Idealism and the sociology of knowledge

Social Studies of Science

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 839-856

  Bloor, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030518864     PISSN: 03063127     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/030631296026004005     Document Type: Review

References (37)

1. John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1995).
2. For work on the corpuscular philosophy, see James R. Jacob, 'Boyle's Atomism and the Restoration Assault on Pagan Naturalism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 8 (1978), 211-33; Steven Shapin, 'Social Uses of Science', in George S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (eds), The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteeth-Century Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 93-139; S. Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). On Mendelian genetics, see Robert Olby, 'Mendel No Mendelian?', History of Science, Vol. 7 (1979), 53-72; Augustine Brannigan, The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chapter 6; and, more generally, Jonathan Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community 1900-1933 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). For an extended bibliography of historical studies in the field to that date, see S. Shapin, 'History of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science, Vol. 20 (1982), 157-211.
3. For work on the corpuscular philosophy, see James R. Jacob, 'Boyle's Atomism and the Restoration Assault on Pagan Naturalism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 8 (1978), 211-33; Steven Shapin, 'Social Uses of Science', in George S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (eds), The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteeth-Century Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 93-139; S. Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). On Mendelian genetics, see Robert Olby, 'Mendel No Mendelian?', History of Science, Vol. 7 (1979), 53-72; Augustine Brannigan, The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chapter 6; and, more generally, Jonathan Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community 1900-1933 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). For an extended bibliography of historical studies in the field to that date, see S. Shapin, 'History of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science, Vol. 20 (1982), 157-211.
4. For work on the corpuscular philosophy, see James R. Jacob, 'Boyle's Atomism and the Restoration Assault on Pagan Naturalism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 8 (1978), 211-33; Steven Shapin, 'Social Uses of Science', in George S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (eds), The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteeth-Century Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 93-139; S. Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). On Mendelian genetics, see Robert Olby, 'Mendel No Mendelian?', History of Science, Vol. 7 (1979), 53-72; Augustine Brannigan, The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chapter 6; and, more generally, Jonathan Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community 1900-1933 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). For an extended bibliography of historical studies in the field to that date, see S. Shapin, 'History of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science, Vol. 20 (1982), 157-211.
5. For work on the corpuscular philosophy, see James R. Jacob, 'Boyle's Atomism and the Restoration Assault on Pagan Naturalism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 8 (1978), 211-33; Steven Shapin, 'Social Uses of Science', in George S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (eds), The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteeth-Century Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 93-139; S. Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). On Mendelian genetics, see Robert Olby, 'Mendel No Mendelian?', History of Science, Vol. 7 (1979), 53-72; Augustine Brannigan, The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chapter 6; and, more generally, Jonathan Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community 1900-1933 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). For an extended bibliography of historical studies in the field to that date, see S. Shapin, 'History of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science, Vol. 20 (1982), 157-211.
6. For work on the corpuscular philosophy, see James R. Jacob, 'Boyle's Atomism and the Restoration Assault on Pagan Naturalism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 8 (1978), 211-33; Steven Shapin, 'Social Uses of Science', in George S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (eds), The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteeth-Century Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 93-139; S. Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). On Mendelian genetics, see Robert Olby, 'Mendel No Mendelian?', History of Science, Vol. 7 (1979), 53-72; Augustine Brannigan, The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chapter 6; and, more generally, Jonathan Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community 1900-1933 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). For an extended bibliography of historical studies in the field to that date, see S. Shapin, 'History of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science, Vol. 20 (1982), 157-211.
7. For work on the corpuscular philosophy, see James R. Jacob, 'Boyle's Atomism and the Restoration Assault on Pagan Naturalism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 8 (1978), 211-33; Steven Shapin, 'Social Uses of Science', in George S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (eds), The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteeth-Century Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 93-139; S. Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). On Mendelian genetics, see Robert Olby, 'Mendel No Mendelian?', History of Science, Vol. 7 (1979), 53-72; Augustine Brannigan, The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chapter 6; and, more generally, Jonathan Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community 1900-1933 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). For an extended bibliography of historical studies in the field to that date, see S. Shapin, 'History of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science, Vol. 20 (1982), 157-211.
8. For work on the corpuscular philosophy, see James R. Jacob, 'Boyle's Atomism and the Restoration Assault on Pagan Naturalism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 8 (1978), 211-33; Steven Shapin, 'Social Uses of Science', in George S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (eds), The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteeth-Century Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 93-139; S. Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). On Mendelian genetics, see Robert Olby, 'Mendel No Mendelian?', History of Science, Vol. 7 (1979), 53-72; Augustine Brannigan, The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chapter 6; and, more generally, Jonathan Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community 1900-1933 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). For an extended bibliography of historical studies in the field to that date, see S. Shapin, 'History of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science, Vol. 20 (1982), 157-211.
9. Accounts of this kind are indicated in the work of Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Winch: see G.E.M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 37 (1976), 188-216; Anscombe, 'Rules, Rights and Promises', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 3 (1978), 318-23; P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). The most developed account, and the one that I have found most useful, is Barry Barnes': 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology, Vol. 17 (1983), 524-45. See also Searle, op. cit. note 1.
10. Accounts of this kind are indicated in the work of Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Winch: see G.E.M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 37 (1976), 188-216; Anscombe, 'Rules, Rights and Promises', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 3 (1978), 318-23; P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). The most developed account, and the one that I have found most useful, is Barry Barnes': 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology, Vol. 17 (1983), 524-45. See also Searle, op. cit. note 1.
11. Accounts of this kind are indicated in the work of Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Winch: see G.E.M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 37 (1976), 188-216; Anscombe, 'Rules, Rights and Promises', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 3 (1978), 318-23; P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). The most developed account, and the one that I have found most useful, is Barry Barnes': 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology, Vol. 17 (1983), 524-45. See also Searle, op. cit. note 1.
12. Accounts of this kind are indicated in the work of Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Winch: see G.E.M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 37 (1976), 188-216; Anscombe, 'Rules, Rights and Promises', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 3 (1978), 318-23; P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). The most developed account, and the one that I have found most useful, is Barry Barnes': 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology, Vol. 17 (1983), 524-45. See also Searle, op. cit. note 1.
13. Accounts of this kind are indicated in the work of Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Winch: see G.E.M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 37 (1976), 188-216; Anscombe, 'Rules, Rights and Promises', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 3 (1978), 318-23; P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). The most developed account, and the one that I have found most useful, is Barry Barnes': 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology, Vol. 17 (1983), 524-45. See also Searle, op. cit. note 1.
14. Strictly, there are exceptions. We can think of certain formal specifications of membership being laid down, and someone satisfying them without anybody realizing that this is so. But these are parasitic on, and derivative from, the basic processes described above.
15. The label 'idealism' can be misleading in some respects, but it is nevertheless historically appropriate. For example, it fits nicely with J.H. Muirhead's definition, as quoted in R.F.A. Hoernlé, Idealism as a Philosophical Doctrine (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1924), 55. It is perhaps useful to remember that Anscombe qualified the character of the idealism involved by calling it 'linguistic idealism'.
16. David Hume (1740), ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), III, ii, v.
17. H.M. Collins, Changing Order: Replications and Induction in Scientific Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, rev. edn, 1992 [1985]), 174.
18. A cogent general argument to this effect is given in Chapter 8 of Searle, op. cit. note 1.
19. See, for example, Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987). For two valuable reviews of the state of the argument, see J. Haugeland, 'The Intentionality All-Stars', in J.E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives IV: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Ataxadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1990), 383-427; and M. Williams, 'Social Norms and Narrow Content', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 40 (1990), 425-62.
20. See, for example, Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987). For two valuable reviews of the state of the argument, see J. Haugeland, 'The Intentionality All-Stars', in J.E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives IV: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Ataxadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1990), 383-427; and M. Williams, 'Social Norms and Narrow Content', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 40 (1990), 425-62.
21. See, for example, Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987). For two valuable reviews of the state of the argument, see J. Haugeland, 'The Intentionality All-Stars', in J.E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives IV: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Ataxadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1990), 383-427; and M. Williams, 'Social Norms and Narrow Content', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 40 (1990), 425-62.
22. Here I will be following Barnes (op. cit. note 3), who distinguishes an idealized and simplified form of a natural-kind predicate (called N-type) from an equally idealized form of a social-kind predicate (called S-type). N-predicates work by pattern-matching.
23. See P.M. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), Chapter 10.
24. See Haugeland, op. cit. note 9; Williams, op. cit. note 9.
25. See Haugeland, op. cit. note 9; Williams, op. cit. note 9.
26. Searle, op. cit. note 1, 61.
27. Ibid., 228.
28. Having introduced Hume earlier in the discussion, it is perhaps worth remarking that Searle's position is in many ways similar to that of Hume's old enemy, Thomas Reid. Like Reid, Searle is a direct realist and also a believer in the simple, irreducible character of the 'social operations' of the mind. For a discussion of Hume and Reid, making the link with today's discussions of intentionality and rule following, see D. Bloor, Rules & Institutions: An Essay on Wittgenstein and Hume (1996, forthcoming).
29. J.R. Searle, 'Collective Intentions and Actions', in P.R. Cohen, J. Morgan and M. Pollock (eds), Intentions in Communication (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 401-15, at 401.
30. Ibid., 406.
31. Ibid., 407.
32. For a systematic account of meaning finitism, and its significance for the sociology of knowledge, see B. Barnes, D. Bloor and John Henry, Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1996).
33. Searle, op. cit. note 1, 166 (emphasis in original).
34. My claim is not that the meaning (such as it is) residing within the pattern-matching capability of the individual brain is indeterminate, and that it is made determinate by the good offices of other concept users. I have not been representing the move from the individual to the social, as the move from indeterminate to determinate meaning. On the contrary, the move from the individual to the social is the move from non-meaning to meaning, where all meaning is indeterminate. The classic statement of the view that individual representations are indeterminate, while collective representations are definite, is to be found in Emile Durkheim, trans. J.W. Swain, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1912), 146-47.
35. See Olby, op. cit. note 2; Brannigan, op. cit. note 2.
36. See Olby, op. cit. note 2; Brannigan, op. cit. note 2.
37. I also want to take issue with the use of the word 'arbitrary' to characterize things which are conventional or definitional. Typically, definitions are not arbitrary, because they must fit together to form systems of classification, and these systems work as cognitive maps to help us find our way in the world. There are, of course, different maps. Judgements differ about the virtues of these maps, and about their utility for different purposes. Different strategies can and are adopted to improve or modify them. Where such judgements, strategies and decisions come into play there, too, the sociologist of knowledge has an explanatory job to do, and the first step will be to see the different maps as having the character of institutions.