Doubting castle or the slough of despond: Davidson and Schiffer on the limits of analysis

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 351-382

  Norris, Christopher ^a  

^a CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 0030525076     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (116)

1. Richard Rorty, The Linguistic Turn, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
2. See Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference," in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gotttob Frege, ed. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), 56-78; Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting," Mind 14 (1905): 479-93.
3. See Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference," in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gotttob Frege, ed. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), 56-78; Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting," Mind 14 (1905): 479-93.
4. J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," in Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 175-204, 182.
5. See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980); -, Consequences of Pragmatism (Brighton: Harvester, 1982); -, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
6. See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980); -, Consequences of Pragmatism (Brighton: Harvester, 1982); -, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
7. See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980); -, Consequences of Pragmatism (Brighton: Harvester, 1982); -, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
8. See Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 183-98, and -, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, ed. Richard E. Grandy and Richard Warner (London: Oxford University Press, 1986), 157-74.
9. See Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 183-98, and -, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, ed. Richard E. Grandy and Richard Warner (London: Oxford University Press, 1986), 157-74.
10. See, for instance, Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Ernest Lepore (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 333-55; see also Rorty, "Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry? Davidson versus Wright," Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995): 281-300.
11. See, for instance, Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Ernest Lepore (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 333-55; see also Rorty, "Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry? Davidson versus Wright," Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995): 281-300.
12. See Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs."
13. See Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme"; see also "Truth and Meaning," "Radical Interpretation," and "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 17-36, 65-76 and 199-214.
14. See Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme"; see also "Truth and Meaning," "Radical Interpretation," and "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 17-36, 65-76 and 199-214.
15. See Alfred Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages," in Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics, trans. J. H. Woodger (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 152-278.
16. Stephen Schiffer, Remnants of Meaning (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1987), 4.
17. Ibid., 8.
18. See note 8 above.
19. Rorty, "Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference, and Pragmatism," in Transcendental Arguments and Science, ed. Peter Bieri, Rolf P. Horstmann, and Lorenz Krüger (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 78.
20. See Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" and Davidson, "In Defence of Convention T," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 65-76.
21. See Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" and Davidson, "In Defence of Convention T," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 65-76.
22. Compare, for instance, the realist position adopted in Hilary Putnam in his Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) with the scaled-down "internal" variant proposed in his The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle: Open Court, 1987) , Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), and Renewing Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 1992). See also the various responses to his work in Reading Putnam, ed. Peter Clark and Bob Hale (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
23. Compare, for instance, the realist position adopted in Hilary Putnam in his Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) with the scaled-down "internal" variant proposed in his The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle: Open Court, 1987) , Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), and Renewing Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 1992). See also the various responses to his work in Reading Putnam, ed. Peter Clark and Bob Hale (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
24. Compare, for instance, the realist position adopted in Hilary Putnam in his Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) with the scaled-down "internal" variant proposed in his The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle: Open Court, 1987) , Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), and Renewing Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 1992). See also the various responses to his work in Reading Putnam, ed. Peter Clark and Bob Hale (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
25. Compare, for instance, the realist position adopted in Hilary Putnam in his Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) with the scaled-down "internal" variant proposed in his The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle: Open Court, 1987) , Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), and Renewing Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 1992). See also the various responses to his work in Reading Putnam, ed. Peter Clark and Bob Hale (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
26. Compare, for instance, the realist position adopted in Hilary Putnam in his Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) with the scaled-down "internal" variant proposed in his The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle: Open Court, 1987) , Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), and Renewing Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 1992). See also the various responses to his work in Reading Putnam, ed. Peter Clark and Bob Hale (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
27. See Schiffer, Remnants of Meaning. See also Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).
28. See Schiffer, Remnants of Meaning. See also Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).
29. Jerry A. Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1992), 179.
30. Schiffer, Remnants, 271.
31. See Fodor, A Theory of Content; see also -, Representations (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1981); -, The Modularity of Mind (M.I.T. Press, 1983); -, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (M.I.T., 1987); -, The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics (M.I.T., 1994).
32. See Fodor, A Theory of Content; see also -, Representations (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1981); -, The Modularity of Mind (M.I.T. Press, 1983); -, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (M.I.T., 1987); -, The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics (M.I.T., 1994).
33. See Fodor, A Theory of Content; see also -, Representations (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1981); -, The Modularity of Mind (M.I.T. Press, 1983); -, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (M.I.T., 1987); -, The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics (M.I.T., 1994).
34. See Fodor, A Theory of Content; see also -, Representations (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1981); -, The Modularity of Mind (M.I.T. Press, 1983); -, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (M.I.T., 1987); -, The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics (M.I.T., 1994).
35. See Fodor, A Theory of Content; see also -, Representations (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1981); -, The Modularity of Mind (M.I.T. Press, 1983); -, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (M.I.T., 1987); -, The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics (M.I.T., 1994).
36. Schiffer, Remnants, xvi.
37. Thus Quine: "If we are limning the true and ultimate structure of reality, the canonical scheme for us is the austere scheme that knows no quotation but direct quotation and no propositional attitudes but only the physical constitution and behavior of organisms"; W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1960), 221.
38. Schiffer, Remnants, xvi.
39. See Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs."
40. Schiffer, Remnants, 271.
41. Ibid., 265.
42. Fodor, A Theory of Content, 4.
43. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958).
44. See especially Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958); also David Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
45. See especially Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958); also David Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
46. See David Papineau, Reality and Representation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); see also -, Theory and Meaning (London: Oxford University Press, 1979) and -, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
47. See David Papineau, Reality and Representation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); see also -, Theory and Meaning (London: Oxford University Press, 1979) and -, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
48. See David Papineau, Reality and Representation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); see also -, Theory and Meaning (London: Oxford University Press, 1979) and -, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
49. See Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs."
50. See Papineau, Reality and Representation.
51. W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1960); see also -, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953); -, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
52. W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1960); see also -, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953); -, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
53. W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1960); see also -, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953); -, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
54. See Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme."
55. Papineau, Reality and Representation, 98.
56. Ibid., 98.
57. Ibid., 99.
58. Ibid.
59. See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (note 28, above); see also -, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967); Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) and Local Knowledge: Further Essays on Interpretive Authority (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Derek L. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1977); Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
60. See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (note 28, above); see also -, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967); Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) and Local Knowledge: Further Essays on Interpretive Authority (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Derek L. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1977); Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
61. See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (note 28, above); see also -, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967); Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) and Local Knowledge: Further Essays on Interpretive Authority (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Derek L. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1977); Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
62. See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (note 28, above); see also -, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967); Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) and Local Knowledge: Further Essays on Interpretive Authority (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Derek L. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1977); Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
63. See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (note 28, above); see also -, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967); Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) and Local Knowledge: Further Essays on Interpretive Authority (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Derek L. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1977); Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
64. See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (note 28, above); see also -, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967); Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) and Local Knowledge: Further Essays on Interpretive Authority (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Derek L. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1977); Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
65. See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (note 28, above); see also -, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967); Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) and Local Knowledge: Further Essays on Interpretive Authority (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Derek L. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1977); Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
66. See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (note 28, above); see also -, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967); Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) and Local Knowledge: Further Essays on Interpretive Authority (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Derek L. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1977); Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
67. See for instance - from various standpoints - Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and its Critics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1989); David Rasmussen, Universalism versus Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1990).
68. See for instance - from various standpoints - Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and its Critics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1989); David Rasmussen, Universalism versus Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1990).
69. See for instance - from various standpoints - Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and its Critics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1989); David Rasmussen, Universalism versus Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1990).
70. See for instance - from various standpoints - Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and its Critics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1989); David Rasmussen, Universalism versus Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1990).
71. See for instance - from various standpoints - Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and its Critics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1989); David Rasmussen, Universalism versus Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1990).
72. See for instance - from various standpoints - Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and its Critics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1989); David Rasmussen, Universalism versus Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1990).
73. See O'Neill, Constructions of Reason.
74. See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science;
75. see also -, Ethics and Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972).
76. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age (London: Duckworth, 1971).
77. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1981); -, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988).
78. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1981); -, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988).
79. O'Neill, Constructions of Reason, 172.
80. Ibid., 175.
81. Schiffer, Remnants, 233.
82. Ibid.
83. See especially Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980); -, Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, ed. Stephen P. Schwartz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977); David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
84. See especially Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980); -, Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, ed. Stephen P. Schwartz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977); David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
85. See especially Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980); -, Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, ed. Stephen P. Schwartz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977); David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
86. See Frege, "On Sense and Reference."
87. See Kripke, Naming and Necessity; see also Putnam, "Is Semantics Possible?" and "Meaning and Reference," in Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, 102-18 and 119-32.
88. See Kripke, Naming and Necessity; see also Putnam, "Is Semantics Possible?" and "Meaning and Reference," in Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, 102-18 and 119-32.
89. See Gareth Evans, "The Causal Theory of Names," in Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, 192-215.
90. Ibid., 200-1.
91. Ibid., 201.
92. Ibid., 204.
93. Ibid.
94. Recent interest in these topics is largely owing to E. L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23 (1963). For some ingenious (if often rather contrived) examples, see Robert Shope, The Analysis of Knowing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
95. Recent interest in these topics is largely owing to E. L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23 (1963). For some ingenious (if often rather contrived) examples, see Robert Shope, The Analysis of Knowing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
96. Evans, "The Causal Theory of Names," 214.
97. Evans, "The Causal Theory of Names," 214.
98. Ibid., 214-5.
99. Schiffer, Remnants, 71.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Schiffer, Remnants, 263.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. See note 48 above; also Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986); Rom Harré, Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Social Sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) , Rom Harré and E. H. Madden, Causal Powers (New York: Blackwell, 1975); Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); Mark Platts, ed., Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); J. J. C. Smart, What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge University Press, 1983); Peter J. Smith, Realism and the Progress of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
107. See note 48 above; also Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986); Rom Harré, Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Social Sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) , Rom Harré and E. H. Madden, Causal Powers (New York: Blackwell, 1975); Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); Mark Platts, ed., Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); J. J. C. Smart, What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge University Press, 1983); Peter J. Smith, Realism and the Progress of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
108. See note 48 above; also Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986); Rom Harré, Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Social Sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) , Rom Harré and E. H. Madden, Causal Powers (New York: Blackwell, 1975); Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); Mark Platts, ed., Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); J. J. C. Smart, What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge University Press, 1983); Peter J. Smith, Realism and the Progress of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
109. See note 48 above; also Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986); Rom Harré, Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Social Sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) , Rom Harré and E. H. Madden, Causal Powers (New York: Blackwell, 1975); Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); Mark Platts, ed., Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); J. J. C. Smart, What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge University Press, 1983); Peter J. Smith, Realism and the Progress of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
110. See note 48 above; also Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986); Rom Harré, Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Social Sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) , Rom Harré and E. H. Madden, Causal Powers (New York: Blackwell, 1975); Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); Mark Platts, ed., Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); J. J. C. Smart, What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge University Press, 1983); Peter J. Smith, Realism and the Progress of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
111. See note 48 above; also Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986); Rom Harré, Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Social Sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) , Rom Harré and E. H. Madden, Causal Powers (New York: Blackwell, 1975); Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); Mark Platts, ed., Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); J. J. C. Smart, What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge University Press, 1983); Peter J. Smith, Realism and the Progress of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
112. See note 48 above; also Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986); Rom Harré, Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Social Sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) , Rom Harré and E. H. Madden, Causal Powers (New York: Blackwell, 1975); Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); Mark Platts, ed., Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); J. J. C. Smart, What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge University Press, 1983); Peter J. Smith, Realism and the Progress of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
113. See note 48 above; also Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986); Rom Harré, Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Social Sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) , Rom Harré and E. H. Madden, Causal Powers (New York: Blackwell, 1975); Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); Mark Platts, ed., Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); J. J. C. Smart, What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge University Press, 1983); Peter J. Smith, Realism and the Progress of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
114. See note 48 above; also Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986); Rom Harré, Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Social Sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) , Rom Harré and E. H. Madden, Causal Powers (New York: Blackwell, 1975); Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); Mark Platts, ed., Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); J. J. C. Smart, What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge University Press, 1983); Peter J. Smith, Realism and the Progress of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
115. These problems are nicely encapsulated in a passage from Carnap's "Intellectual Autobiography" which recalls a meeting with Tarski when the latter first expounded his formalized theory of truth. "I assumed [Carnap writes] that he had in mind a syntactical definition of logical truth or provability. I was surprised when he said that he meant truth in the customary sense, including contingent factual truth. Since I was thinking only in terms of a syntactical meta-language, I wondered how it was possible to state the truth-conditions for a simple sentence like 'this table is black.' Tarski replied: 'This is simple: the sentence "this table is black" is true if and only if this table is black'"; Rudolf Carnap, "An Intellectual Autobiography," in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. Paul Schlipp (La Salle: Open Court, 1963), 60. The passage is cited - along with much other relevant material - in J. Alfred Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 372.
116. These problems are nicely encapsulated in a passage from Carnap's "Intellectual Autobiography" which recalls a meeting with Tarski when the latter first expounded his formalized theory of truth. "I assumed [Carnap writes] that he had in mind a syntactical definition of logical truth or provability. I was surprised when he said that he meant truth in the customary sense, including contingent factual truth. Since I was thinking only in terms of a syntactical meta-language, I wondered how it was possible to state the truth-conditions for a simple sentence like 'this table is black.' Tarski replied: 'This is simple: the sentence "this table is black" is true if and only if this table is black'"; Rudolf Carnap, "An Intellectual Autobiography," in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. Paul Schlipp (La Salle: Open Court, 1963), 60. The passage is cited - along with much other relevant material - in J. Alfred Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 372.