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Volumn 72, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 357-382

Aggregate versus product-specific pricing: Implications for franchise and traditional channels

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EID: 0030525081     PISSN: 00224359     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-4359(96)90019-6     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (8)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.