The benefits of share contracts: Some European results

Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 158-171

  Petersson, Johan ^a   Andersson, Hans ^a  

^a SWEDISH UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARABLE FARMING; CONTRACT ALLOCATION; CROP PRODUCTION; RENTAL CONTRACT; SHARE RENTAL;

EUROPE;

EID: 0030448147     PISSN: 0021857X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-9552.1996.tb00682.x     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Allen, D. W. and Lueck, D. (1993). Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts, RAND Journal of Economics, 24, 78-100.
2. Apland, J., Barnes, N. and Justus, F. (1984). The Farm Lease: An Analysis of Owner-Tenant and Landlord Preferences Under Risk, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66, 376-384.
3. Binswanger, H. P., Deininger, K. and Feder, G. (1993). Power, Distortions, Revolt and Reform in Agricultural Land Relations, Policy Research Working Papers, WPS 1164, Washington DC: The World Bank.
4. Brink, L. and McCarl, B. (1978). The Tradeoff Between Expected Return and Risk Among Corn Belt Farmers, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 60, 259-263.
5. Dixit, A. K. (1990). Optimization in Economic Theory. (2nd edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Grossman, M. R. and Brussard, W. (1992). Agrarian Land Law in the Western World: Some Reflections, in Grossman, M. R. and Brussard, W. (eds.) Agrarian Land Law in the Western World, Wallingford: CAB International.
7. Katz, M. L. (1990). Vertical Contractual Relations, in Schmalensee, R. and Willig, R. (eds.) Handbook of Industrial Organization (Volume 1), Amsterdam: North Holland.
8. Musser, W. and Stamoulis, K. G. (1981). Evaluating the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 with Quadratic Risk Programming, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 63, 447-457.
9. Myers, R. J. (1986). Econometric Test for Risk Averse Behaviour in Agriculture. Staff Paper No. 86-98. Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University.
10. OECD (1991). Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade, Monitoring and Outlook. Paris: OECD.
11. Pederson, G. D. (1984). Selection of Risk-Preferred Rent Strategies: An Application of Simulation and Stochastic Dominance, North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics, 6, 17-27.
12. Pope, R. and Chavas, J. P. (1985). Producer Surplus and Risk, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 853-869.
13. Reid, J. D. Jr. (1976). Sharecropping and Agricultural Uncertainty, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 24, 549-576.
14. Runge, C. F. (1988). The Assault on Agricultural Protectionism, Foreign Affairs, 67, 133-150.
15. Sappington, D. E. M. (1991). Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 45-66.
16. Shah, S. and Thakor, A. V. (1988). Private Versus Public Ownership: Investment, Ownership Distribution, and Optimality, The Journal of Finance, XLIII, 41-59.
17. Statistics Sweden (1992a). Statistical Abstracts 1992, Stockholm: Statistics Sweden.
18. Statistics Sweden (1992b). The Survey of Farmer's Assessed Receipts, Costs, Investments etc. Figures for Holders, Stockholm: Statistics Sweden.
19. Stiglitz, J. E. (1974). Incentives and Risk-Sharing in Sharecropping, Review of Economic Studies, 41, 219-255.
20. van der Velde, M. and Snyder, F. (1992). Agrarian Land Law in the European Community, in Grossman, M. R. and Brussard, W. (eds.) Agrarian Land Law in the Western World, Wallingford: CAB International.
21. Varian, H. R. (1992). Microeconomic Analysis (3rd Edition), New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
22. Wilson, P. N. and Ediman, V. R. (1983). An Empirical Test of the Intenol Approach for Estimating Risk Preferences, Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, 8, 170-182.