The political economy of regional cooperation in South Asia

Pacific Affairs

Volumn 69, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 185-209

  Dash, Kishore C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COOPERATION CONSTRAINT; DEVELOPING REGION; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL TENSION; REGIONAL COOPERATION;

ASIA, (SOUTH);

EID: 0030429112     PISSN: 0030851X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2760724     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. SAPTA was launched at the Dhaka Summit in April 1993. After almost two years of negotiation, SAPTA came into effect on December 7, 1995, with the ratification of the last SAARC member Pakistan in October 1995. At the eighth SAARC Summit in New Delhi, The South Asian Heads of Governments of States took a decision to create SAARC Free Trade Area (SAFTA) as early as possible to allow free movement of goods without any tariff or non-tariff barriers.
2. See Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 36 and 47; Michael Haas, The Asian Way to Peace (New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 276; Sumit Ganguly, "The Prospects for SAARC," in Hafeez Malik, ed., Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 276.
3. See Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 36 and 47; Michael Haas, The Asian Way to Peace (New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 276; Sumit Ganguly, "The Prospects for SAARC," in Hafeez Malik, ed., Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 276.
4. See Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 36 and 47; Michael Haas, The Asian Way to Peace (New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 276; Sumit Ganguly, "The Prospects for SAARC," in Hafeez Malik, ed., Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 276.
5. Bangladesh launched serious initiatives for regional cooperation in South Asia after its approach to ASEAN for membership was turned down. See Kanti Prasad Bajpai, The Origins of Association in South Asia: SAARC, 1979-1989 (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1990), pp. 50-53.
6. For a detailed discussion of these events, see S. D. Muni and Anuradha Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984), pp. 29-31.
7. For an extensive discussion of these factors see ibid., chapters 2 and 3.
8. See W. Howard Wriggins with F. Gregory Gause, III, Terrence P. Lyons, and Evelyn Colbert, Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 132;
9. Thomas Perry Thornton, "Regional Organization in Conflict Management," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 518 (November 1991), p. 136.
10. For the Bangladesh draft paper and the areas or items suggested for cooperation, see Muni and Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia, p. 35.
11. Some of the important achievements of SAARC are as follows. In 1987, a permanent SAARC Secretariat was established in Kathmandu. The SAARC Audio-Visual Exchange Program (SAVE) became operational in November 1987. The same year a SAARC Food Security Reserve of 2,415,680 tons of wheat and rice was established for use by member states in times of natural calamities. The decision to operationalize SAPTA is by far the most important achievement of the Delhi summit in 1995.
12. For a discussion of these two issues and how they affect Indo-Bangladesh relations see Partha S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1989), pp. 75-95.
13. For useful discussions of the security dilemma in the South Asian context, see Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (Houndsmill and London: Macmillan Press, 1986), p. 8; W. Howard Wriggins, Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim, p. 97.
14. For useful discussions of the security dilemma in the South Asian context, see Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (Houndsmill and London: Macmillan Press, 1986), p. 8; W. Howard Wriggins, Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim, p. 97.
15. For an insightful discussion see Ramesh Thakur, "India After Nonalignment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2 (1992), pp. 168-69.
16. See Mohammed Ayoob, "Dateline India: The Deepening Crisis," Foreign Policy, no. 85 (Winter 1991-92), p. 184.
17. Two significant developments already indicate growing Sino-Indian rapprochement. First, both India and China signed a "landmark agreement" in September 1993 to reduce troop levels in the mountainous borders of the two countries and to honour the existing border in the disputed territory of Arunachal Pradesh in northeastern India after three decades of hostility. Second, China has agreed to provide enriched uranium to India to run its Tarapur nuclear plant. On China's transfer of nuclear materials to India, see India Abroad, January 20, 1995, p. 10; also see the news report and editorial of the New York Times, January 13, 1995.
18. Two significant developments already indicate growing Sino-Indian rapprochement. First, both India and China signed a "landmark agreement" in September 1993 to reduce troop levels in the mountainous borders of the two countries and to honour the existing border in the disputed territory of Arunachal Pradesh in northeastern India after three decades of hostility. Second, China has agreed to provide enriched uranium to India to run its Tarapur nuclear plant. On China's transfer of nuclear materials to India, see India Abroad, January 20, 1995, p. 10; also see the news report and editorial of the New York Times, January 13, 1995.
19. For a discussion, see Gowher Rizvi, South Asia in a Changing International Order (New Delhi: Sage Publications), pp. 159-62.
20. Interview with India's former foreign secretary, New Delhi, April 1992.
21. ECO was formed in February 1992. Its members are: Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and the newly independent Central Asian republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kirghiztan. The primary objective of this organization is to facilitate trade and other economic cooperation among the member countries.
22. "Quasi-democracy," as used here, refers to a fragile political system where the political leaders, despite their election through popular vote, are critically dependent on the support of the military and bureaucracy for foreign and domestic policies. Unlike full-blown democracies in Western Europe and North America, where the political leaders can take bold initiatives on domestic and foreign policy issues with wide public support, leaders in quasi-democracies are severely constrained to formulate and implement only those kinds of domestic and foreign policies that are supported by the military, bureaucracy, and other powerful interest groups. Also, while an authoritarian leadership allows more and more leader-to-leader contact (the frequency of the meetings may be limited), quasi-democratic leadership hands over more power to bureaucrats and technocrats who always prefer a "wait-and-see" approach to any bold policy initiatives.
23. The World Bank World Development Report, 1992.
24. The failure to implement three joint Indo-Bangladesh projects (i.e., urea fertilizer plant, sponge iron project and cement plant) during 1973-1975 provides evidence of a lack of political will between these two countries. The success of these joint ventures could have provided a model for future economic cooperation in the region. Recently, there have been some talks to revive the projects again. But the projects will be more politically saleable if they are undertaken under the SAARC rubric. For a discussion see Rehman Sobhan, "Political Dimensions of South Asian Cooperation: The Perspective for Bangladesh," in V. Kanesalingam, ed., Political Dimensions of South Asian Cooperation (New Delhi: Macmillan Ltd. India, 1991), pp. 44-45.
25. See ibid., p. 63.
26. See Lok Raj Baral, "Nepal's Relations with South Asian Countries," in Kanesalingam, ed., Political Dimensions, p. 104.
27. Ibid., p. 104.
28. See Leo Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 129-37 and 239-40.
29. See Nepal Press Digest, vol. 23, no. 33 (August 13, 1979), p. 331.
30. See Government of Nepal, National Commission on Population, Task Force on Migration, "Internal and International Migration in Nepal: Summary and Recommendations" (Kathmandu, August 1983, Mimeographed), p. 17.
31. For a detailed discussion of the improved relationship between India and Nepal after the establishment of a democratic regime in Nepal, see Bimal Prasad, "India-Nepal Relations: New Dimensions," in S. D. Muni, ed., Understanding South Asia (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1994), pp. 38-41.
32. See W. Howard Wriggins, "South Asian Regional Politics: Asymmetrical Balance of One-State Dominance?" in Wriggins, Dynamics of Regional Politics, pp. 130 and 151.
33. I. N. Mukherjee, "Regional Trade, Investment and Economic Cooperation among South Asian Countries," Paper presented at the international Conference on South Asia as a Dynamic Partner: Prospects for the Future, New Delhi, May 25-27, 1992, p. 14.
34. For a discussion of this study, see ibid., pp. 9-10. For a discussion of this study and identified products for trade complementarities in South Asia, see ibid, pp. 9-10.
35. For a discussion of this study, see ibid., pp. 9-10. For a discussion of this study and identified products for trade complementarities in South Asia, see ibid, pp. 9-10.
36. See ibid., pp. 10-12;
37. also see Tayyeb Shabbir, "Economic Transformation in South Asia: Nature and Implications for Competitiveness and Interdependence," Marga, vol. 13, no. 2 (1994), pp. 61-62.
38. W. R. H. Perera, Perspective for the Development of Himalayan Resources (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1984), pp. 22-26.
39. According to one estimate, out of a total of $650 million of Indian exports to Pakistan, only $150 million is routed through official channels. The rest is unofficial and is routed through a third country. For instance, Pakistan has a high demand for textile machinery, which can be imported from India directly at a cheaper rate. But most often, the consignments originate in India, head for Europe, and from there they are rerouted to Pakistan. This means higher transportation costs, delays and quality-control problems. Report on the Study on Regional Economic Cooperation among SAARC countries by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Institute of Economic Growth (New Delhi, 1995).
40. See William R. Thomson, "South Asia: The Challenges and Opportunities of the 1990s" (Report presented at the International Conference on South Asia as a Dynamic Partner: Prospects for the Future, New Delhi, May 25, 1992), pp. 14-15.
41. The spillover effects of the ethnic and religious conflicts had a serious impact on seven out of eight SAARC summits held so far. The very fact that all these summits could be held, despite political tensions and differences, is a testimony to the SAARC leaders' willingness to continue regional cooperation efforts in South Asia.
42. In a "stop-and-go" (SAG) pattern of growth, the progress of a regional organization in terms of institutional developments and program implementation remains uncertain and the organization's life-cycle oscillates between short-lived euphoria and agonizingly protracted stalemates. ASEAN in its early years is a clear example of this pattern of growth. For an explanation of this pattern of growth, see Gerald Schneider and Lars-Erik Cederman, "The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration," International Organization, vol. 48, no. 4 (1994), pp. 636-38.
43. "Security complex" refers to a group of states whose primary security concerns are so deeply intertwined that each nation's security cannot be considered apart from one another. For this definition and further exploration of the concept of security complex, see Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 106. Buzan has argued that the South Asian countries basically suffer from a middle-level security complex. The heart of this complex is an acute rivalry between India and Pakistan. Other less powerful states, such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka are bound into the complex for geographical reasons. See Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (Houndsmill and London: Macmillan Press, 1986), p. 8.
44. "Security complex" refers to a group of states whose primary security concerns are so deeply intertwined that each nation's security cannot be considered apart from one another. For this definition and further exploration of the concept of security complex, see Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 106. Buzan has argued that the South Asian countries basically suffer from a middle-level security complex. The heart of this complex is an acute rivalry between India and Pakistan. Other less powerful states, such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka are bound into the complex for geographical reasons. See Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (Houndsmill and London: Macmillan Press, 1986), p. 8.
45. For a detailed discussion of the post-Westphalian, post-sovereign international system, see James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), ch. 1; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992), ch. 1. For a discussion on neo-medievalism, see Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 2 (1994), pp. 384-96.
46. For a detailed discussion of the post-Westphalian, post-sovereign international system, see James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), ch. 1; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992), ch. 1. For a discussion on neo-medievalism, see Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 2 (1994), pp. 384-96.
47. For a detailed discussion of the post-Westphalian, post-sovereign international system, see James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), ch. 1; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992), ch. 1. For a discussion on neo-medievalism, see Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 2 (1994), pp. 384-96.
48. For a discussion on the role of the state in promoting economic interdependence, see Janice E. Thompson and Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 195-219; Peter B. Evans, "Transnational Linkages and the Economic Role of the State: An Analysis of Developing and Industrialized Nations in the Post-World War II Period," in Peter Evans et al., ed., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 192-226.
49. For a discussion on the role of the state in promoting economic interdependence, see Janice E. Thompson and Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 195-219; Peter B. Evans, "Transnational Linkages and the Economic Role of the State: An Analysis of Developing and Industrialized Nations in the Post-World War II Period," in Peter Evans et al., ed., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 192-226.
50. The Hindu, May 2, 1995, p. 1.
51. See "SAARC: Moving Toward Core Areas of Cooperation," Report by the Independent Group On South Asian Cooperation, United Nations University South Asian Perspectives Project (Columbo, December 1991), p. 59.