The new Japanese election system

Pacific Affairs

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 49-68

  Christensen, Raymond V ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION SYSTEM; ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; POLITICAL REFORM; TWO PARTY POLITICS;

JAPAN;

EID: 0030455453     PISSN: 0030851X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2760873     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. See Takabatake Michitoshi, "The July Revolution and Conservative Self-Renewal," Japan Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 4 (1993), pp. 387-94; Frank McNeil, "Rock of Sisyphus or Road to Reform," Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994), pp. 101-06; and Mizuguchi Hiroshi, "Political Reform: Much Ado About Nothing?" Japan Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 3 (1993), pp. 246-57.
2. See Takabatake Michitoshi, "The July Revolution and Conservative Self-Renewal," Japan Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 4 (1993), pp. 387-94; Frank McNeil, "Rock of Sisyphus or Road to Reform," Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994), pp. 101-06; and Mizuguchi Hiroshi, "Political Reform: Much Ado About Nothing?" Japan Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 3 (1993), pp. 246-57.
3. See Takabatake Michitoshi, "The July Revolution and Conservative Self-Renewal," Japan Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 4 (1993), pp. 387-94; Frank McNeil, "Rock of Sisyphus or Road to Reform," Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994), pp. 101-06; and Mizuguchi Hiroshi, "Political Reform: Much Ado About Nothing?" Japan Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 3 (1993), pp. 246-57.
4. For examples, see McNeil, "Rock"; and Iwamura Tatsurō, "Hosokawa Morihiro: Resolute but Manipulated," Japan Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 2 (1994), pp. 134-40.
5. For the former perspective see Yomiuri Shimbun (Feb. 1, 1994) which summarizes the U.S. reactions to the reforms; for the more careful perspective, see Gerald Curtis as quoted in Yomiuri Shimbun, March 5, 1994, p. 13.
6. For the former perspective see Yomiuri Shimbun (Feb. 1, 1994) which summarizes the U.S. reactions to the reforms; for the more careful perspective, see Gerald Curtis as quoted in Yomiuri Shimbun, March 5, 1994, p. 13.
7. The existing laws were The Public Officers Election Law (Kōshoku Senkyo Hō) and The Political Funds Control Law (Seiji Shikin Kisei Hō). The new laws were The House of Representatives Election District Demarcation Deliberative Council Establishing Act (Shūin Senkyoku Kakutei Shingikai Setchi Hō) and The Political Subsidy Law (Seitō Josei Hō).
8. This last legislative package also included four separate bills. One demarcated the new district boundaries. A second set the date for the 1995 unified local elections. A third created the requirement that political parties register as legal entities in order to receive government funding. The fourth made candidates liable for the campaign law violations of a larger number of their campaign workers.
9. Burt L. Monroe, "Understanding Electoral Systems: Beyond Plurality versus PR," PS Political Science and Politics, vol. 27, no. 4 (1994), pp. 677-82; Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
10. Burt L. Monroe, "Understanding Electoral Systems: Beyond Plurality versus PR," PS Political Science and Politics, vol. 27, no. 4 (1994), pp. 677-82; Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
11. There are many variations of PR systems (see Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971]). Some allow voters to express preferences for specific candidates on the party lists. PR systems also vary in the mathematical formulas used to convert votes for parties into seats awarded to parties.
12. Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, make a convincing argument on this point.
13. Maurice Duverger, Party Politics and Pressure Groups, tr. David Wagoner (New York: Thomas E. Crowell, 1972).
14. There were several exceptions to this rule. The Amami Islands constituted a single seat district for much of the postwar period, and in the 1980s several two-seat districts and one six-seat district were formed by reapportionment efforts.
15. For example, the Democratic Socialist party received from 4.8 to 8.8 percent of the vote in elections from 1960 to 1990. This party won from 14 to 38 seats in these same elections. The size of the House of Representatives has varied in this same period from 467 seats to 512 seats.
16. This percentage is an estimate. Seats are apportioned under the D'hondt PR seat allocation formula. Under this system, the party with the largest share of votes is allocated the first seat. Its vote share is then divided by two (1+ the number of seats already received). The party that now has the largest number of votes is then awarded the second seat. That party's vote is then divided by 1+ number of seats that party has received. This process continues until the last seat in the district is awarded. In a seven-seat district, a party with 13 percent of the vote is guaranteed to win at least the seventh seat. If another party won the remaining 87 percent of the vote, that party's vote would be divided by 7 after it had been awarded the sixth seat. Its vote share for the awarding of the seventh seat would be 12.4, less than 13 giving the final seat to the smaller party.
17. In the Japanese context see an editorial of Asahi Skimbun, January 12, 1994 that takes this viewpoint.
18. The forfeiture rules are as follows: (1) each victor from the party PR list allows the party to reclaim 12,000,000 yen of its deposit; (2) if a party double listed a candidate on a PR list and in a single-seat district, and that candidate won in the district, then the party may reclaim 6,000,000 yen of its deposit. (The deposit for a single-seat district race alone is 3,000,000 per candidate. Dual-listed candidates pay a total deposit of 6,000,000 yen.) In essence, each victor reclaims for the party the deposits of two candidates.
19. Dual-listed candidates must run in local, single-seat districts that are within the bounds of the PR regional district in which they are listed.
20. The decision to use printed ballots was a matter of serious consequence. Forcing voters to correctly write the name of a candidate or a party on a ballot puts parties that draw a relatively larger share of their support from the less educated segments of society (e.g., the former Clean Government party and the Japan Communist party) at a disadvantage. Their supporters are more likely to cast invalid ballots. The passage of this specific reform in 1994 and its repeal in 1995 is best explained by the different members of the coalition government at each respective time. In 1994 the former Clean Government party was part of the coalition government; in 1995 it was in the opposition.
21. Though the new law does not force a regular redistricting, it is a slightly better measure than its predecessor which only "urged efforts" to have a regular redistrictings. Under this new legislation, politicians will have a more difficult time delaying necessary redistricting when the commission has issued its findings. Furthermore, a hostile commission could further embarrass lawmakers by issuing repeated recommendations.
22. The law actually states that the commission's recommendations should be guided by (1) a population disparity ratio of less than 1:2, (2) local government boundaries, (3) topography, (4) transportation, and (5) other factors. Technically, these guidelines only apply to the commission's work and not to the actual legislation that specified district boundaries.
23. On December 30, 1994, it was announced that the disparity had risen to 1:2.22 using more recent population figures. The pressure for a reapportionment of the new system is beginning even at the inaugural point of the new system.
24. The large size of local government units is illustrated by the fact that of the 300 new districts, half (147) of them are composed of only four local government units or less.
25. The previous reporting requirements kicked in for yearly contributions of greater than 10,000 yen ($100) to political parties and official fundraising organizations. Contributions to other political organizations were not reported unless they exceeded 1,000,000 yen ($10,000). Purchase of tickets to fundraising events were only reported if they exceeded 1,000,000 yen ($10,000) in purchases by one purchaser at a single event.
26. Half of the annual subsidy will be awarded to qualifying parties in direct proportion to their percent of seats in the Diet (both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors). The other half is divided into four equal sums which is distributed to parties in proportion to the percent of the vote they won in each of four sets of elections: (1) the most recent house of Representatives PR vote, (2) the most recent House of Representatives local district vote, (3) the average of the two most Recent House of Councillors PR vote, and (4) the average of the two most recent House of Councillors local district vote.
27. There are several prominent exceptions to Duverger's law that require further explanation. Canada has only single-seat districts, yet it has had three or more major political parties. India also has multiple political parties in a single-seat district system. Germany has a mixed system that produces proportional results, yet it has had two major political parties for most of the postwar period. Austria also has a paucity of parties given its PR system.
28. This scenario is based on past Japanese experience with mixed incentives. The House of Councillors combines a PR vote with single and multi-seat districts. In these races it is common for smaller parties to form electoral coalitions in order to contest races in single-seat districts. In addition, electoral coalitions are also quite common in gubernatorial and mayoral races.
29. There is, however, a precedent in single-seat gubernatorial and mayoral races for all political parties (except the Communist party) to unite in support of strong incumbents or the designated heir-apparent to a retiring incumbent. Certainly, strong incumbents will emerge in certain districts who will have no more than token oppositions; this phenomenon occurs in any electoral system. It would be a surprise, though, if "bandwagon" candidates, those with the formal endorsement of most political parties, became the norm in the local district races of the House of Representatives. It is hard to imagine how parties that compete in the Diet and PR districts could justify their joint support of candidates in local districts. Which party would these bandwagon candidates support in the Diet once they were elected?
30. Estimates of how many seats small parties such as the Japan Communist party will win under the new system vary. For example, the Yomiuri Shimbun predicted the Communists would win only three seats under the new system on February 6, 1994 (p. 2); on March 5, 1994 (p. 1) the paper predicted the party would win ten to thirteen seats; on August 12, 1994 (p. 1) the paper was back to predicting only two seats for the Communists. These differences are explained by whether estimations are based on past electoral data or public opinion polling. It is my opinion that the former provide more accurate estimations because many Communist supporters do not identify themselves as such in public opinion polling. These estimates show the Communist party winning a larger share of seats.
31. Steven J. Reed, "Structure and Behavior: Extending Duverger's Law to Japan," The British Journal of Political Science, vol. 20, no. 3 (1990), pp. 335-36; Steven J. Reed, "Thinking about the Heiritsu-sei: A Structural Learning Approach" (Manuscript, Chūō University, 1994); and Gary W. Cox and Emerson Niou, "Seat Bonuses Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan," Comparative Politics, vol. 26 (1994), pp. 221-36 all show how the number of candidates drops after the first several elections of a new party or electoral system in Japan.
32. Steven J. Reed, "Structure and Behavior: Extending Duverger's Law to Japan," The British Journal of Political Science, vol. 20, no. 3 (1990), pp. 335-36; Steven J. Reed, "Thinking about the Heiritsu-sei: A Structural Learning Approach" (Manuscript, Chūō University, 1994); and Gary W. Cox and Emerson Niou, "Seat Bonuses Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan," Comparative Politics, vol. 26 (1994), pp. 221-36 all show how the number of candidates drops after the first several elections of a new party or electoral system in Japan.
33. Steven J. Reed, "Structure and Behavior: Extending Duverger's Law to Japan," The British Journal of Political Science, vol. 20, no. 3 (1990), pp. 335-36; Steven J. Reed, "Thinking about the Heiritsu-sei: A Structural Learning Approach" (Manuscript, Chūō University, 1994); and Gary W. Cox and Emerson Niou, "Seat Bonuses Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan," Comparative Politics, vol. 26 (1994), pp. 221-36 all show how the number of candidates drops after the first several elections of a new party or electoral system in Japan.
34. See Reed, "Structure and Behavior," for the contrasting view that incentives for party consolidation will be predominant under the new electoral system.
35. Even the most pessimistic estimates of Communist party popularity still show the viability that the PR system will give small parties above the 3 percent threshold. Based on an estimate of the Communist party vote at only 3.1 percent (2.4 percent of the 75 percent of the respondents who declared a party preference), Yomiuri Shimbun (February 6, 1994, p. 2) estimates that the party would still win 3 of 200 PR seats.
36. All things being equal, the new electoral system gives the largest party such a huge bonus of seats that the party should not need coalition partners to govern. If the old LDP were to run under this new system, the same share of the vote would translate into approximately 50 percent more seats for the LDP. However, electoral reform and party realignment have split the LDP, and if two parties split the single-seat districts, it is likely that neither party will pick up a sufficient number of seats in the PR races to become a majority party. Coalition governments will therefore become more common under the new electoral system.
37. Another example is the provisions of the law that increase the penalties and liabilities of candidates for violations of campaign laws by their family members, secretaries, and leaders of support groups such as unions or personal support organizations (kōenkai). The impact of these new provisions is assumed to be not a decrease in illegal activities, but the appointment of figurehead directors and campaign secretaries. Politicians will make sure that their real campaign operatives are in lower positions in the campaign organization hierarchy so as to not create any liability in the candidate should the operative be arrested for illegal activities.
38. Wilma Rule and Joseph F. Zimmerman, eds. Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1992).
39. This analysis makes two assumptions that are likely to be violated in practice. First, PR lists are often led by popular vote-getters who are often not politicians. Even if dual-listed candidates were given priority over solely PR candidates, there would likely be some solely PR candidates who would be given high priority on PR lists. Also, irregularities in electoral success of a party's candidates between PR districts would allow some solely PR candidates to win despite a subordinate ranking on PR lists to dual-listed candidates. For example, if the party swept all the single-seat districts in one PR region, then any seats awarded to that party off its PR list would of necessity be solely PR candidates.
40. Ticket splitting will occur in Japan for various reasons. Three prominent explanations are that (1) supporters of small or minor parties will often not have a candidate of their party running in their local district; (2) voters will decide not to waste their ballot on a candidate in the local race who has no chance of victory, but they will cast their sincere preference for a party in the PR race; and (3) some strong, local candidates will attract supporters of other parties who will continue to support their home party in the PR vote.
41. In comparing the vote percentages for the LDP and Socialist party, I deleted local districts in which a party did not run a candidate. Their percent of the local vote is calculated as a national percent that includes only the districts that the party contested.
42. The exception is the Communist party which runs a candidate in every local race. It polls a slightly higher percent of the vote in these local races as compared to the PR vote. Its local candidates are attracting the votes of some who regularly support a different party and therefore do not vote for the Community party in the PR vote.
43. There are, of course, small numbers of voters who abstain from voting in the PR race.
44. These figures are calculated by comparing the LDP and the Socialist party's percentage share of PR seats won with the percent of the vote that the party won in the local districts.
45. See Yomiuri Shimbun, July 29, 1994, p. 2. The LDP was also going slow in deciding its candidate line-up in the local districts in order to delay the creation of disgruntled LDP members who were denied nominations. LDP leaders feared giving Ozawa too much time to woo such disgruntled politicians (Yomiuri Shimbun, February 19, 1994, p. 3). Yomiuri Shimbun (August 13 and 14, 1994, p. 2, p. 2) also reports that Ozawa is leaving nomination slots open in certain districts for anticipated defectors from the LDP and Socialist party.
46. See Yomiuri Shimbun, July 29, 1994, p. 2. The LDP was also going slow in deciding its candidate line-up in the local districts in order to delay the creation of disgruntled LDP members who were denied nominations. LDP leaders feared giving Ozawa too much time to woo such disgruntled politicians (Yomiuri Shimbun, February 19, 1994, p. 3). Yomiuri Shimbun (August 13 and 14, 1994, p. 2, p. 2) also reports that Ozawa is leaving nomination slots open in certain districts for anticipated defectors from the LDP and Socialist party.
47. See Yomiuri Shimbun, July 29, 1994, p. 2. The LDP was also going slow in deciding its candidate line-up in the local districts in order to delay the creation of disgruntled LDP members who were denied nominations. LDP leaders feared giving Ozawa too much time to woo such disgruntled politicians (Yomiuri Shimbun, February 19, 1994, p. 3). Yomiuri Shimbun (August 13 and 14, 1994, p. 2, p. 2) also reports that Ozawa is leaving nomination slots open in certain districts for anticipated defectors from the LDP and Socialist party.
48. See Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Japan 's Political Marketplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
49. See Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Japan 's Political Marketplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
50. See Takabatake, "July Revolution," 1993, p. 394; Takabatake Michitoshi, "Summer's Political Fireworks and the Future of Japan's Social Democrats," Japan Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 4 (1994), p. 397. Iwamura, "Hosokawa," presents a contradictory perspective.
51. See Takabatake, "July Revolution," 1993, p. 394; Takabatake Michitoshi, "Summer's Political Fireworks and the Future of Japan's Social Democrats," Japan Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 4 (1994), p. 397. Iwamura, "Hosokawa," presents a contradictory perspective.
52. See Takabatake, "July Revolution," 1993, p. 394; Takabatake Michitoshi, "Summer's Political Fireworks and the Future of Japan's Social Democrats," Japan Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 4 (1994), p. 397. Iwamura, "Hosokawa," presents a contradictory perspective.
53. Yomiuri Shimbun (November 7, 1994, p. 3; November 11, 1994, p. 1) reports that discussion on the new party's positions with regard to UN peacekeeping participation had to be shelved because of opposition by members of the Clean Government party. The party policy platform proposal focused instead on deregulation of the economy and the more innocuous claim for permanent Security Council membership for Japan.
54. Iwai Tomoaki, "Political Reform in Contemporary Japan" (Paper presented at the 1994 World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, August 21-25, 1994), p. 15.
55. See Curtis, Election Campaigning, for a description of this process.
56. In a three-seat district, 25 percent is needed; in a four-seat district 20 percent is needed; and in a five-seat district, 16.7 percent is needed. There were roughly equal numbers of three-, four-, and five-seat districts.
57. See Mizuguchi, "Political Reform," p. 248; Nathaniel B. Thayer, "Japanese Foreign Policy in Nakasone Years," in Japan's Foreign Polity After the Cold War, Coping with Change, ed. by Gerald L. Curtis (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 90-104; and Gerald L. Curtis, The Japanese Way of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 62-71.
58. See Mizuguchi, "Political Reform," p. 248; Nathaniel B. Thayer, "Japanese Foreign Policy in Nakasone Years," in Japan's Foreign Polity After the Cold War, Coping with Change, ed. by Gerald L. Curtis (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 90-104; and Gerald L. Curtis, The Japanese Way of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 62-71.
59. See Mizuguchi, "Political Reform," p. 248; Nathaniel B. Thayer, "Japanese Foreign Policy in Nakasone Years," in Japan's Foreign Polity After the Cold War, Coping with Change, ed. by Gerald L. Curtis (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 90-104; and Gerald L. Curtis, The Japanese Way of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 62-71.