The role of analogical reasoning in novel foreign-policy situations

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 523-552

  Houghton, David Patrick ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030518262     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0007123400007596     Document Type: Review

References (134)

1. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1976), p. 217.
2. See especially Ernest May, Lessons of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 217-87; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 313-21 ; Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 50-7; Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Freedom Press, 1986); Dwain Mefford, 'The Power of Historical Analogies: Soviet Intervention in Eastern Europe and Central America', in Michael Fry, ed., History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians (London: Pinter, 1991); Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 296-341; Alex Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
3. See especially Ernest May, Lessons of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 217-87; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 313-21 ; Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 50-7; Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Freedom Press, 1986); Dwain Mefford, 'The Power of Historical Analogies: Soviet Intervention in Eastern Europe and Central America', in Michael Fry, ed., History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians (London: Pinter, 1991); Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 296-341; Alex Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
4. See especially Ernest May, Lessons of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 217-87; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 313-21 ; Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 50-7; Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Freedom Press, 1986); Dwain Mefford, 'The Power of Historical Analogies: Soviet Intervention in Eastern Europe and Central America', in Michael Fry, ed., History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians (London: Pinter, 1991); Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 296-341; Alex Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
5. See especially Ernest May, Lessons of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 217-87; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 313-21 ; Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 50-7; Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Freedom Press, 1986); Dwain Mefford, 'The Power of Historical Analogies: Soviet Intervention in Eastern Europe and Central America', in Michael Fry, ed., History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians (London: Pinter, 1991); Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 296-341; Alex Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
6. See especially Ernest May, Lessons of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 217-87; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 313-21 ; Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 50-7; Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Freedom Press, 1986); Dwain Mefford, 'The Power of Historical Analogies: Soviet Intervention in Eastern Europe and Central America', in Michael Fry, ed., History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians (London: Pinter, 1991); Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 296-341; Alex Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
7. See especially Ernest May, Lessons of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 217-87; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 313-21 ; Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 50-7; Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Freedom Press, 1986); Dwain Mefford, 'The Power of Historical Analogies: Soviet Intervention in Eastern Europe and Central America', in Michael Fry, ed., History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians (London: Pinter, 1991); Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 296-341; Alex Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
8. See especially Ernest May, Lessons of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 217-87; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 313-21 ; Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 50-7; Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Freedom Press, 1986); Dwain Mefford, 'The Power of Historical Analogies: Soviet Intervention in Eastern Europe and Central America', in Michael Fry, ed., History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians (London: Pinter, 1991); Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 296-341; Alex Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
9. See especially Ernest May, Lessons of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 217-87; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 313-21 ; Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 50-7; Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Freedom Press, 1986); Dwain Mefford, 'The Power of Historical Analogies: Soviet Intervention in Eastern Europe and Central America', in Michael Fry, ed., History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians (London: Pinter, 1991); Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 296-341; Alex Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
10. See especially Ernest May, Lessons of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 217-87; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 313-21 ; Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 50-7; Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Freedom Press, 1986); Dwain Mefford, 'The Power of Historical Analogies: Soviet Intervention in Eastern Europe and Central America', in Michael Fry, ed., History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians (London: Pinter, 1991); Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 296-341; Alex Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
11. See Dedre Gentner, 'Structure Mapping: A Theoretical Framework for Analogy' Cognitive Science, 7 (1983), 155-70.
12. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies At War, p. 10.
13. Fortunately we are blessed with a large number of first-hand accounts of what went on within these meetings, as well as a growing number of academic studies which draw on these. Of the personal accounts, see especially Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982); Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency (New York: Putnam's, 1982); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in Managing America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Jody Powell, The Other Side of the Story (New York: William Morrow, 1984): Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); and Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1991). For a selection of the major secondary analyses, see the works cited in fn. 95.
14. Fortunately we are blessed with a large number of first-hand accounts of what went on within these meetings, as well as a growing number of academic studies which draw on these. Of the personal accounts, see especially Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982); Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency (New York: Putnam's, 1982); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in Managing America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Jody Powell, The Other Side of the Story (New York: William Morrow, 1984): Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); and Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1991). For a selection of the major secondary analyses, see the works cited in fn. 95.
15. Fortunately we are blessed with a large number of first-hand accounts of what went on within these meetings, as well as a growing number of academic studies which draw on these. Of the personal accounts, see especially Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982); Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency (New York: Putnam's, 1982); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in Managing America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Jody Powell, The Other Side of the Story (New York: William Morrow, 1984): Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); and Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1991). For a selection of the major secondary analyses, see the works cited in fn. 95.
16. Fortunately we are blessed with a large number of first-hand accounts of what went on within these meetings, as well as a growing number of academic studies which draw on these. Of the personal accounts, see especially Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982); Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency (New York: Putnam's, 1982); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in Managing America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Jody Powell, The Other Side of the Story (New York: William Morrow, 1984): Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); and Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1991). For a selection of the major secondary analyses, see the works cited in fn. 95.
17. Fortunately we are blessed with a large number of first-hand accounts of what went on within these meetings, as well as a growing number of academic studies which draw on these. Of the personal accounts, see especially Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982); Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency (New York: Putnam's, 1982); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in Managing America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Jody Powell, The Other Side of the Story (New York: William Morrow, 1984): Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); and Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1991). For a selection of the major secondary analyses, see the works cited in fn. 95.
18. Fortunately we are blessed with a large number of first-hand accounts of what went on within these meetings, as well as a growing number of academic studies which draw on these. Of the personal accounts, see especially Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982); Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency (New York: Putnam's, 1982); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in Managing America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Jody Powell, The Other Side of the Story (New York: William Morrow, 1984): Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); and Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1991). For a selection of the major secondary analyses, see the works cited in fn. 95.
19. Fortunately we are blessed with a large number of first-hand accounts of what went on within these meetings, as well as a growing number of academic studies which draw on these. Of the personal accounts, see especially Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982); Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency (New York: Putnam's, 1982); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in Managing America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Jody Powell, The Other Side of the Story (New York: William Morrow, 1984): Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); and Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1991). For a selection of the major secondary analyses, see the works cited in fn. 95.
20. Interview with Jimmy Carter, Miller Center Interviews, Carter Presidency Project, 29 November 1982, p. 38, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia; Warren Christopher, 'Introduction', in Christopher et al., American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 1.
21. Quoted in Scott Armstrong, George Wilson and Bob Woodward, 'Debate Rekindles on Failed Iran Raid', Washington Post, 25 April 1982, p. A15.
22. Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, p. 72.
23. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 477.
24. Jimmy Carter interview, Carter Library, p. 38.
25. Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, pp. 20-4.
26. Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, p. 29.
27. Jimmy Carter, 'The President's News Conference on November 28, 1979', Public Papers of the President, 1979, p. 2167.
28. The Special Coordinating Committee was an 'action group' used during the Carter administration to deal with crises and other matters which were not the obvious domain of any single department or organization (see Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, pp. 27-9).
29. Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, p. 31.
30. Zbigniew Brzezinski, interview with the author, Washington, DC, 3 February 1995.
31. Cyrus Vance, interview with the author, New York, 14 February 1995.
32. Brzezinski, interview with the author.
33. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 84.
34. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 84.
35. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 84; Brzezinski, interview with the author.
36. Brzezinski, interview with the author.
37. Brzezinski, interview with the author.
38. Gary Sick, interview with the author, New York, 12 December 1994.
39. Gary Sick, 'Military Options and Constraints', in Christopher et al., American Hostages in Iran, p. 145; see also Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 459-60 ; and Powell. The Other Side of the Story, pp. 225-6.
40. Gary Sick, 'Military Options and Constraints', in Christopher et al., American Hostages in Iran, p. 145; see also Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 459-60 ; and Powell. The Other Side of the Story, pp. 225-6.
41. Gary Sick, 'Military Options and Constraints', in Christopher et al., American Hostages in Iran, p. 145; see also Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 459-60 ; and Powell. The Other Side of the Story, pp. 225-6.
42. Sick, interview with the author.
43. Jordan, Crisis. p. 43.
44. Harold Brown's statement to reporters on 25 April 1980. See 'Secretary Brown's News Conference, April 25 1980'. Department of State Bulletin, 80 (June 1980), p. 41.
45. Quoted in Terence Smith, 'Putting the Hostages' Lives First', New York Times Magazine, 17 May 1981, p. 78.
46. Vance, interview with the author.
47. Sick, All Fall Down, p. 425.
48. Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, p. 65.
49. Sick, interview with the author.
50. See Newsweek, 12 May 1980, p. 38.
51. Quoted in Washington Post, 29 March 1980, p. A13.
52. Sick, interview with the author.
53. Jordan, Crisis, p. 242.
54. Vance, interview with the author.
55. Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 408-9.
56. Vance, interview with the author.
57. Robert Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1949-1953 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), pp. 84-5.
58. Vance, interview with the author.
59. Jordan, Crisis, pp. 36-7.
60. See Cyrus Vance, second oral history interview, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin Texas, 29 December 1969, p. 15.
61. Vance, interview with the author.
62. Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 408-9.
63. Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 498-500; see also Foreign Relations, 8 (1949), 1007-19.
64. Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 498-500; see also Foreign Relations, 8 (1949), 1007-19.
65. The 'thirteen' were the original hostages who were released early on in the hostage crisis, all of whom were black or female (Vance, interview with the author).
66. Sick, interview with the author.
67. Vance, interview with the author.
68. See Public Papers of the President, 1979, p. 2242.
69. Question and answer session with reporters from Pennsylvania, 19 April 1980, Public Papers of the President, pp. 744-5.
70. Jordan, Crisis, pp. 36-7
71. Brzezinski, interview with the author.
72. Jordan, Crisis, pp. 36-7.
73. Jordan, Crisis, pp. 36-7.
74. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 459.
75. Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, p. 60.
76. Vance, interview with the author.
77. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 483.
78. See Reginald Ross Smith, 'A Comparative Case Analysis of Presidential Decision-Making' (unpublished MA dissertation, Emory University, Atlanta, 1984, p. 144).
79. Vance, interview with the author.
80. Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, pp. 29-30.
81. Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, pp. 59-60.
82. Stansfield Turner, interview with the author, McLean, Virginia, 28 October 1994.
83. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'The Failed Mission: The Inside Account of the Attempt to Free the Hostages in Iran', New York Times Magazine, 18 April 1982, p. 28.
84. Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, p. 71.
85. Turner, interview with the author.
86. Turner, interview with the author.
87. Sick, interview with the author.
88. Brzezinski, The Failed Mission', p. 30.
89. On this point, see I. M. Destler, Leslie Gelb and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 223; and Sick, All Fall Down, pp. 341-3.
90. On this point, see I. M. Destler, Leslie Gelb and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 223; and Sick, All Fall Down, pp. 341-3.
91. Vance, Hard Choices, p. 408.
92. Vance, Hard Choices, p. 408.
93. Vance, Hard Choices, p. 408.
94. Vance, interview with the author.
95. Lloyd Cutler Exit interview, 2 March 1981, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia, p. 19.
96. See Newsweek, 12 May 1980, p. 36.
97. Jordan, Crisis, p. 246.
98. Vance, interview with the author.
99. Jordan, Crisis, p. 246.
100. Brzezinski, interview with the author.
101. Vance, interview with the author.
102. Quoted in Benjamin Schemmer, 'Presidential Courage - and the April 1980 Iranian Rescue Mission', Armed Forces Journal International (May 1981 ), p. 61.
103. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 495.
104. Brzezinski, interview with the author.
105. See Time, 5 May 1980, p. 19; Jordan, Crisis, p. 256.
106. See Time, 5 May 1980, p. 19; Jordan, Crisis, p. 256.
107. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 514.
108. Brzezinski, interview with the author.
109. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 495.
110. Brzezinski, interview with the author.
111. Time, 5 May 1980, p. 20.
112. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
113. Abraham Ribicoff, 'Lessons and Conclusions', in Christopher et al., American Hostages in Iran, p. 386.
114. A substantial secondary literature exists on decision making during the hostage crisis: see, for example, Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Steve Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission', International Affairs, 61 (1984/1985), 9-25; Steve Smith, 'Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission', British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 117-23; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making', British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 269-86; Betty Glad, 'Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Political Science Review, 10 (1989), 35-61 ; Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 193-6; Rose McDermott, 'Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission', Political Psychology, 13 (1992), 237-63; Michael Link and Charles Kegley, 'Is Access Influence? Measuring Adviser-Presidential Interactions in the Light of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 343-64; and Scott Gartner, 'Predicting the Timing of Carter's Decision to Initiate a Hostage Rescue Attempt: Modelling a Dynamic Information Environment', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 365-86. Of these, only McDermott's account makes reference to the historical precedents employed by the key participants in the crisis.
115. A substantial secondary literature exists on decision making during the hostage crisis: see, for example, Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Steve Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission', International Affairs, 61 (1984/1985), 9-25; Steve Smith, 'Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission', British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 117-23; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making', British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 269-86; Betty Glad, 'Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Political Science Review, 10 (1989), 35-61 ; Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 193-6; Rose McDermott, 'Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission', Political Psychology, 13 (1992), 237-63; Michael Link and Charles Kegley, 'Is Access Influence? Measuring Adviser-Presidential Interactions in the Light of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 343-64; and Scott Gartner, 'Predicting the Timing of Carter's Decision to Initiate a Hostage Rescue Attempt: Modelling a Dynamic Information Environment', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 365-86. Of these, only McDermott's account makes reference to the historical precedents employed by the key participants in the crisis.
116. A substantial secondary literature exists on decision making during the hostage crisis: see, for example, Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Steve Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission', International Affairs, 61 (1984/1985), 9-25; Steve Smith, 'Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission', British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 117-23; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making', British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 269-86; Betty Glad, 'Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Political Science Review, 10 (1989), 35-61 ; Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 193-6; Rose McDermott, 'Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission', Political Psychology, 13 (1992), 237-63; Michael Link and Charles Kegley, 'Is Access Influence? Measuring Adviser-Presidential Interactions in the Light of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 343-64; and Scott Gartner, 'Predicting the Timing of Carter's Decision to Initiate a Hostage Rescue Attempt: Modelling a Dynamic Information Environment', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 365-86. Of these, only McDermott's account makes reference to the historical precedents employed by the key participants in the crisis.
117. A substantial secondary literature exists on decision making during the hostage crisis: see, for example, Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Steve Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission', International Affairs, 61 (1984/1985), 9-25; Steve Smith, 'Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission', British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 117-23; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making', British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 269-86; Betty Glad, 'Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Political Science Review, 10 (1989), 35-61 ; Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 193-6; Rose McDermott, 'Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission', Political Psychology, 13 (1992), 237-63; Michael Link and Charles Kegley, 'Is Access Influence? Measuring Adviser-Presidential Interactions in the Light of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 343-64; and Scott Gartner, 'Predicting the Timing of Carter's Decision to Initiate a Hostage Rescue Attempt: Modelling a Dynamic Information Environment', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 365-86. Of these, only McDermott's account makes reference to the historical precedents employed by the key participants in the crisis.
118. A substantial secondary literature exists on decision making during the hostage crisis: see, for example, Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Steve Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission', International Affairs, 61 (1984/1985), 9-25; Steve Smith, 'Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission', British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 117-23; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making', British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 269-86; Betty Glad, 'Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Political Science Review, 10 (1989), 35-61 ; Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 193-6; Rose McDermott, 'Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission', Political Psychology, 13 (1992), 237-63; Michael Link and Charles Kegley, 'Is Access Influence? Measuring Adviser-Presidential Interactions in the Light of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 343-64; and Scott Gartner, 'Predicting the Timing of Carter's Decision to Initiate a Hostage Rescue Attempt: Modelling a Dynamic Information Environment', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 365-86. Of these, only McDermott's account makes reference to the historical precedents employed by the key participants in the crisis.
119. A substantial secondary literature exists on decision making during the hostage crisis: see, for example, Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Steve Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission', International Affairs, 61 (1984/1985), 9-25; Steve Smith, 'Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission', British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 117-23; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making', British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 269-86; Betty Glad, 'Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Political Science Review, 10 (1989), 35-61 ; Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 193-6; Rose McDermott, 'Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission', Political Psychology, 13 (1992), 237-63; Michael Link and Charles Kegley, 'Is Access Influence? Measuring Adviser-Presidential Interactions in the Light of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 343-64; and Scott Gartner, 'Predicting the Timing of Carter's Decision to Initiate a Hostage Rescue Attempt: Modelling a Dynamic Information Environment', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 365-86. Of these, only McDermott's account makes reference to the historical precedents employed by the key participants in the crisis.
120. A substantial secondary literature exists on decision making during the hostage crisis: see, for example, Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Steve Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission', International Affairs, 61 (1984/1985), 9-25; Steve Smith, 'Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission', British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 117-23; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making', British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 269-86; Betty Glad, 'Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Political Science Review, 10 (1989), 35-61 ; Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 193-6; Rose McDermott, 'Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission', Political Psychology, 13 (1992), 237-63; Michael Link and Charles Kegley, 'Is Access Influence? Measuring Adviser-Presidential Interactions in the Light of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 343-64; and Scott Gartner, 'Predicting the Timing of Carter's Decision to Initiate a Hostage Rescue Attempt: Modelling a Dynamic Information Environment', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 365-86. Of these, only McDermott's account makes reference to the historical precedents employed by the key participants in the crisis.
121. A substantial secondary literature exists on decision making during the hostage crisis: see, for example, Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Steve Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission', International Affairs, 61 (1984/1985), 9-25; Steve Smith, 'Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission', British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 117-23; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making', British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 269-86; Betty Glad, 'Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Political Science Review, 10 (1989), 35-61 ; Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 193-6; Rose McDermott, 'Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission', Political Psychology, 13 (1992), 237-63; Michael Link and Charles Kegley, 'Is Access Influence? Measuring Adviser-Presidential Interactions in the Light of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 343-64; and Scott Gartner, 'Predicting the Timing of Carter's Decision to Initiate a Hostage Rescue Attempt: Modelling a Dynamic Information Environment', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 365-86. Of these, only McDermott's account makes reference to the historical precedents employed by the key participants in the crisis.
122. A substantial secondary literature exists on decision making during the hostage crisis: see, for example, Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Steve Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission', International Affairs, 61 (1984/1985), 9-25; Steve Smith, 'Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission', British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 117-23; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making', British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 269-86; Betty Glad, 'Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Political Science Review, 10 (1989), 35-61 ; Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 193-6; Rose McDermott, 'Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission', Political Psychology, 13 (1992), 237-63; Michael Link and Charles Kegley, 'Is Access Influence? Measuring Adviser-Presidential Interactions in the Light of the Iranian Hostage Crisis', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 343-64; and Scott Gartner, 'Predicting the Timing of Carter's Decision to Initiate a Hostage Rescue Attempt: Modelling a Dynamic Information Environment', International Interactions, 18 (1993), 365-86. Of these, only McDermott's account makes reference to the historical precedents employed by the key participants in the crisis.
123. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown, 1971). For an in-depth examination of these issues, see Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position'; and Hollis and Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making'. Both articles adopt a 'soft' version of the BP approach, in which individual actors matter but where governmental role is a key factor in the shaping of policy attitudes.
124. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown, 1971). For an in-depth examination of these issues, see Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position'; and Hollis and Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making'. Both articles adopt a 'soft' version of the BP approach, in which individual actors matter but where governmental role is a key factor in the shaping of policy attitudes.
125. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown, 1971). For an in-depth examination of these issues, see Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position'; and Hollis and Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making'. Both articles adopt a 'soft' version of the BP approach, in which individual actors matter but where governmental role is a key factor in the shaping of policy attitudes.
126. Vance, interview with the author.
127. Smith, p. 23; Hollis and Smith, passim.
128. Brzezinski, interview with the author.
129. Robert Abelson, 'Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decision-Making', in John Carroll and John Payne, eds, Cognition and Social Behavior (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1976); Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment, pp. 50-7.
130. Robert Abelson, 'Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decision-Making', in John Carroll and John Payne, eds, Cognition and Social Behavior (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1976); Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment, pp. 50-7.
131. For some representative examples, see Mary Gick and Keith Holyoak, 'Analogical Problem-Solving', Cognitive Psychology, 12 (1980), 306-55; Dedre Gentner and Cecile Toupin, 'Systematicity and Surface Similarity in the Development of Analogy ', Cognitive Science, 10 (1986), 277-300; Diane Halpern, Carol Hansen and David Riefer, 'Analogies as an Aid to Understanding and Memory', Journal of Educational Psychology, 82 (1990), 298-305.
132. For some representative examples, see Mary Gick and Keith Holyoak, 'Analogical Problem-Solving', Cognitive Psychology, 12 (1980), 306-55; Dedre Gentner and Cecile Toupin, 'Systematicity and Surface Similarity in the Development of Analogy ', Cognitive Science, 10 (1986), 277-300; Diane Halpern, Carol Hansen and David Riefer, 'Analogies as an Aid to Understanding and Memory', Journal of Educational Psychology, 82 (1990), 298-305.
133. For some representative examples, see Mary Gick and Keith Holyoak, 'Analogical Problem-Solving', Cognitive Psychology, 12 (1980), 306-55; Dedre Gentner and Cecile Toupin, 'Systematicity and Surface Similarity in the Development of Analogy ', Cognitive Science, 10 (1986), 277-300; Diane Halpern, Carol Hansen and David Riefer, 'Analogies as an Aid to Understanding and Memory', Journal of Educational Psychology, 82 (1990), 298-305.
134. Brian Ripley, 'Culture, Cognition and Bureaucratic Politics', in Laura Neack, Jeanne Hey and Patrick Haney, eds, Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995).