Fiduciary responsibility and bank-firm relationships: An analysis of shareholder voting by banks

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 75-87

  Payne, Thomas H ^a   Millar, James A ^b   Glezen, G William ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE AT CHATTANOOGA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Bank director interlock; Bank fiduciary responsibility; Bank voting behavior; Corporate control; Shareholder voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030510097     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0929-1199(96)00006-5     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. Bhagat, S. and J.A. Brickley, 1984, Cumulative voting: The value of minority shareholder voting rights, Journal of Law and Economics 27, 339-366.
2. Bhagat, S. and R.H. Jefferis, 1991, Voting power in the proxy process: The case of antitakeover charter amendments, Journal of Financial Economics 30, 193-225.
3. Brickley, J., R. Lease and C. Smith, 1988, Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 267-291.
4. Brickley, J., R. Lease and C. Smith, 1994, Corporate voting: Evidence from charter amendment proposals, Journal of Corporate Finance 1, 5-31.
5. Coffee, J.C., 1991, Liquidity vs. control: The institutional investor as corporate monitor, Columbia Law Review 91, 1277-1368.
6. DeAngelo, H. and E. Rice, 1983, Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth, Journal of Financial Economics 11, 329-360.
7. Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn, 1985, The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences, Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155-1177.
8. Hair, J., R. Anderson, R. Tatham and W. Black, 1992, Multivariate data analysis with readings - Third edition (Macmillan Publishing Company, New York).
9. Jarrell, G.A. and A.B. Poulsen, 1987, Shark repellents and stock, prices: The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980, Journal of Financial Economics 19, 127-168.
10. Jarrell, G., J. Brickley, and J. Netter, 1988, The market for corporate control: The empirical evidence since 1980, Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, 49-68.
11. Jarrow, R.A. and J.C. Leach, 1991, The relevance of fiduciary conflict-of-interests in control versus issue proxy contests. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 26, 533-547.
12. McGurn, P.S., 1989, Confidential proxy voting (Investor Responsibility Research Center, Washington, DC).
13. Pound, J., 1988, Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 237-265.
14. Van Nuys, K., 1993, Corporate governance through the proxy process: Evidence from the 1989 Honeywell proxy solicitation, Journal of Financial Economics 34, 101-132.
15. White, H., 1980, A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817-838.