The coup d'etat in the Gambia, 1994: The end of the first republic

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 97-111

  Saine, Abdoulaye S M ^a  

^a WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0030487954     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X9602300105     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. The history of democracy in The Gambia is tied to the rule and personality of its first president Sir Dawada Kairaba Jawara. Through his leadership, The Gambia gained the reputation of a stable democracy and in the process, Sir Dawada gained international acclaim for his commitment to human rights. His critics contend, however, that he was party to much corruption. See Ansumana Badjie, "The AFPRC Accuses Jawara of Corruption." The Point, 1 August, 1994; John A Wiseman and Elizabeth Vidler, "The July 1994 coup d'etat in The Gambia: End of an Era?" The Round Table, 333, January 1995, 53-63.
2. The history of democracy in The Gambia is tied to the rule and personality of its first president Sir Dawada Kairaba Jawara. Through his leadership, The Gambia gained the reputation of a stable democracy and in the process, Sir Dawada gained international acclaim for his commitment to human rights. His critics contend, however, that he was party to much corruption. See Ansumana Badjie, "The AFPRC Accuses Jawara of Corruption." The Point, 1 August, 1994; John A Wiseman and Elizabeth Vidler, "The July 1994 coup d'etat in The Gambia: End of an Era?" The Round Table, 333, January 1995, 53-63.
3. While The Gambia enjoyed international support and modest economic growth during the Jawara era, her prospects for development were very much in question, if not gloomy, at independence. See B. Rice, Enter Gambia: The Birth of an Improbable Nation (Boston: Boston University Press, 1967).
4. See H. A. Gailey, Historical Dictionary of The Gambia (London: The Scarecrow Press, 1987).
5. See K. M. Suwareh, "Gambian Democracy - Sad Times," West Africa (30 November 1981), 2866; Leon Dash, "Senegalese Troops in Gambia Find Welcome Wearing Thin," Washington Post, 13 August 1981.
6. See K. M. Suwareh, "Gambian Democracy - Sad Times," West Africa (30 November 1981), 2866; Leon Dash, "Senegalese Troops in Gambia Find Welcome Wearing Thin," Washington Post, 13 August 1981.
7. By the mid to late 1970s, distinctions between party and state functions became fused as leadership roles were coupled with those of the state. Sir Dawda became the central force around which all else revolved. Social differentiation based on access to state resources and education began to show in earnest.
8. For details see "Army Coup in Gambia," Daily Observer, 25 July 1994. For the role of U.S. Ambassador Andrew Winter, see Daily Observer, 28 July 1994. Ambassador Winter denied categorically any U.S. involvement in the coup; Baboucar Gaye, "The Coup in Banjul," West Africa, 1-7 August 1994.
9. For details see "Army Coup in Gambia," Daily Observer, 25 July 1994. For the role of U.S. Ambassador Andrew Winter, see Daily Observer, 28 July 1994. Ambassador Winter denied categorically any U.S. involvement in the coup; Baboucar Gaye, "The Coup in Banjul," West Africa, 1-7 August 1994.
10. For details see "Army Coup in Gambia," Daily Observer, 25 July 1994. For the role of U.S. Ambassador Andrew Winter, see Daily Observer, 28 July 1994. Ambassador Winter denied categorically any U.S. involvement in the coup; Baboucar Gaye, "The Coup in Banjul," West Africa, 1-7 August 1994.
11. The literature on coups in Africa is rich and diverse, yet scholars generally agree on these general perspectives. See P. McGowan and T. H. Johnson, "African Military Coup d'etat and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis," Journal of Modern African Studies 22: 1984; R. M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanian Case," in The Political Influence of the Military, ed. A. Perlmutter (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); and S. Decalo, Coup and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).
12. The literature on coups in Africa is rich and diverse, yet scholars generally agree on these general perspectives. See P. McGowan and T. H. Johnson, "African Military Coup d'etat and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis," Journal of Modern African Studies 22: 1984; R. M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanian Case," in The Political Influence of the Military, ed. A. Perlmutter (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); and S. Decalo, Coup and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).
13. The literature on coups in Africa is rich and diverse, yet scholars generally agree on these general perspectives. See P. McGowan and T. H. Johnson, "African Military Coup d'etat and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis," Journal of Modern African Studies 22: 1984; R. M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanian Case," in The Political Influence of the Military, ed. A. Perlmutter (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); and S. Decalo, Coup and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).
14. The AMRC under military rule has been successful at recovering or putting on sale the property(ies) of individuals who defaulted on their loans to the GCDB. The Daily Observer regularly publishes names of individuals whose assets are put on sale. The former Accountant General has been heavily fined for theft, and his properties have been put up for sale.
15. For a detailed analysis of events leading to the coup and of corruption in particular, see "The Anniversary of the July 22 Coup d'Etat: Looking into the Past, the Present and the Future," Foroyaa, 26 July 1995, "S.S. Ceesay's Assets Up for Sale," Daily Observer, 9 August 1994; "Dibba Endorses Army Coup," Daily Observer, 4 August 1994.
16. For a detailed analysis of events leading to the coup and of corruption in particular, see "The Anniversary of the July 22 Coup d'Etat: Looking into the Past, the Present and the Future," Foroyaa, 26 July 1995, "S.S. Ceesay's Assets Up for Sale," Daily Observer, 9 August 1994; "Dibba Endorses Army Coup," Daily Observer, 4 August 1994.
17. For a detailed analysis of events leading to the coup and of corruption in particular, see "The Anniversary of the July 22 Coup d'Etat: Looking into the Past, the Present and the Future," Foroyaa, 26 July 1995, "S.S. Ceesay's Assets Up for Sale," Daily Observer, 9 August 1994; "Dibba Endorses Army Coup," Daily Observer, 4 August 1994.
18. While the coup had causes deriving from institutional and personal interests, its the fundamental origins were to be found in political decay, some civilian corruption, and loss of legitimacy. This view is consistent with that of Samuel Huntington; see Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), 194.
19. The arrests of Lt. Alhaji Kanten and Capt. Kambi bring the number of military officers detained to around thirty. The arrests were made based on Decree No. 3, which empowers the vice-president of the AFPRC, "in the interest of national security," to arrest anyone, including members of the AFPRC. See, "Captain Kambi Detained," Daily Observer, 18 August 1994; Daily Observer, 3 August 1994. Captain Sabally has been sentenced to a nine-year prison term by a military court for his involvement in the January 1995 assassination attempt against Chairman Jammeh.
20. The arrests of Lt. Alhaji Kanten and Capt. Kambi bring the number of military officers detained to around thirty. The arrests were made based on Decree No. 3, which empowers the vice-president of the AFPRC, "in the interest of national security," to arrest anyone, including members of the AFPRC. See, "Captain Kambi Detained," Daily Observer, 18 August 1994; Daily Observer, 3 August 1994. Captain Sabally has been sentenced to a nine-year prison term by a military court for his involvement in the January 1995 assassination attempt against Chairman Jammeh.
21. Interviews with a cross-section of military officers and infantry men suggested wide-spread dissatisfaction with their general living conditions and salaries under the previous regime. Conditions have improved only marginally under the new regime, yet expectations for future material improvement are high. Many civilians I interviewed felt the AFPRC was doing a good job and that Captain Jammeh was honest and sincere.
22. R. D. Sieh and M. M. Secka, "Who is Lt. Yahya Jammeh?" West Africa, 1-7 August 1994, 348. This gives partial support to Samuel Decalo's contention that the frustration, personal motivation, and ambition of military officers must be analyzed as an important cause of coups. Lt. Jammeh, together with four military members of the AFPRC, was promoted to the rank of captain following the 11 November 1994 coup attempt. The army commander, Baboucar Jatta, was also promoted from the rank of major to that of lieutenant colonel.
23. Decalo, Coup and Army Rule in Africa, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 22.
24. Tourism is The Gambia's second largest source of foreign exchange income. The travel ban by the UK Foreign Office was seen as a sanction against the AFPRC, and the consequences were disastrous financially. The 1995 budget speech delivered by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Employment, Bala Jahumpa, then overseeing the Ministry of Finance, provided a detailed analysis of The Gambia's economic crisis. See "The 1995 Budget Speech," Foroyaa, 5 July 1995.
25. Wiseman and Vidler, The July 1994 Coup d'etat, 59.
26. President Abdou Diouf's assurance to the new military leaders that Senegal "will not tolerate anybody attempting subversive or hostile action directed against the government of The Gambia," clearly added to the confidence and success of the coup. Abdoulaye Wade, leader of the "Partie Democratique Senegalais" (PDS) gave his unequivocal support to the AFPRC; Daily Observer, 26 July 1994, Weekend Observer, 5-9 August 1994, The Point, 25 July 1994, and New Citizen, 12 August 1994. Muslim elders also gave their blessings to the new regime. The official opening of the new mosque at the State House in the summer of 1995 by the Imam of Mecca served as an important legitimizing function for the regime. The visit of the Imam was a major symbolic achievement for the AFPRC in a predominantly Islamic country.
27. President Abdou Diouf's assurance to the new military leaders that Senegal "will not tolerate anybody attempting subversive or hostile action directed against the government of The Gambia," clearly added to the confidence and success of the coup. Abdoulaye Wade, leader of the "Partie Democratique Senegalais" (PDS) gave his unequivocal support to the AFPRC; Daily Observer, 26 July 1994, Weekend Observer, 5-9 August 1994, The Point, 25 July 1994, and New Citizen, 12 August 1994. Muslim elders also gave their blessings to the new regime. The official opening of the new mosque at the State House in the summer of 1995 by the Imam of Mecca served as an important legitimizing function for the regime. The visit of the Imam was a major symbolic achievement for the AFPRC in a predominantly Islamic country.
28. President Abdou Diouf's assurance to the new military leaders that Senegal "will not tolerate anybody attempting subversive or hostile action directed against the government of The Gambia," clearly added to the confidence and success of the coup. Abdoulaye Wade, leader of the "Partie Democratique Senegalais" (PDS) gave his unequivocal support to the AFPRC; Daily Observer, 26 July 1994, Weekend Observer, 5-9 August 1994, The Point, 25 July 1994, and New Citizen, 12 August 1994. Muslim elders also gave their blessings to the new regime. The official opening of the new mosque at the State House in the summer of 1995 by the Imam of Mecca served as an important legitimizing function for the regime. The visit of the Imam was a major symbolic achievement for the AFPRC in a predominantly Islamic country.
29. President Abdou Diouf's assurance to the new military leaders that Senegal "will not tolerate anybody attempting subversive or hostile action directed against the government of The Gambia," clearly added to the confidence and success of the coup. Abdoulaye Wade, leader of the "Partie Democratique Senegalais" (PDS) gave his unequivocal support to the AFPRC; Daily Observer, 26 July 1994, Weekend Observer, 5-9 August 1994, The Point, 25 July 1994, and New Citizen, 12 August 1994. Muslim elders also gave their blessings to the new regime. The official opening of the new mosque at the State House in the summer of 1995 by the Imam of Mecca served as an important legitimizing function for the regime. The visit of the Imam was a major symbolic achievement for the AFPRC in a predominantly Islamic country.
30. Sir Dawda contends that the exposure of Gambian serving officers to the military elements from Nigeria and Ghana in the peacekeeping force in Liberia, "precipitated the military coup that ended his three-decade rule." This assertion is consistent with Robert Prices's contagion thesis; that is, the tendency of military officers to imitate coup leaders in nearby countries. See Daily Observer, 1 August 1995. This is, however, a secondary factor.
31. Bakary Dabo was accused of masterminding the November 1994 coup and fled to Senegal. In the meantime, Alieu Ngum became permanent secretary at the Ministry of Finance, and Momodou "Clark" Bajo Governor of the Central Bank, New Citizen, 7 July 1995, 10.
32. At a mass celebration at the Independence Stadium on 22 July, Chairman Jammeh reassured Gambians that "the timetable for a return to democratic rule in July 1996 is to be fully honored by the AFPRC government"; Daily Observer, 25 July 1995. Since coming to power, the AFPRC has rehabilitated The Radio Gambia studios. Work has also started at Banjul International Airport and a hospital at Farrafenni.
33. Mrs. Haidara rejected the official postmortem report; "My Husband was Never a High-blood Patient," The Point, 8 June 1995.
34. Since its assumption of power in July 1994, the AFPRC has come under much attack for its human rights record. The deportation of Kenneth Best, Managing Director of the Daily Observer, the trial of Pap Saine and two other reporters of The Point, the arbitrary arrest and release of ex-government officials and ex-ministers, and the passage of Decree No. 45 issued in June 1995 that gave powers of search, seizure, and interference to national security personnel, have been demonstrated by international human rights bodies and advocates. See, "Revisit Decree 45: Release Political Detainees," The Point, 14 August 1995; "Decree 45, Described As Most Repressive," Weekend Observer, 18-20 August 1995; Bar Calls for Democracy," West Africa, 4 December 1994; and "Human Rights Abuses," West Africa, 5-11 December 1994. The regime contends that its human rights record is better than the previous government's. Yet, many of those individuals arrested in October 1995 remain in prison.
35. Since its assumption of power in July 1994, the AFPRC has come under much attack for its human rights record. The deportation of Kenneth Best, Managing Director of the Daily Observer, the trial of Pap Saine and two other reporters of The Point, the arbitrary arrest and release of ex-government officials and ex-ministers, and the passage of Decree No. 45 issued in June 1995 that gave powers of search, seizure, and interference to national security personnel, have been demonstrated by international human rights bodies and advocates. See, "Revisit Decree 45: Release Political Detainees," The Point, 14 August 1995; "Decree 45, Described As Most Repressive," Weekend Observer, 18-20 August 1995; Bar Calls for Democracy," West Africa, 4 December 1994; and "Human Rights Abuses," West Africa, 5-11 December 1994. The regime contends that its human rights record is better than the previous government's. Yet, many of those individuals arrested in October 1995 remain in prison.
36. Since its assumption of power in July 1994, the AFPRC has come under much attack for its human rights record. The deportation of Kenneth Best, Managing Director of the Daily Observer, the trial of Pap Saine and two other reporters of The Point, the arbitrary arrest and release of ex-government officials and ex-ministers, and the passage of Decree No. 45 issued in June 1995 that gave powers of search, seizure, and interference to national security personnel, have been demonstrated by international human rights bodies and advocates. See, "Revisit Decree 45: Release Political Detainees," The Point, 14 August 1995; "Decree 45, Described As Most Repressive," Weekend Observer, 18-20 August 1995; Bar Calls for Democracy," West Africa, 4 December 1994; and "Human Rights Abuses," West Africa, 5-11 December 1994. The regime contends that its human rights record is better than the previous government's. Yet, many of those individuals arrested in October 1995 remain in prison.
37. Since its assumption of power in July 1994, the AFPRC has come under much attack for its human rights record. The deportation of Kenneth Best, Managing Director of the Daily Observer, the trial of Pap Saine and two other reporters of The Point, the arbitrary arrest and release of ex-government officials and ex-ministers, and the passage of Decree No. 45 issued in June 1995 that gave powers of search, seizure, and interference to national security personnel, have been demonstrated by international human rights bodies and advocates. See, "Revisit Decree 45: Release Political Detainees," The Point, 14 August 1995; "Decree 45, Described As Most Repressive," Weekend Observer, 18-20 August 1995; Bar Calls for Democracy," West Africa, 4 December 1994; and "Human Rights Abuses," West Africa, 5-11 December 1994. The regime contends that its human rights record is better than the previous government's. Yet, many of those individuals arrested in October 1995 remain in prison.
38. Since its assumption of power in July 1994, the AFPRC has come under much attack for its human rights record. The deportation of Kenneth Best, Managing Director of the Daily Observer, the trial of Pap Saine and two other reporters of The Point, the arbitrary arrest and release of ex-government officials and ex-ministers, and the passage of Decree No. 45 issued in June 1995 that gave powers of search, seizure, and interference to national security personnel, have been demonstrated by international human rights bodies and advocates. See, "Revisit Decree 45: Release Political Detainees," The Point, 14 August 1995; "Decree 45, Described As Most Repressive," Weekend Observer, 18-20 August 1995; Bar Calls for Democracy," West Africa, 4 December 1994; and "Human Rights Abuses," West Africa, 5-11 December 1994. The regime contends that its human rights record is better than the previous government's. Yet, many of those individuals arrested in October 1995 remain in prison.
39. Since its assumption of power in July 1994, the AFPRC has come under much attack for its human rights record. The deportation of Kenneth Best, Managing Director of the Daily Observer, the trial of Pap Saine and two other reporters of The Point, the arbitrary arrest and release of ex-government officials and ex-ministers, and the passage of Decree No. 45 issued in June 1995 that gave powers of search, seizure, and interference to national security personnel, have been demonstrated by international human rights bodies and advocates. See, "Revisit Decree 45: Release Political Detainees," The Point, 14 August 1995; "Decree 45, Described As Most Repressive," Weekend Observer, 18-20 August 1995; Bar Calls for Democracy," West Africa, 4 December 1994; and "Human Rights Abuses," West Africa, 5-11 December 1994. The regime contends that its human rights record is better than the previous government's. Yet, many of those individuals arrested in October 1995 remain in prison.
40. Ex-president Jawara now resides at his Hayward Heath Home in England from which he has made visits to the U.S., Ghana, and Senegal to drum up support for the ouster of the AFPRC regime.
41. It is alleged that 16.8 m barrels of oil had been drilled from Nigeria on behalf of The Gambia government. Although this could have yielded from $168 million to $540 million, The Gambia received only $2.8 million. The commission is to reveal what happened to the rest of the money. Many ex-politicians and civil-servants are implicated. See "The Oil Scandal: The Equation," Foroyaa, 13 December 1994, and "Who Will Account for the Money: The Ex-Ministers Face Commission of Enquiry," Foroyaa, 22 December 1994. Massive fraud was discovered at GAMTEL, Gambia's telephone company, and the managing director has been retired. Some ex-Ministers have had to repay taxes with interest.
42. It is alleged that 16.8 m barrels of oil had been drilled from Nigeria on behalf of The Gambia government. Although this could have yielded from $168 million to $540 million, The Gambia received only $2.8 million. The commission is to reveal what happened to the rest of the money. Many ex-politicians and civil-servants are implicated. See "The Oil Scandal: The Equation," Foroyaa, 13 December 1994, and "Who Will Account for the Money: The Ex-Ministers Face Commission of Enquiry," Foroyaa, 22 December 1994. Massive fraud was discovered at GAMTEL, Gambia's telephone company, and the managing director has been retired. Some ex-Ministers have had to repay taxes with interest.
43. EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter, 1995, 18 and 19. EIU (The Economist Intelligence Unit). Dartford, Kent: Redhouse Press Ltd.