The role of the working class in the 1989 mass movement in Beijing

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 343-373

  Lau, Raymond W K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPING COUNTRY; POLITICAL DEMONSTRATION; POLITICAL OPPOSITION; POLITICAL PROTEST; TIANANMEN SQUARE CONFLICT; WORKING CLASS; WORKING CLASS ROLE;

CHINA, BEIJING;

EID: 0030423484     PISSN: 13523279     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13523279608415317     Document Type: Article

References (160)

1. According to incomplete official figures, between 15 and 19 May, delegations came from over 700 units, including over 160 industrial and commercial units (Zhonghua remin gongheguo guojia jiaowei sixiang zhengzhi gongzuosi, Jingxin dongpo de wushiliu tian: yijiubajiu nian siyue shiwu ri zhi liuyuejiu ri mei rijishi (Beijing, 1989), annotated edition published by Tiananmen minzhu daxue haiwai fujiao jihua xianggang choubeichu (Hong Kong, 1990) [hereinafter 56 Days], p.121) The 1989 mass movement spread to many other cities. However, this article examines the situation only in Beijing where the determining events obviously occurred, and on which data are more complete. Furthermore, the nature of the 1989 mass movement as a whole (democracy movement? students' movement? how defined? and so forth) is not examined in this article; as our analysis will show, the role of the working class can be sufficiently determined without doing so. The analysis of this article was first formulated, in preliminary form, in my 'Bajiu minyun chubu zongjie yu qianzhan' (The 1989 Democratic Movement: Preliminary Balance Sheet and Prospects), Siwu xingdong pinglun, 1 (Nov. 1989), pp. 19-30 (published under my Chinese name Liu Rongjin).
2. According to incomplete official figures, between 15 and 19 May, delegations came from over 700 units, including over 160 industrial and commercial units (Zhonghua remin gongheguo guojia jiaowei sixiang zhengzhi gongzuosi, Jingxin dongpo de wushiliu tian: yijiubajiu nian siyue shiwu ri zhi liuyuejiu ri mei rijishi (Beijing, 1989), annotated edition published by Tiananmen minzhu daxue haiwai fujiao jihua xianggang choubeichu (Hong Kong, 1990) [hereinafter 56 Days], p.121) The 1989 mass movement spread to many other cities. However, this article examines the situation only in Beijing where the determining events obviously occurred, and on which data are more complete. Furthermore, the nature of the 1989 mass movement as a whole (democracy movement? students' movement? how defined? and so forth) is not examined in this article; as our analysis will show, the role of the working class can be sufficiently determined without doing so. The analysis of this article was first formulated, in preliminary form, in my 'Bajiu minyun chubu zongjie yu qianzhan' (The 1989 Democratic Movement: Preliminary Balance Sheet and Prospects), Siwu xingdong pinglun, 1 (Nov. 1989), pp. 19-30 (published under my Chinese name Liu Rongjin).
3. For instance, reckoning this to be the case, Li Jinjin began to take an influential part in the activities of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation (BWAF): Gu Ding, 'Liu si yu zhongguo gongren - fang Li Jinjin', Xinwen ziyou daobao (XZD), 2 May 1993, p.3). Li Jinjin taught at the University of Politics and Law between 1985 and 1987, then enrolled at Beijing University (Beida) as a doctoral candidate. An associate of the famous dissident Wang Juntao, he was chairman of the official Beida Graduates' Union in 1988-89, and joined the protests right from the start: see Zeng Yin, 'Zuijin huo shi de Li Jinjin ceng lai xianggang yanjiu jibenfa', Jing Bao, June 1991, p.41; Gu Ding, op. cit.
4. For instance, reckoning this to be the case, Li Jinjin began to take an influential part in the activities of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation (BWAF): Gu Ding, 'Liu si yu zhongguo gongren - fang Li Jinjin', Xinwen ziyou daobao (XZD), 2 May 1993, p.3). Li Jinjin taught at the University of Politics and Law between 1985 and 1987, then enrolled at Beijing University (Beida) as a doctoral candidate. An associate of the famous dissident Wang Juntao, he was chairman of the official Beida Graduates' Union in 1988-89, and joined the protests right from the start: see Zeng Yin, 'Zuijin huo shi de Li Jinjin ceng lai xianggang yanjiu jibenfa', Jing Bao, June 1991, p.41; Gu Ding, op. cit.
5. For instance, reckoning this to be the case, Li Jinjin began to take an influential part in the activities of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation (BWAF): Gu Ding, 'Liu si yu zhongguo gongren - fang Li Jinjin', Xinwen ziyou daobao (XZD), 2 May 1993, p.3). Li Jinjin taught at the University of Politics and Law between 1985 and 1987, then enrolled at Beijing University (Beida) as a doctoral candidate. An associate of the famous dissident Wang Juntao, he was chairman of the official Beida Graduates' Union in 1988-89, and joined the protests right from the start: see Zeng Yin, 'Zuijin huo shi de Li Jinjin ceng lai xianggang yanjiu jibenfa', Jing Bao, June 1991, p.41; Gu Ding, op. cit.
6. Texts which specifically examine the subject include Andrew Walder, 'The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989', Problems of Communism, Vol.38, No.5 (1989), pp.30-40; Andrew Walder, 'Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989', China Quarterly, No.127 (Sept. 1991), pp.467-92; Andrew Walder, Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement: The Pattern of Grass-Roots Organization (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, c.1992); Andrew Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, 'Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: The Politics of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation', The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.29 (Jan. 1993), pp.1-29; Robin Munro, 'Who Died in Beijing, and Why', The Nation, 11 June 1990, pp.811-22; George Black and Robin Munro, Black Hands of Beijing (New York: Wiley, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, 'The Role of Chinese Workers in the Recent Protest Movement', in Jia Hao (ed.), The Democracy Movement of 1989 and China's Future (Washington, DC: The Washington Center for China Studies, 1990), pp.89-104; Wang Shaoguang, 'From a Pillar of Continuity to a Force for Change: Chinese Workers in the Movement', in Roger V. des Forges et al. (eds.), Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 177-90. (An earlier paper by Wang is not, however, available to this author.)
7. Texts which specifically examine the subject include Andrew Walder, 'The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989', Problems of Communism, Vol.38, No.5 (1989), pp.30-40; Andrew Walder, 'Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989', China Quarterly, No.127 (Sept. 1991), pp.467-92; Andrew Walder, Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement: The Pattern of Grass-Roots Organization (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, c.1992); Andrew Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, 'Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: The Politics of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation', The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.29 (Jan. 1993), pp.1-29; Robin Munro, 'Who Died in Beijing, and Why', The Nation, 11 June 1990, pp.811-22; George Black and Robin Munro, Black Hands of Beijing (New York: Wiley, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, 'The Role of Chinese Workers in the Recent Protest Movement', in Jia Hao (ed.), The Democracy Movement of 1989 and China's Future (Washington, DC: The Washington Center for China Studies, 1990), pp.89-104; Wang Shaoguang, 'From a Pillar of Continuity to a Force for Change: Chinese Workers in the Movement', in Roger V. des Forges et al. (eds.), Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 177-90. (An earlier paper by Wang is not, however, available to this author.)
8. Texts which specifically examine the subject include Andrew Walder, 'The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989', Problems of Communism, Vol.38, No.5 (1989), pp.30-40; Andrew Walder, 'Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989', China Quarterly, No.127 (Sept. 1991), pp.467-92; Andrew Walder, Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement: The Pattern of Grass-Roots Organization (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, c.1992); Andrew Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, 'Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: The Politics of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation', The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.29 (Jan. 1993), pp.1-29; Robin Munro, 'Who Died in Beijing, and Why', The Nation, 11 June 1990, pp.811-22; George Black and Robin Munro, Black Hands of Beijing (New York: Wiley, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, 'The Role of Chinese Workers in the Recent Protest Movement', in Jia Hao (ed.), The Democracy Movement of 1989 and China's Future (Washington, DC: The Washington Center for China Studies, 1990), pp.89-104; Wang Shaoguang, 'From a Pillar of Continuity to a Force for Change: Chinese Workers in the Movement', in Roger V. des Forges et al. (eds.), Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 177-90. (An earlier paper by Wang is not, however, available to this author.)
9. Texts which specifically examine the subject include Andrew Walder, 'The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989', Problems of Communism, Vol.38, No.5 (1989), pp.30-40; Andrew Walder, 'Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989', China Quarterly, No.127 (Sept. 1991), pp.467-92; Andrew Walder, Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement: The Pattern of Grass-Roots Organization (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, c.1992); Andrew Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, 'Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: The Politics of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation', The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.29 (Jan. 1993), pp.1-29; Robin Munro, 'Who Died in Beijing, and Why', The Nation, 11 June 1990, pp.811-22; George Black and Robin Munro, Black Hands of Beijing (New York: Wiley, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, 'The Role of Chinese Workers in the Recent Protest Movement', in Jia Hao (ed.), The Democracy Movement of 1989 and China's Future (Washington, DC: The Washington Center for China Studies, 1990), pp.89-104; Wang Shaoguang, 'From a Pillar of Continuity to a Force for Change: Chinese Workers in the Movement', in Roger V. des Forges et al. (eds.), Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 177-90. (An earlier paper by Wang is not, however, available to this author.)
10. Texts which specifically examine the subject include Andrew Walder, 'The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989', Problems of Communism, Vol.38, No.5 (1989), pp.30-40; Andrew Walder, 'Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989', China Quarterly, No.127 (Sept. 1991), pp.467-92; Andrew Walder, Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement: The Pattern of Grass-Roots Organization (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, c.1992); Andrew Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, 'Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: The Politics of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation', The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.29 (Jan. 1993), pp.1-29; Robin Munro, 'Who Died in Beijing, and Why', The Nation, 11 June 1990, pp.811-22; George Black and Robin Munro, Black Hands of Beijing (New York: Wiley, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, 'The Role of Chinese Workers in the Recent Protest Movement', in Jia Hao (ed.), The Democracy Movement of 1989 and China's Future (Washington, DC: The Washington Center for China Studies, 1990), pp.89-104; Wang Shaoguang, 'From a Pillar of Continuity to a Force for Change: Chinese Workers in the Movement', in Roger V. des Forges et al. (eds.), Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 177-90. (An earlier paper by Wang is not, however, available to this author.)
11. Texts which specifically examine the subject include Andrew Walder, 'The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989', Problems of Communism, Vol.38, No.5 (1989), pp.30-40; Andrew Walder, 'Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989', China Quarterly, No.127 (Sept. 1991), pp.467-92; Andrew Walder, Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement: The Pattern of Grass-Roots Organization (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, c.1992); Andrew Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, 'Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: The Politics of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation', The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.29 (Jan. 1993), pp.1-29; Robin Munro, 'Who Died in Beijing, and Why', The Nation, 11 June 1990, pp.811-22; George Black and Robin Munro, Black Hands of Beijing (New York: Wiley, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, 'The Role of Chinese Workers in the Recent Protest Movement', in Jia Hao (ed.), The Democracy Movement of 1989 and China's Future (Washington, DC: The Washington Center for China Studies, 1990), pp.89-104; Wang Shaoguang, 'From a Pillar of Continuity to a Force for Change: Chinese Workers in the Movement', in Roger V. des Forges et al. (eds.), Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 177-90. (An earlier paper by Wang is not, however, available to this author.)
12. Texts which specifically examine the subject include Andrew Walder, 'The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989', Problems of Communism, Vol.38, No.5 (1989), pp.30-40; Andrew Walder, 'Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989', China Quarterly, No.127 (Sept. 1991), pp.467-92; Andrew Walder, Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement: The Pattern of Grass-Roots Organization (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, c.1992); Andrew Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, 'Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: The Politics of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation', The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.29 (Jan. 1993), pp.1-29; Robin Munro, 'Who Died in Beijing, and Why', The Nation, 11 June 1990, pp.811-22; George Black and Robin Munro, Black Hands of Beijing (New York: Wiley, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, 'The Role of Chinese Workers in the Recent Protest Movement', in Jia Hao (ed.), The Democracy Movement of 1989 and China's Future (Washington, DC: The Washington Center for China Studies, 1990), pp.89-104; Wang Shaoguang, 'From a Pillar of Continuity to a Force for Change: Chinese Workers in the Movement', in Roger V. des Forges et al. (eds.), Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 177-90. (An earlier paper by Wang is not, however, available to this author.)
13. Texts which specifically examine the subject include Andrew Walder, 'The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989', Problems of Communism, Vol.38, No.5 (1989), pp.30-40; Andrew Walder, 'Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989', China Quarterly, No.127 (Sept. 1991), pp.467-92; Andrew Walder, Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement: The Pattern of Grass-Roots Organization (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, c.1992); Andrew Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, 'Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: The Politics of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation', The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.29 (Jan. 1993), pp.1-29; Robin Munro, 'Who Died in Beijing, and Why', The Nation, 11 June 1990, pp.811-22; George Black and Robin Munro, Black Hands of Beijing (New York: Wiley, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, 'The Role of Chinese Workers in the Recent Protest Movement', in Jia Hao (ed.), The Democracy Movement of 1989 and China's Future (Washington, DC: The Washington Center for China Studies, 1990), pp.89-104; Wang Shaoguang, 'From a Pillar of Continuity to a Force for Change: Chinese Workers in the Movement', in Roger V. des Forges et al. (eds.), Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 177-90. (An earlier paper by Wang is not, however, available to this author.)
14. This article draws a distinction between, first, the working, class and workers in general and, second, the minority of activists who attempted to represent working-class interests by engaging in organized activities, such as those who formed the BWAF; it does not assume, however, that the two were completely separate entities. While no attempt is made to provide a general theoretical justification for making such a distinction, the distinction is straightforward enough. For instance, there is a Trotskyite party in China known as The Revolutionary Communist Party of China (RCPC), the existence of which is unknown to the vast majority of workers. It is clear that to judge the present state of consciousness of the working class by referring to the RCPC's declarations and the like would be completely mistaken. Similarly, as our analysis will show, it would be mistaken to discuss the state of consciousness of workers in general in 1989 by simply referring to the views, activities and so forth of minority activists such as BWAF members (see also note 105).
15. Black and Munro, op. cit., p. 167, state that several thousand workers marched on 4 May. The accuracy of this statement appears to be questionable. I have come across no report in other sources that mentions any worker participation on that date.
16. Hua Shan, 'Wo de pengyou Liu Huanwen', Ming Bao (MB), 1 Sept. 1994, p.C4. In the article, the author indirectly reveals himself to be Shen. Shen, a university graduate (Black and Munro, op. cit., p.200), was a cadre of the official civil aviation trade union.
17. Hua Shan, 'Wo de pengyou Liu Huanwen', Ming Bao (MB), 1 Sept. 1994, p.C4. In the article, the author indirectly reveals himself to be Shen. Shen, a university graduate (Black and Munro, op. cit., p.200), was a cadre of the official civil aviation trade union.
18. General Office of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, Beijing zhizhi dongluan pingxi fangeming baoluan jishi (Beijing: Beijing ribao chubanshe, 1989; hereinafter Zhizhi), p.83.
19. The name of the organization underwent several changes; sometimes, different names were used at the same time. In this article, when the union is referred to generally, the name BWAF is used, while its specific variations are mentioned where appropriate. It should be noted that besides the BWAF, several other workers' groups also existed, namely: Beijing gangtie gongren zizhi hui (Autonomous Union of Steel Workers of the Capital) (Walder, 1991, p.489); Zhongguo cheng jian gongren zifa lianhehui (Spontaneous Federation of Municipal Construction Workers) (see its 21 May handbill, 'Cheng jian gongren zifa lianhehui de zongzhi', reprinted in Zhongguo minyun yuan ziliao jingxuan, Vol.1 (Hong Kong: Shiyue pinglun she, 1989; hereinafter Yuan ziliao 1), p.32); and Shoudu gongren jiucha dui linshi zhihuibu (Provisional Headquarters of the Capital Workers' Picket Corps) (see the handbill 'Zhi shoudu gongren shu' which it signed jointly with the Shengyuan xuesheng xingdong weiyuanhui (Action Committee to Support the Students) of the Workers' Movement Institute of China (WMIC), reprinted in Yuan ziliao 1, p.31). Very little is known about their activities. In fact, it seems probable that the last 'group' was simply a name used by some students or staff (or both) of the WMIC. In view of the above, these groups appear to have little, if any, significance, and can be disregarded.
20. The name of the organization underwent several changes; sometimes, different names were used at the same time. In this article, when the union is referred to generally, the name BWAF is used, while its specific variations are mentioned where appropriate. It should be noted that besides the BWAF, several other workers' groups also existed, namely: Beijing gangtie gongren zizhi hui (Autonomous Union of Steel Workers of the Capital) (Walder, 1991, p.489); Zhongguo cheng jian gongren zifa lianhehui (Spontaneous Federation of Municipal Construction Workers) (see its 21 May handbill, 'Cheng jian gongren zifa lianhehui de zongzhi', reprinted in Zhongguo minyun yuan ziliao jingxuan, Vol.1 (Hong Kong: Shiyue pinglun she, 1989; hereinafter Yuan ziliao 1), p.32); and Shoudu gongren jiucha dui linshi zhihuibu (Provisional Headquarters of the Capital Workers' Picket Corps) (see the handbill 'Zhi shoudu gongren shu' which it signed jointly with the Shengyuan xuesheng xingdong weiyuanhui (Action Committee to Support the Students) of the Workers' Movement Institute of China (WMIC), reprinted in Yuan ziliao 1, p.31). Very little is known about their activities. In fact, it seems probable that the last 'group' was simply a name used by some students or staff (or both) of the WMIC. In view of the above, these groups appear to have little, if any, significance, and can be disregarded.
21. The name of the organization underwent several changes; sometimes, different names were used at the same time. In this article, when the union is referred to generally, the name BWAF is used, while its specific variations are mentioned where appropriate. It should be noted that besides the BWAF, several other workers' groups also existed, namely: Beijing gangtie gongren zizhi hui (Autonomous Union of Steel Workers of the Capital) (Walder, 1991, p.489); Zhongguo cheng jian gongren zifa lianhehui (Spontaneous Federation of Municipal Construction Workers) (see its 21 May handbill, 'Cheng jian gongren zifa lianhehui de zongzhi', reprinted in Zhongguo minyun yuan ziliao jingxuan, Vol.1 (Hong Kong: Shiyue pinglun she, 1989; hereinafter Yuan ziliao 1), p.32); and Shoudu gongren jiucha dui linshi zhihuibu (Provisional Headquarters of the Capital Workers' Picket Corps) (see the handbill 'Zhi shoudu gongren shu' which it signed jointly with the Shengyuan xuesheng xingdong weiyuanhui (Action Committee to Support the Students) of the Workers' Movement Institute of China (WMIC), reprinted in Yuan ziliao 1, p.31). Very little is known about their activities. In fact, it seems probable that the last 'group' was simply a name used by some students or staff (or both) of the WMIC. In view of the above, these groups appear to have little, if any, significance, and can be disregarded.
22. Black and Munro, op .cit., pp. 153-4. This source mentions another worker, Zhao Pinlu, who it says was a boilermaker. But according to Zhao himself, he was a construction worker, did not go to the Square until 13 May, and did not join the BWAF until 18 May: see XZD, 5 March 1993, and 28 May 1994) Except where indicated, the following account is based upon the following sources: Liang Hong, 'Beijing gongzilian cheng li shi mo', in Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin (ed.), Gongren qilalie: Gongren zizhi lianhehui yundong 1989 (Hong Kong: Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin, 1990; hereinafter Qilaile), pp.1-11 (the article clearly shows the author to be Zhao Hongliang); 'Gongzilian renwu jianying fangwen (1) - cong shouhuoyuan dao houqin buchang', in Qilaile, pp.20-40 (the interviewee is also Zhao Hongliang); Black and Munro, op.cit.; Walder and Gong, op.cit. Zhao Hongliang is a rather inarticulate writer, often mixing up events and people; he also makes some rather extraordinary claims for the BWAF; his article and also his statements in interviews must, therefore, be treated with extreme care. Black and Munro's work, and that of Walder and Gong, must also be used by cross-checking with other sources, many of which have newly emerged.
23. Black and Munro, op .cit., pp. 153-4. This source mentions another worker, Zhao Pinlu, who it says was a boilermaker. But according to Zhao himself, he was a construction worker, did not go to the Square until 13 May, and did not join the BWAF until 18 May: see XZD, 5 March 1993, and 28 May 1994) Except where indicated, the following account is based upon the following sources: Liang Hong, 'Beijing gongzilian cheng li shi mo', in Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin (ed.), Gongren qilalie: Gongren zizhi lianhehui yundong 1989 (Hong Kong: Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin, 1990; hereinafter Qilaile), pp.1-11 (the article clearly shows the author to be Zhao Hongliang); 'Gongzilian renwu jianying fangwen (1) - cong shouhuoyuan dao houqin buchang', in Qilaile, pp.20-40 (the interviewee is also Zhao Hongliang); Black and Munro, op.cit.; Walder and Gong, op.cit. Zhao Hongliang is a rather inarticulate writer, often mixing up events and people; he also makes some rather extraordinary claims for the BWAF; his article and also his statements in interviews must, therefore, be treated with extreme care. Black and Munro's work, and that of Walder and Gong, must also be used by cross-checking with other sources, many of which have newly emerged.
24. Black and Munro, op .cit., pp. 153-4. This source mentions another worker, Zhao Pinlu, who it says was a boilermaker. But according to Zhao himself, he was a construction worker, did not go to the Square until 13 May, and did not join the BWAF until 18 May: see XZD, 5 March 1993, and 28 May 1994) Except where indicated, the following account is based upon the following sources: Liang Hong, 'Beijing gongzilian cheng li shi mo', in Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin (ed.), Gongren qilalie: Gongren zizhi lianhehui yundong 1989 (Hong Kong: Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin, 1990; hereinafter Qilaile), pp.1-11 (the article clearly shows the author to be Zhao Hongliang); 'Gongzilian renwu jianying fangwen (1) - cong shouhuoyuan dao houqin buchang', in Qilaile, pp.20-40 (the interviewee is also Zhao Hongliang); Black and Munro, op.cit.; Walder and Gong, op.cit. Zhao Hongliang is a rather inarticulate writer, often mixing up events and people; he also makes some rather extraordinary claims for the BWAF; his article and also his statements in interviews must, therefore, be treated with extreme care. Black and Munro's work, and that of Walder and Gong, must also be used by cross-checking with other sources, many of which have newly emerged.
25. Black and Munro, op .cit., pp. 153-4. This source mentions another worker, Zhao Pinlu, who it says was a boilermaker. But according to Zhao himself, he was a construction worker, did not go to the Square until 13 May, and did not join the BWAF until 18 May: see XZD, 5 March 1993, and 28 May 1994) Except where indicated, the following account is based upon the following sources: Liang Hong, 'Beijing gongzilian cheng li shi mo', in Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin (ed.), Gongren qilalie: Gongren zizhi lianhehui yundong 1989 (Hong Kong: Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin, 1990; hereinafter Qilaile), pp.1-11 (the article clearly shows the author to be Zhao Hongliang); 'Gongzilian renwu jianying fangwen (1) - cong shouhuoyuan dao houqin buchang', in Qilaile, pp.20-40 (the interviewee is also Zhao Hongliang); Black and Munro, op.cit.; Walder and Gong, op.cit. Zhao Hongliang is a rather inarticulate writer, often mixing up events and people; he also makes some rather extraordinary claims for the BWAF; his article and also his statements in interviews must, therefore, be treated with extreme care. Black and Munro's work, and that of Walder and Gong, must also be used by cross-checking with other sources, many of which have newly emerged.
26. Black and Munro, op .cit., pp. 153-4. This source mentions another worker, Zhao Pinlu, who it says was a boilermaker. But according to Zhao himself, he was a construction worker, did not go to the Square until 13 May, and did not join the BWAF until 18 May: see XZD, 5 March 1993, and 28 May 1994) Except where indicated, the following account is based upon the following sources: Liang Hong, 'Beijing gongzilian cheng li shi mo', in Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin (ed.), Gongren qilalie: Gongren zizhi lianhehui yundong 1989 (Hong Kong: Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin, 1990; hereinafter Qilaile), pp.1-11 (the article clearly shows the author to be Zhao Hongliang); 'Gongzilian renwu jianying fangwen (1) - cong shouhuoyuan dao houqin buchang', in Qilaile, pp.20-40 (the interviewee is also Zhao Hongliang); Black and Munro, op.cit.; Walder and Gong, op.cit. Zhao Hongliang is a rather inarticulate writer, often mixing up events and people; he also makes some rather extraordinary claims for the BWAF; his article and also his statements in interviews must, therefore, be treated with extreme care. Black and Munro's work, and that of Walder and Gong, must also be used by cross-checking with other sources, many of which have newly emerged.
27. Black and Munro, op .cit., pp. 153-4. This source mentions another worker, Zhao Pinlu, who it says was a boilermaker. But according to Zhao himself, he was a construction worker, did not go to the Square until 13 May, and did not join the BWAF until 18 May: see XZD, 5 March 1993, and 28 May 1994) Except where indicated, the following account is based upon the following sources: Liang Hong, 'Beijing gongzilian cheng li shi mo', in Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin (ed.), Gongren qilalie: Gongren zizhi lianhehui yundong 1989 (Hong Kong: Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin, 1990; hereinafter Qilaile), pp.1-11 (the article clearly shows the author to be Zhao Hongliang); 'Gongzilian renwu jianying fangwen (1) - cong shouhuoyuan dao houqin buchang', in Qilaile, pp.20-40 (the interviewee is also Zhao Hongliang); Black and Munro, op.cit.; Walder and Gong, op.cit. Zhao Hongliang is a rather inarticulate writer, often mixing up events and people; he also makes some rather extraordinary claims for the BWAF; his article and also his statements in interviews must, therefore, be treated with extreme care. Black and Munro's work, and that of Walder and Gong, must also be used by cross-checking with other sources, many of which have newly emerged.
28. 'Gao quan shi renmin shu', and its accompanying 'Shi wen shu', both reprinted in Yuan ziliao 1, p.27.
29. Beijing Bureau of Public Security's Arrest Warrant dated 14 June 1989: Xinhua, 14 June 1989, reprinted in Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (ed.), Jianjue yonghu dang zhongyang juece jianjue pingxi fangeming baoluan (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1989), p.145.
30. Zhang Lun, 'Mo mo gengyun de Liu Huanwen', in Qilaile, p.156.
31. Hua Shan, op. cit.
32. In late May, Shen was joined by ex-student leader Zhou Yongjun in propaganda work. (Zhao Hongliang's interview in Zhongguo zhichun (ZZ), Nov. 1991, p.64; Hua Shan, op. cit.; Cheng Jin (former student leader), 'Gongyun yu xueyun, minyun', in Qilaile, pp. 174-814)
33. In late May, Shen was joined by ex-student leader Zhou Yongjun in propaganda work. (Zhao Hongliang's interview in Zhongguo zhichun (ZZ), Nov. 1991, p.64; Hua Shan, op. cit.; Cheng Jin (former student leader), 'Gongyun yu xueyun, minyun', in Qilaile, pp. 174-814)
34. In late May, Shen was joined by ex-student leader Zhou Yongjun in propaganda work. (Zhao Hongliang's interview in Zhongguo zhichun (ZZ), Nov. 1991, p.64; Hua Shan, op. cit.; Cheng Jin (former student leader), 'Gongyun yu xueyun, minyun', in Qilaile, pp. 174-814)
35. Gu Ding, op. cit.
36. Reprinted in Yuan ziliao 1, p.29. Authorship according to Gu Ding, op. cit.
37. Zhang Boli, 'Wo suo zhidao de Beijing "gongzilian"', Pai Shing, 1 Aug. 1991, pp.25-7. Zhang was the student leader who gave the approval.
38. Shen says a mid-May document of the same title was drafted by him (Hua Shan, op. cit.); the quotation from the document read out at the press conference in Zhang Boli, op. cit., shows the two to be the same document. The document is reprinted in Yuan ziliao, Vol.2 (hereinafter Yuan ziliao 2), p.43; no date is given, but in all probability, it was either 18 or 19 May.
39. Shen says a mid-May document of the same title was drafted by him (Hua Shan, op. cit.); the quotation from the document read out at the press conference in Zhang Boli, op. cit., shows the two to be the same document. The document is reprinted in Yuan ziliao, Vol.2 (hereinafter Yuan ziliao 2), p.43; no date is given, but in all probability, it was either 18 or 19 May.
40. Shen says a mid-May document of the same title was drafted by him (Hua Shan, op. cit.); the quotation from the document read out at the press conference in Zhang Boli, op. cit., shows the two to be the same document. The document is reprinted in Yuan ziliao, Vol.2 (hereinafter Yuan ziliao 2), p.43; no date is given, but in all probability, it was either 18 or 19 May.
41. According to Han Dongfang, the phrase 'chouweihui' served another, legal purpose: since the real union was yet to be formed, the BWAF could argue that they were not forming an illegal organization (Author's interview with Han).
42. Zhang Boli met him together with Liu Qiang et al. on 19 May (Zhang Boli, op. cit.). Han says that, when He joined on 20 May, he had already been with the group for some time. Since He's name has never been mentioned in the context of the group's existence during April and early May, it seems probable that He joined around the same time as Shen.
43. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Security, op. cit.
44. Zhang Boli, op. cit., dates the SC's formation to 23 May; Black and Munro, op. cit., p.222, to 25 May. There is a document entitled 'Beijing shi gongren zizhihui de gonggao' (reprinted in Yuan ziliao 1, p.29) which was dated 21 May and signed in the name of 'all members of the standing committee'. Han cannot recall the document, but is quite definite that the first SC was elected at a meeting on 23 May that was attended by 50-60 people, at which the group's 'Choujian gangling' (Preparatory Programme), drafted on 21 May by Li Jinjin (see below), was adopted. It is possible that the date of the above 'gonggao' is a misprint.
45. Author's interview with Han. Zhang went back to work soon after becoming an SC member, and never reappeared.
46. Hua Shan, op. cit.
47. Black and Munro, op. cit., p.224, states the attendance to be over 100, but Han says there were only 60-odd at most.
48. Lu Jinghua, 'Ji Beijing gongzilian yongshi', Qilaile, pp.139-45. Lu, a worker-turned-getihu (private business employing fewer than eight people), joined in late May and was put in charge of broadcasting.
49. Author's interview with Han; Li Pei'er and Mai Yanting, 'Zhou Yongjun de "pingfan"', Remin bu hui wangji (Hong Kong: Xianggang jizhe xiehui, 1989, enlarged edition), pp.227-30; Gu Ding, op. cit. It should be noted that while Shen and Zhao were formally given liaison responsibilities only on 28 May, they must already have been undertaking them all along, since joint activities with the students and other activities had beeen undertaken since 22 May. Shen himself states that he, Zhao and Liu Huanwen had all along been responsible for such work (Hua Shan, op. cit.)
50. Author's interview with Han; Li Pei'er and Mai Yanting, 'Zhou Yongjun de "pingfan"', Remin bu hui wangji (Hong Kong: Xianggang jizhe xiehui, 1989, enlarged edition), pp.227-30; Gu Ding, op. cit. It should be noted that while Shen and Zhao were formally given liaison responsibilities only on 28 May, they must already have been undertaking them all along, since joint activities with the students and other activities had beeen undertaken since 22 May. Shen himself states that he, Zhao and Liu Huanwen had all along been responsible for such work (Hua Shan, op. cit.)
51. Author's interview with Han; Li Pei'er and Mai Yanting, 'Zhou Yongjun de "pingfan"', Remin bu hui wangji (Hong Kong: Xianggang jizhe xiehui, 1989, enlarged edition), pp.227-30; Gu Ding, op. cit. It should be noted that while Shen and Zhao were formally given liaison responsibilities only on 28 May, they must already have been undertaking them all along, since joint activities with the students and other activities had beeen undertaken since 22 May. Shen himself states that he, Zhao and Liu Huanwen had all along been responsible for such work (Hua Shan, op. cit.)
52. The Joint Conference is to be distinguished from the Shoudou zhishijie lianhehui (Federation of Intellectuals of the Capital) organized by Yan Jiaqi et al.
53. Zhizhi, pp.109-10.
54. Renmin Ribao (RMRB), 31 May 1989; Wen Wei Boo (WWB, Hong Kong), 1 June 1989.
55. Renmin Ribao (RMRB), 31 May 1989; Wen Wei Boo (WWB, Hong Kong), 1 June 1989.
56. Based upon a recording in the possession of Lu Jinghua: see Lu's interview in ZZ, Nov. 1991, p.64.
57. Zhao Hongliang's interview in Qilaile, p.38.
58. Lu's interview 'Gongzilian renwu jianying fangwen (2) - cong fuzhuang dian jingxiao dao nu guangbo yuan', in Qilaile, pp.41-66 (pp.49-58).
59. Zhao Hongliang's interview in Qilaile, p.32. However, in Walder and Gong's account of the BWAF up to mid-May, which is largely based upon their interview with Zhao (whom they identify as activist No.1), the number of core activists is said to have swollen to around 150 only by mid-May (op. cit., p.7). As noted above (note 9), Zhao's evidence must be taken with great care.
60. Munro, op. cit., p.813. He cites no source for his data.
61. Walder and Gong, op. cit., p.9. According to them, this figure was claimed by both Zhao Hongliang and Lu Jinghua (whom they identify as activist No.2). As noted, Zhao's testimony must be taken with extreme caution. As to Lu, her claim of 20,000 contradicts her previously-quoted testimony (note 33).
62. Lu's interview in Qilaile, pp.58, 61.
63. Sources for the four new members respectively: Black and Munro, op. cit., p.222; Wu Ming, 'Momo wu wen de Beijing gongren zizhi hui houqin buchang', Dangdai, 19 May 1990, p.21; Li Jinjin, 'Wo suo renshi de Dong Huanmin', XZD, 19 March 1993, p.3; Walder and Gong, op. cit., p.16.
64. Sources for the four new members respectively: Black and Munro, op. cit., p.222; Wu Ming, 'Momo wu wen de Beijing gongren zizhi hui houqin buchang', Dangdai, 19 May 1990, p.21; Li Jinjin, 'Wo suo renshi de Dong Huanmin', XZD, 19 March 1993, p.3; Walder and Gong, op. cit., p.16.
65. Sources for the four new members respectively: Black and Munro, op. cit., p.222; Wu Ming, 'Momo wu wen de Beijing gongren zizhi hui houqin buchang', Dangdai, 19 May 1990, p.21; Li Jinjin, 'Wo suo renshi de Dong Huanmin', XZD, 19 March 1993, p.3; Walder and Gong, op. cit., p.16.
66. Sources for the four new members respectively: Black and Munro, op. cit., p.222; Wu Ming, 'Momo wu wen de Beijing gongren zizhi hui houqin buchang', Dangdai, 19 May 1990, p.21; Li Jinjin, 'Wo suo renshi de Dong Huanmin', XZD, 19 March 1993, p.3; Walder and Gong, op. cit., p.16.
67. It is worth pointing out that workers struggling for working-class demands (which include economic demands such as wage increases or political demands such as freeing imprisoned labour activists, or a combination) may, and sometimes do, also raise other demands which are not specifically working-class in nature, such as freedom of speech. As can be seen, in addition to wages and similar issues, the early BWAF leaders also spoke against official privileges and corruption, which were more of a populist (that is, non-class-specific) nature.
68. Liang Hong, op. cit., p.2. In his interview with Walder, Zhao Hongliang spoke about his interest in democracy in addition to the above issues (Walder 1991, passim). However, none of this interest of Zhao's found its way into the group's documents of this period, showing that the dominant concerns of the early BWAF leaders as a whole were as stated above.
69. Reprinted in Yuan ziliao 1, p.28; authorship unknown. Han tells the author that it does not read like Li Jinjin's work. Its much greater length than the group's first two documents suggests an intellectual origin.
70. 'Jueshi xuanyan' (Hunger Strike Manifesto), of which different versions exist: see Bajiu zhongguo minyun ziliao ce (Hong Kong: Xianggang zhongwen daxue xueshenghui, 1990; hereinafter Zhongda), pp.160, 161, and 534.
71. Chen Xitong, 'Guanyu zhizhi dongluan he pingxi fangeming baoluan de qingkuang baogao', report delievered to SC of the National People's Congress (NPC) on 30 June 1989; Yang Shangkun, internal speech dated 22 May 1989, reprinted in MB, 7 July and 30 May 1989 respectively.
72. Reprinted in Ho Zizhou (ed.), Xuewo zhonghua: bajiu nian Beijing xuechao ziliaoji, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Xianggang xinyidai wenhua xiehui, 1989), p.62.
73. In accordance with the Constitution, martial law imposed by the State Council can be rescinded by the NPCSC; once martial law was rescinded, the NPC could then meet to depose Li Peng and Yang Shangkun.
74. The demand for Deng Xiaoping to step down was also raised in the first two days after the declaration of martial law, but was then abruptly withdrawn by the intellectuals for tactical reasons.
75. Reprinted in Qilaile, p.228, which dates it only in May, but it is certain from its contents that it was 19 May. Authorship according to Hua Shan, op. cit.
76. These were: (1) 'Beijing gongren zizhi lianhehui choubeichu gonggao (di yi hao)' dated 20 May; (2) a joint declaration signed by the BWAF, the autonomous union of the students, and the hunger-strikers, drafted by Li Jinjin and dated 20 May; (3) 'Beijing shi gongren zizhihui de gonggao' dated 21 May; (4) 'Shoudou gongren zizhi lianhehui choujian gangling' (this is the previously-mentioned Preparatory Programme) dated 21 May, drafted by Li Jinjin; 5. 'Gongren xuanyan' dated 21 May; (6) 'Jinji huyu' dated 24 May; (7) 'Jinji dongyuan qilai, gong ke bashi mandai de ba shi di yu' dated 26 May and drafted by Dong Huaimin; (8) 'Gao kai wai tongbao shu' dated 26 May and drafted by Dong Huaimin; (9) 'Zhongguo xianzhuang shi da guai' dated 26 May; (10) 'Gongren xiongdi, dongyuan qilai' dated 27 May; (11) 'Shoudou gongren zizhi lianhehui linshi zhangcheng' (this is the previously-mentioned Provisional Statutes) drafted by Li Jinjin and passed by the group on 28 May; and (12) 'Renmin de haoling' dated 29 May. All except item 2 are reprinted in Yuan ziliao 1, pp.29-31, and Yuan ziliao 2, pp.42-8. Item 2 is reprinted in Zhonggong yanjiu zazhi she, Wo yu xue de zhenxiang: zhongguo dalu minzhu yundong jishi, 1989 (Taipei: Zhongguo yanjiu zazhi she, 1989), Section 4, pp 85-7. Authorship of items 2, 4 and 8, and 7, according to Gu Ding, op. cit.; Han's personal communication; and Li Jinjin, op. cit. respectively.
77. These were: (1) 'Beijing gongren zizhi lianhehui choubeichu gonggao (di yi hao)' dated 20 May; (2) a joint declaration signed by the BWAF, the autonomous union of the students, and the hunger-strikers, drafted by Li Jinjin and dated 20 May; (3) 'Beijing shi gongren zizhihui de gonggao' dated 21 May; (4) 'Shoudou gongren zizhi lianhehui choujian gangling' (this is the previously-mentioned Preparatory Programme) dated 21 May, drafted by Li Jinjin; 5. 'Gongren xuanyan' dated 21 May; (6) 'Jinji huyu' dated 24 May; (7) 'Jinji dongyuan qilai, gong ke bashi mandai de ba shi di yu' dated 26 May and drafted by Dong Huaimin; (8) 'Gao kai wai tongbao shu' dated 26 May and drafted by Dong Huaimin; (9) 'Zhongguo xianzhuang shi da guai' dated 26 May; (10) 'Gongren xiongdi, dongyuan qilai' dated 27 May; (11) 'Shoudou gongren zizhi lianhehui linshi zhangcheng' (this is the previously-mentioned Provisional Statutes) drafted by Li Jinjin and passed by the group on 28 May; and (12) 'Renmin de haoling' dated 29 May. All except item 2 are reprinted in Yuan ziliao 1, pp.29-31, and Yuan ziliao 2, pp.42-8. Item 2 is reprinted in Zhonggong yanjiu zazhi she, Wo yu xue de zhenxiang: zhongguo dalu minzhu yundong jishi, 1989 (Taipei: Zhongguo yanjiu zazhi she, 1989), Section 4, pp 85-7. Authorship of items 2, 4 and 8, and 7, according to Gu Ding, op. cit.; Han's personal communication; and Li Jinjin, op. cit. respectively.
78. These were: (1) 'Beijing gongren zizhi lianhehui choubeichu gonggao (di yi hao)' dated 20 May; (2) a joint declaration signed by the BWAF, the autonomous union of the students, and the hunger-strikers, drafted by Li Jinjin and dated 20 May; (3) 'Beijing shi gongren zizhihui de gonggao' dated 21 May; (4) 'Shoudou gongren zizhi lianhehui choujian gangling' (this is the previously-mentioned Preparatory Programme) dated 21 May, drafted by Li Jinjin; 5. 'Gongren xuanyan' dated 21 May; (6) 'Jinji huyu' dated 24 May; (7) 'Jinji dongyuan qilai, gong ke bashi mandai de ba shi di yu' dated 26 May and drafted by Dong Huaimin; (8) 'Gao kai wai tongbao shu' dated 26 May and drafted by Dong Huaimin; (9) 'Zhongguo xianzhuang shi da guai' dated 26 May; (10) 'Gongren xiongdi, dongyuan qilai' dated 27 May; (11) 'Shoudou gongren zizhi lianhehui linshi zhangcheng' (this is the previously-mentioned Provisional Statutes) drafted by Li Jinjin and passed by the group on 28 May; and (12) 'Renmin de haoling' dated 29 May. All except item 2 are reprinted in Yuan ziliao 1, pp.29-31, and Yuan ziliao 2, pp.42-8. Item 2 is reprinted in Zhonggong yanjiu zazhi she, Wo yu xue de zhenxiang: zhongguo dalu minzhu yundong jishi, 1989 (Taipei: Zhongguo yanjiu zazhi she, 1989), Section 4, pp 85-7. Authorship of items 2, 4 and 8, and 7, according to Gu Ding, op. cit.; Han's personal communication; and Li Jinjin, op. cit. respectively.
79. These were: (1) 'Beijing gongren zizhi lianhehui choubeichu gonggao (di yi hao)' dated 20 May; (2) a joint declaration signed by the BWAF, the autonomous union of the students, and the hunger-strikers, drafted by Li Jinjin and dated 20 May; (3) 'Beijing shi gongren zizhihui de gonggao' dated 21 May; (4) 'Shoudou gongren zizhi lianhehui choujian gangling' (this is the previously-mentioned Preparatory Programme) dated 21 May, drafted by Li Jinjin; 5. 'Gongren xuanyan' dated 21 May; (6) 'Jinji huyu' dated 24 May; (7) 'Jinji dongyuan qilai, gong ke bashi mandai de ba shi di yu' dated 26 May and drafted by Dong Huaimin; (8) 'Gao kai wai tongbao shu' dated 26 May and drafted by Dong Huaimin; (9) 'Zhongguo xianzhuang shi da guai' dated 26 May; (10) 'Gongren xiongdi, dongyuan qilai' dated 27 May; (11) 'Shoudou gongren zizhi lianhehui linshi zhangcheng' (this is the previously-mentioned Provisional Statutes) drafted by Li Jinjin and passed by the group on 28 May; and (12) 'Renmin de haoling' dated 29 May. All except item 2 are reprinted in Yuan ziliao 1, pp.29-31, and Yuan ziliao 2, pp.42-8. Item 2 is reprinted in Zhonggong yanjiu zazhi she, Wo yu xue de zhenxiang: zhongguo dalu minzhu yundong jishi, 1989 (Taipei: Zhongguo yanjiu zazhi she, 1989), Section 4, pp 85-7. Authorship of items 2, 4 and 8, and 7, according to Gu Ding, op. cit.; Han's personal communication; and Li Jinjin, op. cit. respectively.
80. It is interesting to note that such an organization would be similar in nature to Poland's Solidarity of 1980-81. On this dual nature of Solidarity, see Alain Touraine, Solidarity: Poland 1980-81 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.55-9. However, Han Dongfang tells the author that he was not at the time aware of the parallel with Solidarity. He does not know whether or not Li Jinjin and others were aware of it.
81. During this time, former RMRB editor Hu Jiwei and others were collecting signatures from NPCSC members to demand its convention in emergency session. Wan Li was then on a trip to North America. His early return was thus required. Wan's early return was announced on 23 May. He landed in Shanghai on 25 May, but stayed there, instead of returning to Beijing. Apparently, Zhao Ziyang either sent Wan a telegram himself on 21 May, asking him to return early to convene the NPCSC, or gave approval to the dangzu (party fraction) of the NPCSC to send Wan a similar telegram (WWB, 6 July 1989, p.2, and 25 July 1989, p.1)
82. Black and Munro, op. cit., p.222.
83. Zhizhi, pp. 109-10; Qilaile, p.79: photograph shows the group marching under these slogans.
84. Zhizhi, pp. 109-10; Qilaile, p.79: photograph shows the group marching under these slogans.
85. In my interview with Han Dongfang, I told him: 'I find it surprising that despite what is being said in the "Choujian gangling" and the "Linshi zhangcheng", the BWAF made not one single working-class demand in late May'. In an earnest subsequent discussion, Han readily agreed that 'in terms of contents (cong neirong lai jiang), the BWAF never played any trade union role'. He also agreed that the BWAF had acted only as a support force for the students and the intellectuals. Significantly, he reveals that, dissatisfied with such a situation, on the eve of the crackdown, he discussed with Li Jinjin the possibility of moving the group out of Tiananmen Square altogether (so as to dissociate from the mainstream movement), rent a place as its headquarters, and work in the industrial districts for the purpose of asking workers to join them to build a union on the basis of the 'Linshi zhangcheng'. In short, to start anew on a specifically working-class basis. But the crackdown killed their plans. In the interview, Han makes no claim that the support force role was a tactical choice. It is not known whether or not it might have been intended as such on the part of some other leaders. However, even if it was (which I doubt in view of Han's and Li's discussion, noted above), this in no way affects our analysis, simply because it still remains a fact that the group's politics changed between April and May. The question of whether or not any individual BWAF leader actually meant the change to be a tactic does not alter this fact itself. (Incidentally, tactics on the part of the BWAF are obviously an area where further research can be done. We know about some of the tactical decisions made by it. For instance, adding the phrase 'chouweihui' to its name [note 19]. Another example is their choice not to mention the right to strike in 'Linshi zhangcheng' or any other document, in order to remain within the Constitution. However, as just noted, the fact of the group's political change remains unaffected whether or not tactical considerations entered into it.)
86. Munro argues that the BWAF 'represented the terrifying power of the workers awakened' and draws a parallel between 1989 and Poland: 'the prospect of organized unrest and dissent among the urban working class, along the lines of Poland's Solidarity. Above all, it was the rapid trend toward just such a movement ... in Beijing ...' (op. cit., pp.812-13) What Munro is suggesting, it would appear, is that a quasi-Polish situation existed in 1989, in which the BWAF played a role analogous to Solidarity, although perhaps only in miniature. Disregarding the intimated quasi-Polish situation, and the BWAF's incomparably smaller influence on the working class than Solidarity's, it would appear that to liken the former to the latter in terms of the BWAF's politics (not as it is stated in the 'Linshi zhangcheng', but as it was in relation to the mass movement's development as just analysed) is also unjustified, as the following shows. When strikes broke out in 1980 in Gdansk (referring only to the Solidarity of 1980-81 for the sake of convenience), strike committees were formed at various enterprises, which established the MKS (Inter-factory Committee). The MKS drew up a list of '21 Points' to negotiate with the government (the text can be found in A. Kemp-Welch, The Birth of Solidarity: The Gdansk Negotiations, 1980 (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp.168-78). Point 1 demanded the right to form free trade unions; point 4 the release, among others, of imprisoned workers and activists; point 9 the indexation of wage increases to the price index; and so on. Note that unlike the 'Linshi zhangcheng', which represented the BWAF's stated intentions, point 1, in common with all the other 20 points, was an immediate demand on the basis of which the striking workers were mobilized for the Polish government to fulfil. Walder and Gong state that the 'Gongren xiongdi, dongyuan qilai' of 27 May was 'the only [BWAF] handbill we have found that supports any specific leader or group within the government' (op. cit., p.22, n.68) This seems to be mistaken, for 'Jinji huyu' (24 May) did the same thing. More importantly, our analysis, arguing that since the declaration of martial law the BWAF had faithfully been putting the programme of the intellectuals into practice, does not appear in Walder and Gong's discussion; neither is the origin of this programme (the demand to convene the NPC/NPCSC) mentioned. On the contrary, they actually state: 'The [BWAF's] consequent unwillingness to differentiate among the Party leadership in the midst of the political struggles of May left them estranged from the pro-reform intellectuals who participated in the protests, and from many of the students, who sought to buttress Zhao's forces... Our [BWAF] informants reported that the workers were wary from mid-May onward about getting involved in leadership struggles and being used and discarded in the process' (ibid., p.22). It may very well be true that Walder and Gong's informants (Zhao Hongliang and Lu Jinghua) did not want to be used by Zhao Ziyang's aides, but our analysis shows that the BWAF's politics changed in May irrespective of what they did or did not want to happen. Finally, on the basis mainly of their interviews with Zhao Hongliang and Lu Jinghua, and the BWAF's leaflets in which material concerns were raised, Walder and Gong discuss (op. cit., pp. 15-27) differences between the students and BWAF activists in terms of political mentality, attitude toward economic reform, and so on, and also frictions between the two parties. The class awareness of the BWAF's leaders - at least the majority of them - is not doubted, but the change in the group's politics is in no way affected because of this (the specific roles played by, and the importance of, Zhao Hongliang and Lu Jinghua in the BWAF in May should be noted).
87. This change in the social composition of the leadership, something that has also not been analysed in the existing literature, sometimes occurred in a de facto, though not de jure, manner. For instance, Liu Qiang was elected to the first SC, while neither Shen Yinhan nor Li Jinjin was a member. However, as noted, the SC did not function as a leadership at all, while the roles played by Shen and Li have been noted. Liu Qiang, in fact, became so frustrated that in the end he organized his own 'Beijing Workers' Picket Corps', independently of the BWAF (Walder, c.1992, p.6).
88. In this section, the focus is on the general working class. There were rumours (in my view, unsubstantiated) in mid-May that the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) was to call a general strike. Since the ACFTU neither articulated its members' views nor enjoyed their support, whatever the decisions of its leadership were, they cannot be taken as representative of its members' position. For this reason, I regard the behaviour of the ACFTU leadership during this time as a subject of the intra-party struggle. Similarly, the behaviour of some ACFTU cadres (demanding the convention of an emergency NPCSC session, and so forth) properly comes under the heading of the inner fracture of the party and state apparatus. Neither will, therefore, be discussed in this article. Furthermore, the caveat in note 4 (above) applies throughout this section: our concern here is with the majority of the working class. Given the BWAF's size of only 50-60 active members (there is no reason to assume that those who hung around at one time or another were of similar levels of political consciousness), its positions cannot, without supporting evidence, be taken to be representative of the working class in general, or even of a significant proportion of it. For instance, it would be mistaken to say that workers, or at least a substantial number of them, were ready in 1989 to support the formation of independent unions simply by pointing to the formation of the BWAF. Whether or not any significant number of workers were really ready has to be determined by other means, such as by reference to the kind of evidence to be examined in this section (see also note 105, below).
89. All figures taken or calculated from Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1989 (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe 1989), p.138; Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 1994 (hereinafter LDTJNJ) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe 1994), p.56.
90. LDTJNJ 1992, p.442.
91. I have come across no total figures for 1987-88, the figures given in the text come from a 1989 national survey of 43,825 SOEs which had adopted the practice (Zhongguo laodong gongzi tongji nianjian 1990 (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe 1990), pp.350-51). The percentage of basic wage to total wage for 1988 is taken from LDTJNJ 1994, p.359.
92. I have come across no total figures for 1987-88, the figures given in the
93. Raymond W.K. Lau, 'China: Labour Reform and the Challenge Facing the Working Class', January 1996 manuscript available from the author.
94. Walder (1991, p.479) remarks that 'there have emerged no new means of negotiating labour issues, either collectively or individually. China's enterprises ended the 1980s with the same powerless trade unions and workers' congresses with which they began them.' This appears to be inaccurate: as Lau, op. cit., points out, no one has been more acutely aware of the transformation of labour-state into labour-management contradictions than the Chinese government itself, which has since July 1987 established new mechanisms for the purpose of keeping labour disputes under official control on a daily basis, as it were, namely, enterprise Industrial Disputes Resolution Committees (laodong zhengyi tiaojie weiyuanhui) and territorial Arbitration Committees (zhongcai weiyuanhui).
95. For instance, Wang, 1993. Zhu Jianhua, 'Cong bu man gaige dao tongqing xueyun?' Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu zhongxing lunwen, Vol.3, No.8 (Aug. 1992), pp.2-25, finds that in a survey conducted among 2,500 people (65.2 per cent of whom were manual workers) in an unnamed city in early 1989, there was a positive correlation between dissatisfaction with the results of economic reforms and verbal support for the students' demonstrations of 1986-87.
96. See Appendix. It should be noted that while I have examined a substantial number of newspapers, compilations and other sources, the examination is by no means exhaustive. Contrary evidence may exist in sources which I have not perused. However, my argument is that the scope of my examination is broad enough for the picture provided by it to possess a high degree of accuracy.
97. Fang Liangzhu et al., op. cit., p.61, photograph.
98. Zhongda, p.192. Zhongda reproduces four lists of slogans (pp 191-5, 443, 444 and 487). The above is taken from the first which in turn is taken from a students' poster reproducing some of the slogans of the march on 19 May. The lists, however, do not identify the slogans' origins, although their dates are known or deducible. Extreme care must, therefore, be exercised in making use of them.
99. Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (ZGQNB), 19 May 1989, p.1.
100. Zhongda, p.192; see the caveat in note 65, above.
101. MB, 19 May 1989, p.1; ZGQNB, 19 May 1989, p.1.
102. MB, 19 May 1989, p.1; ZGQNB, 19 May 1989, p.1.
103. FBIS-CHI-89-095 (18 May), pp.48, 37, 47; 56 Days, p.118; Zhongda, pp.191-5.
104. FBIS-CHI-89-095 (18 May), pp.48, 37, 47; 56 Days, p.118; Zhongda, pp.191-5.
105. FBIS-CHI-89-095 (18 May), pp.48, 37, 47; 56 Days, p.118; Zhongda, pp.191-5.
106. Hong Kong Standard (HKS), 20 May 1989, p.6. A couple of other cases are also worth mentioning, as they may be taken as similar evidence. The following slogan has been reported: 'If Li Peng does not go home, workers will not go home'. But this report comes from Tiananmen 1989 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban gongsi 1989), p.360, which identifies neither the source of the slogan nor its date. The date is just as important as the source because the small number of workers who continued to demonstrate in late May were probably much more militant than the vast majority of workers who had stopped protesting; some of them were also possibly associated with the BWAF in one way or another. Thus, they constituted a small minority which cannot be considered, without supporting evidence, as being representative of the class as a whole. On 19 May, Anne Penketh of AFP reported that, in talking to some Beijing workers, one told her: 'We have lost trust in the government. If the government is incapable, it should step down' (FBIS-CHI-89-096 (19 May), p.36). However, speaking under anonymity to a foreign reporter and brandishing a banner under the public eye are two different things altogether.
107. HKS, 19 May 1989, p.8.
108. Yuan ziliao 2, p.3, photograph.
109. According to Zhao Hongliang, some construction workers split from the BWAF to found their own group (Walder and Gong, op. cit., p. 11, note 34) This is the Cheng jian gongren zifa lianhehui mentioned above (note 8). The date of its 'Zhongzhi' (21 May) suggests that its members split from the BWAF before then. It seems probable that the banner in question was produced by them or at least some of them. In addition to the two cases mentioned in the text, there is, in fact, another similar case. Since it involves an argument put forth by Walder, it is preferable to deal with it in a note. Walder (1991, p.467) argues that in 1989 workers' economic discontentment was 'widely expressed in the form of a political critque of corrupt officialdom, and as a demand for greater democracy'. By the former he means the view that if there is democracy, officials will be subject to citizens' supervision, thereby closing the door to guandao. In her despatch dated 19 May, AFP's Anne Penketh also reports another worker as telling her: 'without democracy, we can't eliminate corruption'. In his paper, Walder similarly quotes a former Beijing worker whom he has interviewed: 'Workers thought that inflation was caused by corruption, and that if there was more democracy, there would be less corruption' (ibid., p.484). What does evidence of this type tell us about whether or not workers demanded democracy? While there can be little doubt that some workers did share the view of the these two workers, the important question is whether or not the workers who actually demonstrated in 1989 did so because they held such a view, if they held such a view at all. In other words, while some workers did put forth anti-corruption slogans in their demonstration, and undoubtedly some workers did hold the above view, this does not allow us to conclude that this view was the reason workers demonstrated. This is simply because a worker who demonstrated and shouted an anti-corruption slogan might not be holding the ascribed view: he might, for instance, believe that corruption could be eliminated by replacing bad with good officials; moreover, a worker who did hold such a view might not have participated in any demonstration at all, or even if he did, might have done so for another reason. Since workers do not demonstrate in silence, but put forth demands, enunciate slogans and otherwise express opinions, the best way to find out what caused them to demonstrate is to examine these demands and slogans themselves, while the views of interviewees can be used in a supplementary way. In view of this, the expression of the above view by some individual interviewees should not, on its own, be used to determine whether or not protesting workers demanded democracy.
110. As noted (previous note), Walder argues that workers did demand greater democracy in 1989. In addition to the passage already quoted, he further states (1991, pp.487-8): '[the] work unit delegations [which included enterprise contingents] were expressly political ... They called for greater democracy and freedom.' Walder quotes Zhao Hongliang: 'Why do a lot of workers agree with democracy and freedom? ... In the factory the director is a dictator, what one man says goes. If you view the state from the angle of the factory, it's about the same, one man rule ... we want rule by laws, not by men ... In work units, it's personal rule' (p.483). He argues that this perception of the 'connection' between democracy and labour-management relations was 'likely to have been evident to a great many' workers (ibid.). As noted, given the BWAFs lack of roots and influence among the general working class, it would appear to us that the views of its members cannot be taken as being representative of it without supporting evidence. Moreover, as analysed in the previous note, the relevant question in ascertaining the actual cause of the protests is not whether or not some 'workers agree[d] with democracy and freedom' hypothetically, but whether or not demonstrating workers actually put forth such demands. In addition to the above, Walder also cites the call for democracy in the BWAF's 'Linshi zhangcheng' to support his argument. Both of the above comments would appear to apply. In rejecting Walder's argument that workers demanded democracy, I am not saying that none of the workers who demonstrated supported democracy. What I am saying is that, on the basis of the available evidence, the vast majority of the workers who demonstrated were not motivated in their protest by fundamental support for democracy (however general or vague it was) for which some of them might be demonstrating.
111. See Lu Jinghua's interview in Qilaile, pp.42-4. Interestingly, students from Beijing Normal University conducted two surveys in early May, the (similar) results of which lend further support to the argument of the present article: see Poll Work Group, Psychology Department, Beijing Normal University, 'Beijing Public Opinion Poll on the Student Demonstrations', China Information, Vol.4, No.1 (Summer 1989), pp.94-124.
112. See Lu Jinghua's interview in Qilaile, pp.42-4. Interestingly, students from Beijing Normal University conducted two surveys in early May, the (similar) results of which lend further support to the argument of the present article: see Poll Work Group, Psychology Department, Beijing Normal University, 'Beijing Public Opinion Poll on the Student Demonstrations', China Information, Vol.4, No.1 (Summer 1989), pp.94-124.
113. This is true, not only of general workers, but even of many militant activists. According to Zhao Hongliang, he and others formed the BWAF on 20 April after the student-police clashes earlier that day, because 'we felt we should immediately set up a workers' organization to protect the students' (Liang Hong, op. cit., p. 1). Lu Jinghua has also related that the shimen shengyuan tuan (probably the one formed by Shen Tinhan) which she followed on 20 May marched under the slogan of 'citizens of the capital, unite to protect the students, [this is our] unshirkable duty' (Lu's interview in Qilaile, p.48).
114. WWB, 19 May 1989, p.1, photograph. The question mark refers to an illegible character, the word within square brackets to a character not actually shown in the photograph, but can be guessed at with complete certainty.
115. WWB, 18 May 1989, p.2; MB, 19 May 1989, p.1; Zhongda, p.186; ZGQNB, 19 May 1989, p.1; Fang Liangzhu et al., op. cit., p.61, photograph.
116. WWB, 18 May 1989, p.2; MB, 19 May 1989, p.1; Zhongda, p.186; ZGQNB, 19 May 1989, p.1; Fang Liangzhu et al., op. cit., p.61, photograph.
117. WWB, 18 May 1989, p.2; MB, 19 May 1989, p.1; Zhongda, p.186; ZGQNB, 19 May 1989, p.1; Fang Liangzhu et al., op. cit., p.61, photograph.
118. WWB, 18 May 1989, p.2; MB, 19 May 1989, p.1; Zhongda, p.186; ZGQNB, 19 May 1989, p.1; Fang Liangzhu et al., op. cit., p.61, photograph.
119. WWB, 18 May 1989, p.2; MB, 19 May 1989, p.1; Zhongda, p.186; ZGQNB, 19 May 1989, p.1; Fang Liangzhu et al., op. cit., p.61, photograph.
120. Renmin bu hui wangji, p. 104; Yuan ziliao 2, p.97, photograph.
121. Renmin bu hui wangji, p. 104; Yuan ziliao 2, p.97, photograph.
122. What they did not know about them is even more important, as will be shown below.
123. Reproduced in Sichuan ribao bianjibu, Xuechao, dongluan, baoluan (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1989), p.75.
124. Shen Tong, secretary-general of the Dialogue Delegation, gives a detailed first-hand account of the dialogue in his Almost a Revolution (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), pp.244-51.
125. Xinhua, 15 May 1989, reprinted in Sichuan ribao bianjibu, op. cit., pp.76-7. This dialogue, however, was boycotted by the Dialogue Delegation (Shen Tong, op. cit., p.239)
126. Xinhua, 15 May 1989, reprinted in Sichuan ribao bianjibu, op. cit., pp.76-7. This dialogue, however, was boycotted by the Dialogue Delegation (Shen Tong, op. cit., p.239)
127. Space forbids an analysis of the nature of this demand. Suffice to say that it was modelled, almost word for word, on the Gdansk negotiations of August 1980. For an account of the latter, see Kemp-Welch, op. cit.
128. See, for instance, GRRB's report on 18 May 1989 (p.2). Not only Beijing workers at the time, but numerous authors subsequently, have underplayed the significance of the demand for dialogue: see, for instance, David Strand, 'Protest in Beijing: Civil Society and Public Sphere in China', Problems of Communism, Vol.34, No.3 (1990), pp.1-19, p 1; Ruth Cherrington, China's Students: The Struggle for Democracy (London: Routledge, 1991), p.149; Craig Calhoun, 'Revolution and Repression in Tiananmen Square', Society, Vol.26, No.6 (1989), p.23.
129. See, for instance, GRRB's report on 18 May 1989 (p.2). Not only Beijing workers at the time, but numerous authors subsequently, have underplayed the significance of the demand for dialogue: see, for instance, David Strand, 'Protest in Beijing: Civil Society and Public Sphere in China', Problems of Communism, Vol.34, No.3 (1990), pp.1-19, p 1; Ruth Cherrington, China's Students: The Struggle for Democracy (London: Routledge, 1991), p.149; Craig Calhoun, 'Revolution and Repression in Tiananmen Square', Society, Vol.26, No.6 (1989), p.23.
130. See, for instance, GRRB's report on 18 May 1989 (p.2). Not only Beijing workers at the time, but numerous authors subsequently, have underplayed the significance of the demand for dialogue: see, for instance, David Strand, 'Protest in Beijing: Civil Society and Public Sphere in China', Problems of Communism, Vol.34, No.3 (1990), pp.1-19, p 1; Ruth Cherrington, China's Students: The Struggle for Democracy (London: Routledge, 1991), p.149; Craig Calhoun, 'Revolution and Repression in Tiananmen Square', Society, Vol.26, No.6 (1989), p.23.
131. The first survey conducted by Beijing Normal University's students found that 73.9 per cent of the respondents thought the dingxing to be 'unfair': Poll Work Group, op. cit., p.99.
132. FBIS-CHI-89-095 (18 May), pp.72-5, and 89-097 (22 May), pp.75-7.
133. An ACFTU cadre and a BWAF leader have both testified to the effect of the contrast on them and their colleagues (Qilaile, pp.99 and 114, respectively). One slogan shouted by Shougang workers was 'Premier, premier, why don't you care?' (Lu Jinghua's interview in Qilaile, pp.45-6). A cab driver told a Hong Kong citizen on 19 May of their sympathy for the students because of the government's indifference toward the students' lives (Witness statement, Editorial Board of the June 4 Eyewitness Accounts, The Eyes Have It, 2nd edn (Hong Kong: Grassy Plan, 1990), p.573). Further evidence can be found in the appeals of this period mentioned above.
134. HKS, 19 May 1989, p. 1.
135. RMRB, 18 May 1989, p.1.
136. See (1) Beijing ski gaoxiao xuesheng zizhi lianhehui (Autonomous Students' Federation of Beijing's Higher Learning Institutes), 'Shengming' (Declaration), 1 May 1989, in Zhongda, pp.108-10; and (2) a letter that Wang Dan and other student leaders delivered on 2 May (reproduced in Xinhua, 3 May, reprinted in Sichuan ribao bianjibu (eds.), op. cit., pp.48-50). (1) was probably unknown to the population other than the more active students and intellectuals; (2) was carried in full in RMRB on 4 May (p. 2), but there is every reason to believe that it did not feature in workers' minds in mid-May for several reasons. First, the letter was a long, tedious and technical document, and when it was published in early May the working class was all quiet. Under such circumstances, few workers would have paid attention to such a document. Even those who did would probably have forgotten about it amidst the crisis situation of mid-May.
137. The letter of 2 May delivered by Wang Dan et al. demanded only the presence of officials of the rank of Politburo SC member or above, Vice-Premier or above, and NPC Vice-Chairman or above. Compare the Gdansk negotiations at which the Polish authorities were represented by Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Jagielski.
138. See, for instance, the letter of the ten university presidents in RMRB, 17 May 1989, p.2; and the letter of 17 May addressed to Zhao Ziyang by Fei Xiaotong (chairman of the China Democratic League) and others, printed in both GRRB and RMRB on 18 May.
139. GRRB, 18 May 1989, p.1.
140. Yuan Mu's remarks on 29 April (Sichuan ribao bianjibu, op. cit., p.39). Similar remarks were also made by Li Tieying and Yan Mingfu at the 15 May dialogue (ibid., pp.76-7).
141. Yuan Mu's remarks on 29 April (Sichuan ribao bianjibu, op. cit., p.39). Similar remarks were also made by Li Tieying and Yan Mingfu at the 15 May dialogue (ibid., pp.76-7).
142. Li Peng's speech on the evening of 19 May 1989, reprinted in Ho Zizhou, op. cit., Vol.1, pp.63-6 (p.64).
143. See, for instance, Wu'er Kaixi's interview in MB, 17 June 1989.
144. Whether or not such a programme was 'anti-socialist' is open to interpretation, but it was certainly anti-system. It can thus be seen that the editorial's dingxing was inextricably tied to the existence of such a programme. But just as most Beijingers were unaware of the latter, they found it difficult, as noted, to understand why students willing to die for the country should receive such a dingxing. Without intimating any value judgment, the author wishes to point out that an exiled dissident who reacted angrily to the editorial in 1989 has told him that he has since realized that his reaction was based upon an erroneous understanding of the editorial, which was not helped by its provocative style.
145. Ostergaard aigues that 'The extent of [the workers'] actions amounted to an undeclared general strike': see Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, 'Citizens, Groups, and a Nascent Civil Society in China: Toward an Understanding of the 1989 Student Demonstrations', China Information, Vol.4, No.2 (Autumn 1989), p.32. This would appear to us to be inaccurate, as the following shows. Workers' contingents on 17-19 May carried banners identifying their work units. Under China's stringent and highly sophisticated (though relaxing over the 1980s) system of social control (such as fixed employment and the dang'an [personal file] system) which greatly inhibited actions expressing discontentment, this implied management's approval of the marches. (The reason management gave approval on 17 May, and not earlier or later, cannot be discussed here; suffice to note that it was closely related to Zhao Ziyang's revelation on the afternoon of 16 May, in a televised meeting with the visiting Gorbachev, that the first plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee made a secret decision to retain Deng Xiaoping as the highest authority.) Thus, in an important sense, the contingents represented the enterprises, instead of being working-class delegations, although they were composed mostly of workers. Furthermore, many of them began their marches only after work (see Lu's interview in Qilaile, pp.45-6; Zhongda, p.186; Wang Chaohua, 'Gongren wei shenme mei neng fadong qilai', Jiushi niandai, Oct. 1990, pp.106-7). They also comprised only 'a few representatives' of the employees, while the rest went on with their work (Walder, 1991, p.486).
146. Ostergaard aigues that 'The extent of [the workers'] actions amounted to an undeclared general strike': see Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, 'Citizens, Groups, and a Nascent Civil Society in China: Toward an Understanding of the 1989 Student Demonstrations', China Information, Vol.4, No.2 (Autumn 1989), p.32. This would appear to us to be inaccurate, as the following shows. Workers' contingents on 17-19 May carried banners identifying their work units. Under China's stringent and highly sophisticated (though relaxing over the 1980s) system of social control (such as fixed employment and the dang'an [personal file] system) which greatly inhibited actions expressing discontentment, this implied management's approval of the marches. (The reason management gave approval on 17 May, and not earlier or later, cannot be discussed here; suffice to note that it was closely related to Zhao Ziyang's revelation on the afternoon of 16 May, in a televised meeting with the visiting Gorbachev, that the first plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee made a secret decision to retain Deng Xiaoping as the highest authority.) Thus, in an important sense, the contingents represented the enterprises, instead of being working-class delegations, although they were composed mostly of workers. Furthermore, many of them began their marches only after work (see Lu's interview in Qilaile, pp.45-6; Zhongda, p.186; Wang Chaohua, 'Gongren wei shenme mei neng fadong qilai', Jiushi niandai, Oct. 1990, pp.106-7). They also comprised only 'a few representatives' of the employees, while the rest went on with their work (Walder, 1991, p.486).
147. Ostergaard aigues that 'The extent of [the workers'] actions amounted to an undeclared general strike': see Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, 'Citizens, Groups, and a Nascent Civil Society in China: Toward an Understanding of the 1989 Student Demonstrations', China Information, Vol.4, No.2 (Autumn 1989), p.32. This would appear to us to be inaccurate, as the following shows. Workers' contingents on 17-19 May carried banners identifying their work units. Under China's stringent and highly sophisticated (though relaxing over the 1980s) system of social control (such as fixed employment and the dang'an [personal file] system) which greatly inhibited actions expressing discontentment, this implied management's approval of the marches. (The reason management gave approval on 17 May, and not earlier or later, cannot be discussed here; suffice to note that it was closely related to Zhao Ziyang's revelation on the afternoon of 16 May, in a televised meeting with the visiting Gorbachev, that the first plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee made a secret decision to retain Deng Xiaoping as the highest authority.) Thus, in an important sense, the contingents represented the enterprises, instead of being working-class delegations, although they were composed mostly of workers. Furthermore, many of them began their marches only after work (see Lu's interview in Qilaile, pp.45-6; Zhongda, p.186; Wang Chaohua, 'Gongren wei shenme mei neng fadong qilai', Jiushi niandai, Oct. 1990, pp.106-7). They also comprised only 'a few representatives' of the employees, while the rest went on with their work (Walder, 1991, p.486).
148. Ostergaard aigues that 'The extent of [the workers'] actions amounted to an undeclared general strike': see Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, 'Citizens, Groups, and a Nascent Civil Society in China: Toward an Understanding of the 1989 Student Demonstrations', China Information, Vol.4, No.2 (Autumn 1989), p.32. This would appear to us to be inaccurate, as the following shows. Workers' contingents on 17-19 May carried banners identifying their work units. Under China's stringent and highly sophisticated (though relaxing over the 1980s) system of social control (such as fixed employment and the dang'an [personal file] system) which greatly inhibited actions expressing discontentment, this implied management's approval of the marches. (The reason management gave approval on 17 May, and not earlier or later, cannot be discussed here; suffice to note that it was closely related to Zhao Ziyang's revelation on the afternoon of 16 May, in a televised meeting with the visiting Gorbachev, that the first plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee made a secret decision to retain Deng Xiaoping as the highest authority.) Thus, in an important sense, the contingents represented the enterprises, instead of being working-class delegations, although they were composed mostly of workers. Furthermore, many of them began their marches only after work (see Lu's interview in Qilaile, pp.45-6; Zhongda, p.186; Wang Chaohua, 'Gongren wei shenme mei neng fadong qilai', Jiushi niandai, Oct. 1990, pp.106-7). They also comprised only 'a few representatives' of the employees, while the rest went on with their work (Walder, 1991, p.486).
149. See his interview in Jiefang yuebao, Aug. 1989, p.24.
150. Walder (c.1992, p.12) refers to the mid-May enterprise contingents interchangeably as 'protest brigades' and 'sympathy brigades'. The two terms, however, are not synonymous, as Walder defines the former as the broader category incorporating the latter: '"protest brigades" ... came together for purposes of public demonstration in support of student demands or in sympathy with student hunger-strikers' (p. 11). While 'in support of student demands' appears to be consistent with Walder's argument in his 1991 paper, 'in sympathy with student hunger-strikers' may signify a shift away from that paper's argument of '[workers] called for greater democracy ...' (see note 74, above). Whether or not that is the case is not known.
151. As the bloody clashes on 3-4 June arose out of the blocking of troops, there is no need to analyse the nature of workers' participation in these clashes separately from that of their participation in troop-blocking.
152. See the lack of working-class response to the students' protests in late 1986 - early 1987. Inflation had fallen back from 11.9 per cent in 1985 to seven per cent in 1986 whereas it jumped to 20.7 per cent in 1988 (LDTJNJ 1994, p.56); guandao had not yet acquired the dimensions in public consciousness that it did in 1988 with the rectification of Deng Pufang's Kang Hua group, and so forth; and economic industrial disputes had not yet burst upon the scene.
153. See above, note 73, for qualifications on interpreting the possible implications of anti-corruption slogans.
154. It is, therefore, clear that while the early BWAF documents voiced concerns common to most workers, the early BWAF leaders comprised only a minuscule number of workers who possessed sufficient levels of consciousness, motivation and courage to organize themselves politically to address these concerns (see note 4, above). The failure of workers to respond shows that, for most workers, their discontentment in relation to these concerns was not sufficiently deep, making them unready to express such dissatisfaction in a political way, for instance, by marching in support of the early BWAF's economic demands.
155. It is interesting to note that in contrast to Western authors, Chinese commentators generally play down the significance of the workers' protests in 1989, although none has provided an anlysis to back up his remarks. For example, Shi Tianjian also shares Su Shaozhi's view: see his 'The Democratic Movement in China in 1989', Asian Survey, Vol.30, No.12 (1990), p.1203. The analysis in this section is obviously premised upon a specific methodology as to how the nature of the workers' protests can most accurately be determined, namely, by examining the slogans and demands actually raised by workers. This is by no means the only methodology that can be employed for the same purpose. Some authors adopt a culturalist approach in examining the students' protests (for example, J. Wasserstrom and E. Perry (eds.), Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China: Learning from 1989 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992). Needless to say, one may, of course, also adopt the same approach in examining the present subject. While this author considers the methodology adopted in this section to be the most appropriate to provide us with an accurate picture of the nature of the workers' protests, no claim, of course, is made that the picture so provided is complete. Whether or not complementary or superior alternative interpretations can be provided by the adoption of other methodologies can, naturally, be determined only by examining such interpretations as and when they are made.
156. It is interesting to note that in contrast to Western authors, Chinese commentators generally play down the significance of the workers' protests in 1989, although none has provided an anlysis to back up his remarks. For example, Shi Tianjian also shares Su Shaozhi's view: see his 'The Democratic Movement in China in 1989', Asian Survey, Vol.30, No.12 (1990), p.1203. The analysis in this section is obviously premised upon a specific methodology as to how the nature of the workers' protests can most accurately be determined, namely, by examining the slogans and demands actually raised by workers. This is by no means the only methodology that can be employed for the same purpose. Some authors adopt a culturalist approach in examining the students' protests (for example, J. Wasserstrom and E. Perry (eds.), Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China: Learning from 1989 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992). Needless to say, one may, of course, also adopt the same approach in examining the present subject. While this author considers the methodology adopted in this section to be the most appropriate to provide us with an accurate picture of the nature of the workers' protests, no claim, of course, is made that the picture so provided is complete. Whether or not complementary or superior alternative interpretations can be provided by the adoption of other methodologies can, naturally, be determined only by examining such interpretations as and when they are made.
157. In note 53, we mentioned that it is not known whether or not the BWAF's political change was a tactical choice on the part of some BWAF leaders other than Han Dongfang. In relation to our present argument, it should be noted that tactics are a response to concrete situations. Thus, just as it is true that, if workers had demanded wage increases and so forth in their protests, the BWAF's political change would have been impossible, it is equally true that, given what the workers were protesting for, it would have been impossible for the BWAF to mobilize workers on the basis of wage demands and the like. In other words, the concrete conditions of the nature of the workers' protests set narrow limits within which tactical choices could realistically be made, if indeed any such choice in relation to the issue under discussion was consciously made by any individual BWAF leader. Hence, our argument that the BWAF's political change was basically determined by the nature of the workers' protests remains valid, even were such a change to be a tactic for certain individual BWAF leaders, although the determination would in such a case be mediated, in relation to these leaders, through a conscious choice.
158. For a theoretical discussion of this point, see Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions, translated by Patrick Lavin (London: Merlin Press, n.d.), Ch.4. Poland's experience, particularly in 1970 and 1980, again provides illustration: on both occasions, workers' protests were ignited by the announcement of price increases, and economic demands such as retracting the increases were raised, soon followed by political demands such as the formation of free trade unions (which was raised in both 1970 and 1980). For an account of the movement in 1970-71, see Informations Correspondance Ouvrières, Poland 1970-71: Capitalism and Class Struggle, translated by Lorraine Perlman (Detroit: Black & Red, 1977).
159. For a theoretical discussion of this point, see Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions, translated by Patrick Lavin (London: Merlin Press, n.d.), Ch.4. Poland's experience, particularly in 1970 and 1980, again provides illustration: on both occasions, workers' protests were ignited by the announcement of price increases, and economic demands such as retracting the increases were raised, soon followed by political demands such as the formation of free trade unions (which was raised in both 1970 and 1980). For an account of the movement in 1970-71, see Informations Correspondance Ouvrières, Poland 1970-71: Capitalism and Class Struggle, translated by Lorraine Perlman (Detroit: Black & Red, 1977).
160. The larger issue of how the Chinese working class would be able to constitute itself into an independent political force formulating a political agenda of its own is beyond the scope of this article, the objective of which is solely to determine the role played by the working class in 1989, a subject that has been either misinterpreted or left unanalysed (as in the case of Su Shaozhi). Obviously, this article's analysis will be part and parcel of an analysis of the above-mentioned larger issue, an initial discussion of which (in relation to the reform era) can be found in Lau, op. cit.