Naturalists' portrayals of animal life: Engaging the Verstehen approach

Social Studies of Science

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 799-838

  Crist, Eileen ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030491071     PISSN: 03063127     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/030631296026004004     Document Type: Article

References (94)

1. Max Weber, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947); Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. 1: The Problem of Social Reality (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).
2. Max Weber, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947); Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. 1: The Problem of Social Reality (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).
3. 'Classical ethology' refers to the school of animal behaviour studies introduced in the 1930s with the pioneering work of Konrad Lorenz, Nikolaas Tinbergen and Karl von Frisch: see K. Lorenz, Studies in Animal and Human Behaviour, Vols 1 & 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, 1971); N. Tinbergen, The Study of Instinct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989 [1951]); K. von Frisch, The Dance Language and Orientation of Bees (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). As a subdiscipline of biological science, ethology diverged from comparative psychology (and, in part, emerged in opposition to it) in its focus on naturally occurring animal behaviours in their undisturbed environments, and in its interest in instinct, that is, innate, complex behaviour patterns. On the history of the emergence of ethology, see Richard W. Burkhardt, Jr, 'On the Emergence of Ethology as a Scientific Discipline', Conspectus of History, Vol. 1 (1981), 62-81.
4. 'Classical ethology' refers to the school of animal behaviour studies introduced in the 1930s with the pioneering work of Konrad Lorenz, Nikolaas Tinbergen and Karl von Frisch: see K. Lorenz, Studies in Animal and Human Behaviour, Vols 1 & 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, 1971); N. Tinbergen, The Study of Instinct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989 [1951]); K. von Frisch, The Dance Language and Orientation of Bees (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). As a subdiscipline of biological science, ethology diverged from comparative psychology (and, in part, emerged in opposition to it) in its focus on naturally occurring animal behaviours in their undisturbed environments, and in its interest in instinct, that is, innate, complex behaviour patterns. On the history of the emergence of ethology, see Richard W. Burkhardt, Jr, 'On the Emergence of Ethology as a Scientific Discipline', Conspectus of History, Vol. 1 (1981), 62-81.
5. 'Classical ethology' refers to the school of animal behaviour studies introduced in the 1930s with the pioneering work of Konrad Lorenz, Nikolaas Tinbergen and Karl von Frisch: see K. Lorenz, Studies in Animal and Human Behaviour, Vols 1 & 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, 1971); N. Tinbergen, The Study of Instinct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989 [1951]); K. von Frisch, The Dance Language and Orientation of Bees (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). As a subdiscipline of biological science, ethology diverged from comparative psychology (and, in part, emerged in opposition to it) in its focus on naturally occurring animal behaviours in their undisturbed environments, and in its interest in instinct, that is, innate, complex behaviour patterns. On the history of the emergence of ethology, see Richard W. Burkhardt, Jr, 'On the Emergence of Ethology as a Scientific Discipline', Conspectus of History, Vol. 1 (1981), 62-81.
6. 'Classical ethology' refers to the school of animal behaviour studies introduced in the 1930s with the pioneering work of Konrad Lorenz, Nikolaas Tinbergen and Karl von Frisch: see K. Lorenz, Studies in Animal and Human Behaviour, Vols 1 & 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, 1971); N. Tinbergen, The Study of Instinct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989 [1951]); K. von Frisch, The Dance Language and Orientation of Bees (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). As a subdiscipline of biological science, ethology diverged from comparative psychology (and, in part, emerged in opposition to it) in its focus on naturally occurring animal behaviours in their undisturbed environments, and in its interest in instinct, that is, innate, complex behaviour patterns. On the history of the emergence of ethology, see Richard W. Burkhardt, Jr, 'On the Emergence of Ethology as a Scientific Discipline', Conspectus of History, Vol. 1 (1981), 62-81.
7. In this paper, I focus specifically on George and Elizabeth Peckham, and Jean Henri Fabre. Both studied insect life and behaviour - indeed, the Peckhams were inspired to observe insects by Fabre's studies. I limit the investigation to these specific naturalists for two reasons: one, for purposes of brevity and consistency; and two, because they are outstanding observers and writers, and therefore interesting to study and exposit. While I believe that the Verstehen approach of these authors is more broadly characteristic of past and present naturalist writing, I do not want to make any strong claims about the general scope of my analyses. The reason for this reticence is that naturalists differ markedly from one another; since they do not follow strict methodological guidelines, nor structure their observations and explanations through a specialized vocabulary, their writings have a markedly individualistic character.
8. Schutz, op. cit. note 1, 55. While Max Weber introduced the Verstehen method to the social sciences, it was Alfred Schutz, and later Harold Garfinkel, who elaborated this idea in relation to the everyday lifeworld. Hence I rely upon Schutz's and Garfinkel's elucidations of Verstehen.
9. Schutz, op. cit. note 1, 55.
10. Ibid., 56.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 55.
13. Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1967), 56.
14. See Schutz, op. cit. note 1, 312-26. For a systematic, powerful critique of the idea of 'subjective meaning as private', see Jeff Coulter's work: J. Coulter, The Social Construction of Mind: Studies in Ethnomethodology and Linguistic Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1979); Coulter, Mind in Action (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989); Coulter, 'Cognition: Cognition in an Ethnomethodological Mode', in Graham Button (ed.), Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 176-95. The classic resource for arguments against 'privacy' of meaning (as well as of sensation) as hidden or inaccessible is, of course, Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'private language argument': L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958 [1953]), paragraphs 241-316, and passim.
15. See Schutz, op. cit. note 1, 312-26. For a systematic, powerful critique of the idea of 'subjective meaning as private', see Jeff Coulter's work: J. Coulter, The Social Construction of Mind: Studies in Ethnomethodology and Linguistic Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1979); Coulter, Mind in Action (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989); Coulter, 'Cognition: Cognition in an Ethnomethodological Mode', in Graham Button (ed.), Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 176-95. The classic resource for arguments against 'privacy' of meaning (as well as of sensation) as hidden or inaccessible is, of course, Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'private language argument': L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958 [1953]), paragraphs 241-316, and passim.
16. See Schutz, op. cit. note 1, 312-26. For a systematic, powerful critique of the idea of 'subjective meaning as private', see Jeff Coulter's work: J. Coulter, The Social Construction of Mind: Studies in Ethnomethodology and Linguistic Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1979); Coulter, Mind in Action (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989); Coulter, 'Cognition: Cognition in an Ethnomethodological Mode', in Graham Button (ed.), Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 176-95. The classic resource for arguments against 'privacy' of meaning (as well as of sensation) as hidden or inaccessible is, of course, Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'private language argument': L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958 [1953]), paragraphs 241-316, and passim.
17. See Schutz, op. cit. note 1, 312-26. For a systematic, powerful critique of the idea of 'subjective meaning as private', see Jeff Coulter's work: J. Coulter, The Social Construction of Mind: Studies in Ethnomethodology and Linguistic Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1979); Coulter, Mind in Action (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989); Coulter, 'Cognition: Cognition in an Ethnomethodological Mode', in Graham Button (ed.), Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 176-95. The classic resource for arguments against 'privacy' of meaning (as well as of sensation) as hidden or inaccessible is, of course, Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'private language argument': L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958 [1953]), paragraphs 241-316, and passim.
18. See Schutz, op. cit. note 1, 312-26. For a systematic, powerful critique of the idea of 'subjective meaning as private', see Jeff Coulter's work: J. Coulter, The Social Construction of Mind: Studies in Ethnomethodology and Linguistic Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1979); Coulter, Mind in Action (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989); Coulter, 'Cognition: Cognition in an Ethnomethodological Mode', in Graham Button (ed.), Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 176-95. The classic resource for arguments against 'privacy' of meaning (as well as of sensation) as hidden or inaccessible is, of course, Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'private language argument': L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958 [1953]), paragraphs 241-316, and passim.
19. See Thomas Nagel (orig. 1974), 'What is it Like to be a Bat?', in D.R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett (eds), The Mind's I (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 391-403.
20. See Schutz, op. cit. note 1; A. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967); Garfinkel, op. cit. note 9; Harvey Sacks, 'On Doing "Being Ordinary" ', in J. Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage (eds), Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 413-29.
21. See Schutz, op. cit. note 1; A. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967); Garfinkel, op. cit. note 9; Harvey Sacks, 'On Doing "Being Ordinary" ', in J. Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage (eds), Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 413-29.
22. See Schutz, op. cit. note 1; A. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967); Garfinkel, op. cit. note 9; Harvey Sacks, 'On Doing "Being Ordinary" ', in J. Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage (eds), Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 413-29.
23. See Schutz, op. cit. note 1; A. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967); Garfinkel, op. cit. note 9; Harvey Sacks, 'On Doing "Being Ordinary" ', in J. Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage (eds), Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 413-29.
24. George and Elizabeth Peckham, Wasps: Solitary and Social (Westminster: Archibald Constable, 1905), 280.
25. Ibid., 2-3.
26. Ibid., 130-31.
27. Garfinkel, op. cit. note 9, 118.
28. Schutz, op. cit. note 1, 120.
29. Peckham & Peckham, op. cit. note 13, 154-55.
30. Ibid., 19-21.
31. Schutz, op. cit. note 1, 316.
32. Charles Taylor maintains that this antithesis reflects different conceptions of knowledge, linked with different worldviews: one is the Aristotelian model according to which the knower 'participates in the being of the known object'; the other is the Cartesian-representational model, which fosters a picture of the knower as 'ideally disengaged': see C. Taylor, 'Overcoming Epistemology', in Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman and Thomas McCarthy (eds), After Philosophy: End or Transformation? (Cambodge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987), 464-88, at 467, 471.
33. See the collections in which these viewpoints are debated in their various guises: Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); Brian R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985 [1970]). See also the debate between Larry Laudan and David Bloor: L. Laudan, 'The Pseudo-Science of Science?', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11 (1981), 173-98; D. Bloor, 'The Strengths of the Strong Programme', ibid., 199-213; and, more recently, the exchange between Harry Collins and Steve Yearley, and Michel Callon and Bruno Latour: H.M. Collins and S. Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Knowledge and Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-26; M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bath School! A Reply to Collins and Yearley', ibid., 343-68. For theoretical endeavours to deconstruct the constructivist/realist (and realist/rationalist) dichotomies, see Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies, Vol. 14 (1988), 575-99; B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
34. See the collections in which these viewpoints are debated in their various guises: Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); Brian R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985 [1970]). See also the debate between Larry Laudan and David Bloor: L. Laudan, 'The Pseudo-Science of Science?', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11 (1981), 173-98; D. Bloor, 'The Strengths of the Strong Programme', ibid., 199-213; and, more recently, the exchange between Harry Collins and Steve Yearley, and Michel Callon and Bruno Latour: H.M. Collins and S. Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Knowledge and Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-26; M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bath School! A Reply to Collins and Yearley', ibid., 343-68. For theoretical endeavours to deconstruct the constructivist/realist (and realist/rationalist) dichotomies, see Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies, Vol. 14 (1988), 575-99; B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
35. See the collections in which these viewpoints are debated in their various guises: Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); Brian R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985 [1970]). See also the debate between Larry Laudan and David Bloor: L. Laudan, 'The Pseudo-Science of Science?', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11 (1981), 173-98; D. Bloor, 'The Strengths of the Strong Programme', ibid., 199-213; and, more recently, the exchange between Harry Collins and Steve Yearley, and Michel Callon and Bruno Latour: H.M. Collins and S. Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Knowledge and Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-26; M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bath School! A Reply to Collins and Yearley', ibid., 343-68. For theoretical endeavours to deconstruct the constructivist/realist (and realist/rationalist) dichotomies, see Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies, Vol. 14 (1988), 575-99; B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
36. See the collections in which these viewpoints are debated in their various guises: Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); Brian R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985 [1970]). See also the debate between Larry Laudan and David Bloor: L. Laudan, 'The Pseudo-Science of Science?', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11 (1981), 173-98; D. Bloor, 'The Strengths of the Strong Programme', ibid., 199-213; and, more recently, the exchange between Harry Collins and Steve Yearley, and Michel Callon and Bruno Latour: H.M. Collins and S. Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Knowledge and Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-26; M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bath School! A Reply to Collins and Yearley', ibid., 343-68. For theoretical endeavours to deconstruct the constructivist/realist (and realist/rationalist) dichotomies, see Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies, Vol. 14 (1988), 575-99; B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
37. See the collections in which these viewpoints are debated in their various guises: Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); Brian R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985 [1970]). See also the debate between Larry Laudan and David Bloor: L. Laudan, 'The Pseudo-Science of Science?', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11 (1981), 173-98; D. Bloor, 'The Strengths of the Strong Programme', ibid., 199-213; and, more recently, the exchange between Harry Collins and Steve Yearley, and Michel Callon and Bruno Latour: H.M. Collins and S. Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Knowledge and Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-26; M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bath School! A Reply to Collins and Yearley', ibid., 343-68. For theoretical endeavours to deconstruct the constructivist/realist (and realist/rationalist) dichotomies, see Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies, Vol. 14 (1988), 575-99; B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
38. See the collections in which these viewpoints are debated in their various guises: Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); Brian R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985 [1970]). See also the debate between Larry Laudan and David Bloor: L. Laudan, 'The Pseudo-Science of Science?', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11 (1981), 173-98; D. Bloor, 'The Strengths of the Strong Programme', ibid., 199-213; and, more recently, the exchange between Harry Collins and Steve Yearley, and Michel Callon and Bruno Latour: H.M. Collins and S. Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Knowledge and Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-26; M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bath School! A Reply to Collins and Yearley', ibid., 343-68. For theoretical endeavours to deconstruct the constructivist/realist (and realist/rationalist) dichotomies, see Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies, Vol. 14 (1988), 575-99; B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
39. See the collections in which these viewpoints are debated in their various guises: Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); Brian R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985 [1970]). See also the debate between Larry Laudan and David Bloor: L. Laudan, 'The Pseudo-Science of Science?', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11 (1981), 173-98; D. Bloor, 'The Strengths of the Strong Programme', ibid., 199-213; and, more recently, the exchange between Harry Collins and Steve Yearley, and Michel Callon and Bruno Latour: H.M. Collins and S. Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Knowledge and Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-26; M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bath School! A Reply to Collins and Yearley', ibid., 343-68. For theoretical endeavours to deconstruct the constructivist/realist (and realist/rationalist) dichotomies, see Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies, Vol. 14 (1988), 575-99; B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
40. See the collections in which these viewpoints are debated in their various guises: Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); Brian R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985 [1970]). See also the debate between Larry Laudan and David Bloor: L. Laudan, 'The Pseudo-Science of Science?', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11 (1981), 173-98; D. Bloor, 'The Strengths of the Strong Programme', ibid., 199-213; and, more recently, the exchange between Harry Collins and Steve Yearley, and Michel Callon and Bruno Latour: H.M. Collins and S. Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Knowledge and Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-26; M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bath School! A Reply to Collins and Yearley', ibid., 343-68. For theoretical endeavours to deconstruct the constructivist/realist (and realist/rationalist) dichotomies, see Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies, Vol. 14 (1988), 575-99; B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
41. See Eileen Crist, The Significance of Language in Portraying Animals: Anthropomorphism and Mechanomorphism in Behavioral Studies (unpublished PhD dissertation, Boston University, 1994), Chapter 4, 'The Ethological Constitution of the Animal as Object'.
42. Harold Garfinkel and Harvey Sacks, 'On Formal Structures of Practical Action', in John C. McKinney and Edward A. Tiryakian (eds), Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Developments (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1971), 337-66.
43. Garfinkel, op. cit. note 9, 77.
44. Ibid., 78.
45. Peckham & Peckham, op. cit. note 13, 174-75.
46. Ibid., 58.
47. Garfinkel, op. cit. note 7, 78.
48. Peckham & Peckham, op. cit. note 13, 60-62.
49. Ibid., 65-66.
50. Ibid., 68.
51. Garfinkel & Sacks, op. cit. note 24; Michael Lynch, Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
52. Garfinkel & Sacks, op. cit. note 24; Michael Lynch, Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
53. Schutz, op. cit. note 1, 217.
54. Ibid., 208.
55. Ibid., 209.
56. Peckham & Peckham, op. cit. note 13, 38-39.
57. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, quoted in Lynch, op. cit. note 33, 128.
58. Schutz, op. cit. note 1, 213 (emphasis in original).
59. Donald Griffin, therefore, in advancing evidence for animal mentality in his latest work, dedicates two chapters to the construction of artefacts and the use of tools and special devices by animals: D. Griffin, Animal Minds (Chicago, IL: The University Press, 1992), 67-114. In fact, he refers to this use of a pebble as a tool by the wasps of the genus Ammophila and Sphex ( ibid., 102-03). See also James L. Gould and Carol Grant Gould, The Animal Mind (New York: Scientific American Library, 1994), Chapter 6, 'Animals as Architects'.
60. Donald Griffin, therefore, in advancing evidence for animal mentality in his latest work, dedicates two chapters to the construction of artefacts and the use of tools and special devices by animals: D. Griffin, Animal Minds (Chicago, IL: The University Press, 1992), 67-114. In fact, he refers to this use of a pebble as a tool by the wasps of the genus Ammophila and Sphex ( ibid., 102-03). See also James L. Gould and Carol Grant Gould, The Animal Mind (New York: Scientific American Library, 1994), Chapter 6, 'Animals as Architects'.
61. Donald Griffin, therefore, in advancing evidence for animal mentality in his latest work, dedicates two chapters to the construction of artefacts and the use of tools and special devices by animals: D. Griffin, Animal Minds (Chicago, IL: The University Press, 1992), 67-114. In fact, he refers to this use of a pebble as a tool by the wasps of the genus Ammophila and Sphex ( ibid., 102-03). See also James L. Gould and Carol Grant Gould, The Animal Mind (New York: Scientific American Library, 1994), Chapter 6, 'Animals as Architects'.
62. D. Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness (New York: The Rockefeller University Press, 1976), 48.
63. See Crist, op. cit. note 23; E. Crist, 'From Questions to Stimuli, from Answers to Reactions: The Case of Clever Hans', Semiotica (forthcoming, 1996).
64. See Crist, op. cit. note 23; E. Crist, 'From Questions to Stimuli, from Answers to Reactions: The Case of Clever Hans', Semiotica (forthcoming, 1996).
65. On the other hand, a significant divergence of the ethologists from their naturalist predecessors is that their accounts of behavioural patterns are abstract -that is, they are accounts of the average or typical case, not the singular instance. The portrayal of animal behaviour through a generic methodology of inscription tends to support, if not advance, a mechanomorphic picture of the animal. This is so because 'generic description' elides the modulations of local expressions which, precisely, subvert the see-ability of the animal as an automaton. The form of depiction, then, is extremely consequential for the view of animal behaviour that is advanced. The method of depiction generates the central body of the writing, and it is thus the groundwork both for the particular arguments advanced by the author, as well as for the overall view educed by the reader.
66. Rom Harré draws a distinction between units of behaviour as 'mere movement', action as 'doing something' and act as what is accomplished through 'doing something'. While 'action' is a meaningful behaviour, an 'act' implicates an entire temporal or situational complex context. For example, 'hunting' is an act composed of a sequence of interconnected actions such as 'searching', 'stalking', 'staring', attacking', and so on. Harré points out that 'there is no evidence that . . . acts-actions as behaviours are in 1:1 correspondence': R. Harré, 'Vocabularies and Theories', in Harré and Vernon Reynolds (eds), The Meaning of Primate Signals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 90-110, at 94. Similarly, it may be pointed out that neither are actions and acts in a 1:1 correspondence; this is so, because the same act might be achieved by (a) different (sequence of) actions.
67. See Harvey Sacks, 'On the Preferences for Agreement and Contiguity in Sequences of Conversation', in Graham Button and John R.E. Lee (eds), Talk and Social Organization (Clevedon, Somerset: Multilingual Matters, 1987), 54-69; Emanuel A. Schegloff. 'Sequencing in Conversational Openings', in John J. Gumpertz and Del Hymes (eds), Directions in Psycholinguistics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1972), 346-80. The recognition of the sequential and hence intersubjective generation of meaning in conversation is central in the sociological field of conversation analysis.
68. See Harvey Sacks, 'On the Preferences for Agreement and Contiguity in Sequences of Conversation', in Graham Button and John R.E. Lee (eds), Talk and Social Organization (Clevedon, Somerset: Multilingual Matters, 1987), 54-69; Emanuel A. Schegloff. 'Sequencing in Conversational Openings', in John J. Gumpertz and Del Hymes (eds), Directions in Psycholinguistics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1972), 346-80. The recognition of the sequential and hence intersubjective generation of meaning in conversation is central in the sociological field of conversation analysis.
69. J.H. Fabre, The Hunting Wasps (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1915), 82.
70. Garfinkel, op. cit. note 9, 9-10.
71. Barbara McClintock, quoted in Evelyn Fox Keller, A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1983), 117.
72. Keller, ibid.
73. Ibid., 117.
74. Ibid., 198.
75. Regarding Fabre's work and life, see C.V. Legros, Fabre, Poet of Science (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913); Donald Culross Peattie, Green Laurels: The Lives and Achievements of the Great Naturalists (New York: Garden City Publishing Co., 1939), esp. Chapter 15, 'Fabre and the Epic Commonplace', 326-47; and Edwin W. Teale's 'Introduction' to his edited compilation of Fabre's essays: E.W. Teale (ed.), The Insect World of J. Henri Fabre (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1991), xi-xviii. See also Georges Pasteur's article on 'Jean Henri Fabre', Scientific American (July 1994), 58-64, which discusses Fabre's original contributions to knowledge of insect life, and his pioneering use of experimentation in behavioural studies. I am indebted to Susan Sterne for calling my attention to this latter article.
76. Regarding Fabre's work and life, see C.V. Legros, Fabre, Poet of Science (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913); Donald Culross Peattie, Green Laurels: The Lives and Achievements of the Great Naturalists (New York: Garden City Publishing Co., 1939), esp. Chapter 15, 'Fabre and the Epic Commonplace', 326-47; and Edwin W. Teale's 'Introduction' to his edited compilation of Fabre's essays: E.W. Teale (ed.), The Insect World of J. Henri Fabre (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1991), xi-xviii. See also Georges Pasteur's article on 'Jean Henri Fabre', Scientific American (July 1994), 58-64, which discusses Fabre's original contributions to knowledge of insect life, and his pioneering use of experimentation in behavioural studies. I am indebted to Susan Sterne for calling my attention to this latter article.
77. Regarding Fabre's work and life, see C.V. Legros, Fabre, Poet of Science (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913); Donald Culross Peattie, Green Laurels: The Lives and Achievements of the Great Naturalists (New York: Garden City Publishing Co., 1939), esp. Chapter 15, 'Fabre and the Epic Commonplace', 326-47; and Edwin W. Teale's 'Introduction' to his edited compilation of Fabre's essays: E.W. Teale (ed.), The Insect World of J. Henri Fabre (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1991), xi-xviii. See also Georges Pasteur's article on 'Jean Henri Fabre', Scientific American (July 1994), 58-64, which discusses Fabre's original contributions to knowledge of insect life, and his pioneering use of experimentation in behavioural studies. I am indebted to Susan Sterne for calling my attention to this latter article.
78. Regarding Fabre's work and life, see C.V. Legros, Fabre, Poet of Science (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913); Donald Culross Peattie, Green Laurels: The Lives and Achievements of the Great Naturalists (New York: Garden City Publishing Co., 1939), esp. Chapter 15, 'Fabre and the Epic Commonplace', 326-47; and Edwin W. Teale's 'Introduction' to his edited compilation of Fabre's essays: E.W. Teale (ed.), The Insect World of J. Henri Fabre (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1991), xi-xviii. See also Georges Pasteur's article on 'Jean Henri Fabre', Scientific American (July 1994), 58-64, which discusses Fabre's original contributions to knowledge of insect life, and his pioneering use of experimentation in behavioural studies. I am indebted to Susan Sterne for calling my attention to this latter article.
79. J.H. Fabre, The Wonders of Instinct (New York: The Century Co., 1918), 44.
80. Ibid., 44-45.
81. Ibid., 50-51.
82. Ibid., 51.
83. Ibid., 53-55.
84. Ibid., 56-57.
85. Schutz, op. cit. note 1, 212.
86. See, for instance, John S. Kennedy, The New Anthropomorphism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
87. S. Anthony Barnett, The Rat: A Study in Behaviour (Chicago, IL: Aldine, 1963), 9.
88. See Pamela J. Asquith, 'The Inevitability and Utility of Anthropomorphism in Description of Primate Behaviour', in Harré & Reynolds (eds), op. cit. note 44, 138-74; Kennedy, op. cit. note 60.
89. See Pamela J. Asquith, 'The Inevitability and Utility of Anthropomorphism in Description of Primate Behaviour', in Harré & Reynolds (eds), op. cit. note 44, 138-74; Kennedy, op. cit. note 60.
90. Fabre, op. cit. note 46, 189-90.
91. L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), paragraph 144.
92. Crist, op. cit. note 23.
93. For a discussion of 'virtual witnessing', see Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 60.
94. Peattie, op. cit. note 52.