Congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy: A reconsideration of the evidence

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 561-570

  Chopin, Marc C ^a   Cole, C Steven ^b   Ellis, Michael A ^c  

^a LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS   (United States)

^c KENT STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Congressional influence; Monetary policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030498364     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(96)01295-0     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Beck, N., 1990, Congress and the Fed: Why the dog does not bark in the night, in: T. Mayer, ed., The political economy of American monetary policy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
2. Grier, K.B., 1986, Monetary policy as a political equilibrium, Cato Journal 6, 539-543.
3. Grier, K.B., 1991, Congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy: An empirical test, Journal of Monetary Economics 28, 201-220.
4. Havrilesky, T., 1988, Monetary policy signalling from the administration to the Federal Reserve, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 20, 83-99.
5. Pierce, J.L., 1978, The myth of congressional supervision of monetary policy, Journal of Monetary Economics 4, 363-370.
6. Reed, W.R. and D.E. Schamberg, 1992, The behavior of congressional tenure over time: 1953-1991, Public Choice 73, 183-203.
7. Toma, M., 1991, The demise of the public-interest model of the Federal Reserve System, Journal of Monetary Economics 27, 157-163.
8. Wagner, R.E., 1986, Central banking and the Fed: A public choice perspective, Cato Journal 6, 519-538.
9. Wooley, J.T., 1984, Monetary politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).