Negotiation and renegotiation of optimal financial contracts under the threat of predation

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 325-343

  Snyder, Christopher M ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030508953     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2950500     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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3. BENSAID, B. and GARY-BOBO, R. J., 1993, 'Commitment Value of Contracts under Renegotiation Constraints', Econometrica, 61, pp. 1423-1429.
4. BOLTON, P., 1990, 'Renegotiation and the Dynamics of Contract Design', European Economic Review, 34, pp. 303-310.
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10. KATZ, M. L., 1991, 'Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments', Rand Journal of Economics, 22, pp. 307-328.
11. MASKIN, E. and TIROLE, J., 1992, 'The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values', Econometrica, 60, pp. 1-42.
12. PETERSEN, M. A. and RAJAN, R. G., 1995, 'The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, pp. 407-443.
13. SNYDER, C. M., 1994, 'Predation, Renegotiation and the Scope of Financial Contracts', Massachusetts Institute of Technology Ph.D. thesis, chapter 1.
14. SNYDER, C. M., 1995, 'Negotiation and Renegotiation of Optimal Financial Contracts Under the Threat of Predation', George Washington University working paper, no. D-9504.
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