Europe's monetary malaise: International institutions and domestic policy commitments

Review of International Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 257-273

  Sandholtz, Wayne ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0030488968     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0260210500118546     Document Type: Article

References (49)

1. The only exceptions were the Deutschmark and the Dutch guilder, which form the hard kernel of the ERM, and the Greek drachma, which was not part of the system.
2. That most of the currencies returned within months to their pre-widening, narrow bands vis-à-vis the Deutschmark is important and suggests numerous additional questions. Governments did not take advantage of the wider bands to reduce interest rates precipitously; on the contrary, they continued cautiously to follow German interest rate reductions.
3. Financial Times, 26 May 1993.
4. Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz, 'The Unstable EMS', paper prepared for a Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, March 1993, pp. 19-26.
5. New York Times, 25 April 1990.
6. For a more extensive and formal explanation of the logic, see Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 'Unstable EMS', pp. 27-9.
7. David R. Cameron, 'British Exit, German Voice, French Loyalty: Defection, Domination, and Cooperation in the 1992-93 ERM Crisis', typescript, Yale University, n.d.
8. Cameron, 'British Exit'; David Andrews, 'Scapegoating, Exit Costs, and Credibility: The Politics of Exchange Rate Regimes', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2-5 September 1993.
9. Cameron, 'British Exit'; David Andrews, 'Scapegoating, Exit Costs, and Credibility: The Politics of Exchange Rate Regimes', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2-5 September 1993.
10. See Jacques Melitz, 'Monetary Discipline and Cooperation in the European Monetary System: A Synthesis', in Francesco Giavazzi, Stefano Micossi and Marcus Miller (eds.), The European Monetary System (New York, 1988), p. 58. I am not aware of any cross-national empirical tests of this generalization.
11. Financial Times, 3 August 1992.
12. Ibid., 4 August 1993.
13. Higher inflation elsewhere, in an adjustable-rate system like the ERM in which realignments were not entirely compensating for accumulated inflation differentials, meant that foreign prices rose faster than French prices. Hence the increasing price competitiveness of French output.
14. Financial Times, 20 November 1992.
15. Ibid., 24 September 1992.
16. Ibid., 21 December 1992.
17. Ibid., 6 January 1993.
18. Ibid., 10 July 1993.
19. Ibid., 13 July 1993.
20. Ibid., 31 July 1993.
21. Ibid., 13 August 1993.
22. Ibid., 21 July 1992.
23. Ibid., 1 August 1992.
24. Ibid., 29 August 1992.
25. See Robert O. Keohane, 'The Demand for International Regimes', in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY, 1983), pp. 155-7.
26. See Wayne Sandholtz, 'Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions', Journal of Common Market Studies, forthcoming; also Lisa L. Martin, 'International and Domestic Institutions in the EMU Process', Economics and Politics, 5 (1993), p. 126.
27. See Wayne Sandholtz, 'Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions', Journal of Common Market Studies, forthcoming; also Lisa L. Martin, 'International and Domestic Institutions in the EMU Process', Economics and Politics, 5 (1993), p. 126.
28. I will explain the procedures defined by the Treaty on European Union, despite well-founded doubts that the timetable remains valid after the EMS crisis. My argument will be that the treaty provisions influenced the decision-making of national governments in 1991 and 1992, when the treaty created a set of expectations concerning the course of monetary integration. For my purposes, it is irrelevant that later events altered those expectations.
29. The treaty allows that the criteria are not necessarily strict cut-offs, that member states can take into consideration whether a state is making notable progress toward satisfying the criteria. Member states can also include in their assessments aspects of a country's economic performance that are not covered by the criteria.
30. Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, 'On the Feasibility of a One-speed or Multispeed European Monetary Union', Economics and Politics, 5 (1993), pp. 145-65.
31. Financial Times, 30 December 1992.
32. Ibid., 20 May 1992.
33. Ibid., 1 June 1992.
34. Ibid., 30 April 1993.
35. Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 'Unstable EMS', p. 27.
36. Financial Times, 30 April 1993.
37. Ibid., 29 August 1992.
38. Ibid., 15 September 1992.
39. Ibid., 11 December 1992.
40. According to Bank of Italy governor Carlo Ciampi; ibid., 12 October 1992.
41. Quoted ibid., 1 October 1992.
42. Ibid., 31 July 1993.
43. Ibid., 10 July 1993.
44. Ibid., 23 July 1993.
45. Ibid., 31 July 1993.
46. Ibid.
47. For a discussion of the nature and depth of French and German commitment to EMU, see Wayne Sandholtz, 'Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht', International Organization, 47 (1993).
48. Financial Times, 3 August 1993.
49. David Andrews discusses the implications for exchange rate commitments of differing levels of public support for European integration in 'Scapegoating' (see no. 8); Jeffry Frieden analyzes how French and Italian governments linked EMS exchange rate commitments to the larger process of European integration, to which both French and Italian publics were highly favourable, in 'Making Commitments: France and Italy in the European Monetary System, 1979-1985', in Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden (eds.), The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification (Boulder, CO, 1994).