The strategic functions of U.S. aid to Israel

Middle East Policy

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 90-101

  Zunes, Stephen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO   (United States)

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EID: 0030506204     PISSN: 10611924     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.1996.tb00239.x     Document Type: Article

References (53)

1. Congressional Research Service, "Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance," August 30, 1995, compiled by Clyde Mark. This amount is higher than even that of the frequently cited Soviet aid to Cuba in the 30 years prior to 1991.
2. Martha Wenger, "U.S. Aid to Israel: From Handshake to Embrace," Middle East Report, MayAugust 1990.
3. The breakdown of grant aid over the official $3 billion is as follows: bank charges incurred by U.S. government for lump-sum withdrawal ($60 million); interest earned by Israel on ESF aid money reinvested in U.S. treasury notes ($90 million); supplemental State-Department-funded aid ($93.5 million); supplemental Defense Department items ($242.3 million); a contract with the Immigration and Naturalization Service ($17 million); assistance from the Commerce Department ($2.5 million). "House Appropriations Committee Funds U.S.-Israeli Cooperation," Near East Report, vol. XXXIX, no. 18, August 14, 1995, p. 99, and Shawn Twing, "A Comprehensive Guide to U.S. Aid to Israel," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs" April 1996, p. 7.
4. The breakdown of grant aid over the official $3 billion is as follows: bank charges incurred by U.S. government for lump-sum withdrawal ($60 million); interest earned by Israel on ESF aid money reinvested in U.S. treasury notes ($90 million); supplemental State-Department-funded aid ($93.5 million); supplemental Defense Department items ($242.3 million); a contract with the Immigration and Naturalization Service ($17 million); assistance from the Commerce Department ($2.5 million). "House Appropriations Committee Funds U.S.-Israeli Cooperation," Near East Report, vol. XXXIX, no. 18, August 14, 1995, p. 99, and Shawn Twing, "A Comprehensive Guide to U.S. Aid to Israel," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs" April 1996, p. 7.
5. In other countries that receive U.S. economic aid, there is an AID mission as part of the U.S. embassy that audits all relevant expenditures. Without such oversight in Israel, there have been a number of scandals involving U.S. funds, such as when General Electric's manager for Israel was caught paying kickbacks to Israeli authorities responsible for procurement, or when General Rami Dotan was found to be siphoning off U.S. funds for his personal use.
6. Figures cited in Edward T. Pound, "A Close Look at U.S. Aid to Israel Reveals Deals That Push Cost Above Publicly Quoted Figures," The Wall Street Journal, September 19, 1991, p. A16.
7. Martha Wenger, "The Money Tree: U.S. Aid to Israel," Middle East Report, May-August 1990, p. 12.
8. Ibid.
9. Background briefing, Department of State, March 26, 1996.
10. Cited in Joel Bainerman, "Looking the Gift Horse in the Mouth: Israelis Ask If U.S. Generosity Might Actually Be Hurting their Country," The Washington Post, October 29, 1995, p. C4.
11. This commitment to Israeli superiority is often cast in terms of compensating for the superior numerical strength of the combined forces of neighboring Arab states. However, not only are Israeli forces far better trained and more mobile, but the idea of large numbers of Arab states uniting to destroy Israel at this point is highly questionable at best.
12. Karen L. Puschel, U.S.-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: An American Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press) 1993, p. 150.
13. Glenn Frankel, The Washington Post, November 19, 1986.
14. Cited in Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1988) p. 250.
15. Also known as the Guam Doctrine, or "surrogate strategy," where a Third World ally would be capable of military intervention on behalf of the United States, thus minimizing the political risks from direct American military intervention. For a descrption of this policy in relation to the Persian Gulf see Zunes, "The U.S.-GCC Relationship: Its Rise and Potential Fall" in Middle East Policy, vol. II; no. 1, 1993, particularly pp. 103-104.
16. The chronotogy of aid figures is taken from Wenger, op. cit.
17. Pound, op. cit.
18. Ronald Young, Missed Opportunities for Peace: U.S. Middle East Policy 1981-1986 (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1988).
19. Interviews at Ben-Gurion University in Beersheba, January 1994.
20. David Hoffman, The Washington Post, June 10, 1993.
21. Ruth E. Steele, "Why Republicans Have Put Cuts in Aid to Israel 'Off the Table,'" Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April-May 1995, p. 41-42.
22. Lucille Barnes, "Once Again, Israel Gets Away With Spending U.S. Aid on Settlements," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, October-November 1995.
23. Nathan Jones, "Exempting Israel Makes Foreign Aid Savings Insignificant," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March 1995, p. 44.
24. Steele, op. cit.
25. Interview, Major General (ret.) Mattityahu Peled, May 12, 1992, Seattle, WA.
26. Alan Kronstadt et al., Hostile Takeover: How the Aerospace Industries Association Gain Control of American Foreign Policy and Double Arms Transfers to Dictators, (Washington, DC: Project on Demilitarization and Democracy, 1995).
27. Joshua Goldstein, PACs in Profile: Spending Patterns in the 1994 Elections (Washington: Center for Responsive Politics, June 1995).
28. Twing, op. cit.
29. Peled interview.
30. It is noteworthy that in the development of a new anti-missile defense system for Israel, the United States initially insisted that it be mobile, despite the Israeli preference for a cheaper and simpler fixed system, which would have been quite adequate for their small territory.
31. Bainerman, op. cit.
32. Simcha Bahiri, "A Peace Economy for Israel," The New Economy, Spring 1995.
33. Bainerman, op. cit.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Charles Lane, "Rabble Rousing: National Insecurity" The New Republic, June 12, 1995.
37. Peled interview.
38. Department of State, op. cit. Given that AID support goes directly into the Israeli treasury with few restrictions, it is unclear just how this pressure is applied.
39. Matti Peled, New Outlook, May/June 1975.
40. Nathan Shaham, Yediot Ahronot, November 28, 1996, cited in Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 206.
41. Nathan Shaham, Yediot Ahronot, November 28, 1996, cited in Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 206.
42. B. Michael, Haaretz, November 11, 1983, cited in Ibid.
43. B. Michael, Haaretz, November 11, 1983, cited in Ibid.
44. For example, see Cherie Brown, et al., "A Draft Policy on Jewish Liberation," Ruah Hadashah #4 (1981), particularly pp. 11-13.
45. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (Boston: Little, Brown, Company, 1982), p. 621.
46. For example, see Cherie Brown, op. cit; and Zunes, "Zionism, Anti-Semitism and Imperialism," in Peace Review, vol. 6, no. 1 (Spring 1994).
47. For example, see Cherie Brown, op. cit; and Zunes, "Zionism, Anti-Semitism and Imperialism," in Peace Review, vol. 6, no. 1 (Spring 1994).
48. Wirthlin Group, 95 percent confidence level, polled September 6-8, 1994. 53 percent favored phase-out, 36 percent opposed, 11 percent did not know or had no opinion. On the question of amount of aid, 33 percent said cutoff, 36 percent said reduction, 18 percent favored current levels, 6 percent favored an increase, 6 percent did not know or had no opinion. Cited in Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November-December 1994.
49. Zunes, "The Roots of the U. S.-Israeli Relationship," New Political Science, Spring-Summer 1992, nos. 21-22. For similar conclusions, albeit from a very different perspective, see A.F.K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), especially chapter 3.
50. Zunes, "The Roots of the U. S.-Israeli Relationship," New Political Science, Spring-Summer 1992, nos. 21-22. For similar conclusions, albeit from a very different perspective, see A.F.K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), especially chapter 3.
51. Interview with director Barry Rubin, April 29, 1996.
52. Roger Fisher et al., Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).
53. Edward Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger: A Secret History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Readers Digest Press, 1976), p. 200.