Export versus direct investment in the German optical industry: Carl Zeiss, Jena and Glaswerk Schott & Gen. in the UK, from their beginnings to 1933

Business History

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 1-20

  Hagen, Antje ^a  

^a FRIEDRICH SCHILLER UNIVERSITY JENA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CARL ZEISS, JENA; GERMAN FIRM; HISTORICAL STUDY; INDUSTRIAL HISTORY; OPTICAL INDUSTRY; SCHOTT AND GEN; TRADE STRATEGY; TWENTIETH CENTURY;

UK;

EID: 0030435489     PISSN: 00076791     EISSN: 17437938     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00076799600000132     Document Type: Review

References (92)

1. Examples are the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, electrical and mechanical engineering, the optical industry, and so on.
2. For the purpose of this article, MNE and FDI are defined in accordance with J. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (Wokingham, 2nd edn. 1993), p.3 and M. Wilkins, 'Hosts to Transnational Investments: A Comparative Analysis', in H. Pohl (ed.), Transnational Investment from the 19th Century to the Present, ZUG-Beiheft 81 (Stuttgart, 1994), p.27.
3. For the purpose of this article, MNE and FDI are defined in accordance with J. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (Wokingham, 2nd edn. 1993), p.3 and M. Wilkins, 'Hosts to Transnational Investments: A Comparative Analysis', in H. Pohl (ed.), Transnational Investment from the 19th Century to the Present, ZUG-Beiheft 81 (Stuttgart, 1994), p.27.
4. The term Optical industry' comprises the making of optical, photographical, medical and other precision instruments. It was one of the smaller new sectors of the economy, accounting for 0.6 per cent of German exports of finished products in 1913 compared to 2.4 per cent for the dyestuffs industry.
5. Whereas Optische Anstalt C.P. Goerz AG specialised in the supply of military equipment, Ernst Leitz, Optische Werke, mainly produced microscopes. Emil Busch AG was the leading producer of spectacles. Ernemann-Werke AG specialised in camera production.
6. Company Archive of Carl Zeiss, Jena, GmbH (hereafter BACZ), 30293, statutes of the Carl Zeiss Foundation, 23,014 documents of the chief trustee of the Zeiss Foundation, Jan.-Dec. 1904: From the beginning, co-operation between the optical works of Carl Zeiss and Schott glassworks was close. As the leading figures of the optical works, Ernst Abbe, Carl Zeiss and his son Roderich, together with Otto Schott, were the co-founders of the glassworks, there was personal continuity between the two companies. With the formation of the Carl Zeiss Foundation in 1889, one year after Carl Zeiss' death, Abbe and Roderich Zeiss relinquished their financial interests in the optical works to this newly created legal body. As the Foundation was to comprise both the optical works and the glassworks. Abbe and Roderich Zeiss furthermore vested their share in the glassworks into the Foundation. Otto Schott held on to his share in the glassworks until 1919, when he also handed his financial interest over to the Foundation. The statutes of the Foundation provided for the following management structure; while it was the state ministry of culture and education that was the most senior body of control and owner of the capital of the Foundation, within each of the two companies there was a collective leadership body, jointly responsible for the firms' management. In both companies, this body consisted of one commercially trained manager, one production manager and one scientist. Moreover, one senior manager of each company attended those meetings of the other enterprise at which strategic decisions were made. This way both companies were well informed about each other's position. The superordinate institution of the Foundation ensured that business strategies were devised to further the interests of both companies jointly. Major decisions taken ran parallel to rather than counter each other. While the optical works were no doubt the larger enterprise of the two and a major customer of Glaswerk Schott & Gen. (Zeiss bought approximately 45-50 per cent of the optical glass produced by Schott), Zeiss managers did not exert direct control over the glassworks. Schott retained its independence firstly through its wide range of products, of which only the optical glass production had a connection to Zeiss, and secondly through the Foundation, which, in the place of private individuals, held the capital of both companies with a view to guarding their long-term existence. From this it seems that the most appropriate term to describe the relationship between Zeiss and Schott is that of twin companies.
7. A.D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, MA, 1990), pp. 631-732. This is due to the fact that Chandler only takes into account Aktiengesellschaften. BACZ, 1494, 10475: Carl Zeiss' total assets amounted to M 22.6 million in 1913 and M 60.8 million in 1930. The total assets of Schott & Gen. came to approximately a third of Carl Zeiss' in both years.
8. P. Hertner, 'Fallstudien zu deutschen multinationalen Unternehmen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg', in N. Horn and J. Kocka (eds.), Recht und Entwicklung der Groβunternehmen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert. Wirtschafts-, sozial- und rechtshistorische Untersuchungen zur Industrialisierung in Deutschland, Frankreich, England und den USA (1979), pp. 388-419; idem, 'German Multinational Enterprise before 1914: Some Case Studies', in P. Hertner and G. Jones (eds.), Multinationals: Theory and History (Aldershot, 1986), pp. 113-34; G. Jones, 'Foreign Multinationals and British Industry before 1945', Economic History Review, 2nd series, Vol.XVI (1988), pp. 429-53; H. Schröter, 'Continuity and Change: German Multinationals since 1850', in G. Jones and H. Schröter (eds.), The Rise of Multinationals in Continental Europe (Aldershot, 1993), pp. 28-48; G. Jones and F. Bostock, 'Foreign Multinationals in British Manufacturing, 1850-1962', Business History, Vol.36 (1994), pp. 89-126.
9. P. Hertner, 'Fallstudien zu deutschen multinationalen Unternehmen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg', in N. Horn and J. Kocka (eds.), Recht und Entwicklung der Groβunternehmen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert. Wirtschafts-, sozial- und rechtshistorische Untersuchungen zur Industrialisierung in Deutschland, Frankreich, England und den USA (1979), pp. 388-419; idem, 'German Multinational Enterprise before 1914: Some Case Studies', in P. Hertner and G. Jones (eds.), Multinationals: Theory and History (Aldershot, 1986), pp. 113-34; G. Jones, 'Foreign Multinationals and British Industry before 1945', Economic History Review, 2nd series, Vol.XVI (1988), pp. 429-53; H. Schröter, 'Continuity and Change: German Multinationals since 1850', in G. Jones and H. Schröter (eds.), The Rise of Multinationals in Continental Europe (Aldershot, 1993), pp. 28-48; G. Jones and F. Bostock, 'Foreign Multinationals in British Manufacturing, 1850-1962', Business History, Vol.36 (1994), pp. 89-126.
10. P. Hertner, 'Fallstudien zu deutschen multinationalen Unternehmen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg', in N. Horn and J. Kocka (eds.), Recht und Entwicklung der Groβunternehmen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert. Wirtschafts-, sozial- und rechtshistorische Untersuchungen zur Industrialisierung in Deutschland, Frankreich, England und den USA (1979), pp. 388-419; idem, 'German Multinational Enterprise before 1914: Some Case Studies', in P. Hertner and G. Jones (eds.), Multinationals: Theory and History (Aldershot, 1986), pp. 113-34; G. Jones, 'Foreign Multinationals and British Industry before 1945', Economic History Review, 2nd series, Vol.XVI (1988), pp. 429-53; H. Schröter, 'Continuity and Change: German Multinationals since 1850', in G. Jones and H. Schröter (eds.), The Rise of Multinationals in Continental Europe (Aldershot, 1993), pp. 28-48; G. Jones and F. Bostock, 'Foreign Multinationals in British Manufacturing, 1850-1962', Business History, Vol.36 (1994), pp. 89-126.
11. P. Hertner, 'Fallstudien zu deutschen multinationalen Unternehmen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg', in N. Horn and J. Kocka (eds.), Recht und Entwicklung der Groβunternehmen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert. Wirtschafts-, sozial- und rechtshistorische Untersuchungen zur Industrialisierung in Deutschland, Frankreich, England und den USA (1979), pp. 388-419; idem, 'German Multinational Enterprise before 1914: Some Case Studies', in P. Hertner and G. Jones (eds.), Multinationals: Theory and History (Aldershot, 1986), pp. 113-34; G. Jones, 'Foreign Multinationals and British Industry before 1945', Economic History Review, 2nd series, Vol.XVI (1988), pp. 429-53; H. Schröter, 'Continuity and Change: German Multinationals since 1850', in G. Jones and H. Schröter (eds.), The Rise of Multinationals in Continental Europe (Aldershot, 1993), pp. 28-48; G. Jones and F. Bostock, 'Foreign Multinationals in British Manufacturing, 1850-1962', Business History, Vol.36 (1994), pp. 89-126.
12. P. Hertner, 'Fallstudien zu deutschen multinationalen Unternehmen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg', in N. Horn and J. Kocka (eds.), Recht und Entwicklung der Groβunternehmen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert. Wirtschafts-, sozial- und rechtshistorische Untersuchungen zur Industrialisierung in Deutschland, Frankreich, England und den USA (1979), pp. 388-419; idem, 'German Multinational Enterprise before 1914: Some Case Studies', in P. Hertner and G. Jones (eds.), Multinationals: Theory and History (Aldershot, 1986), pp. 113-34; G. Jones, 'Foreign Multinationals and British Industry before 1945', Economic History Review, 2nd series, Vol.XVI (1988), pp. 429-53; H. Schröter, 'Continuity and Change: German Multinationals since 1850', in G. Jones and H. Schröter (eds.), The Rise of Multinationals in Continental Europe (Aldershot, 1993), pp. 28-48; G. Jones and F. Bostock, 'Foreign Multinationals in British Manufacturing, 1850-1962', Business History, Vol.36 (1994), pp. 89-126.
13. P. Hertner, 'Financial Strategies and Adaptation to Foreign Markets: The German ElectroTechnical Industry and its Multinational Activities: 1890s to 1939', in A. Teichova, M. LévyLeboyer and H. Nußbaum (eds.), Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 145-59; P. Hertner, 'Vom Wandel einer Untemehmensstrategie. Die deutsche Elektroindustrie in Italien vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg und in der Zwischenkriegszeit', in H. Schröter and C. Wurm (eds.), Politik, Wirtschaft und internationale Beziehungen: Studien zu ihrem Verhältnis zwischen den Weltkriegen (1991), pp. 139-48.
14. P. Hertner, 'Financial Strategies and Adaptation to Foreign Markets: The German ElectroTechnical Industry and its Multinational Activities: 1890s to 1939', in A. Teichova, M. LévyLeboyer and H. Nußbaum (eds.), Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 145-59; P. Hertner, 'Vom Wandel einer Untemehmensstrategie. Die deutsche Elektroindustrie in Italien vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg und in der Zwischenkriegszeit', in H. Schröter and C. Wurm (eds.), Politik, Wirtschaft und internationale Beziehungen: Studien zu ihrem Verhältnis zwischen den Weltkriegen (1991), pp. 139-48.
15. H. Schröter, 'Die Auslandsinvestitionen der deutschen chemischen Industrie 1870 bis 1930', Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte, Vol. 35 (1990), pp. 1-22; idem, 'Foreign Direct Investment by the German Chemical Industry from 1870 to 1930', in German Yearbook on Business History (1993), pp. 87-108.
16. H. Schröter, 'Die Auslandsinvestitionen der deutschen chemischen Industrie 1870 bis 1930', Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte, Vol. 35 (1990), pp. 1-22; idem, 'Foreign Direct Investment by the German Chemical Industry from 1870 to 1930', in German Yearbook on Business History (1993), pp. 87-108.
17. J. Dunning, Explaining International Production (London, 2nd edn. 1991), Chs. 1-2; idem, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, pp. 76-86.
18. J. Dunning, Explaining International Production (London, 2nd edn. 1991), Chs. 1-2; idem, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, pp. 76-86.
19. Company Archive of Jenaer Glaswerk GmbH, formerly Schott & Gen., Jena (hereafter UAJG), 13/1; R. and K. MacLeod, 'War and Economic Development: Government and the Optical Industry in Britain, 1914-1918', in J.M. Winter (ed.). War and Economic Development (Cambridge, 1975), p. 170.
20. BACZ, 21196.
21. F. Schomerus, Geschichte des Jenaer Zeisswerkes, 1846-1946 (Stuttgart, 1952), p.10.
22. W. Mühlfriedel and E. Hellmuth, 'Die Geschichte der Optischen Werkstätte Carl Zeiss in Jena von 1875 bis 1891', Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte, Vol. 38 (1993), p.6. As the quality of the glass was not constant, in the early years every microscope had to be devised and adjusted individually. Abbe later managed to specify a set of theoretical requirements which, when met, allowed for mass production of standardised microscopes.
23. J. Wittig, Ernst Abbe (Leipzig, 1989), pp.45-6.
24. Schomerus, Geschichte, p.49.
25. E. Zschimmer, Die Glasindustrie in Jena (Jena, 1909), pp.68-9; W. Mühlfriedel, 'Otto Schott begründete in Jena die moderne Glastechnologie' (unpublished manuscript), pp.15, 17-18.
26. E. Zschimmer, Die Glasindustrie in Jena (Jena, 1909), pp.68-9; W. Mühlfriedel, 'Otto Schott begründete in Jena die moderne Glastechnologie' (unpublished manuscript), pp.15, 17-18.
27. Which hoped for better optical instruments for its military and also the development of a heat-resistant glass for the use in thermometers. Zschimmer, Glasindustrie, pp.59-60; Mühlfriedel, Otto Schott, pp.24-5. Of the overall costs of the foundation of the glassworks in 1884 and 1885, the firm of Carl Zeiss bore 61.5 per cent, Otto Schott 10.5 per cent and the Prussian State 28 per cent.
28. Which hoped for better optical instruments for its military and also the development of a heat-resistant glass for the use in thermometers. Zschimmer, Glasindustrie, pp.59-60; Mühlfriedel, Otto Schott, pp.24-5. Of the overall costs of the foundation of the glassworks in 1884 and 1885, the firm of Carl Zeiss bore 61.5 per cent, Otto Schott 10.5 per cent and the Prussian State 28 per cent.
29. Wittig, Ernst Abbe, p. 106.
30. Mühlfriedel and Hellmuth, Geschichte, pp. 13-19.
31. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, pp. 193-205.
32. BACZ, 10989, turnover by country in photographic objectives and microscopes during the financial years of 1889/90-1891/92.
33. BACZ, 10532, sales per first half year of 1899. Cf. also BACZ, 15450, sales statistics for 1896-97. Telescopes accounted for 65.5 per cent of total sales by Carl Zeiss in London. BACZ, 13962, p.2; W. Schumann et al., Carl Zeiss Jena: Einst und Jetzt (Berlin, 1962), p. 187: In 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, Zeiss supplied both the Japanese and the Russian army with field glasses, which greatly boosted the company's business with these two countries.
34. BACZ, 8333, 9466. Other foreign licensees of Carl Zeiss were Bausch & Lomb Co., Rochester, New York, E. Krauss in Paris, which both produced Zeiss telescopes and objectives, and F. Koristka in Milan, which like Ross only manufactured photographic objectives. While both Bausch & Lomb and Krauss contributed more to Zeiss' income from licencing fees than Ross did, Koristka contributed less than the British company.
35. BACZ, 16039. The company's other pre-war sales subsidiaries were Vienna (1902), St Petersburg (1903), Paris (1911), Milan (1911), Tokyo (1911) and Buenos Aires (1914). BACZ, 1486 and M. Wilkins, The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914 (Cambridge, MA, 1989), p.446. In the US Zeiss did not set up its own sales subsidiary, but was represented by several companies, foremost of all by Bausch & Lomb, an optical company set up in Rochester, NY, by German immigrants. Zeiss bought a 25 per cent stake in Bausch & Lomb, and the company, in addition to its own products, sold and manufactured certain Zeiss products.
36. BACZ, 9691, monthly wages and salaries paid to employees of Zeiss subsidiaries.
37. 7 Edw. VII, Ch.50; Companies Act, 1907. Accordingly, a foreign company from 1908 onwards would have to file annually with the British Registrar of Companies: a certified copy of its statutes together with a certified translation thereof; a list of directors; the names and addresses of one or more persons resident in the UK authorised to represent the company in legal proceeding; and a balance sheet for the whole business.
38. BACZ, 23023, p.402; 'Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Zeißwerks seit dem Tode Ernst Abbes', Zeiss-Werkszeitung, Vol.1 No.1 (Oct. 1919), p.5.
39. BACZ, 11704, p.7.
40. BACZ, 23021, pp.41-4, annual report of Ross Ltd for the year ended 31 Dec. 1907.
41. BACZ, 23021, report by the Chief Trustee of the Zeiss Foundation, dated 30 May 1908, pp. 13-34.
42. Schomerus, Einst und Jetzt, pp. 100-116.
43. BACZ, 14490, contains both the original shares and the transfer notes.
44. BACZ, 16039, 1 Oct. 1909 as opening date; PRO, BT 31/ 19065/ 105708, 2 Nov. 1909.
45. BACZ, 16039.
46. BACZ, 11514, report by F. Loewen, manager of branch factory at Mill Hill, about factory before and during the war, dated 8 March 1919.
47. BACZ, 23023, documents of chief trustee of the Zeiss Foundation, report dated 19 Oct. 1909, p.402. BACZ 23018, 23020, 23021, 23022, 30273. The factory at Mill Hill was not the only, nor the first branch factory, Zeiss opened in a foreign country before the First World War. It had been preceded by factories in Vienna (1906), Györ, Hungary (1908) and coincided with the foundation of a factory in Riga, Russia (1909). Both the opening of the Vienna and the Riga plant had been necessitated by local content rules which applied to government orders, while Györ was a branch factory to the Vienna factory. It had had to be started after quota legislation was introduced in Austria-Hungary to assist the economic growth of underdeveloped Hungary. Prior to the War, none of the branch factories apart from Vienna made a profit. In part, this was due to the fact that they had only been in operation for a few years, when war broke out. In part, the losses derived from higher production costs, which in turn were caused by a lack of skilled labour, the need to transport raw materials and semifinished products to the production sites and lower production figures.
48. BACZ, 7228. Annual profits of the London sales subsidiary developed as follows between 1903 and 1914; 1903, M 18,518; 1904, M 6,827; 1905, M 15,005; 1906, M 41,128; 1907, M 50,466; 1908, M 41,485; 1909, M 88,565; 1910, M 41,226; 1911, M 26,000; 1912, M 24,480; 1913, M 39,260; 1914, no entry, table stops here.
49. BACZ, 1483. Other important sales offices, which were of a similar size as London, were Vienna and St Petersburg.
50. BACZ, 15950.
51. BACZ, 8333.
52. BACZ, 5947.
53. The first news arrived in Jena in March 1918. A former fellow-prisoner of Mr Loewen, a Zeiss employee, at the POW Camp at Alexandra Palace reported that the factory at Mill Hill had been sold to the competitor firm of Ross Ltd for the 'ridiculously low' price of £10,000.
54. BACZ, 15948, estimate by Paul Henrichs, former managing director of Carl Zeiss (London) Ltd.
55. BACZ, 11704, estimate by Dr Max Fischer of Carl Zeiss, Jena. The figure may be exaggerated as Fischer was at the time seeking compensation for Carl Zeiss' losses in the UK from the German government.
56. BACZ, 15950. Its British interests were not the only foreign operations Zeiss lost in the course of the war. Both its sales subsidiaries and branch factories in the other 'enemy countries' were lost as well. Due to high outstanding debts, Zeiss' Russian interests (sales subsidiary and factory) contributed 65 per cent to the total damage, while the sales subsidiaries in Paris, Milan and Tokyo made up for the remaining nine per cent. BACZ, 1486. In the US, Carl Zeiss did not incur any losses in connection with the War, as it had sold its stakes in Bausch & Lomb before sequestrations of 'enemy property' began. With the help of the Deutsche Bank, Berlin, $800,000-worth of shareholding were transferred into M 3,933,835 on 8 Nov. 1915.
57. Peace Treaty, articles 296-8.
58. Handelskammer Bremen, Archive, M II 21, 8, Vol.4.
59. BACZ, 15947, 15948, 15950. Compared to other German companies, Zeiss' pervasive desire for control of its London subsidiary was to prove beneficial after the War. The Board of Trade had seized the books of the sequestrated German companies. Many were consequently unable to determine the value of their British subsidiaries. Zeiss, Jena, on the other hand, had required its subsidiary to send reports of every transaction and business deal to the head office, where a parallel accounting system was kept. This enabled Jena after the War to make precise claims for compensation to the German Ministry of Trade and Industry.
60. BACZ, 4959, prospectus of Howard Grubb & Co. Ltd; BACZ, 11739, draft agreement.
61. It produced astronomical telescopes for observatories, periscopes for submarines, telescopes, range finders, signalling lamps, lights for cars and cinematographic instruments.
62. BACZ, 4959.
63. BACZ, 7687.
64. BACZ, 7187, balance sheets of J.W. Atha & Co. for the years 1920 to 1927; BACZ, 7228. Profits amounted to £2,000 in 1922/23, £2,375 in 1923/24 and £7,700 in 1924/25.
65. BACZ, 7686; BACZ, 8357, Memorandum and Articles of Association of Carl Zeiss (London) Ltd, 1926; BACZ, 17202, SächsHStA Dresden, Ememann-Werke AG, 20. Other sales subsidiaries Zeiss had stakes in in London during the inter-war period were as follows. The agency for the sale of Carl Zeiss products in British India, Ceylon and Burma, was held by Adair, Dutt & Co. Ltd, from 1921, a company incorporated in London, but with experience in trade with the Empire. In 1930, when Adair, Dutt & Co. Ltd faced serious liquidity problems, Carl Zeiss, Jena and Zeiss Ikon AG, Dresden decided to restructure the company and each took 50 per cent of the increased capital of £10,000. Zeiss Ikon AG itself had been created during the concentration process in the German optical industry which took place in the late 1920s. In 1930, Zeiss Ikon, which preserved its own identity on the surface, founded its own subsidiary in London for the sale of cameras.
66. BACZ, 7686, 7687.
67. Prior to the Safeguarding of Industries Act, the Dyestuffs Act had been passed in 1920 to prohibit imports of German dyestuffs to the UK. The aim of the Safeguarding of Industries Act was to protect further branches of industry from foreign, especially German, competition. Apart from the optical industry, the electrical and chemical industry came to be regarded as 'key industries' in case of future wars. As their development had been aided by British government support during wartime, capacities had been expanded. After the end of the War, British companies again faced German competition. Due to the depreciation of the German currency and their desire to recapture lost international markets, German companies sold at low prices in the UK. From the point of view of the British companies, the import duties imposed in connection with the two Acts made adjustments for German 'dumping prices'. From the German point of view, the Acts artificially raised prices and caused a loss of market share. This experience was not exclusive to Carl Zeiss, but was shared by German companies of the electrical and chemical industries.
68. Categorisation according to 'Annual Statement of Trade of the UK with Foreign Countries and British Possessions'.
69. UAJG, 13/45.
70. MacLeod and MacLeod, 'War and Economic Development', p.190; 'Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung', Zeiss-Werkszeitung, pp.6-7: Employment in the British optical industry rose from 3,000 to 10,000.
71. MacLeod and MacLeod, 'War and Economic Development', p.190; 'Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung', Zeiss-Werkszeitung, pp.6-7: Employment in the British optical industry rose from 3,000 to 10,000.
72. BACZ 16039. Other sales subsidiaries established after the war were Madrid (1922), Paris (1925), New York (1926), Tokyo (1927), Rio de Janeiro (1928) and Milan (1929).
73. 'Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung', Zeiss-Werkszeitung, pp.4-5.
74. Household glass was only a minor branch of Schott's production range before the War, and as far as exports were concerned. Laboratory glass came in the form of flasks, tubes etc. for the chemical, medical and related industries. Technical glass mainly comprised bulbs, globes and cones for the lighting industry.
75. UAJG, annual report for 1912/13. This business received a boost in 1912/13, when the British government - following a couple of accidents with lamps in mines - introduced legislation which required stronger, more durable glass to be used in miners' lamps.
76. Zschimmer, Glasindustrie, p. 142.
77. J. Steiner and U. Hoff, 'Vom Versuchslaboratorium zum Weltuntemehmen. Das Jenaer Glaswerk 1884-1934', in J. John and V. Wahl (eds.), Zwischen Konvention und Avantgarde. Doppelstadt Jena - Weimar (1995), pp.215-18.
78. UAJG, annual reports for respective years; Annual reports only exist from the financial year 1902/3 onwards in the glassworks' archive. Exports by country were listed from 1903/4, with the UK's share ranging between ten and 27 per cent.
79. UAJG, sales prospectuses for various years; UAJG, 13/40.
80. Of the remaining 40 per cent, 30 per cent came from France, while Chance Brothers, Birmingham, contributed ten per cent.
81. MacLeod and MacLeod, 'War and Economic Development', p. 168.
82. UAJG, 9/26, balance sheets for 1914/15-1918/19.
83. MacLeod and MacLeod, 'War and Economic Development', pp. 172-92; W. Scheiffele, Wilhelm Wagenfeld und die moderne Glasindustrie (Stuttgart, 1994), pp.22-4.
84. MacLeod and MacLeod, 'War and Economic Development', pp. 172-92; W. Scheiffele, Wilhelm Wagenfeld und die moderne Glasindustrie (Stuttgart, 1994), pp.22-4.
85. Steiner & Hoff, Versuchslaboratorium, pp.230-31.
86. UAJG, 18/13.
87. UAJG, annual report for 1923/24.
88. UAJG, 11/26, Agreement for Formation of a Company for the Manufacture of Mercury Vapour Rectifier Bulbs in the UK between Schott & Gen. of Jena and Hewittic Electric Co. Ltd, Hersham.
89. UAJG, 13/27, which accounted for 17-35 per cent of total sales.
90. UAJG, annual reports for 1924/25-1933/34.
91. J. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, pp. 197-8.
92. Ibid., p. 195.