 7, and Pizzorno and della Porta in this volume.
46. A 1983 amendment to the Ethics in Government Act 1978 PL 95-521 replaced the post of special prosecutor with that of 'independent counsel'. The former are appointed by and may be removed by the Attorney-General - in the United States of America, as in England and Wales, a political appointment. The latter are appointed by a division of the United States Federal Court of Appeals following a request by the Attorney-General: Attorneys-General have no formal say in who is appointed, and cannot fire them, as they did Archibald Cox during the Watergate investigation when he showed too great enthusiasm for following the leads upwards to the White House.
47. The Walsh final reports into Iran-Contra were published only in January 1994, some seven years after his appointment: see R. Williams, 'The last word on the Iran-Contra affair? (1995) 23 Crime, Law and Social Change 367-85.
48. id., p. 379.