British aid to Africa: A changing agenda?

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 487-502

  Cumming, Gordon D ^a  

^a CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AID POLICY; BILATERAL AID; DEVELOPING REGION; INTERNATIONAL AID; POLICY CHANGE; UK AID;

AFRICA;

EID: 0030429951     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436599615470     Document Type: Article

References (100)

1. Most studies have sought to explain the recent phenomenon whereby Western donors have made their foreign aid conditional upon democratic reforms. See for example IDS Bulletin, 'Good government', 24 (1), 1993.
2. There has been surprisingly little country-specific analysis of post-Cold War British aid policy. For a brief review, see A Hewitt and J Howell 'UK Aid in the 1990s' in A Hewitt, (ed), Crisis or Transition in Foreign Aid, London: ODI, 1994, pp 72-79. For the initial findings of a substantive research project, see G Crawford, Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance Through Development Aid: A Comparative Study of the Policies of Four Northern Donors, Leeds: Centre for Democratization Studies, 1995, pp 6-9 and passim.
3. There has been surprisingly little country-specific analysis of post-Cold War British aid policy. For a brief review, see A Hewitt and J Howell 'UK Aid in the 1990s' in A Hewitt, (ed), Crisis or Transition in Foreign Aid, London: ODI, 1994, pp 72-79. For the initial findings of a substantive research project, see G Crawford, Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance Through Development Aid: A Comparative Study of the Policies of Four Northern Donors, Leeds: Centre for Democratization Studies, 1995, pp 6-9 and passim.
4. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development uses essentially this definition to measure the volume and concessionality (grants or grant equivalents of assistance given as loans) of 'official development assistance'.
5. That bilateral aid reflects donor motivation more closely than multilateral has been shown by A Maizels & M R Nissanke, 'Motivations for aid to developing countries', World Development, 12, 1984, pp 879-900.
6. See O Morrissey et al, British Aid and International Trade, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1992, pp 20-44.
7. It has been shown empirically that British assistance was not motivated by Cold War concerns: see R D McKinlay and R Little, 'A foreign policy model of the distribution of British bilateral aid 1960-70', British Journal of Political Science, 8, 1978.
8. British aid to Sudan and Malawi rose from £1.1 million and £6.9 million respectively in 1973 to £13.1 million and £23.3 million in 1979. See ODA, British Aid Statistics, London: Government Statistical Services, various years.
9. P Byrd, 'Foreign policy and overseas aid' in A Bose & P Burnell (eds), British Overseas Aid Since 1979, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991, pp 68-69.
10. At the time of signing agreements with the Bank and Fund - 1986 and 1987 respectively - Tanzania was receiving £335 000 and Mozambique £5.2 million in programme assistance from Britain. By 1989, these figures had risen to £13.4 million and £20.9 million respectively. See ODA, British Aid Statistics.
11. The Paris Club was another source of peer pressure as it sought to maintain a united front among official creditors on the terms of debt rescheduling (concessionality in which has become a form of aid). Although its agenda goes beyond developmental issues, the G7 also recommended the terms on which debts should be renegotiated - a sensitive matter for the British, whose African recipients included middle-income debtor countries such as Nigeria. The United Nations was a forum in which the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands regularly pressed the West to achieve UN targets, and the UNDP used its chairmanship of 'round tables' to encourage donors to fund projects.
12. Despite the government's ideological opposition to tying, around 70% of Britain's bilateral effort is tied to procurement of goods and services in the UK. Between 1981 and 1992 Britain also devoted an average of 7.1% of the aid budget to mixed credits, significantly more than average DAC donor. See OECD, Development Cooperation Review Series, United Kingdom, Paris: OECD, pp 9-10.
13. Britain was a founder member of the aid consortia for India and Pakistan in the early 1960s: see John White, Pledged to Development, London: ODI, 1967.
14. Gross bilateral aid to the poorest countries rose from 59.2% of the British programme in 1974 to 67.9% in 1981: see ODA, British Aid Statistics. Ultimately, however, the Labour government was less concerned with Basic Needs than with Britain's domestic economic problems; see S H Arnold, Implementing Development Assistance: European Approaches to Basic Needs, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982.
15. Gross bilateral aid to the poorest countries rose from 59.2% of the British programme in 1974 to 67.9% in 1981: see ODA, British Aid Statistics. Ultimately, however, the Labour government was less concerned with Basic Needs than with Britain's domestic economic problems; see S H Arnold, Implementing Development Assistance: European Approaches to Basic Needs, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982.
16. By 1988-89 programme assistance constituted around 44% of bilateral aid to North and West Africa. (Morrissey et al, British Aid and International Trade, p 16.)
17. In late 1983, Britain suspended programme aid to Kenya's government for its slow progress in meeting World Bank conditions; see J T Winpenny, 'Efficiency and effectiveness in the ODA', in A Bose & P Burnell, British Overseas Aid Since 1979, p. 40.
18. P Mosley, 'Britain, The World Bank and structural adjustment', in ibid, pp 74-85. London always suspected that structural adjustment would bring the Bank into conflict with the IMF, undermine the former's financial viability and slow down aid disbursement.
19. Most recent studies cast doubt on the economic return to the UK of tied bilateral assistance and mixed credits. See for example O Morrissey, 'The impact of multilateral and tied bilateral aid on the UK Economy', Journal of International Development, 2(1), 1990, pp 60-76; and O Morrissey 'An evaluation of the economic effects of the aid and trade provision', Journal of Development Studies, 28(1), 1991, pp 104-129.
20. Most recent studies cast doubt on the economic return to the UK of tied bilateral assistance and mixed credits. See for example O Morrissey, 'The impact of multilateral and tied bilateral aid on the UK Economy', Journal of International Development, 2(1), 1990, pp 60-76; and O Morrissey 'An evaluation of the economic effects of the aid and trade provision', Journal of Development Studies, 28(1), 1991, pp 104-129.
21. The Conservatives downgraded the Overseas Development Ministry to the ODA, cut staff by a third between 1979 and 1987 and slashed bilateral aid by 23% between 1979 and 1987 (Morrissey et al, British Aid and International Trade, p 91). Nevertheless by the late 1980s, the most radical changes had been overturned: the ODA had come under the ministerial direction of Chris Patten, a prominent figure from the 'wet' wing of the party; moves to commercialise the programme had come unstuck; and both aid volumes and assistance to the poorest countries had risen.
22. With Britain's accession to the Common Market, the focus of the programme shifted: in 1970 Africa and Asia received 32.9% and 43.7% respectively while by 1987 this balance had been virtually reversed to 48.8% and 36.3% respectively. See ODA, British Aid Statistics.
23. Britain has had one of the best records on concessionality: see OECD, DAC Report 1985, Paris: OECD, 1985, p 106.
24. See Alain Rouvez et al. Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994.
25. In the 1970s, the Government declined to renew development aid to Ethiopia or to start programmes in Cambodia and the Central African Republic. It maintained only token assistance to Nicaragua; refused to increase aid to Indonesia over the issue of political prisoners; and suspended support to the mining sector in Bolivia in 1977 in protest at working conditions there. Assistance was also cut off to Pinochet's Chile and to Amin's Uganda; in the latter case, however, this measure was part of the wider breakdown in Anglo-Ugandan relations.
26. Cited in 'Poverty-focused aid: the lessons of experience', Actionaid Report, London, 1987, p 18.
27. The government has, between 1991-92 and 1993-94, increased spending on environmental proiection and WID-related activities from £116.7 million to £146.8 million and from £46.9 million to £81.8 million respectively. It has over the same period doubled expenditure on health and population. See ODA, Progress Report on ODA'S Policy Objectives 1992/93 to 1993/94, London: ODA, 1995, pp 216, 207, 161.
28. Britain's multilateral share of aid has increased from 43.4% in 1989 to 49% in 1994-95 (OECD, DAC Report 1993, Paris: OECD, 1994, p 183; Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1996 Departmental Report, London: HMSO, p 86); its expenditure on emergencies has almost quadrupled over the last six years to reach £209 million in 1994 (ibid, p 95); and its peacekeeping contributions have risen eightfold between 1990-91 and 1995-96 (ibid, p 2).
29. Britain's multilateral share of aid has increased from 43.4% in 1989 to 49% in 1994-95 (OECD, DAC Report 1993, Paris: OECD, 1994, p 183; Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1996 Departmental Report, London: HMSO, p 86); its expenditure on emergencies has almost quadrupled over the last six years to reach £209 million in 1994 (ibid, p 95); and its peacekeeping contributions have risen eightfold between 1990-91 and 1995-96 (ibid, p 2).
30. Britain's multilateral share of aid has increased from 43.4% in 1989 to 49% in 1994-95 (OECD, DAC Report 1993, Paris: OECD, 1994, p 183; Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1996 Departmental Report, London: HMSO, p 86); its expenditure on emergencies has almost quadrupled over the last six years to reach £209 million in 1994 (ibid, p 95); and its peacekeeping contributions have risen eightfold between 1990-91 and 1995-96 (ibid, p 2).
31. Britain's multilateral share of aid has increased from 43.4% in 1989 to 49% in 1994-95 (OECD, DAC Report 1993, Paris: OECD, 1994, p 183; Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1996 Departmental Report, London: HMSO, p 86); its expenditure on emergencies has almost quadrupled over the last six years to reach £209 million in 1994 (ibid, p 95); and its peacekeeping contributions have risen eightfold between 1990-91 and 1995-96 (ibid, p 2).
32. Although policy makers use the terms interchangeably, democratic conditionality is of more recent origin. It is not part of an established international legal framework and is more concerned with challenging the political status quo in developing countries.
33. This speech was given at a meeting of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development (APGOOD), London, 6 June 1990.
34. John Major as Chancellor warned the IMF in May 1990 of the need to cut aid to non-reformist regimes; Douglas Hurd as Foreign Secretary strongly urged EC Foreign Ministers to adopt political conditionality (Sunday Times, 18 August 1991); and John Major as Prime Minister had support for conditionality written into the Harare Declaration of the 1991 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.
35. These included a review of bilateral relations with Nigeria, a suspension of new military training courses in Britain, the withdrawal of a British Military advisory team and an end to special treatment for official visa applications. See Daily Telegraph, 25 June 1993.
36. See ODA, Progress Report on Policy Objectives, pp 84 & 98. These figures do not include projects below £100 000. But some assistance used in the past to promote participative development has been reclassified as aid for 'good government'. The 1993-94 statistics also include programme assistance which promotes political liberalisation.
37. ODA, British Aid to Southern Africa, London: ODA, 1994 and The Economist, 20 January 1996, p 61.
38. ODA, British Aid to Southern Africa, London: ODA, 1994 and The Economist, 20 January 1996, p 61.
39. L Chalker, Good Government and the Aid Programme, London: ODA, 1991.
40. ODA, Progress Report on Policy Objectives, pp 86-88.
41. L Chalker, Good Government: Putting Policy into Practice, London: ODA, 1994.
42. Britain's continued aid to China and East Timor, despite the massacres in Tiananmen and East Timor, are perhaps the most obvious examples.
43. Crawford, Promoting Democracy, p 7 and passim.
44. D Hurd, APGOOD speech, pp 2, 7.
45. ODA, British Aid Statistics. Clearly the strong economic performance of the Museveni presidency and the fear of a return to the brutality of earlier regimes have weighed heavily in aid-policy makers' minds.
46. D Hurd, 'Promoting Good Government', Crossbow, autumn 1990.
47. In Ghana, the opposition boycotted the legislative elections in which the ruling National Convention Party and its allies won 198 of the 200 seats. In the March 1990 Zimbabwe elections, Zanu-PF won 116 of the 119 parliamentary seats and, in March-April 1995, 118 out of 120.
48. The Foundation has allotted only around £530 000 for projects in anglophone Africa as compared to some £650 000 for the former Soviet Union and £1.2 million for Central and Eastern Europe: see Westminster Foundation, Current Projects List for 1995-96.
49. For a critical observer report, see for example National Electoral Monitoring Unit, The Multiparty General Elections in Kenya, December 1992, Nairobi: NEMU, 1993.
50. The UK is to honour existing aid commitments while not making any new ones; see International Development Studies, Briefing Paper No 2, Sussex: IDS, 1995.
51. Proposals were instead announced for an EU arms embargo and a ban on members of the Nigerian armed forces visiting Europe. Note, however, that these measures have already been in place for two years; see The Economist, 18, 1995, p 17. Subsequent penalties have included expulsion from the Commonwealth, a freezing of European Union aid and a sports boycott. (Financial Times, 5 December 1995.)
52. Proposals were instead announced for an EU arms embargo and a ban on members of the Nigerian armed forces visiting Europe. Note, however, that these measures have already been in place for two years; see The Economist, 18, 1995, p 17. Subsequent penalties have included expulsion from the Commonwealth, a freezing of European Union aid and a sports boycott. (Financial Times, 5 December 1995.)
53. Environmental and gender concerns predate and are not strictly part of the political conditionality debate: they relate more to micro-level project issues and are integrated into the ODA'S four broad objectives. They are, however, relevant insofar as they represent non-economic conditions which developing countries have to meet in order to receive assistance.
54. Guardian, 9 May 1990.
55. The Ministry of Defence had to find cuts of £750 million in 1994-95 to meet the expenditure targets set out in the budget: see Financial Times, 30 June 1994.
56. L Chalker, Governance, Business and Aid, London: ODA, 1993.
57. See in this context N Ball, Pressing for Peace: Can Aid Induce Reform?, Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1992, pp 22, 67. Labour in its 1992 Manifesto (A World of Difference, p 14) accused the DTI of giving licences for military exports to Saddam's Iraq and the MOD of providing training to factions fighting alongside Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The Conservative government also overrode ODA advice and gave £234 million in aid to build the uneconomic Pergau dam; in linking this to the sale of over £1 billion of military equipment to Malaysia, Britain contravened her own and OECD guidelines.
58. See in this context N Ball, Pressing for Peace: Can Aid Induce Reform?, Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1992, pp 22, 67. Labour in its 1992 Manifesto (A World of Difference, p 14) accused the DTI of giving licences for military exports to Saddam's Iraq and the MOD of providing training to factions fighting alongside Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The Conservative government also overrode ODA advice and gave £234 million in aid to build the uneconomic Pergau dam; in linking this to the sale of over £1 billion of military equipment to Malaysia, Britain contravened her own and OECD guidelines.
59. Financial Times, 22 September 1994. Such exports sit uncomfortably with government guidelines whereby 'every proposed sale of defence or internal security equipment is subject to strict vetting procedures...in particular, an assessment of the human rights of the country concerned'. See Human Rights in Foreign Policy, London: FCO, para 28.
60. Financial Times, 22 September 1994. Such exports sit uncomfortably with government guidelines whereby 'every proposed sale of defence or internal security equipment is subject to strict vetting procedures...in particular, an assessment of the human rights of the country concerned'. See Human Rights in Foreign Policy, London: FCO, para 28.
61. ODA, British Overseas Aid: Anniversary Review, London: ODA, 1989, p 79.
62. See House of Commons Session 1992-93, Committee of Public Accounts, 23rd Report: Overseas Aid and the Environment, 27 January 1993, p v.
63. The ODA withdrew a £12 million grant for a forestry conservation programme in Kenya because of green concerns (Financial Times, 1 February 1994).
64. ODA, Progress Report, p 186.
65. This new agenda arose out of a 1989 World Bank strategy paper, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. According to the ODA, which has adopted good government as one of its four main objectives, it 'involves a democratic political process, accountability..., a capacity for effective decision-making..., respect for human rights and the rule of law'; see FCO, 1996 Departmental Report, p 87.
66. This new agenda arose out of a 1989 World Bank strategy paper, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. According to the ODA, which has adopted good government as one of its four main objectives, it 'involves a democratic political process, accountability..., a capacity for effective decision-making..., respect for human rights and the rule of law'; see FCO, 1996 Departmental Report, p 87.
67. Total overseas developmental aid to sub-Saharn Africa rose from $17.4 billion in 1993 to $18.1 billion in 1994 but is still less than the $18.4 billion given by the donor community in 1992; see OECD, The DAC Report 1995, Paris: OECD, 1995, table 37, p A64.
68. British aid to Ethiopia and Angola increased from £12.2 and £1.3 million respectively in 1989 to £20.1 million and £13.6 million in 1994-95. See FCO, 1996 Departmental Report, p 140.
69. Good government is thought by some to have restored the state to the centre of the development process: see Robert Archer, Markets and Good Government: The Way Forward for Economic and Social Development, London: NGLS, 1994. For others, the state's role remains confined to creating an enabling environment for the private sector: see Crawford, Promoting Democracy, pp 89-90.
70. Good government is thought by some to have restored the state to the centre of the development process: see Robert Archer, Markets and Good Government: The Way Forward for Economic and Social Development, London: NGLS, 1994. For others, the state's role remains confined to creating an enabling environment for the private sector: see Crawford, Promoting Democracy, pp 89-90.
71. For an account of the similar positions of the Conservatives and Labour on good government, see L Chalker, 'Aid and poverty', Journal on International Development, 4(1), 1992, pp 87-93; and A Clwyd, 'The Labour Party policy on overseas development', ibid, pp 94-102. Labour's main criticism has been that good government has not been applied consistently enough.
72. For an account of the similar positions of the Conservatives and Labour on good government, see L Chalker, 'Aid and poverty', Journal on International Development, 4(1), 1992, pp 87-93; and A Clwyd, 'The Labour Party policy on overseas development', ibid, pp 94-102. Labour's main criticism has been that good government has not been applied consistently enough.
73. Cited in OECD, The DAC Report 1995, note 56, pp A8, A64; and L Chalker, Speech to Prince of Wales Business Leaders' Forum, 12 December 1995, p 2.
74. Cited in OECD, The DAC Report 1995, note 56, pp A8, A64; and L Chalker, Speech to Prince of Wales Business Leaders' Forum, 12 December 1995, p 2.
75. The USA, Italy and Belgium are among the donors believed to have openly diverted monies to more commercially viable countries. In particular, the USA has drastically scaled down its Africa programme, closing nine missions and placing others on a watch list, redirecting aid personnel to new priority assignments in the former Eastern bloc and cutting assistance from 0.20% to 0.15% of GNP from 1992 to 1994. See OECD, The DAC Report 1995, note 56, p A36; and M Bratton, 'International versus domestic pressures for democratization', School of Oriental and African Studies conference, 21-22 October 1994, pp 5-6.
76. The USA, Italy and Belgium are among the donors believed to have openly diverted monies to more commercially viable countries. In particular, the USA has drastically scaled down its Africa programme, closing nine missions and placing others on a watch list, redirecting aid personnel to new priority assignments in the former Eastern bloc and cutting assistance from 0.20% to 0.15% of GNP from 1992 to 1994. See OECD, The DAC Report 1995, note 56, p A36; and M Bratton, 'International versus domestic pressures for democratization', School of Oriental and African Studies conference, 21-22 October 1994, pp 5-6.
77. L Chalker, Good Government and the Aid Programme, p 5. Britain does not insist upon multiparty democracy where this is 'impractical or unsustainable' and seeks instead to encourage 'legitimate' government. The adequacy of these terms as substitutes for democracy is challenged by Crawford, Promoting Democracy, pp 65-66.
78. L Chalker, Good Government and the Aid Programme, p 5. Britain does not insist upon multiparty democracy where this is 'impractical or unsustainable' and seeks instead to encourage 'legitimate' government. The adequacy of these terms as substitutes for democracy is challenged by Crawford, Promoting Democracy, pp 65-66.
79. See P Burnell, Good Government and Foreign Aid, Coventry: Warwick University, 1993, pp 33-34.
80. There are 40000 British passport holders in Kenya alone: see Guardian, 24 July 1995, p 8.
81. Zimbabwe contributed troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Mozambique, Rwanda and Somalia. Nigeria also took part in the Congo, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.
82. UK economic interests are particularly strong in Kenya, where it has £1 billion of investments and exports worth £250 million per annum (The Times, 12 September 1991). Also in Nigeria where it has exports worth on average £1.4 billion (Financial Times, 19 July 1995) and South Africa where trade totalled over £1 billion in 1993 and investments amounted to some £12 billion. (Guardian, 12 July 1994).
83. UK economic interests are particularly strong in Kenya, where it has £1 billion of investments and exports worth £250 million per annum (The Times, 12 September 1991). Also in Nigeria where it has exports worth on average £1.4 billion (Financial Times, 19 July 1995) and South Africa where trade totalled over £1 billion in 1993 and investments amounted to some £12 billion. (Guardian, 12 July 1994).
84. UK economic interests are particularly strong in Kenya, where it has £1 billion of investments and exports worth £250 million per annum (The Times, 12 September 1991). Also in Nigeria where it has exports worth on average £1.4 billion (Financial Times, 19 July 1995) and South Africa where trade totalled over £1 billion in 1993 and investments amounted to some £12 billion. (Guardian, 12 July 1994).
85. Note that when the Netherlands cut off assistance to Indonesia over its massacres in East Timor in November 1991, it found its Dutch-led consortium replaced by a World Bank-organised forum which increased aid to Indonesia in 1993.
86. Ruling elites have even sought to enshrine constitutional dispensations to protect themselves from the sort of retribution that looked like being meted out to Malawi's President Banda: the transitional provisions of Ghana's 1992 constitution are a case in point.
87. Good government, if rigorously applied, may conflict with wider Foreign Office aims, such as 'to promote and protect British interests and influence overseas, enhance the...prosperity of the United Kingdom'; see FCO, 1996 Departmental Report, p 1.
88. Crawford, Promoting Democracy, p viii.
89. Between 1990 and September 1994, 41 of the 47 sub-Saharan states underwent a measure of political liberalisation (although only 14 achieved transition to a minimally 'democratic' regime). Now, however, 'Westerners and Africans alike are turning their attention from regime transition to regime consolidation'. See Bratton, (International versus domestic pressure for democratisation), pp 1, 10.
90. M Moore & M Robinson, 'Can aid be used to promote good government in developing countries?', Ethics and International Affairs, 8, 1994, p 143.
91. Britain's Official Secrets Act and lack of freedom of information legislation are a case in point.
92. The evidence suggests there is no guaranteed link between political liberalisation and faster economic growth. See J M Healey & M Robinson, Governance and Economic Policy, Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective, London: ODI, 1992.
93. See M Robinson 'Strengthening civil society in Africa : the role of foreign political aid', IDS Bulletin, 26(2), 1995, pp 70-80.
94. Figures drawn from FCO, 1996 Departmental Report, p 83; and ODA, Fundamental Expenditure Review, London: ODA, 1995, p 99. According to a Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee report, Britain's agreement at the 1992 Edinburgh Summit to a 60% increase in its aid contributions to the EC may mean that it has to divert over £160 million of assistance from Africa to the former Soviet Bloc. (Guardian, 19 July 1994).
95. Figures drawn from FCO, 1996 Departmental Report, p 83; and ODA, Fundamental Expenditure Review, London: ODA, 1995, p 99. According to a Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee report, Britain's agreement at the 1992 Edinburgh Summit to a 60% increase in its aid contributions to the EC may mean that it has to divert over £160 million of assistance from Africa to the former Soviet Bloc. (Guardian, 19 July 1994).
96. Figures drawn from FCO, 1996 Departmental Report, p 83; and ODA, Fundamental Expenditure Review, London: ODA, 1995, p 99. According to a Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee report, Britain's agreement at the 1992 Edinburgh Summit to a 60% increase in its aid contributions to the EC may mean that it has to divert over £160 million of assistance from Africa to the former Soviet Bloc. (Guardian, 19 July 1994).
97. The EU agreed to spend at least £2.8 billion over the next five years in the Mediterranean area and a minimum of £5.2 billion in Central and Eastern Europe; see The Times, 21 June 1995, p 12. Britain, while not oblivious to threats to the East or the growing problems of migration, drugs and terrorism around the Mediterranean, had argued unsuccessfully that the problems of these middle income countries should be tackled through trade and not aid.
98. See House of Commons Debate, 30 January 1996, cols 838-883. Note, however, that Labour's pledge in its 1992 Manifesto and at its 1993 party conference that it would seek to achieve the UN 0.7% target in its first term of office has been toned down in favour of 'steady and measurable progress' towards that target.
99. Government statistics for 1994-95 to 1997-98 suggest that bilateral aid will be cut across the board and that 85% of assistance will be focused on only 20 priority recipients; see ODA, Fundamental Expenditure Review, pp 99, 113.
100. The Fundamental Expenditure Review, written before the 5.4% (£124 million) cut in November 1995, predicted that aid would fall to its lowest ever level, 0.26%, in 1997-98; see ODA, Fundamental Expenditure Review, p 22.