Reclaiming Africa's agenda: Good governance and the role of the NGOs in the African context

Australian Journal of International Affairs

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 293-303

  Tandon, Yash ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE   (Zimbabwe)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRATISATION; DEVELOPING REGION; DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY; GLOBAL COALITION FOR AFRICA; GOVERNANCE; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE; LOCAL PARTICIPATION; NGO ROLE; NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION;

AFRICA;

EID: 0030430957     PISSN: 10357718     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10357719608445188     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. For a more detailed exploration of the link between good and effective governance, see Adrian Leftwich, 'Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World', Third World Quarterly 14, 3 (1993) pp.605-24. The relationship between democracy, good governance and economic development is discussed by Charles Harvey and Mark Robinson, The Design of Economic Reforms in the Context of Political Liberalization, paper from the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, November 1995.
2. See William Greider, Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American Democracy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).
3. Basil Davidson, The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (London: James Curry, 1992); Cheikh Anta Dio, The African Origins of Civilization: Myth or Reality (United States of America: Lawrence Hill Books, 1974).
4. Basil Davidson, The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (London: James Curry, 1992); Cheikh Anta Dio, The African Origins of Civilization: Myth or Reality (United States of America: Lawrence Hill Books, 1974).
5. Martin Doornbos, Lionel Cliffe, Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed and John Markakis, Beyond Conflict in the Horn (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1992).
6. On a personal note, I have been actively involved in these democratic struggles in Uganda, even when the British militarily and economically supported the brutal regime of Amin and, later, the military regime of Obote during his second time in power.
7. See Patricia Adams, Odious Debts: Loose Lending, Corruption, and the Third World's Environmental Legacy (Canada: Probe International, Earthscan, 1991).
8. Michael Barratt Brown, Africa's Choices: After Thirty Years of the World Bank (Penguin, 1995) p.129.
9. Bade Onimode, A Future for Africa: Beyond the Politics of Adjustment (London: Earthscan, 1992) p.54.
10. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1981).
11. For what still remains the best critique of the Berg Report, see Samir Amin, 'A Critique of the World Bank Report entitled "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa"', Africa Development (Dakar) VII (1982).
12. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics (New York: United Nations, 1993).
13. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long Term Perspective Study (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989) p.15.
14. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Sub-Saharan Africa p.194.
15. For a critique of Uruguay in relation to Africa, see Y. Tandon, 'Recolonizing the Subject Peoples', Alternatives 19, 2 (Spring 1994) pp.173-83.
16. For an excellent exposition of this analysis, see Bhikhu Parekh, 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy', in David Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993).
17. Lest readers misconstrue the above argument as an endorsement of the 'Asian values', let me add that I am not even prepared to enter into a debate on the legitimacy or otherwise of these values. For that is not the point at issue here. The point is that the Asian states referred to above use the cultural weapon of 'Asian values' to ward off the ideological weapon of 'democracy' that Western countries use to further their own particularistic interests in Asia. The West and Asia are both engaged in 'myth-making' for their own reasons. For further discussion on this, see Stephanie Lawson, Culture, Relativism and Democracy: Political Myths about 'Asia' and the 'West', Working Paper 1995/6 (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University). See also, Muthiah Alagappa, Democratic Transition in Asia: the Role of International Community Special Reports, No. 3 (Honolulu: East-West Center, October 1994). It is worth quoting Alagappa at some length:Apart from some questionable premises that underlie the Western effort to forge a unified world order, the West's power to impose such a value system has suffered relative decline and is likely to decline further if Asia's economic dynamism is sustained. This attempt by the West to create a universal order in its image when its power and influence are ebbing, as well as the linkage of democracy and human rights to economic and security considerations, give rise to the perception of a reactionary West seeking to preserve its dominance by ideological means. Instead of contributing to the forging of a unified world order, the substance and style of current policy are creating ideological tension between the West and Asia.
18. Lest readers misconstrue the above argument as an endorsement of the 'Asian values', let me add that I am not even prepared to enter into a debate on the legitimacy or otherwise of these values. For that is not the point at issue here. The point is that the Asian states referred to above use the cultural weapon of 'Asian values' to ward off the ideological weapon of 'democracy' that Western countries use to further their own particularistic interests in Asia. The West and Asia are both engaged in 'myth-making' for their own reasons. For further discussion on this, see Stephanie Lawson, Culture, Relativism and Democracy: Political Myths about 'Asia' and the 'West', Working Paper 1995/6 (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University). See also, Muthiah Alagappa, Democratic Transition in Asia: the Role of International Community Special Reports, No. 3 (Honolulu: East-West Center, October 1994). It is worth quoting Alagappa at some length:Apart from some questionable premises that underlie the Western effort to forge a unified world order, the West's power to impose such a value system has suffered relative decline and is likely to decline further if Asia's economic dynamism is sustained. This attempt by the West to create a universal order in its image when its power and influence are ebbing, as well as the linkage of democracy and human rights to economic and security considerations, give rise to the perception of a reactionary West seeking to preserve its dominance by ideological means. Instead of contributing to the forging of a unified world order, the substance and style of current policy are creating ideological tension between the West and Asia.