Turkey and Central Asia: Challenges of change

Central Asian Survey

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 157-177

  Aydin, Mustafa ^a  

^a ANKARA UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; FOREIGN POLICY; GEOPOLITICAL STUDY; REGIONAL SECURITY;

TURKEY;

EID: 0030498241     PISSN: 02634937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Trade Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02634939608400943     Document Type: Article

References (153)

1. Sükrü S. Gürel, 'Turkish foreign policy in a changing world', in Turkey in a Changing World, Tokyo Institute of Developing Economies, 1993, p 1.
2. Edward Mortimer, 'Active in a new world role', in Turkey, Europe's Rising Star; The Opportunities in Anglo-Turkish Relations, published for the Turkish Embassy, London by Lowe Bell Comm., 1993, p 44.
3. Gürel, op cit, p 3.
4. The then Turkish president Turgut Özal, in his opening speech of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on 1 September 1991, described the situation created by the end of the Cold War and the breaking up of the former Soviet Union as an 'historic opportunity' for the Turks to become a 'regional power', and urged the TGNA not to 'throw away this change which presented itself for the first time in 400 years'. See Minutes of the TGNA, Term: 19-1, Vol 1, No 3, p 25.
5. As the then Turkish prime minister Süleyman Demirel put it, 'We share a common history, a common language, a common religion and a common culture. We are cousins cut off from each other for over a hundred years, first by the Russians under the Czars, and then by the Communist regime.' See Mushahid Hussain, 'Iran and Turkey in Central Asia; complementary or competing roles?', Middle East International, 19 February 1993, p 19. Also see 'Turkey, Central Asia's dominant power', Newsweek, 28 January 1992; 'Turkey: a guarantee for the Soviet Muslims', Los Angeles Times, cited in Newspot, 12 December 1991, pp 2 and 6.
6. As the then Turkish prime minister Süleyman Demirel put it, 'We share a common history, a common language, a common religion and a common culture. We are cousins cut off from each other for over a hundred years, first by the Russians under the Czars, and then by the Communist regime.' See Mushahid Hussain, 'Iran and Turkey in Central Asia; complementary or competing roles?', Middle East International, 19 February 1993, p 19. Also see 'Turkey, Central Asia's dominant power', Newsweek, 28 January 1992; 'Turkey: a guarantee for the Soviet Muslims', Los Angeles Times, cited in Newspot, 12 December 1991, pp 2 and 6.
7. As the then Turkish prime minister Süleyman Demirel put it, 'We share a common history, a common language, a common religion and a common culture. We are cousins cut off from each other for over a hundred years, first by the Russians under the Czars, and then by the Communist regime.' See Mushahid Hussain, 'Iran and Turkey in Central Asia; complementary or competing roles?', Middle East International, 19 February 1993, p 19. Also see 'Turkey, Central Asia's dominant power', Newsweek, 28 January 1992; 'Turkey: a guarantee for the Soviet Muslims', Los Angeles Times, cited in Newspot, 12 December 1991, pp 2 and 6.
8. As the then Turkish prime minister Süleyman Demirel put it, 'We share a common history, a common language, a common religion and a common culture. We are cousins cut off from each other for over a hundred years, first by the Russians under the Czars, and then by the Communist regime.' See Mushahid Hussain, 'Iran and Turkey in Central Asia; complementary or competing roles?', Middle East International, 19 February 1993, p 19. Also see 'Turkey, Central Asia's dominant power', Newsweek, 28 January 1992; 'Turkey: a guarantee for the Soviet Muslims', Los Angeles Times, cited in Newspot, 12 December 1991, pp 2 and 6.
9. Paul B. Henze, Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century, A RAND Note, 1992, p 2.
10. Although there was a Turkish Language Congress in Turkey in June 1992, and one of the topics for consideration was the introduction of a Latin script for the Turkish dialects spoken in each republic, up to now only Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan announced their intention to change their written script to Latin. Uzbekistan (and non-Turkic-speaking Tajikistan) have shown interest in Arabic script, and both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan opted for Cyrillic, though the latter also expressed its willingness to turn to Latin. Information obtained from Ahmet B. Ercilasun, 'From Cyrillic to Latin alphabet; problems of a common Turkic (Latin) alphabet', paper presented at the International Conference on Caucasus and Central Asia: After Independence, Past and Future, Bilkent University, Ankara, 25-27 May 1995.
11. See Philip Robins, 'Between sentiment and self interest; Turkey's policy toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States', Middle East Journal, Vol 47, No 4, 1993, p 595. Also John M. Brown, 'Euphoria has evaporated', Financial Times Special Report, 7 May 1993, p 5.
12. See Philip Robins, 'Between sentiment and self interest; Turkey's policy toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States', Middle East Journal, Vol 47, No 4, 1993, p 595. Also John M. Brown, 'Euphoria has evaporated', Financial Times Special Report, 7 May 1993, p 5.
13. Changes experienced by Turkey during the 1980s, both internally and externally, were the main concerns of my recent study Foreign Policy Formation and the Interaction Between Domestic and International Environments: A Study of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy (1980-1991). Unpublished PhD thesis, Lancaster University, UK, August 1994.
14. John M. Brown, 'Isolated and suspicious', Financial Times Special Report; Turkey, 20 May 1991, p 4.
15. Milliyet, 12 December 1991.
16. During this period (from early 1989 to mid-1990), which covers the years before national sovereignty when the republics were strictly tied to Moscow under the central government, initial steps towards establishing contacts were taken by private companies and individuals rather than the Turkish government, and Turkey could establish official ties with only Azerbaijan in 1990 when the then Azerbaijani president visited Turkey on 5-10 January 1990. Even then he was not accorded full protocol as president but hosted at ministerial level, and the Soviet flag was flown next to Azerbaijan's. For the full account of Turkey's contacts with Turkic people during this period see Bilal Simsir, 'Turkey's relations with Central Asian Turkic republics', Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Vol 6, No 28, Summer 1992, pp 14-15; also see Suat Bilge, 'Turkey and Turkic people', Eurasian Studies (Ankara), Vol 1, No 4, Winter 1995, pp 84-87.
17. During this period (from early 1989 to mid-1990), which covers the years before national sovereignty when the republics were strictly tied to Moscow under the central government, initial steps towards establishing contacts were taken by private companies and individuals rather than the Turkish government, and Turkey could establish official ties with only Azerbaijan in 1990 when the then Azerbaijani president visited Turkey on 5-10 January 1990. Even then he was not accorded full protocol as president but hosted at ministerial level, and the Soviet flag was flown next to Azerbaijan's. For the full account of Turkey's contacts with Turkic people during this period see Bilal Simsir, 'Turkey's relations with Central Asian Turkic republics', Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Vol 6, No 28, Summer 1992, pp 14-15; also see Suat Bilge, 'Turkey and Turkic people', Eurasian Studies (Ankara), Vol 1, No 4, Winter 1995, pp 84-87.
18. More importantly, Özal stressed the differences between the Azerbaijanis and the Turks. He said the Azerbaijanis are Shias and although Azerbaijani dialect is close to Turkish, they are separate. Özal also alienated pan-Turkists both in Turkey and in Azerbaijan by saying that the Azerbaijanis, being Shias, were more a concern of Iran. On Özal's statement, see 'Fiaş Ülke Oluruz', Cumhuriyet, 19 January 1990.
19. Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of new republics, Azerbaijan on 9 December, and the rest on 16 December. After the recognition, Turkey also signed protocols with each of them, initiating diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. See Turkey Confidential, December 1991, pp 11-12; Newspot, 14 November 1991, pp 2-3, and 19 December 1991, p 1. For more details on formal ties see Robins, op cit; Simsir, op cit; and Bilge, op cit. Even before their independence, Turkey had exchanged high level visits and signed various agreements with the then Soviet republics after they declared sovereignty one after the other between June and October 1990, though the relations were still under the surveillance of Moscow. See Simsir, op cit, pp 14-15.
20. Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of new republics, Azerbaijan on 9 December, and the rest on 16 December. After the recognition, Turkey also signed protocols with each of them, initiating diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. See Turkey Confidential, December 1991, pp 11-12; Newspot, 14 November 1991, pp 2-3, and 19 December 1991, p 1. For more details on formal ties see Robins, op cit; Simsir, op cit; and Bilge, op cit. Even before their independence, Turkey had exchanged high level visits and signed various agreements with the then Soviet republics after they declared sovereignty one after the other between June and October 1990, though the relations were still under the surveillance of Moscow. See Simsir, op cit, pp 14-15.
21. Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of new republics, Azerbaijan on 9 December, and the rest on 16 December. After the recognition, Turkey also signed protocols with each of them, initiating diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. See Turkey Confidential, December 1991, pp 11-12; Newspot, 14 November 1991, pp 2-3, and 19 December 1991, p 1. For more details on formal ties see Robins, op cit; Simsir, op cit; and Bilge, op cit. Even before their independence, Turkey had exchanged high level visits and signed various agreements with the then Soviet republics after they declared sovereignty one after the other between June and October 1990, though the relations were still under the surveillance of Moscow. See Simsir, op cit, pp 14-15.
22. Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of new republics, Azerbaijan on 9 December, and the rest on 16 December. After the recognition, Turkey also signed protocols with each of them, initiating diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. See Turkey Confidential, December 1991, pp 11-12; Newspot, 14 November 1991, pp 2-3, and 19 December 1991, p 1. For more details on formal ties see Robins, op cit; Simsir, op cit; and Bilge, op cit. Even before their independence, Turkey had exchanged high level visits and signed various agreements with the then Soviet republics after they declared sovereignty one after the other between June and October 1990, though the relations were still under the surveillance of Moscow. See Simsir, op cit, pp 14-15.
23. Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of new republics, Azerbaijan on 9 December, and the rest on 16 December. After the recognition, Turkey also signed protocols with each of them, initiating diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. See Turkey Confidential, December 1991, pp 11-12; Newspot, 14 November 1991, pp 2-3, and 19 December 1991, p 1. For more details on formal ties see Robins, op cit; Simsir, op cit; and Bilge, op cit. Even before their independence, Turkey had exchanged high level visits and signed various agreements with the then Soviet republics after they declared sovereignty one after the other between June and October 1990, though the relations were still under the surveillance of Moscow. See Simsir, op cit, pp 14-15.
24. Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of new republics, Azerbaijan on 9 December, and the rest on 16 December. After the recognition, Turkey also signed protocols with each of them, initiating diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. See Turkey Confidential, December 1991, pp 11-12; Newspot, 14 November 1991, pp 2-3, and 19 December 1991, p 1. For more details on formal ties see Robins, op cit; Simsir, op cit; and Bilge, op cit. Even before their independence, Turkey had exchanged high level visits and signed various agreements with the then Soviet republics after they declared sovereignty one after the other between June and October 1990, though the relations were still under the surveillance of Moscow. See Simsir, op cit, pp 14-15.
25. Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of new republics, Azerbaijan on 9 December, and the rest on 16 December. After the recognition, Turkey also signed protocols with each of them, initiating diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. See Turkey Confidential, December 1991, pp 11-12; Newspot, 14 November 1991, pp 2-3, and 19 December 1991, p 1. For more details on formal ties see Robins, op cit; Simsir, op cit; and Bilge, op cit. Even before their independence, Turkey had exchanged high level visits and signed various agreements with the then Soviet republics after they declared sovereignty one after the other between June and October 1990, though the relations were still under the surveillance of Moscow. See Simsir, op cit, pp 14-15.
26. President Niyazov of Turkmenistan arrived in Turkey on 2 December, President Kerimov of Uzbekistan came on 16 December, and Akayev of Kyrgyzstan landed on 22 December. They were all preceded by the Azerbaijani delegation which came in November. And by February 1993, Turkey and the five Turkic republics had signed more than 140 bilateral accords on a variety of different subjects. See Robins, op cit, Newspot, 19 February 1991, p 7.
27. Graham E. Fuller, 'Turkey's new eastern orientation' in Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, A RAND study, London: Westview Press, 1993, p 45.
28. Henze, op cit, p 9; Shireen Hunter, 'Turkey's difficult foreign policy options', Middle East International, 17 May 1991, p 18.
29. Henze, op cit, p 9; Shireen Hunter, 'Turkey's difficult foreign policy options', Middle East International, 17 May 1991, p 18.
30. 'İstikbal Türklerin', Türkiye, 25 September 1991.
31. Quoted in Fuller, op cit, p 67 from Los Angeles Times, 16 March 1991.
32. Quoted in Fuller, op cit, p 67 from Los Angeles Times, 16 March 1991.
33. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's speech at Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, Italy, 14 May 1992, Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Vol 6, No 28, Summer 1992, p 89.
34. I borrowed this phrase from the title of Graham E. Fuller's article, 'Central Asia: the quest for identity', Current History, Vol 93, No 582, April 1994. Premier Demirel was quick, after the declaration of independence by the Central Asian and Caucasian states, to offer in the spring of 1992 Turkey's services to the West in a form of comprehensive proposal submitted to President Bush of the US as a conduit for channelling funds and ideas to the new republics. See 'Ankara dan Yardim Hamlesi', Milliyet, 24 March 1992.
35. I borrowed this phrase from the title of Graham E. Fuller's article, 'Central Asia: the quest for identity', Current History, Vol 93, No 582, April 1994. Premier Demirel was quick, after the declaration of independence by the Central Asian and Caucasian states, to offer in the spring of 1992 Turkey's services to the West in a form of comprehensive proposal submitted to President Bush of the US as a conduit for channelling funds and ideas to the new republics. See 'Ankara dan Yardim Hamlesi', Milliyet, 24 March 1992.
36. See Newspot, 19 December 1991, pp 1 and 7.
37. By mid-1992, it was reported that the number of Turkish firms investing or planning to invest in these states was more than 200. See Korkmaz Haktanir, 'Developments in Central Asia and Turkish-Iranian relations', Middle East Business and Banking, June 1992, p 10. According to the Turkish Premier Tansu Ciller, by 1995, Turkey's private and public investment in Central Asia, approximated $4 billion. Quoted from her speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, 19 April 1995, by Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Dynamics of the International Relations of Central Asia, unpublished paper presented at the International Conference on Caucasus and Central Asia: After Independence, Past and Future, Bilkent University, Ankara, 25-27 May 1995. Also see Yeni Yüzyil, 30 July 1995, p 8, which argues that the undertakings of Turkish construction firms alone in the region reached $3.7 billion, excluding Russia whose contracts to Turkish construction firms were worth another $6 billion.
38. By mid-1992, it was reported that the number of Turkish firms investing or planning to invest in these states was more than 200. See Korkmaz Haktanir, 'Developments in Central Asia and Turkish-Iranian relations', Middle East Business and Banking, June 1992, p 10. According to the Turkish Premier Tansu Ciller, by 1995, Turkey's private and public investment in Central Asia, approximated $4 billion. Quoted from her speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, 19 April 1995, by Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Dynamics of the International Relations of Central Asia, unpublished paper presented at the International Conference on Caucasus and Central Asia: After Independence, Past and Future, Bilkent University, Ankara, 25-27 May 1995. Also see Yeni Yüzyil, 30 July 1995, p 8, which argues that the undertakings of Turkish construction firms alone in the region reached $3.7 billion, excluding Russia whose contracts to Turkish construction firms were worth another $6 billion.
39. By mid-1992, it was reported that the number of Turkish firms investing or planning to invest in these states was more than 200. See Korkmaz Haktanir, 'Developments in Central Asia and Turkish-Iranian relations', Middle East Business and Banking, June 1992, p 10. According to the Turkish Premier Tansu Ciller, by 1995, Turkey's private and public investment in Central Asia, approximated $4 billion. Quoted from her speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, 19 April 1995, by Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Dynamics of the International Relations of Central Asia, unpublished paper presented at the International Conference on Caucasus and Central Asia: After Independence, Past and Future, Bilkent University, Ankara, 25-27 May 1995. Also see Yeni Yüzyil, 30 July 1995, p 8, which argues that the undertakings of Turkish construction firms alone in the region reached $3.7 billion, excluding Russia whose contracts to Turkish construction firms were worth another $6 billion.
40. Sabri Sayari, 'Turkey: the changing European security environment'. Middle East Journal, Vol 46, Winter 1992, p 15; Henze, op cit, p 9.
41. Sabri Sayari, 'Turkey: the changing European security environment'. Middle East Journal, Vol 46, Winter 1992, p 15; Henze, op cit, p 9.
42. See Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, pp 69-70. One of those who object following 'pan-Turkic' policy, Oral Sander, argues that such a policy 'would not only be a futile attempt, but also one to further polarize the region on ethnic and religious lines and thus sever the painstakingly established organic ties with Europe'. See his 'Turkey and the Turkic world', Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 1, 1994, p 42.
43. See Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, pp 69-70. One of those who object following 'pan-Turkic' policy, Oral Sander, argues that such a policy 'would not only be a futile attempt, but also one to further polarize the region on ethnic and religious lines and thus sever the painstakingly established organic ties with Europe'. See his 'Turkey and the Turkic world', Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 1, 1994, p 42.
44. Turkey's obligations to the region now total several billion dollars and it is currently the fourth largest provider of aid to the Turkic republics, the largest donors being Japan, the EU, and the US. See Robins, op cit, p 14; Morton I. Abramowitz, 'Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Özal', Foreign Policy, Vol 91, Summer 1993, p 197; and Obrad Kesic, 'American-Turkish relations at a crossroads', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol 6, No 1, Winter 1995, p 101.
45. Turkey's obligations to the region now total several billion dollars and it is currently the fourth largest provider of aid to the Turkic republics, the largest donors being Japan, the EU, and the US. See Robins, op cit, p 14; Morton I. Abramowitz, 'Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Özal', Foreign Policy, Vol 91, Summer 1993, p 197; and Obrad Kesic, 'American-Turkish relations at a crossroads', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol 6, No 1, Winter 1995, p 101.
46. Turkey's obligations to the region now total several billion dollars and it is currently the fourth largest provider of aid to the Turkic republics, the largest donors being Japan, the EU, and the US. See Robins, op cit, p 14; Morton I. Abramowitz, 'Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Özal', Foreign Policy, Vol 91, Summer 1993, p 197; and Obrad Kesic, 'American-Turkish relations at a crossroads', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol 6, No 1, Winter 1995, p 101.
47. Hussain, op cit, p 14. Among them was the Turkish foreign minister who toured the region in March 1992 accompanied by the new Turkish ambassadors to these new republics.
48. The Times, 17 February 1992, observed that the 'fear of fundamentalism spreading in the Central Asia has in turn prompted Washington to encourage Turkey in its approaches towards region'. The Daily Telegraph of 22 February 1993 quoted the US Secretary of State James Baker urging Turkmenistan 'to follow Turkey, rather than Iran'. On the same issue also see 'The go-between, Turkey: Islam's link to the West', Time, 19 October 1992, No 42, pp 34-35.
49. The Times, 17 February 1992, observed that the 'fear of fundamentalism spreading in the Central Asia has in turn prompted Washington to encourage Turkey in its approaches towards region'. The Daily Telegraph of 22 February 1993 quoted the US Secretary of State James Baker urging Turkmenistan 'to follow Turkey, rather than Iran'. On the same issue also see 'The go-between, Turkey: Islam's link to the West', Time, 19 October 1992, No 42, pp 34-35.
50. The Times, 17 February 1992, observed that the 'fear of fundamentalism spreading in the Central Asia has in turn prompted Washington to encourage Turkey in its approaches towards region'. The Daily Telegraph of 22 February 1993 quoted the US Secretary of State James Baker urging Turkmenistan 'to follow Turkey, rather than Iran'. On the same issue also see 'The go-between, Turkey: Islam's link to the West', Time, 19 October 1992, No 42, pp 34-35.
51. See his speech at Johns Hopkins University, op cit, pp 88-89, also see Newspot, 21 May 1992, p 7.
52. See his speech at Johns Hopkins University, op cit, pp 88-89, also see Newspot, 21 May 1992, p 7.
53. Turkish Daily News, 30 April 1992; Newspot, 21 May 1992, p 2.
54. Turkish Daily News, 30 April 1992; Newspot, 21 May 1992, p 2.
55. For a description of the new 'Great Game' and the policies and aims of its players see M. E. Ahrari, 'The dynamics of the new great game in Muslim Central Asia', Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 4, 1994, pp. 525-539; also see 'Between Marx and Mecca', The Economist, 16 May 1992, pp 16-17 and 96; Hugh Pope, 'Rivalries in Central Asia', Middle East International, 5 March 1993, pp 12-13; 'Central Asia; suddenly everybody's interested', The Middle East, February 1992, No 208, pp 14-16; 'New players in an old game', The Middle East, July 1992, No 213, p 5.
56. For a description of the new 'Great Game' and the policies and aims of its players see M. E. Ahrari, 'The dynamics of the new great game in Muslim Central Asia', Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 4, 1994, pp. 525-539; also see 'Between Marx and Mecca', The Economist, 16 May 1992, pp 16-17 and 96; Hugh Pope, 'Rivalries in Central Asia', Middle East International, 5 March 1993, pp 12-13; 'Central Asia; suddenly everybody's interested', The Middle East, February 1992, No 208, pp 14-16; 'New players in an old game', The Middle East, July 1992, No 213, p 5.
57. For a description of the new 'Great Game' and the policies and aims of its players see M. E. Ahrari, 'The dynamics of the new great game in Muslim Central Asia', Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 4, 1994, pp. 525-539; also see 'Between Marx and Mecca', The Economist, 16 May 1992, pp 16-17 and 96; Hugh Pope, 'Rivalries in Central Asia', Middle East International, 5 March 1993, pp 12-13; 'Central Asia; suddenly everybody's interested', The Middle East, February 1992, No 208, pp 14-16; 'New players in an old game', The Middle East, July 1992, No 213, p 5.
58. For a description of the new 'Great Game' and the policies and aims of its players see M. E. Ahrari, 'The dynamics of the new great game in Muslim Central Asia', Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 4, 1994, pp. 525-539; also see 'Between Marx and Mecca', The Economist, 16 May 1992, pp 16-17 and 96; Hugh Pope, 'Rivalries in Central Asia', Middle East International, 5 March 1993, pp 12-13; 'Central Asia; suddenly everybody's interested', The Middle East, February 1992, No 208, pp 14-16; 'New players in an old game', The Middle East, July 1992, No 213, p 5.
59. For a description of the new 'Great Game' and the policies and aims of its players see M. E. Ahrari, 'The dynamics of the new great game in Muslim Central Asia', Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 4, 1994, pp. 525-539; also see 'Between Marx and Mecca', The Economist, 16 May 1992, pp 16-17 and 96; Hugh Pope, 'Rivalries in Central Asia', Middle East International, 5 March 1993, pp 12-13; 'Central Asia; suddenly everybody's interested', The Middle East, February 1992, No 208, pp 14-16; 'New players in an old game', The Middle East, July 1992, No 213, p 5.
60. For analyses of the current struggle for national identification in Central Asian republics see Fuller, Current History, op cit; Martha B. Olcott, 'Central Asia's Islamic awakening'; and Shafiqual Islam, 'Capitalism on the silk route?', both of which are in Current History, Vol 93, No 582, April 1994.
61. For analyses of the current struggle for national identification in Central Asian republics see Fuller, Current History, op cit; Martha B. Olcott, 'Central Asia's Islamic awakening'; and Shafiqual Islam, 'Capitalism on the silk route?', both of which are in Current History, Vol 93, No 582, April 1994.
62. For analyses of the current struggle for national identification in Central Asian republics see Fuller, Current History, op cit; Martha B. Olcott, 'Central Asia's Islamic awakening'; and Shafiqual Islam, 'Capitalism on the silk route?', both of which are in Current History, Vol 93, No 582, April 1994.
63. Yoshihiro Kimura, 'Central Asia and the Caucasus; nationalism and Islamic trends', in Turkey in a Changing World, op cit, p 196. Ahrari, op cit, p 528, argues that, being former Communists, except for Kyrgyzstan, all of the Central Asian leaders may obviously feel more comfortable with secularism. However, what will determine the future role of Islam in Central Asia in the longer term would not be the feelings of the leaders, but the popular response to the notion of Islamic government. For further elaboration of this point see Olcott, ibid.
64. Yoshihiro Kimura, 'Central Asia and the Caucasus; nationalism and Islamic trends', in Turkey in a Changing World, op cit, p 196. Ahrari, op cit, p 528, argues that, being former Communists, except for Kyrgyzstan, all of the Central Asian leaders may obviously feel more comfortable with secularism. However, what will determine the future role of Islam in Central Asia in the longer term would not be the feelings of the leaders, but the popular response to the notion of Islamic government. For further elaboration of this point see Olcott, ibid.
65. Yoshihiro Kimura, 'Central Asia and the Caucasus; nationalism and Islamic trends', in Turkey in a Changing World, op cit, p 196. Ahrari, op cit, p 528, argues that, being former Communists, except for Kyrgyzstan, all of the Central Asian leaders may obviously feel more comfortable with secularism. However, what will determine the future role of Islam in Central Asia in the longer term would not be the feelings of the leaders, but the popular response to the notion of Islamic government. For further elaboration of this point see Olcott, ibid.
66. Mehrdad Haghayeghi goes further as to argue that the internal political dynamics in Central Asia are conditioned by the pressures exerted from the Middle East (i.e. Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia). See his 'Islamic revival in the Central Asian Republics', Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 2, 1994, p 257.
67. For exploration of the idea that Iran and Saudi Arabia have been competing for influence in the Gulf region and the contiguous areas for regional hegemony ever since the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979, see Ahrari, op cit, pp 527-528.
68. It has been argued by some Russian and independent observers that Western fears of Iran sweeping over Central Asia with its version of political Islam have been exaggerated. See Christian Science Monitor, April 1993, pp 23-29. For further elaboration of such views see Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 75; Meshabi, op cit, pp 12-13; Haghayeghi, op cit, pp 258-261; for a discussion of Iran's changing foreign policy orientation see R. K. Ramazani, 'Iran's foreign policy: both north and south', The Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 3, Summer 1992; also Ahrari, ibid, pp 529 and 533.
69. It has been argued by some Russian and independent observers that Western fears of Iran sweeping over Central Asia with its version of political Islam have been exaggerated. See Christian Science Monitor, April 1993, pp 23-29. For further elaboration of such views see Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 75; Meshabi, op cit, pp 12-13; Haghayeghi, op cit, pp 258-261; for a discussion of Iran's changing foreign policy orientation see R. K. Ramazani, 'Iran's foreign policy: both north and south', The Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 3, Summer 1992; also Ahrari, ibid, pp 529 and 533.
70. It has been argued by some Russian and independent observers that Western fears of Iran sweeping over Central Asia with its version of political Islam have been exaggerated. See Christian Science Monitor, April 1993, pp 23-29. For further elaboration of such views see Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 75; Meshabi, op cit, pp 12-13; Haghayeghi, op cit, pp 258-261; for a discussion of Iran's changing foreign policy orientation see R. K. Ramazani, 'Iran's foreign policy: both north and south', The Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 3, Summer 1992; also Ahrari, ibid, pp 529 and 533.
71. It has been argued by some Russian and independent observers that Western fears of Iran sweeping over Central Asia with its version of political Islam have been exaggerated. See Christian Science Monitor, April 1993, pp 23-29. For further elaboration of such views see Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 75; Meshabi, op cit, pp 12-13; Haghayeghi, op cit, pp 258-261; for a discussion of Iran's changing foreign policy orientation see R. K. Ramazani, 'Iran's foreign policy: both north and south', The Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 3, Summer 1992; also Ahrari, ibid, pp 529 and 533.
72. It has been argued by some Russian and independent observers that Western fears of Iran sweeping over Central Asia with its version of political Islam have been exaggerated. See Christian Science Monitor, April 1993, pp 23-29. For further elaboration of such views see Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 75; Meshabi, op cit, pp 12-13; Haghayeghi, op cit, pp 258-261; for a discussion of Iran's changing foreign policy orientation see R. K. Ramazani, 'Iran's foreign policy: both north and south', The Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 3, Summer 1992; also Ahrari, ibid, pp 529 and 533.
73. It has been argued by some Russian and independent observers that Western fears of Iran sweeping over Central Asia with its version of political Islam have been exaggerated. See Christian Science Monitor, April 1993, pp 23-29. For further elaboration of such views see Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 75; Meshabi, op cit, pp 12-13; Haghayeghi, op cit, pp 258-261; for a discussion of Iran's changing foreign policy orientation see R. K. Ramazani, 'Iran's foreign policy: both north and south', The Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 3, Summer 1992; also Ahrari, ibid, pp 529 and 533.
74. Fuller, ibid., p 75. Haghayeghi, ibid., p 260, too, argues that Iran's reluctance so far to export its version of Islam to Central Asia could easily change if the radical elements within the Iranian ruling elite, who are now somewhat subdued by the supporters of Rafsanjani, once again rise to prominence.
75. Fuller, ibid., p 75. Haghayeghi, ibid., p 260, too, argues that Iran's reluctance so far to export its version of Islam to Central Asia could easily change if the radical elements within the Iranian ruling elite, who are now somewhat subdued by the supporters of Rafsanjani, once again rise to prominence.
76. Fuller, ibid. Because of its secular character, Turkey, officially has nothing to do with pan-Islamism. However, Turkish officials are already engaged in an effort to emphasize in the region that Turkey is also a Muslim country, and also to export its conservative and essentially secular version of Islam to Central Asian republics. For example, a group of Turkish clergy toured the region during April 1992 to prepare the groundwork for future training of Central Asian clergy by Turkey. See Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 11 April 1992, SU/1153 B7. Moreover, scholarships were offered to students who were immediately dispatched to Turkey to receive Islamic training to become Muslim clerics. SWB, 7 February 1992, SU/1298 A 4/1; 2 March 1992, SU/1318 A4/1; and 27 May 1992, SU/1391 A4/5.
77. Fuller, ibid. Because of its secular character, Turkey, officially has nothing to do with pan-Islamism. However, Turkish officials are already engaged in an effort to emphasize in the region that Turkey is also a Muslim country, and also to export its conservative and essentially secular version of Islam to Central Asian republics. For example, a group of Turkish clergy toured the region during April 1992 to prepare the groundwork for future training of Central Asian clergy by Turkey. See Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 11 April 1992, SU/1153 B7. Moreover, scholarships were offered to students who were immediately dispatched to Turkey to receive Islamic training to become Muslim clerics. SWB, 7 February 1992, SU/1298 A 4/1; 2 March 1992, SU/1318 A4/1; and 27 May 1992, SU/1391 A4/5.
78. For a discussion of this view see Gürel, op cit, pp 21-23.
79. Mesbahi, op cit, p 4.
80. Sander, op cit, p 40.
81. For an attempt to explain the Turkish model vaguely, see Andrew Mango, 'The Turkish model', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol 29, No 4, October 1993.
82. I owe this point to my post-graduate student Dövran Yamatov from Turkmenistan 44. For such views see, for example, Sander, op cit, pp 41-42; and Gürel, op cit, pp 22-23. For a discussion of Ankara's steps to calm the fears of its neighbours see Gareth M. Winrow, A Stabilizing Influence in a Fragile Commonwealth?: Turkey and the Former USSR. Paper delivered at the 33rd Annual Convention on the International Studies Association, Atlanta, GA, 31 March-4 April 1992.
83. I owe this point to my post-graduate student Dövran Yamatov from Turkmenistan 44. For such views see, for example, Sander, op cit, pp 41-42; and Gürel, op cit, pp 22-23. For a discussion of Ankara's steps to calm the fears of its neighbours see Gareth M. Winrow, A Stabilizing Influence in a Fragile Commonwealth?: Turkey and the Former USSR. Paper delivered at the 33rd Annual Convention on the International Studies Association, Atlanta, GA, 31 March-4 April 1992.
84. I owe this point to my post-graduate student Dövran Yamatov from Turkmenistan 44. For such views see, for example, Sander, op cit, pp 41-42; and Gürel, op cit, pp 22-23. For a discussion of Ankara's steps to calm the fears of its neighbours see Gareth M. Winrow, A Stabilizing Influence in a Fragile Commonwealth?: Turkey and the Former USSR. Paper delivered at the 33rd Annual Convention on the International Studies Association, Atlanta, GA, 31 March-4 April 1992.
85. Turkey extends a helping hand', World Press Review, July 1992, pp 12-13.
86. This point is further elaborated by Kimura, op cit, p 194; and Ahrari, op cit, pp 534-536.
87. This point is further elaborated by Kimura, op cit, p 194; and Ahrari, op cit, pp 534-536.
88. Kesic, op cit, p 101.
89. Cumhuriyet, 16 December 1991.
90. Kimura, op cit, p 194.
91. For elaboration of this view and an explanation of how Turkey's and the US's interests in Central Asia are matched, see Ahrari, op cit, pp 531-533.
92. For exploration of Russia's newly asserted interests in its near abroad see Stephen Blank, 'Russia, the Gulf and Central Asia in new Middle East', Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 2, 1994; also see 'Central Asia: rumblings from the north', The Middle East, No 230, January 1994, pp 14-15.
93. For exploration of Russia's newly asserted interests in its near abroad see Stephen Blank, 'Russia, the Gulf and Central Asia in new Middle East', Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 2, 1994; also see 'Central Asia: rumblings from the north', The Middle East, No 230, January 1994, pp 14-15.
94. Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 76, further elaborates this point by pointing out that 'Russia...sees the extension of fundamentalism into Central Asia as detrimental to its own position in the region...But, in Russian eyes, aggressive pan-Turkist policies are not much better than Islamic inroads if the net effect is to dislodge Russian influence on ethnic if not religious grounds.' For recent Russian complaints on the issue of Turkic-unity' see FBIS-SOV, 20 January 1995, p 59.
95. Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 76, further elaborates this point by pointing out that 'Russia...sees the extension of fundamentalism into Central Asia as detrimental to its own position in the region...But, in Russian eyes, aggressive pan-Turkist policies are not much better than Islamic inroads if the net effect is to dislodge Russian influence on ethnic if not religious grounds.' For recent Russian complaints on the issue of Turkic-unity' see FBIS-SOV, 20 January 1995, p 59.
96. For a view that Russia is actively seeking to destabilize the region by raking up the nationalities issues there and thus trying to make an eventual 'pax-Russicana' inevitable see Briefing, No 1045, 19 June 1995, p 13. The same view was also expressed by Paul Henze at the International Conference on Caucasus and Central Asia: After Independence, Past and Future, Bilkent University, Ankara, 25-27 May 1995.
97. For a view that Russia is actively seeking to destabilize the region by raking up the nationalities issues there and thus trying to make an eventual 'pax-Russicana' inevitable see Briefing, No 1045, 19 June 1995, p 13. The same view was also expressed by Paul Henze at the International Conference on Caucasus and Central Asia: After Independence, Past and Future, Bilkent University, Ankara, 25-27 May 1995.
98. Statement was made by the Russian Frontier Forces Commander in August 1994; see Carol Migdalowitz, 'Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict', CRS Issue Brief, updated 12 April 1995, The Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Washington, DC, p 13. For echoes in Turkey of recent Russian pressures about oil issue, see Taha Akyol, 'Petrolde En Büyük Siyasi Adim', Milliyet, 14 June 1995; 'Petrol Satrancinda Hayati Hamle', Yeni Yüzyil, 6 July 1995, p 9; Turkish Daily News, 7 July 1995, p 7. For a view that Russia is making political mischief in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to persuade them to oppose Turkish option in exporting their oil, and that it was also behind the recent army uprising in Azerbaijan to replace Aliyev who earlier came to power with Russian blessing and is expected to play for Russia, but did not so, see Briefing, 6 February 1995, No 1027, pp 7-9; 20 March 1995, No 1033, p 13; and 11 June 1995, No 1045, p 14.
99. Statement was made by the Russian Frontier Forces Commander in August 1994; see Carol Migdalowitz, 'Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict', CRS Issue Brief, updated 12 April 1995, The Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Washington, DC, p 13. For echoes in Turkey of recent Russian pressures about oil issue, see Taha Akyol, 'Petrolde En Büyük Siyasi Adim', Milliyet, 14 June 1995; 'Petrol Satrancinda Hayati Hamle', Yeni Yüzyil, 6 July 1995, p 9; Turkish Daily News, 7 July 1995, p 7. For a view that Russia is making political mischief in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to persuade them to oppose Turkish option in exporting their oil, and that it was also behind the recent army uprising in Azerbaijan to replace Aliyev who earlier came to power with Russian blessing and is expected to play for Russia, but did not so, see Briefing, 6 February 1995, No 1027, pp 7-9; 20 March 1995, No 1033, p 13; and 11 June 1995, No 1045, p 14.
100. Statement was made by the Russian Frontier Forces Commander in August 1994; see Carol Migdalowitz, 'Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict', CRS Issue Brief, updated 12 April 1995, The Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Washington, DC, p 13. For echoes in Turkey of recent Russian pressures about oil issue, see Taha Akyol, 'Petrolde En Büyük Siyasi Adim', Milliyet, 14 June 1995; 'Petrol Satrancinda Hayati Hamle', Yeni Yüzyil, 6 July 1995, p 9; Turkish Daily News, 7 July 1995, p 7. For a view that Russia is making political mischief in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to persuade them to oppose Turkish option in exporting their oil, and that it was also behind the recent army uprising in Azerbaijan to replace Aliyev who earlier came to power with Russian blessing and is expected to play for Russia, but did not so, see Briefing, 6 February 1995, No 1027, pp 7-9; 20 March 1995, No 1033, p 13; and 11 June 1995, No 1045, p 14.
101. Statement was made by the Russian Frontier Forces Commander in August 1994; see Carol Migdalowitz, 'Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict', CRS Issue Brief, updated 12 April 1995, The Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Washington, DC, p 13. For echoes in Turkey of recent Russian pressures about oil issue, see Taha Akyol, 'Petrolde En Büyük Siyasi Adim', Milliyet, 14 June 1995; 'Petrol Satrancinda Hayati Hamle', Yeni Yüzyil, 6 July 1995, p 9; Turkish Daily News, 7 July 1995, p 7. For a view that Russia is making political mischief in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to persuade them to oppose Turkish option in exporting their oil, and that it was also behind the recent army uprising in Azerbaijan to replace Aliyev who earlier came to power with Russian blessing and is expected to play for Russia, but did not so, see Briefing, 6 February 1995, No 1027, pp 7-9; 20 March 1995, No 1033, p 13; and 11 June 1995, No 1045, p 14.
102. Statement was made by the Russian Frontier Forces Commander in August 1994; see Carol Migdalowitz, 'Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict', CRS Issue Brief, updated 12 April 1995, The Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Washington, DC, p 13. For echoes in Turkey of recent Russian pressures about oil issue, see Taha Akyol, 'Petrolde En Büyük Siyasi Adim', Milliyet, 14 June 1995; 'Petrol Satrancinda Hayati Hamle', Yeni Yüzyil, 6 July 1995, p 9; Turkish Daily News, 7 July 1995, p 7. For a view that Russia is making political mischief in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to persuade them to oppose Turkish option in exporting their oil, and that it was also behind the recent army uprising in Azerbaijan to replace Aliyev who earlier came to power with Russian blessing and is expected to play for Russia, but did not so, see Briefing, 6 February 1995, No 1027, pp 7-9; 20 March 1995, No 1033, p 13; and 11 June 1995, No 1045, p 14.
103. Statement was made by the Russian Frontier Forces Commander in August 1994; see Carol Migdalowitz, 'Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict', CRS Issue Brief, updated 12 April 1995, The Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Washington, DC, p 13. For echoes in Turkey of recent Russian pressures about oil issue, see Taha Akyol, 'Petrolde En Büyük Siyasi Adim', Milliyet, 14 June 1995; 'Petrol Satrancinda Hayati Hamle', Yeni Yüzyil, 6 July 1995, p 9; Turkish Daily News, 7 July 1995, p 7. For a view that Russia is making political mischief in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to persuade them to oppose Turkish option in exporting their oil, and that it was also behind the recent army uprising in Azerbaijan to replace Aliyev who earlier came to power with Russian blessing and is expected to play for Russia, but did not so, see Briefing, 6 February 1995, No 1027, pp 7-9; 20 March 1995, No 1033, p 13; and 11 June 1995, No 1045, p 14.
104. Statement was made by the Russian Frontier Forces Commander in August 1994; see Carol Migdalowitz, 'Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict', CRS Issue Brief, updated 12 April 1995, The Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Washington, DC, p 13. For echoes in Turkey of recent Russian pressures about oil issue, see Taha Akyol, 'Petrolde En Büyük Siyasi Adim', Milliyet, 14 June 1995; 'Petrol Satrancinda Hayati Hamle', Yeni Yüzyil, 6 July 1995, p 9; Turkish Daily News, 7 July 1995, p 7. For a view that Russia is making political mischief in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to persuade them to oppose Turkish option in exporting their oil, and that it was also behind the recent army uprising in Azerbaijan to replace Aliyev who earlier came to power with Russian blessing and is expected to play for Russia, but did not so, see Briefing, 6 February 1995, No 1027, pp 7-9; 20 March 1995, No 1033, p 13; and 11 June 1995, No 1045, p 14.
105. For example, see Turkish PM Demirel visits Moscow: useful, constructive talks expected', FBIS-SOV, 27 May 1992, pp 15-16. For clauses of the Treaty signed between Turkey and Russia during Demirel's visit, see Bilge, op cit, pp 88-89; and Milliyet, 24 January 1992.
106. For example, see Turkish PM Demirel visits Moscow: useful, constructive talks expected', FBIS-SOV, 27 May 1992, pp 15-16. For clauses of the Treaty signed between Turkey and Russia during Demirel's visit, see Bilge, op cit, pp 88-89; and Milliyet, 24 January 1992.
107. For example, see Turkish PM Demirel visits Moscow: useful, constructive talks expected', FBIS-SOV, 27 May 1992, pp 15-16. For clauses of the Treaty signed between Turkey and Russia during Demirel's visit, see Bilge, op cit, pp 88-89; and Milliyet, 24 January 1992.
108. It was reported in Turkey that Russia offered to sign an internationally guaranteed mutual non-aggression pact with Turkey in return for agreement to dispense with the CFE in the region. However, Turkey's response was that the CFE treaty was an agreement for the whole of Europe and would be weakened if a any part of it were altered except by agreement among all the parties. It was also speculated that this was the reason why Russia's deputy foreign minister, Albert Chernishev, called off his scheduled trip to Turkey in late April 1995. See Briefing, 1 May 1995, No. 1039, p 13.
109. For Turkey's reaction to Russian move see Briefing, 2 January 1995, No 1022, pp 12-13; 1 May 1995, No 1039, p 13; 'Kizilordu Kapimizda', Milliyet, 1 May 1995, pp 1 and 16; 10 May 1995, p 13; 11 May 1995, p 13; Hürriyet, 10 June 1995, p 10.
110. For Turkey's reaction to Russian move see Briefing, 2 January 1995, No 1022, pp 12-13; 1 May 1995, No 1039, p 13; 'Kizilordu Kapimizda', Milliyet, 1 May 1995, pp 1 and 16; 10 May 1995, p 13; 11 May 1995, p 13; Hürriyet, 10 June 1995, p 10.
111. For Turkey's reaction to Russian move see Briefing, 2 January 1995, No 1022, pp 12-13; 1 May 1995, No 1039, p 13; 'Kizilordu Kapimizda', Milliyet, 1 May 1995, pp 1 and 16; 10 May 1995, p 13; 11 May 1995, p 13; Hürriyet, 10 June 1995, p 10.
112. For Turkey's reaction to Russian move see Briefing, 2 January 1995, No 1022, pp 12-13; 1 May 1995, No 1039, p 13; 'Kizilordu Kapimizda', Milliyet, 1 May 1995, pp 1 and 16; 10 May 1995, p 13; 11 May 1995, p 13; Hürriyet, 10 June 1995, p 10.
113. For Turkey's reaction to Russian move see Briefing, 2 January 1995, No 1022, pp 12-13; 1 May 1995, No 1039, p 13; 'Kizilordu Kapimizda', Milliyet, 1 May 1995, pp 1 and 16; 10 May 1995, p 13; 11 May 1995, p 13; Hürriyet, 10 June 1995, p 10.
114. For Turkey's reaction to Russian move see Briefing, 2 January 1995, No 1022, pp 12-13; 1 May 1995, No 1039, p 13; 'Kizilordu Kapimizda', Milliyet, 1 May 1995, pp 1 and 16; 10 May 1995, p 13; 11 May 1995, p 13; Hürriyet, 10 June 1995, p 10.
115. Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 86.
116. Despite the economic chaos that engulfed Russia, it still remains one of Turkey's most lucrative markets. In 1991, the two countries traded an estimated $2 billion worth of goods, a five-fold increase over the previous year. Moreover, it was calculated in January 1992 that 90 per cent of Turkey's trade with the former Soviet Union was realized with Russia. Figures quoted in A. Ehteshami and E. C. Murphy, The non-Arab Middle Eastern States and the Caucasian/Central Asian Republics; Turkey', International Relations, 1993, p 521.
117. James Chritchlow, Ties with Turkey; a lifeline for the Central Asians?', Report on the USSR, Radio Free Liberty Bulletin, 8 February 1991, p 4; The Middle East, No 208, February 1992, p 14.
118. James Chritchlow, Ties with Turkey; a lifeline for the Central Asians?', Report on the USSR, Radio Free Liberty Bulletin, 8 February 1991, p 4; The Middle East, No 208, February 1992, p 14.
119. The existing Turkish-Armenian border was determined by a peace treaty signed between Turkey and the short-lived independent Armenian Republic in 1921, and the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 1921 confirmed all the borders between the Soviet Union and Turkey. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Turkey no longer bordered on Russia, the validity of that treaty and its provisions for local borders with former Soviet republics became questionable. The problem became imminent when the Armenian Parliament announced that it did not recognize those borders established by Moscow between Armenia and Turkey. Thus, in spring 1992, Turkey stipulated that it would not proceed to formalize diplomatic relations with Armenia until Armenia provided formal written recognition of existing borders. As of now, it has not done so. See Briefing, 19 March 1991, p 3; Çoskun Kirca, The Only Hope For Armenia', Turkish Daily News, 12 February 1991; 'Ermenistanla Yakmlaşma', Milliyet, 29 January 1992.
120. The existing Turkish-Armenian border was determined by a peace treaty signed between Turkey and the short-lived independent Armenian Republic in 1921, and the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 1921 confirmed all the borders between the Soviet Union and Turkey. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Turkey no longer bordered on Russia, the validity of that treaty and its provisions for local borders with former Soviet republics became questionable. The problem became imminent when the Armenian Parliament announced that it did not recognize those borders established by Moscow between Armenia and Turkey. Thus, in spring 1992, Turkey stipulated that it would not proceed to formalize diplomatic relations with Armenia until Armenia provided formal written recognition of existing borders. As of now, it has not done so. See Briefing, 19 March 1991, p 3; Çoskun Kirca, The Only Hope For Armenia', Turkish Daily News, 12 February 1991; 'Ermenistanla Yakmlaşma', Milliyet, 29 January 1992.
121. The existing Turkish-Armenian border was determined by a peace treaty signed between Turkey and the short-lived independent Armenian Republic in 1921, and the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 1921 confirmed all the borders between the Soviet Union and Turkey. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Turkey no longer bordered on Russia, the validity of that treaty and its provisions for local borders with former Soviet republics became questionable. The problem became imminent when the Armenian Parliament announced that it did not recognize those borders established by Moscow between Armenia and Turkey. Thus, in spring 1992, Turkey stipulated that it would not proceed to formalize diplomatic relations with Armenia until Armenia provided formal written recognition of existing borders. As of now, it has not done so. See Briefing, 19 March 1991, p 3; Çoskun Kirca, The Only Hope For Armenia', Turkish Daily News, 12 February 1991; 'Ermenistanla Yakmlaşma', Milliyet, 29 January 1992.
122. Especially during the first half of 1992 there were calls within Turkey for at least a veiled military intervention on the Azéris' side. Right wing groups organized public rallies, and even some influential people (among them was the then president Turgut Özal) argued that Turkey 'had the right to intervene'. See Edward Mortimer, 'Foreign policy: centre of an unstable region', Financial Times Report on Turkey, 7 May 1993, p 5.
123. Ehteshami and Murphy, op cit, pp 522-523.
124. Although early in the independence process both sides seemed to agree on the need to overcome psychological barriers between the two peoples, moves by the Armenians over Karabakh caused Turkish public opinion overwhelmingly to press Ankara to speak out firmly against Armenian actions, and thus halted the process of reconciliation. See Ehteshami and Murphy, ibid, pp 522-523. However, as the conflict over Karabakh is somewhat thawed after the cease-fire between warring parties took effect on 12 May 1994, Turkey, conscious of the fact that it does not border Turkic Central Asia and a modus vivendi with Armenia would provide it with a bridge to the region, gradually moved to amend its relations with Armenia. See 'Ankara'da Siki Pazarlik', Milliyet, 25 February 1995, p 17. In early 1995, Turkey announced its unilateral decision to allow flights to and from Armenia to use its air space. See 'Gesture to Armenia announced in Washington', Briefing, No 1038, 24 April 1995, p 4. Later on, it was argued in the Turkish press that Turkey was to give up its precondition of Armenian withdrawal from Azerbaijani soil for re-establishment of contacts between two countries. See Yeni Yüzyil, 8 July 1995, p 17, interview with Jirayir Libaridyan, chief adviser to president Ter-Petrosyan of Armenia. This move was without doubt facilitated by the acceptance of new constitution in Armenia, which omitted earlier clauses referring to so-called Armenian genocide. See Yeni Yüzyil, 4 July 1995, p 16. For the Azerbaijani aspect of recent Turkish-Armenian rapprochement see 'Azerbaijan alarmed as Armenia looks south', Briefing, No 1030, 27 February 1995, p 11.
125. Although early in the independence process both sides seemed to agree on the need to overcome psychological barriers between the two peoples, moves by the Armenians over Karabakh caused Turkish public opinion overwhelmingly to press Ankara to speak out firmly against Armenian actions, and thus halted the process of reconciliation. See Ehteshami and Murphy, ibid, pp 522-523. However, as the conflict over Karabakh is somewhat thawed after the cease-fire between warring parties took effect on 12 May 1994, Turkey, conscious of the fact that it does not border Turkic Central Asia and a modus vivendi with Armenia would provide it with a bridge to the region, gradually moved to amend its relations with Armenia. See 'Ankara'da Siki Pazarlik', Milliyet, 25 February 1995, p 17. In early 1995, Turkey announced its unilateral decision to allow flights to and from Armenia to use its air space. See 'Gesture to Armenia announced in Washington', Briefing, No 1038, 24 April 1995, p 4. Later on, it was argued in the Turkish press that Turkey was to give up its precondition of Armenian withdrawal from Azerbaijani soil for re-establishment of contacts between two countries. See Yeni Yüzyil, 8 July 1995, p 17, interview with Jirayir Libaridyan, chief adviser to president Ter-Petrosyan of Armenia. This move was without doubt facilitated by the acceptance of new constitution in Armenia, which omitted earlier clauses referring to so-called Armenian genocide. See Yeni Yüzyil, 4 July 1995, p 16. For the Azerbaijani aspect of recent Turkish-Armenian rapprochement see 'Azerbaijan alarmed as Armenia looks south', Briefing, No 1030, 27 February 1995, p 11.
126. Although early in the independence process both sides seemed to agree on the need to overcome psychological barriers between the two peoples, moves by the Armenians over Karabakh caused Turkish public opinion overwhelmingly to press Ankara to speak out firmly against Armenian actions, and thus halted the process of reconciliation. See Ehteshami and Murphy, ibid, pp 522-523. However, as the conflict over Karabakh is somewhat thawed after the cease-fire between warring parties took effect on 12 May 1994, Turkey, conscious of the fact that it does not border Turkic Central Asia and a modus vivendi with Armenia would
127. Although early in the independence process both sides seemed to agree on the need to overcome psychological barriers between the two peoples, moves by the Armenians over Karabakh caused Turkish public opinion overwhelmingly to press Ankara to speak out firmly against Armenian actions, and thus halted the process of reconciliation. See Ehteshami and Murphy, ibid, pp 522-523. However, as the conflict over Karabakh is somewhat thawed after the cease-fire between warring parties took effect on 12 May 1994, Turkey, conscious of the fact that it does not border Turkic Central Asia and a modus vivendi with Armenia would provide it with a bridge to the region, gradually moved to amend its relations with Armenia. See 'Ankara'da Siki Pazarlik', Milliyet, 25 February 1995, p 17. In early 1995, Turkey announced its unilateral decision to allow flights to and from Armenia to use its air space. See 'Gesture to Armenia announced in Washington', Briefing, No 1038, 24 April 1995, p 4. Later on, it was argued in the Turkish press that Turkey was to give up its precondition of Armenian withdrawal from Azerbaijani soil for re-establishment of contacts between two countries. See Yeni Yüzyil, 8 July 1995, p 17, interview with Jirayir Libaridyan, chief adviser to president Ter-Petrosyan of Armenia. This move was without doubt facilitated by the acceptance of new constitution in Armenia, which omitted earlier clauses referring to so-called Armenian genocide. See Yeni Yüzyil, 4 July 1995, p 16. For the Azerbaijani aspect of recent Turkish-Armenian rapprochement see 'Azerbaijan alarmed as Armenia looks south', Briefing, No 1030, 27 February 1995, p 11.
128. Although early in the independence process both sides seemed to agree on the need to overcome psychological barriers between the two peoples, moves by the Armenians over Karabakh caused Turkish public opinion overwhelmingly to press Ankara to speak out firmly against Armenian actions, and thus halted the process of reconciliation. See Ehteshami and Murphy, ibid, pp 522-523. However, as the conflict over Karabakh is somewhat thawed after the cease-fire between warring parties took effect on 12 May 1994, Turkey, conscious of the fact that it does not border Turkic Central Asia and a modus vivendi with Armenia would provide it with a bridge to the region, gradually moved to amend its relations with Armenia. See 'Ankara'da Siki Pazarlik', Milliyet, 25 February 1995, p 17. In early 1995, Turkey announced its unilateral decision to allow flights to and from Armenia to use its air space. See 'Gesture to Armenia announced in Washington', Briefing, No 1038, 24 April 1995, p 4. Later on, it was argued in the Turkish press that Turkey was to give up its precondition of Armenian withdrawal from Azerbaijani soil for re-establishment of contacts between two countries. See Yeni Yüzyil, 8 July 1995, p 17, interview with Jirayir Libaridyan, chief adviser to president Ter-Petrosyan of Armenia. This move was without doubt facilitated by the acceptance of new constitution in Armenia, which omitted earlier clauses referring to so-called Armenian genocide. See Yeni Yüzyil, 4 July 1995, p 16. For the Azerbaijani aspect of recent Turkish-Armenian rapprochement see 'Azerbaijan alarmed as Armenia looks south', Briefing, No 1030, 27 February 1995, p 11.
129. Although early in the independence process both sides seemed to agree on the need to overcome psychological barriers between the two peoples, moves by the Armenians over Karabakh caused Turkish public opinion overwhelmingly to press Ankara to speak out firmly against Armenian actions, and thus halted the process of reconciliation. See Ehteshami and Murphy, ibid, pp 522-523. However, as the conflict over Karabakh is somewhat thawed after the cease-fire between warring parties took effect on 12 May 1994, Turkey, conscious of the fact that it does not border Turkic Central Asia and a modus vivendi with Armenia would provide it with a bridge to the region, gradually moved to amend its relations with Armenia. See 'Ankara'da Siki Pazarlik', Milliyet, 25 February 1995, p 17. In early 1995, Turkey announced its unilateral decision to allow flights to and from Armenia to use its air space. See 'Gesture to Armenia announced in Washington', Briefing, No 1038, 24 April 1995, p 4. Later on, it was argued in the Turkish press that Turkey was to give up its precondition of Armenian withdrawal from Azerbaijani soil for re-establishment of contacts between two countries. See Yeni Yüzyil, 8 July 1995, p 17, interview with Jirayir Libaridyan, chief adviser to president Ter-Petrosyan of Armenia. This move was without doubt facilitated by the acceptance of new constitution in Armenia, which omitted earlier clauses referring to so-called Armenian genocide. See Yeni Yüzyil, 4 July 1995, p 16. For the Azerbaijani aspect of recent Turkish-Armenian rapprochement see 'Azerbaijan alarmed as Armenia looks south', Briefing, No 1030, 27 February 1995, p 11.
130. On 10 March 1993, after a visit by the then foreign minister Hikmet Çetin to Moscow, it was announced that Turkey and the Russian Federation will jointly act as moderators between Azerbaijan and Armenia'. TRT News, 16 March 1993. For earlier calls on Russia to end the conflict see Newspot, 25 January 1990; for Turkey's attempts to involve the UN and CSCE see Newspot, 21 May 1992, pp 1 and 7.
131. On 10 March 1993, after a visit by the then foreign minister Hikmet Çetin to Moscow, it was announced that Turkey and the Russian Federation will jointly act as moderators between Azerbaijan and Armenia'. TRT News, 16 March 1993. For earlier calls on Russia to end the conflict see Newspot, 25 January 1990; for Turkey's attempts to involve the UN and CSCE see Newspot, 21 May 1992, pp 1 and 7.
132. On 10 March 1993, after a visit by the then foreign minister Hikmet Çetin to Moscow, it was announced that Turkey and the Russian Federation will jointly act as moderators between Azerbaijan and Armenia'. TRT News, 16 March 1993. For earlier calls on Russia to end the conflict see Newspot, 25 January 1990; for Turkey's attempts to involve the UN and CSCE see Newspot, 21 May 1992, pp 1 and 7.
133. Same apprehension was shared by the then US ambassador to CSCE, Mr Maresca, who noted that, after 1993, 'Russia competed with and undercut the international community, wanting to re-establish dominance over Armenia and Azerbaijan to control frontiers with Turkey and Iran and share Azerbaijan's oil riches'. See CRS Issue Brief, op cit, p 13. Also Milliyet, 25 February 1995, p 17; and 8 May 1995, p 13.
134. Same apprehension was shared by the then US ambassador to CSCE, Mr Maresca, who noted that, after 1993, 'Russia competed with and undercut the international community, wanting to re-establish dominance over Armenia and Azerbaijan to control frontiers with Turkey and Iran and share Azerbaijan's oil riches'. See CRS Issue Brief, op cit, p 13. Also Milliyet, 25 February 1995, p 17; and 8 May 1995, p 13.
135. Same apprehension was shared by the then US ambassador to CSCE, Mr Maresca, who noted that, after 1993, 'Russia competed with and undercut the international community, wanting to re-establish dominance over Armenia and Azerbaijan to control frontiers with Turkey and Iran and share Azerbaijan's oil riches'. See CRS Issue Brief, op cit, p 13. Also Milliyet, 25 February 1995, p 17; and 8 May 1995, p 13.
136. For a view that Turkey's Chechnya policy is marked by dilemmas, see Briefing, No 1023, 9 January 1995, pp 7-8; and No 1024, 16 January 1995, p 10.
137. For a view that Turkey's Chechnya policy is marked by dilemmas, see Briefing, No 1023, 9 January 1995, pp 7-8; and No 1024, 16 January 1995, p 10.
138. For public accusation from the Head of Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service on 20 December 1995, that volunteer fighters from Turkey were discovered in the Northern Caucasus, mainly in Chechnya, see FBIS-SOV, 3 February 1995, p 71. Also see Briefing, 9 January 1995, No 1023, pp 7-8.
139. For public accusation from the Head of Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service on 20 December 1995, that volunteer fighters from Turkey were discovered in the Northern Caucasus, mainly in Chechnya, see FBIS-SOV, 3 February 1995, p 71. Also see Briefing, 9 January 1995, No 1023, pp 7-8.
140. Briefing, 1 May 1995, No 1039, p 13; 19 June 1995, No 1045, p 13.
141. Briefing, 1 May 1995, No 1039, p 13; 19 June 1995, No 1045, p 13.
142. Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 81. For an evaluation of Turkey's options and dilemmas regarding ethnic conflicts within Russia, see 'How to handle post-Chechnya crisis Moscow', Briefing, No 1029, 20 February 1995, p 10.
143. Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 81. For an evaluation of Turkey's options and dilemmas regarding ethnic conflicts within Russia, see 'How to handle post-Chechnya crisis Moscow', Briefing, No 1029, 20 February 1995, p 10.
144. For further elaboration of this point, see John Colarusso, 'Abkhazia', Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 1, 1994, and Charles W. Hostler, The Turks of Central Asia, Wesport, London: Praeger, 1993.
145. For further elaboration of this point, see John Colarusso, 'Abkhazia', Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 1, 1994, and Charles W. Hostler, The Turks of Central Asia, Wesport, London: Praeger, 1993.
146. Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 84.
147. Iran became the first Muslim state outside the CIS to establish diplomatic ties with Armenia. For Turkey's recent attempts for 'quiet diplomacy' between Armenia and Azerbaijan see Milliyet, 8 May 1995, p 13; and Yeni Yüzyil, 13 June 1995, p 16.
148. Iran became the first Muslim state outside the CIS to establish diplomatic ties with Armenia. For Turkey's recent attempts for 'quiet diplomacy' between Armenia and Azerbaijan see Milliyet, 8 May 1995, p 13; and Yeni Yüzyil, 13 June 1995, p 16.
149. Dr Velayeti's speech in a conference, cited in Haktanir, op cit, p 11; also see Robins, op cit, p 9, who argues that American backing for Turkey as a moderate state against Iran in the region significantly reinforced Iran's sense of mistrust towards Turkey.
150. Dr Velayeti's speech in a conference, cited in Haktanir, op cit, p 11; also see Robins, op cit, p 9, who argues that American backing for Turkey as a moderate state against Iran in the region significantly reinforced Iran's sense of mistrust towards Turkey.
151. For elaboration of such views see Ahrari, op cit, p 53; Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 85.
152. For elaboration of such views see Ahrari, op cit, p 53; Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, p 85.
153. Haktanir, op cit, p 11.