Britain, the United States, and the Development of NATO Strategy, 1950-1964

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 260-281

  Twigge, Stephen ^a   Macmillan, Alan ^a  

^a ABERYSTWYTH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030508309     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402399608437637     Document Type: Article

References (77)

1. John S. Duffield, 'The Evolution of NATO's Strategy of Flexible Response: A Reinterpretation', Security Studies 1/1 (Autumn 1991) pp.132-56; Jane Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1988); David Schwartz, NATO s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington DC: Brookings 1983).
2. John S. Duffield, 'The Evolution of NATO's Strategy of Flexible Response: A Reinterpretation', Security Studies 1/1 (Autumn 1991) pp.132-56; Jane Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1988); David Schwartz, NATO s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington DC: Brookings 1983).
3. John S. Duffield, 'The Evolution of NATO's Strategy of Flexible Response: A Reinterpretation', Security Studies 1/1 (Autumn 1991) pp.132-56; Jane Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1988); David Schwartz, NATO s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington DC: Brookings 1983).
4. Beatrice Heuser, 'The Development of NATO Nuclear Strategy', Contemporary European History 4/1 (1994) pp.37-66.
5. Robert Wampler, 'Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britain and the Foundations of NATO Strategy 1948-1957' (PhD, Harvard U. 1991); Martin Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning 1955-1958 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991) pp.51-67; Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America 1957-62 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994) pp. 115-25.
6. Robert Wampler, 'Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britain and the Foundations of NATO Strategy 1948-1957' (PhD, Harvard U. 1991); Martin Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning 1955-1958 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991) pp.51-67; Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America 1957-62 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994) pp. 115-25.
7. Robert Wampler, 'Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britain and the Foundations of NATO Strategy 1948-1957' (PhD, Harvard U. 1991); Martin Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning 1955-1958 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991) pp.51-67; Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America 1957-62 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994) pp. 115-25.
8. Ivo Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theatre Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (NY: Columbia UP 1991) pp.40-6; J. Michael Legge, 'Theatre Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response', RAND Paper R-2964-FF (1983); John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: The United Kingdom and Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995) pp.331-7.
9. Ivo Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theatre Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (NY: Columbia UP 1991) pp.40-6; J. Michael Legge, 'Theatre Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response', RAND Paper R-2964-FF (1983); John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: The United Kingdom and Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995) pp.331-7.
10. Ivo Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theatre Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (NY: Columbia UP 1991) pp.40-6; J. Michael Legge, 'Theatre Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response', RAND Paper R-2964-FF (1983); John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: The United Kingdom and Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995) pp.331-7.
11. The 1950 Global Strategy Paper, DO (50) 45, was recently published in H.J. Yasamee and K.A. Hamilton (eds.) Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, Vol.IV, Korea: June 1950-April 1951 (London: HMSO 1991) pp.411-31.
12. For an assessment of the significance of the 1952 GSP, see John Baylis and Alan Macmillan, 'The British Global Strategy Paper of 1952', Jnl of Strategic Studies 16/2 (June 1993) pp.200-26.
13. For the full text of the paper, see Alan Macmillan and John Baylis, A Reassessment of the British Global Strategy Paper of 1952, Nuclear History Program, Occas. Paper No.8.
14. Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO): PREM 11/849, telegram from Sir Gladwyn Jebb to Foreign Office, No.816, 16 Dec. 1954.
15. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1955-57, Vol. IV, p.28, telegram from US delegates at the North Ministerial Meeting to Dept. of State, 16 Dec. 1955.
16. PRO, AIR 8/2045, ACAS (P) to CAS, 16 Feb. 1956.
17. PRO, AIR 8/2064, Mountbatten to Boyle, 11 July 1956.
18. PRO, DEFE 32/5, COS (56) 271, Long Term Defence Review, NATO Strategy and Level of Forces, 13 July 1956.
19. Ibid. Annex I to COS (56) 271, Military Brief by FSL and CIGS.
20. Ibid. Annex II to COS (56) 271, Military Brief by CAS.
21. PRO, CAB 129/84, Annex to CP (56) 269, 28 Nov. 1956.
22. For full details of the British Directive see PRO, AIR 41/86, T.C.G. James, Defence Policy and the Royal Air Force 1956-1963 (Air Historical Branch 1987) Appendix C.
23. Robert A. Wampler, NATO Strategic Planning and Nuclear Weapons 1950-57, Nuclear History Program, Occas. Paper No.6, pp.30-2.
24. Directive to NATO Military Authorities from the North Atlantic Council, as finally approved by the Council at its meeting on 13 Dec. 1956 [C-M (56) 138 (Final)], reproduced in James (note 16) App. C. The Directive specifically stated that NATO must possess the capability to deal with 'infiltration, incursions, or hostile local actions without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons'.
25. Details of MC 14/2, April 1957, are given in Wampler (note 3) Appendix II, pp.1077-9.
26. PRO, DEFE 4/95, COS (57) 11th meeting, 8 Feb. 1957.
27. Cmnd. 124, Defence Outline of Future Policy (London: HMSO 1957).
28. PRO, DEFE 4/96, JP (57) 30 (Final), The Overall Strategic Concept, 22 March 1957.
29. PRO, DEFE 4/95, JP (57) 11 (Final), NATO - Overall Strategic Concept, 5 Feb. 1957.
30. PRO, DEFE 5/79, COS (57) 245, Allied Command Europe Minimum Forces Study 1958-62, 14 Nov. 1957.
31. FRUS, 1955-57, Vol.IV, pp. 170-1. To develop a more flexible response, Norstad proposed utilising conventional forces to create a 'pause' and force the enemy to reconsider the implications of continuing the attack. See Schwartz (note 1) pp.55-9.
32. John Dulles, 'Challenge and Response in United States Policy', Foreign Affairs 36/1 (Oct. 1957) pp.25-43.
33. For more details on limited nuclear war see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan 1989) pp.91-120.
34. European fears were initially aroused in mid-1956 by the leak of the Radford Plan which suggested that the US was planning to withdraw the majority of its conventional forces stationed in Europe This view was subsequently endorsed by George Kennan in his 1957 Reith Lectures. For more details see G. Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963 (London: Hutchinson 1973).
35. FRUS, 1958-60, 7/1 pp.314-20; 386-402.
36. FRUS, 1958-60, 7/1 pp.314-20; 386-402.
37. Jan Melissen, 'Nuclearising NATO, 1957-1959: the "Anglo-Saxons", nuclear sharing and the fourth country problem', Review of Int. Studies 20/3 (July 1994) pp.253-75.
38. FRUS, 1958-60, 7/1 p.466.
39. John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis CNJ: Princeton UP 1974) pp.185-6.
40. Christian Tuschhoff, Causes and Consequences of Germany's Development of Nuclear Capable Delivery Systems 1957-1963, Nuclear History Program, Occas. Paper No.9, pp.32 et passim.
41. Speech by Gen. Norstad to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, Paris, 21 Nov. 1960, Documents on International Affairs 1960 (London: OUP for the RIIA 1964) pp.124-30.
42. Robert R. Bowie, The North Atlantic Nations Tasks for the 1960s: A Report to the Secretary of State, August 1960, Nuclear History Program, Occas. Paper No.7.
43. Ibid, p.14
44. FRUS, 1958-60, 7/1 pp.624-82.
45. PRO, DEFE 7/2228, The Reform of NATO Strategy, Memorandum by Richard Chilver, 8 Aug. 1960.
46. PRO, DEFE 7/2228, JP (60) 63 (Final), NATO Strategy, 26 Aug. 1960.
47. Ibid.
48. Chilver Memo (note 38).
49. PRO, DEFE 7/2228, The Reform of NATO Strategy, Memorandum for the Minister's Consideration, 29 Aug. 1960.
50. For details of Rear-Adm. Sir Anthony Buzzard's strategic thinking, see John Baylis, 'Anthony Buzzard', in John Baylis and John Gamett (eds.) Makers of Nuclear Strategy (London: Pinter 1991) pp.136-53.
51. Memo for the Minister's Consideration (note 42).
52. PRO, DEFE 7/2228, Confidential Annex to COS (60) 55th meeting, 13 Sept. 1960.
53. MOD Records, MO 13/1/16, Minute of 14 Sept. 1960, cited in James (note 16) p.122.
54. Ibid.
55. PRO, CAB 131/23, D (60) 31, 8 July 1960.
56. 'NATO and the Atlantic Nations', for full text see, FRUS, 1961-63, Vol.XIII, pp.285-91. In addition to Acheson, the working group included Nitze, Finletter, Bundy, Kohler, McGhee and Fessenden.
57. PRO, CAB 131/25, D (61) 23, UK Views on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, Memorandum by the Minister of Defence, 1 May 1961.
58. Ibid.
59. David S. Yost, 'The History of NATO Theater Nuclear Force Policy: Key Findings from the Sandia Conference', Jnl of Strategic Studies 15/2 (June 1992) p.238.
60. For more details, see Phil Williams, 'Thomas Schelling', in Baylis and Garnett (note 43) pp.120-35.
61. National Archives and Research Administration, Washington DC (NARA), RG 273, National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 109, United States Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict, 23 Oct. 1961; for further details see Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision (Weidenfeld 1990) pp. 196-208.
62. National Archives and Research Administration, Washington DC (NARA), RG 273, National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 109, United States Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict, 23 Oct. 1961; for further details see Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision (Weidenfeld 1990) pp. 196-208.
63. For the full text of the address, see Robert McNamara, 'Speech to NATO Council, Athens', in Philip Bobbin, Lawrence Freedman and Gregory Treverton (eds) US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader (London: Macmillan 1989) pp.205-22. The conference also adopted 'guidelines' for the use of nuclear weapons with specific reference to alliance consultation, for more details see, Tuschhoff (note 33) p.45.
64. For the full text of the address, see Robert McNamara, 'Speech to NATO Council, Athens', in Philip Bobbin, Lawrence Freedman and Gregory Treverton (eds) US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader (London: Macmillan 1989) pp.205-22. The conference also adopted 'guidelines' for the use of nuclear weapons with specific reference to alliance consultation, for more details see, Tuschhoff (note 33) p.45.
65. PRO, DEFE 6/78, Annex to JP (62) 18 (Final), SACEUR's Revised Emergency Defence Plan. As the EDP was an emergency plan it did not require the prior approval of either the Standing Group or North Atlantic Council.
66. Ibid; MC 14/2 explicitly stated that 'in no case is there a concept of limited war with the Soviets'.
67. PRO, AIR 20/10056, COS (62) 262, 21 June 1962. Significantly, as the S-Hour procedure was to be mediated solely through the US chain of command, overall NATO approval was not required.
68. In light of this and other disagreements over the new administration's strategy, Gen. Norstad offered his resignation which was accepted by President Kennedy on 19 July 1962. However, due to the urgency of the Cuban missile crisis Norstad was asked to remain in office, eventually being replaced by Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer in Dec. 1962. For more details see FRUS, 1961-63, Vol.XIII, p.431.
69. PRO, DEFE 13/254, Record of a restricted meeting between British Defence Secretary Harold Watkinson and Robert McNamara, 11 Dec. 1961.
70. Cmnd. 1639, Statement on Defence 1962, The Next Five Years (London: HMSO 1962).
71. McNamara's Ann Arbor speech of June 1962 was widely interpreted as criticising British and French nuclear ambitions. This was followed in Oct. by the Cuban Missile Crisis whilst in Dec. Britain and the USA negotiated the Nassau Agreement.
72. For more details see Duffield (note 1) p.145.
73. PRO, DEFE 4/157, Annex to JP Note 26/63, 15 Aug. 1963.
74. PRO, DEFE 4/151, JP (62) 110 (Final), The British View of Strategy for the Defence of Central Europe, 17 Jan. 1963.
75. Blue Water was cancelled as 'it was becoming increasingly clear that the concept of a war of movement on the European front with the employment of modern nuclear weapons - but without the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons - was untenable'. PRO, CAB 128/36, CC (53) 62, 3 Aug. 1962.
76. PRO, JP (62) 110 (Final) (note 65).
77. Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Penguin ed. 1990) pp.305-10.