Democracies don't fight: A case of the wrong research agenda?

Review of International Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 275-299

  Macmillan, John ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0030487309     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0260210500118558     Document Type: Review

References (115)

1. The literature uses the terms 'liberal state', 'democracy', 'liberal democracy' and 'libertarian' state to signify virtually the same subject. I shall use the term' liberal state', though when discussing particular authors shall use the term they themselves employ.
2. A. Mintz and N. Geva, 'Why Don't Democracies Fight Each Other: An Experimental Study', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37:3 (Sept. 1993), p. 484.
3. For recent articles critical of the claim see J. J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security, 15:1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; K. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security, 18:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; R. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other"', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (July 1994); C. Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; D. Spiro, 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86. J. M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125, is sympathetic to the claim that there is a positive relationship between democracies and peace, accredits this to liberalism, though maintains that the relationship is manifest only in inter-liberal state relations.
4. For recent articles critical of the claim see J. J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security, 15:1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; K. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security, 18:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; R. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other"', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (July 1994); C. Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; D. Spiro, 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86. J. M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125, is sympathetic to the claim that there is a positive relationship between democracies and peace, accredits this to liberalism, though maintains that the relationship is manifest only in inter-liberal state relations.
5. For recent articles critical of the claim see J. J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security, 15:1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; K. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security, 18:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; R. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other"', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (July 1994); C. Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; D. Spiro, 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86. J. M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125, is sympathetic to the claim that there is a positive relationship between democracies and peace, accredits this to liberalism, though maintains that the relationship is manifest only in inter-liberal state relations.
6. For recent articles critical of the claim see J. J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security, 15:1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; K. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security, 18:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; R. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other"', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (July 1994); C. Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; D. Spiro, 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86. J. M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125, is sympathetic to the claim that there is a positive relationship between democracies and peace, accredits this to liberalism, though maintains that the relationship is manifest only in inter-liberal state relations.
7. For recent articles critical of the claim see J. J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security, 15:1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; K. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security, 18:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; R. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other"', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (July 1994); C. Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; D. Spiro, 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86. J. M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125, is sympathetic to the claim that there is a positive relationship between democracies and peace, accredits this to liberalism, though maintains that the relationship is manifest only in inter-liberal state relations.
8. For recent articles critical of the claim see J. J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security, 15:1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; K. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security, 18:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; R. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other"', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (July 1994); C. Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; D. Spiro, 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86. J. M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125, is sympathetic to the claim that there is a positive relationship between democracies and peace, accredits this to liberalism, though maintains that the relationship is manifest only in inter-liberal state relations.
9. I borrow the term 'pacificism' from M. Ceadel, Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford, 1987). It refers to the belief that peace is both possible and desirable, and is thus similar to 'eirenicism'.
10. M. D. Babst, 'A Force for Peace', Industrial Research, April 1972, pp. 55-8; M. Small and J. D. Singer, 'The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 1:1 (1976), R. J. Rummel 'Libertarianism and International Violence', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27:1 (1983), pp 27-71; M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:3 (1983), pp. 205-35; M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:4 (1983), pp. 323-53.
11. M. D. Babst, 'A Force for Peace', Industrial Research, April 1972, pp. 55-8; M. Small and J. D. Singer, 'The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 1:1 (1976), R. J. Rummel 'Libertarianism and International Violence', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27:1 (1983), pp 27-71; M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:3 (1983), pp. 205-35; M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:4 (1983), pp. 323-53.
12. M. D. Babst, 'A Force for Peace', Industrial Research, April 1972, pp. 55-8; M. Small and J. D. Singer, 'The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 1:1 (1976), R. J. Rummel 'Libertarianism and International Violence', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27:1 (1983), pp 27-71; M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:3 (1983), pp. 205-35; M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:4 (1983), pp. 323-53.
13. M. D. Babst, 'A Force for Peace', Industrial Research, April 1972, pp. 55-8; M. Small and J. D. Singer, 'The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 1:1 (1976), R. J. Rummel 'Libertarianism and International Violence', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27:1 (1983), pp 27-71; M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:3 (1983), pp. 205-35; M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:4 (1983), pp. 323-53.
14. M. D. Babst, 'A Force for Peace', Industrial Research, April 1972, pp. 55-8; M. Small and J. D. Singer, 'The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 1:1 (1976), R. J. Rummel 'Libertarianism and International Violence', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27:1 (1983), pp 27-71; M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:3 (1983), pp. 205-35; M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:4 (1983), pp. 323-53.
15. Rummel, 'Libertarianism', p. 28.
16. Doyle, 'Kant, Part 1', pp. 213, 225, 223.
17. There are a number of scholars besides Rummel who have considered different aspects of the relationship between liberal states and peace. J. S. Levy, 'Domestic Politics and War', Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18:3 (1988), pp. 653-73, has, as will be discussed below, drawn attention to the differences between the way historians and political scientists study the question of war. R. L. Schweller, 'Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?', World Politics, 44:2 (1992), pp. 235-69, has developed the interesting argument that democracies do not wage preventive war as this is inconsistent with liberal principles. A merit of this piece is that Schweller recognizes that liberal democracies recognize norms applicable beyond inter-liberal state relations. D. P. Forsythe, Human Rights and Peace (Lincoln and London, 1993), has developed an approach which synthesizes the variables of rights and power in explaining the breakdown of peace, and supports his case with a number of empirical case-studies. This argument is, however, in the context of the claim that democracies don't fight each other. C. Lynch, 'Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral Guidance in International Law', Ethics and International Affairs, 8 (1994) directed a discussion of Kantian ethics to the relationship between liberal states and peace.
18. There are a number of scholars besides Rummel who have considered different aspects of the relationship between liberal states and peace. J. S. Levy, 'Domestic Politics and War', Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18:3 (1988), pp. 653-73, has, as will be discussed below, drawn attention to the differences between the way historians and political scientists study the question of war. R. L. Schweller, 'Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?', World Politics, 44:2 (1992), pp. 235-69, has developed the interesting argument that democracies do not wage preventive war as this is inconsistent with liberal principles. A merit of this piece is that Schweller recognizes that liberal democracies recognize norms applicable beyond inter-liberal state relations. D. P. Forsythe, Human Rights and Peace (Lincoln and London, 1993), has developed an approach which synthesizes the variables of rights and power in explaining the breakdown of peace, and supports his case with a number of empirical case-studies. This argument is, however, in the context of the claim that democracies don't fight each other. C. Lynch, 'Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral Guidance in International Law', Ethics and International Affairs, 8 (1994) directed a discussion of Kantian ethics to the relationship between liberal states and peace.
19. There are a number of scholars besides Rummel who have considered different aspects of the relationship between liberal states and peace. J. S. Levy, 'Domestic Politics and War', Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18:3 (1988), pp. 653-73, has, as will be discussed below, drawn attention to the differences between the way historians and political scientists study the question of war. R. L. Schweller, 'Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?', World Politics, 44:2 (1992), pp. 235-69, has developed the interesting argument that democracies do not wage preventive war as this is inconsistent with liberal principles. A merit of this piece is that Schweller recognizes that liberal democracies recognize norms applicable beyond inter-liberal state relations. D. P. Forsythe, Human Rights and Peace (Lincoln and London, 1993), has developed an approach which synthesizes the variables of rights and power in explaining the breakdown of peace, and supports his case with a number of empirical case-studies. This argument is, however, in the context of the claim that democracies don't fight each other. C. Lynch, 'Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral Guidance in International Law', Ethics and International Affairs, 8 (1994) directed a discussion of Kantian ethics to the relationship between liberal states and peace.
20. There are a number of scholars besides Rummel who have considered different aspects of the relationship between liberal states and peace. J. S. Levy, 'Domestic Politics and War', Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18:3 (1988), pp. 653-73, has, as will be discussed below, drawn attention to the differences between the way historians and political scientists study the question of war. R. L. Schweller, 'Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?', World Politics, 44:2 (1992), pp. 235-69, has developed the interesting argument that democracies do not wage preventive war as this is inconsistent with liberal principles. A merit of this piece is that Schweller recognizes that liberal democracies recognize norms applicable beyond inter-liberal state relations. D. P. Forsythe, Human Rights and Peace (Lincoln and London, 1993), has developed an approach which synthesizes the variables of rights and power in explaining the breakdown of peace, and supports his case with a number of empirical case-studies. This argument is, however, in the context of the claim that democracies don't fight each other. C. Lynch, 'Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral Guidance in International Law', Ethics and International Affairs, 8 (1994) directed a discussion of Kantian ethics to the relationship between liberal states and peace.
21. Besides the works cited above in notes 2 and 3 see, for instance, C. T. Morgan and S. Howard Campbell, 'Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35:2 (June 1991), pp. 187-211; C. T. Morgan and V. Schwebach, 'Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?', International Interactions, 17:3 (1992), pp. 305-20; N. Gleditsch, 'Democracy and Peace', Journal of Peace Research, 29:4 (1992), pp. 369-76; H. Starr, 'Why Don't Democracies Fight One Another? Evaluating the Theory-Findings Feedback Loop', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 14:4 (1992), pp. 41-59; J. L. Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies: Rare, or Nonexistent?', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 251-76; B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1993).
22. Besides the works cited above in notes 2 and 3 see, for instance, C. T. Morgan and S. Howard Campbell, 'Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35:2 (June 1991), pp. 187-211; C. T. Morgan and V. Schwebach, 'Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?', International Interactions, 17:3 (1992), pp. 305-20; N. Gleditsch, 'Democracy and Peace', Journal of Peace Research, 29:4 (1992), pp. 369-76; H. Starr, 'Why Don't Democracies Fight One Another? Evaluating the Theory-Findings Feedback Loop', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 14:4 (1992), pp. 41-59; J. L. Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies: Rare, or Nonexistent?', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 251-76; B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1993).
23. Besides the works cited above in notes 2 and 3 see, for instance, C. T. Morgan and S. Howard Campbell, 'Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35:2 (June 1991), pp. 187-211; C. T. Morgan and V. Schwebach, 'Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?', International Interactions, 17:3 (1992), pp. 305-20; N. Gleditsch, 'Democracy and Peace', Journal of Peace Research, 29:4 (1992), pp. 369-76; H. Starr, 'Why Don't Democracies Fight One Another? Evaluating the Theory-Findings Feedback Loop', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 14:4 (1992), pp. 41-59; J. L. Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies: Rare, or Nonexistent?', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 251-76; B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1993).
24. Besides the works cited above in notes 2 and 3 see, for instance, C. T. Morgan and S. Howard Campbell, 'Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35:2 (June 1991), pp. 187-211; C. T. Morgan and V. Schwebach, 'Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?', International Interactions, 17:3 (1992), pp. 305-20; N. Gleditsch, 'Democracy and Peace', Journal of Peace Research, 29:4 (1992), pp. 369-76; H. Starr, 'Why Don't Democracies Fight One Another? Evaluating the Theory-Findings Feedback Loop', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 14:4 (1992), pp. 41-59; J. L. Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies: Rare, or Nonexistent?', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 251-76; B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1993).
25. Besides the works cited above in notes 2 and 3 see, for instance, C. T. Morgan and S. Howard Campbell, 'Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35:2 (June 1991), pp. 187-211; C. T. Morgan and V. Schwebach, 'Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?', International Interactions, 17:3 (1992), pp. 305-20; N. Gleditsch, 'Democracy and Peace', Journal of Peace Research, 29:4 (1992), pp. 369-76; H. Starr, 'Why Don't Democracies Fight One Another? Evaluating the Theory-Findings Feedback Loop', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 14:4 (1992), pp. 41-59; J. L. Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies: Rare, or Nonexistent?', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 251-76; B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1993).
26. Besides the works cited above in notes 2 and 3 see, for instance, C. T. Morgan and S. Howard Campbell, 'Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35:2 (June 1991), pp. 187-211; C. T. Morgan and V. Schwebach, 'Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?', International Interactions, 17:3 (1992), pp. 305-20; N. Gleditsch, 'Democracy and Peace', Journal of Peace Research, 29:4 (1992), pp. 369-76; H. Starr, 'Why Don't Democracies Fight One Another? Evaluating the Theory-Findings Feedback Loop', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 14:4 (1992), pp. 41-59; J. L. Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies: Rare, or Nonexistent?', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 251-76; B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1993).
27. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 32.
28. F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Harmondsworth, 1992), p. 263, my italics.
29. S. P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK, 1991), p. 29.
30. K. von Hippel, 'Democratisation as Foreign Policy: the Case of Haiti', in The World Today, 51:1 (Jan. 1995), pp. 11-14.
31. C. L. de Secondat de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge, 1989 [1748]), pp. 132, 143, 338; I. Kant, Perpetual Peace, in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant's Political Philosophy (Cambridge, 1991 [1795]); J. A. Schumpeter, 'The Sociology of Imperialism', in Imperialism and Social Classes (New York, 1955 [1919]). Doyle discusses Schumpeter at some length in M. V. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (Dec. 1986), pp. 1151-69.
32. C. L. de Secondat de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge, 1989 [1748]), pp. 132, 143, 338; I. Kant, Perpetual Peace, in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant's Political Philosophy (Cambridge, 1991 [1795]); J. A. Schumpeter, 'The Sociology of Imperialism', in Imperialism and Social Classes (New York, 1955 [1919]). Doyle discusses Schumpeter at some length in M. V. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (Dec. 1986), pp. 1151-69.
33. C. L. de Secondat de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge, 1989 [1748]), pp. 132, 143, 338; I. Kant, Perpetual Peace, in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant's Political Philosophy (Cambridge, 1991 [1795]); J. A. Schumpeter, 'The Sociology of Imperialism', in Imperialism and Social Classes (New York, 1955 [1919]). Doyle discusses Schumpeter at some length in M. V. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (Dec. 1986), pp. 1151-69.
34. C. L. de Secondat de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge, 1989 [1748]), pp. 132, 143, 338; I. Kant, Perpetual Peace, in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant's Political Philosophy (Cambridge, 1991 [1795]); J. A. Schumpeter, 'The Sociology of Imperialism', in Imperialism and Social Classes (New York, 1955 [1919]). Doyle discusses Schumpeter at some length in M. V. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (Dec. 1986), pp. 1151-69.
35. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 30, cites ch. 4 of his own book; S. A. Bremer, 'Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36:2 (1992), pp. 309-41; and Z. Maoz and N. Abdolali, 'Regime Types and International Conflict', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33:1 (1989), pp. 3-35. One of Maoz and Abdolali's general conclusions, for instance, is that 'there is no relationship between regime type and conflict involvement at the national (or polity) level of analysis. This finding is extremely robust; it holds regardless of the indexes of regime type used, the aggregation of specific indexes to overall regime categories, the indexes of conflict involvement, and the breakdown of the temporal domain into subperiods' (p. 30). Qualitative factors are, however, completely neglected and as such there is no indication of how the incidence of violence by liberal states is related to any normative framework. See also Mintz and Geva, 'Why Don't Democracies . . .?'.
36. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 30, cites ch. 4 of his own book; S. A. Bremer, 'Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36:2 (1992), pp. 309-41; and Z. Maoz and N. Abdolali, 'Regime Types and International Conflict', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33:1 (1989), pp. 3-35. One of Maoz and Abdolali's general conclusions, for instance, is that 'there is no relationship between regime type and conflict involvement at the national (or polity) level of analysis. This finding is extremely robust; it holds regardless of the indexes of regime type used, the aggregation of specific indexes to overall regime categories, the indexes of conflict involvement, and the breakdown of the temporal domain into subperiods' (p. 30). Qualitative factors are, however, completely neglected and as such there is no indication of how the incidence of violence by liberal states is related to any normative framework. See also Mintz and Geva, 'Why Don't Democracies . . .?'.
37. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 30, cites ch. 4 of his own book; S. A. Bremer, 'Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36:2 (1992), pp. 309-41; and Z. Maoz and N. Abdolali, 'Regime Types and International Conflict', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33:1 (1989), pp. 3-35. One of Maoz and Abdolali's general conclusions, for instance, is that 'there is no relationship between regime type and conflict involvement at the national (or polity) level of analysis. This finding is extremely robust; it holds regardless of the indexes of regime type used, the aggregation of specific indexes to overall regime categories, the indexes of conflict involvement, and the breakdown of the temporal domain into subperiods' (p. 30). Qualitative factors are, however, completely neglected and as such there is no indication of how the incidence of violence by liberal states is related to any normative framework. See also Mintz and Geva, 'Why Don't Democracies . . .?'.
38. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 30, cites ch. 4 of his own book; S. A. Bremer, 'Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36:2 (1992), pp. 309-41; and Z. Maoz and N. Abdolali, 'Regime Types and International Conflict', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33:1 (1989), pp. 3-35. One of Maoz and Abdolali's general conclusions, for instance, is that 'there is no relationship between regime type and conflict involvement at the national (or polity) level of analysis. This finding is extremely robust; it holds regardless of the indexes of regime type used, the aggregation of specific indexes to overall regime categories, the indexes of conflict involvement, and the breakdown of the temporal domain into subperiods' (p. 30). Qualitative factors are, however, completely neglected and as such there is no indication of how the incidence of violence by liberal states is related to any normative framework. See also Mintz and Geva, 'Why Don't Democracies . . .?'.
39. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 30-1, 38.
40. Doyle, 'Kant, Part 1', p. 230.
41. Ibid., p. 225; see also Doyle, 'Kant, Part 2'; Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', pp. 1156-7; and M. W. Doyle, 'Liberalism and International Relations', in R. Beiner and W. J. Booth, Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy (London, 1993), pp. 176-7.
42. Ibid., p. 225; see also Doyle, 'Kant, Part 2'; Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', pp. 1156-7; and M. W. Doyle, 'Liberalism and International Relations', in R. Beiner and W. J. Booth, Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy (London, 1993), pp. 176-7.
43. Ibid., p. 225; see also Doyle, 'Kant, Part 2'; Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', pp. 1156-7; and M. W. Doyle, 'Liberalism and International Relations', in R. Beiner and W. J. Booth, Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy (London, 1993), pp. 176-7.
44. Ibid., p. 225; see also Doyle, 'Kant, Part 2'; Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', pp. 1156-7; and M. W. Doyle, 'Liberalism and International Relations', in R. Beiner and W. J. Booth, Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy (London, 1993), pp. 176-7.
45. To be fair to Doyle, in his most recent work he does qualify his claim that 'peaceful restraint only seems to work in the liberals' relations with other liberals' with the qualification that relations with non-liberals do appear to be 'more complicated'. Doyle, 'Liberalism and International Relations', pp. 176-7. In his 'Kant, Part 2' he discusses the relations of liberal states with non-liberal states at some length.
46. See the heading of Doyle's lists of liberal states in Doyle, 'Kant, Part 1', p. 209, and Doyle, 'Liberalism and International Relations', p. 193.
47. See the heading of Doyle's lists of liberal states in Doyle, 'Kant, Part 1', p. 209, and Doyle, 'Liberalism and International Relations', p. 193.
48. H. Suganami, Reflections on the Causes of War (provisional title, Oxford, 1996), ch. 3; Cohen, 'Pacific Unions', p. 214.
49. H. Suganami, Reflections on the Causes of War (provisional title, Oxford, 1996), ch. 3; Cohen, 'Pacific Unions', p. 214.
50. See B. Russett, 'And Yet It Moves', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-84, pp. 171-2 and n.16 therein; see also Z. Maoz and B. Russett, 'Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace', American Political Science Review, 87:3 (Sept. 1993), pp. 624-38.
51. See B. Russett, 'And Yet It Moves', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-84, pp. 171-2 and n.16 therein; see also Z. Maoz and B. Russett, 'Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace', American Political Science Review, 87:3 (Sept. 1993), pp. 624-38.
52. B. Russett, J. L. Ray and R. Cohen, 'Raymond Cohen on Pacific Unions: A Response and a Reply', Review of International Studies, 21:3 (July 1995), pp. 319-25, p. 325.
53. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions'; Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future'; Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies'; J. MacMillan, 'Liberalism and Peace', D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford (1991); Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 85; Spiro, 'Insignificance of Liberal Peace'. Forsythe, Human Rights, pp. 27-31, draws on Mueller's 'developmentalism' enunciated in J. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday (New York, 1989). The argument is in two parts: first, that all developed states (authoritarian as well as democratic) know that even a major conventional war would not be in their interests, and second that there is an increasing moral revulsion against war among such states which is a consequence of a broad historical learning process. Russett and Spiro continue their debate upon statistical methods in 'Correspondence: The Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-84.
54. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions'; Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future'; Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies'; J. MacMillan, 'Liberalism and Peace', D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford (1991); Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 85; Spiro, 'Insignificance of Liberal Peace'. Forsythe, Human Rights, pp. 27-31, draws on Mueller's 'developmentalism' enunciated in J. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday (New York, 1989). The argument is in two parts: first, that all developed states (authoritarian as well as democratic) know that even a major conventional war would not be in their interests, and second that there is an increasing moral revulsion against war among such states which is a consequence of a broad historical learning process. Russett and Spiro continue their debate upon statistical methods in 'Correspondence: The Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-84.
55. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions'; Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future'; Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies'; J. MacMillan, 'Liberalism and Peace', D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford (1991); Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 85; Spiro, 'Insignificance of Liberal Peace'. Forsythe, Human Rights, pp. 27-31, draws on Mueller's 'developmentalism' enunciated in J. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday (New York, 1989). The argument is in two parts: first, that all developed states (authoritarian as well as democratic) know that even a major conventional war would not be in their interests, and second that there is an increasing moral revulsion against war among such states which is a consequence of a broad historical learning process. Russett and Spiro continue their debate upon statistical methods in 'Correspondence: The Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-84.
56. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions'; Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future'; Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies'; J. MacMillan, 'Liberalism and Peace', D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford (1991); Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 85; Spiro, 'Insignificance of Liberal Peace'. Forsythe, Human Rights, pp. 27-31, draws on Mueller's 'developmentalism' enunciated in J. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday (New York, 1989). The argument is in two parts: first, that all developed states (authoritarian as well as democratic) know that even a major conventional war would not be in their interests, and second that there is an increasing moral revulsion against war among such states which is a consequence of a broad historical learning process. Russett and Spiro continue their debate upon statistical methods in 'Correspondence: The Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-84.
57. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions'; Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future'; Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies'; J. MacMillan, 'Liberalism and Peace', D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford (1991); Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 85; Spiro, 'Insignificance of Liberal Peace'. Forsythe, Human Rights, pp. 27-31, draws on Mueller's 'developmentalism' enunciated in J. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday (New York, 1989). The argument is in two parts: first, that all developed states (authoritarian as well as democratic) know that even a major conventional war would not be in their interests, and second that there is an increasing moral revulsion against war among such states which is a consequence of a broad historical learning process. Russett and Spiro continue their debate upon statistical methods in 'Correspondence: The Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-84.
58. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions'; Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future'; Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies'; J. MacMillan, 'Liberalism and Peace', D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford (1991); Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 85; Spiro, 'Insignificance of Liberal Peace'. Forsythe, Human Rights, pp. 27-31, draws on Mueller's 'developmentalism' enunciated in J. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday (New York, 1989). The argument is in two parts: first, that all developed states (authoritarian as well as democratic) know that even a major conventional war would not be in their interests, and second that there is an increasing moral revulsion against war among such states which is a consequence of a broad historical learning process. Russett and Spiro continue their debate upon statistical methods in 'Correspondence: The Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-84.
59. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions'; Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future'; Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies'; J. MacMillan, 'Liberalism and Peace', D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford (1991); Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 85; Spiro, 'Insignificance of Liberal Peace'. Forsythe, Human Rights, pp. 27-31, draws on Mueller's 'developmentalism' enunciated in J. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday (New York, 1989). The argument is in two parts: first, that all developed states (authoritarian as well as democratic) know that even a major conventional war would not be in their interests, and second that there is an increasing moral revulsion against war among such states which is a consequence of a broad historical learning process. Russett and Spiro continue their debate upon statistical methods in 'Correspondence: The Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-84.
60. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions'; Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future'; Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies'; J. MacMillan, 'Liberalism and Peace', D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford (1991); Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 85; Spiro, 'Insignificance of Liberal Peace'. Forsythe, Human Rights, pp. 27-31, draws on Mueller's 'developmentalism' enunciated in J. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday (New York, 1989). The argument is in two parts: first, that all developed states (authoritarian as well as democratic) know that even a major conventional war would not be in their interests, and second that there is an increasing moral revulsion against war among such states which is a consequence of a broad historical learning process. Russett and Spiro continue their debate upon statistical methods in 'Correspondence: The Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-84.
61. Cohen, 'Pacific Unions'; Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future'; Ray, 'Wars Between Democracies'; J. MacMillan, 'Liberalism and Peace', D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford (1991); Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 85; Spiro, 'Insignificance of Liberal Peace'. Forsythe, Human Rights, pp. 27-31, draws on Mueller's 'developmentalism' enunciated in J. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday (New York, 1989). The argument is in two parts: first, that all developed states (authoritarian as well as democratic) know that even a major conventional war would not be in their interests, and second that there is an increasing moral revulsion against war among such states which is a consequence of a broad historical learning process. Russett and Spiro continue their debate upon statistical methods in 'Correspondence: The Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-84.
62. Owen, 'How Liberalism'.
63. Doyle, 'Kant, Part 1', p. 216.
64. R. J. B. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 123, 132, 134. In fact, the situation is more complicated, for, by Italian standards, the leaders concerned would have regarded themselves as being liberals. In the Italian context, however, this led to an especial concern for certain territorial acquisitions in the interests of the completion of the Risorgimento. This indicates further questions for research in this area regarding the diversity of the liberal traditions in various national contexts and also that there is a degree of tension in the liberal tradition between universalism and particularism.
65. Doyle, 'Kant, Part 1', p. 216.
66. G. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile 1882-1899 (Edinburgh, 1965), pp. 342, 349; J. Gallagher, R. Robinson and A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1963), p. 375.
67. G. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile 1882-1899 (Edinburgh, 1965), pp. 342, 349; J. Gallagher, R. Robinson and A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1963), p. 375.
68. See for example A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1954), p. 381; P. M. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy (London, 1981), p. 112; J. Joll, Europe since 1870 (Harmondsworth, 1985), p. 98.
69. See for example A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1954), p. 381; P. M. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy (London, 1981), p. 112; J. Joll, Europe since 1870 (Harmondsworth, 1985), p. 98.
70. See for example A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1954), p. 381; P. M. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy (London, 1981), p. 112; J. Joll, Europe since 1870 (Harmondsworth, 1985), p. 98.
71. See Cohen, 'Pacific Unions', p. 219, and Layne, 'Kant or Cant', pp. 28-33. Their interpretation of the conflict in terms of superior British power probably overplays the assumption of 'rationality'. They overlook the possibility that the parties could have been pushed to war through concern for other factors such as credibility, honour, or domestic political pressures.
72. See Cohen, 'Pacific Unions', p. 219, and Layne, 'Kant or Cant', pp. 28-33. Their interpretation of the conflict in terms of superior British power probably overplays the assumption of 'rationality'. They overlook the possibility that the parties could have been pushed to war through concern for other factors such as credibility, honour, or domestic political pressures.
73. C. Holbraad, The Concert of Europe (Harlow, 1970), p. 145.
74. B. Bueno de Mesquita and D. Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven and London, 1992), pp. 160-4.
75. See J. MacMillan, On Liberal Peace (London, forthcoming) for the development of this approach.
76. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace being the paradigmatic case.
77. J. Dumbrell, Vietnam: American Involvement at Home and Abroad, BAAS Pamphlets in American Studies (Keele, 1992).
78. See MacMillan, 'Liberalism and Peace' and On Liberal Peace.
79. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', p. 1157, and 'Liberalism and International Relations', p. 186.
80. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', p. 1157, and 'Liberalism and International Relations', p. 186.
81. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 22; my italics.
82. Although I do discuss the implications of Kant's political philosophy for the 'democracies don't fight' debate, and the way in which Kant's thought has been interpreted by liberal peace theorists, in 'A Kantian Protest against the Peculiar Discourse of Inter-Liberal State Peace', Millennium, 24:3 (Winter 1995), pp. 549-62.
83. A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York, 1990), book 3, ch. 22, p. 269. Montesquieu explicitly referred to the dangers presented by conquest to the domestic constitution of a democracy: 'If a democracy conquers a people in order to govern it as a subject, it will expose its own liberty, because it will entrust too much power to the magistrates whom it sends out to the conquered state'. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, p. 143.
84. A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York, 1990), book 3, ch. 22, p. 269. Montesquieu explicitly referred to the dangers presented by conquest to the domestic constitution of a democracy: 'If a democracy conquers a people in order to govern it as a subject, it will expose its own liberty, because it will entrust too much power to the magistrates whom it sends out to the conquered state'. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, p. 143.
85. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1973), p. 379.
86. Doyle, 'Kant, Part 1', p. 232.
87. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 30, 39.
88. Doyle, 'Kant, Part 1', p. 230.
89. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 31.
90. Ibid., pp 32-3; Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', p. 1161.
91. Ibid., pp 32-3; Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', p. 1161.
92. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason, p. 160.
93. Ibid., p. 158. Z. Maoz and B. Russett adopt a broadly similar explanatory framework in 'Normative and Structural Causes'.
94. Ibid., p. 158. Z. Maoz and B. Russett adopt a broadly similar explanatory framework in 'Normative and Structural Causes'.
95. I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals', in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge, 1991), p. 174.
96. C. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, 1979), p. 57.
97. C. Brewin, 'The Duties of Liberal States', in C. Navari (ed.), The Condition of States (Milton Keynes, 1991), p. 207.
98. 558 H. C. Deb., 1905, 3 November 1956.
99. J. S. Mill, The Principles of Political Economy (London, 1948), p. 120.
100. Doyle, 'Kant, Part 1', pp. 231-2.
101. Doyle, 'Kant, Part 2', p. 326.
102. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 26.
103. M. Leifer, 'ASEAN's Search for Regional Order', Faculty Lecture 12, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, 1987.
104. For a critical discussion of the adoption of the neoliberal model of economic development see K. Lee, 'A Neo-Gramscian Approach to International Organisation', in J. MacMillan and Andrew Linklater (eds.), Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations (London, 1995). R. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York, 1986); C. Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia, Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era (Cambridge, 1993).
105. For a critical discussion of the adoption of the neoliberal model of economic development see K. Lee, 'A Neo-Gramscian Approach to International Organisation', in J. MacMillan and Andrew Linklater (eds.), Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations (London, 1995). R. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York, 1986); C. Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia, Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era (Cambridge, 1993).
106. For a critical discussion of the adoption of the neoliberal model of economic development see K. Lee, 'A Neo-Gramscian Approach to International Organisation', in J. MacMillan and Andrew Linklater (eds.), Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations (London, 1995). R. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York, 1986); C. Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia, Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era (Cambridge, 1993).
107. In this vein, D. H. Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989 (Princeton, NJ, 1993), shows convincingly the way in which the foreign aid regime emerged after World War II as the international counterpart of the domestic welfare state and increasing awareness of world poverty and beliefs regarding the interdependencies of peace, prosperity and justice.
108. For a study of the relationship between domestic political ideologies and foreign policy assumptions see Ceadel, Thinking about Peace and War.
109. Levy, 'Domestic Politics', pp. 654-5.
110. See for instance R. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Theory', Millennium 10:2 (1981); A. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organisation, 46 (1992), pp. 392-425; M. Neufeld, 'Reflexivity and International Relations Theory', Millennium, 22:1 (1993). Lumsdaine's Moral Vision is a major study to have linked philosophical factors with policy developments.
111. See for instance R. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Theory', Millennium 10:2 (1981); A. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organisation, 46 (1992), pp. 392-425; M. Neufeld, 'Reflexivity and International Relations Theory', Millennium, 22:1 (1993). Lumsdaine's Moral Vision is a major study to have linked philosophical factors with policy developments.
112. See for instance R. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Theory', Millennium 10:2 (1981); A. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organisation, 46 (1992), pp. 392-425; M. Neufeld, 'Reflexivity and International Relations Theory', Millennium, 22:1 (1993). Lumsdaine's Moral Vision is a major study to have linked philosophical factors with policy developments.
113. G. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1971).
114. F. Meinecke, Machiavellism (London, 1957 [1924]). In case readers think it odd that I should draw upon Realist writers to support an argument rooted in liberalism, it should be remembered that a number of liberals (e.g. Kant) held similar views regarding the impediment to moral development presented by the anarchic nature of the international system.
115. Lumsdaine's analysis of the foreign aid regime in Moral Vision is a notable model of how to disaggregate the significance of particularly liberal elements upon policy-making within a liberal democratic state.