Models of economic development in Africa: Lessons from the experiences of Ghana, 1957-95

Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 174-198

  Busumtwi Sam, James ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPING COUNTRY; DEVELOPMENT FAILURE; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ECONOMIC PLANNING; GOVERNANCE; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

EID: 0030389922     PISSN: 03063631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14662049608447730     Document Type: Review

References (149)

1. See, for example, Michael Bratton, 'Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa', World Politics 11,3 (1989), 407-30.
2. See World Bank, Ghana: 2000 and Beyond: Setting The Stage for Accelerated Growth and Poverty Reduction. Report No. GH-11486 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 6 Nov. 1992); also, 'Ray of Hope', The Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) 26 March 1994, A1-A9.
3. See World Bank, Ghana: 2000 and Beyond: Setting The Stage for Accelerated Growth and Poverty Reduction. Report No. GH-11486 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 6 Nov. 1992); also, 'Ray of Hope', The Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) 26 March 1994, A1-A9.
4. See Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy, 1950-1990 (Oxford/New York: Pergamon Press, 1992), for a detailed analysis of Ghana's long-term economic decline.
5. World Bank, Ghana: Policies and Programme For Adjustment (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1984), xv-xvii.
6. These governments are: parliamentary democracy (Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party, 1957-60; Busia's Progress Party, 1969-72; and Limann's Peoples National Party, 1979-81); single party authoritarian (Nkrumah's CPP, 1960-66); coercive personal rule (Acheampong's National Redemption Council and Supreme Military Council 1, 1972-78); military coalitions (The National Liberation Council, 1966-69; The Supreme Military Council II, 1978-79; Rawlings' Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, June-Sept. 1979 and PNDC, 31 Dec. 1981 to 1992).
7. See, for example, World Bank, Adjustment In Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993); also New African, May 1994, 35-7.
8. See, for example, World Bank, Adjustment In Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993); also New African, May 1994, 35-7.
9. World Bank, Trends In Developing Countries (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993), 197-201; West Africa, 11-17 Oct. 1993, 1808
10. World Bank, Trends In Developing Countries (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993), 197-201; West Africa, 11-17 Oct. 1993, 1808
11. Ibid., 197-201.
12. Ibid.; West Africa, 11-17 Oct. 1993, 1808-9.
13. Ibid.; West Africa, 11-17 Oct. 1993, 1808-9.
14. With respect to agriculture, apart from export crops such as cocoa, production of food crops for domestic consumption declined between 1985 and 1993. The manufacturing sector reeled under the effects of import liberalisation, exchange rate adjustments, and a tight monetary and fiscal policy. According to the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI), by 1992 over 1,200 local industries - mostly garment, leather, metal and pharmaceutical - had disappeared since the ERP began in 1983. West Africa, 14-20 Sept. 1992, 1572.
15. West Africa, 11-17 Oct. 1993, 1813-14.
16. In May 1992, the PNDC lifted the ban on political parties that had been in place since 1982, and a timetable was set for presidential elections in November that year to be followed by parliamentary elections in December. The two strongest parties that emerged were the New Democratic Congress (NDC), led by Rawlings, which was an amalgamation of three smaller parties; and the New Patriotic Party (NPC) led by Adu Boahen. The ballotting for the election of the president was held on 3 November 1992, which was to be followed by ballotting for the parliamentary elections on December. However, the presidential ballot generated considerable controversy as charges of fraud and vote-rigging were laid by the other presidential candidates when it became evident that Rawlings would win. An international observer group, called in to monitor the elections, did note some problems, but pronounced the overall ballotting to be fair. Nevertheless, the other parties boycotted the parliamentary elections, which were held on 28 December 1992 (having been postponed from 8 December) resulting in a parliament that is dominated by Rawlings' NDC. See Jeff Haynes, 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects', Third World Quarterly, 14, 3 (1993), 451-67; and Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992', African Affairs, 92 (1993), 331-66. For more critical views on the 1992 election, see Mike Oquaye, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992: A Dissenting View', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 259-75; and Adu Boahen, 'A Note on the Ghanaian Elections', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 277-80. See also, West Africa, 18-24 Jan. 1993, 52-3; 'A Winning Formula', Africa Report, 38, 1 (Jan./Feb. 1993), 44-6; and 'The Elections Controversy', Africa Report, 31, 1 (July/Aug. 1993), 33-5.
17. In May 1992, the PNDC lifted the ban on political parties that had been in place since 1982, and a timetable was set for presidential elections in November that year to be followed by parliamentary elections in December. The two strongest parties that emerged were the New Democratic Congress (NDC), led by Rawlings, which was an amalgamation of three smaller parties; and the New Patriotic Party (NPC) led by Adu Boahen. The ballotting for the election of the president was held on 3 November 1992, which was to be followed by ballotting for the parliamentary elections on December. However, the presidential ballot generated considerable controversy as charges of fraud and vote-rigging were laid by the other presidential candidates when it became evident that Rawlings would win. An international observer group, called in to monitor the elections, did note some problems, but pronounced the overall ballotting to be fair. Nevertheless, the other parties boycotted the parliamentary elections, which were held on 28 December 1992 (having been postponed from 8 December) resulting in a parliament that is dominated by Rawlings' NDC. See Jeff Haynes, 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects', Third World Quarterly, 14, 3 (1993), 451-67; and Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992', African Affairs, 92 (1993), 331-66. For more critical views on the 1992 election, see Mike Oquaye, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992: A Dissenting View', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 259-75; and Adu Boahen, 'A Note on the Ghanaian Elections', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 277-80. See also, West Africa, 18-24 Jan. 1993, 52-3; 'A Winning Formula', Africa Report, 38, 1 (Jan./Feb. 1993), 44-6; and 'The Elections Controversy', Africa Report, 31, 1 (July/Aug. 1993), 33-5.
18. In May 1992, the PNDC lifted the ban on political parties that had been in place since 1982, and a timetable was set for presidential elections in November that year to be followed by parliamentary elections in December. The two strongest parties that emerged were the New Democratic Congress (NDC), led by Rawlings, which was an amalgamation of three smaller parties; and the New Patriotic Party (NPC) led by Adu Boahen. The ballotting for the election of the president was held on 3 November 1992, which was to be followed by ballotting for the parliamentary elections on December. However, the presidential ballot generated considerable controversy as charges of fraud and vote-rigging were laid by the other presidential candidates when it became evident that Rawlings would win. An international observer group, called in to monitor the elections, did note some problems, but pronounced the overall ballotting to be fair. Nevertheless, the other parties boycotted the parliamentary elections, which were held on 28 December 1992 (having been postponed from 8 December) resulting in a parliament that is dominated by Rawlings' NDC. See Jeff Haynes, 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects', Third World Quarterly, 14, 3 (1993), 451-67; and Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992', African Affairs, 92 (1993), 331-66. For more critical views on the 1992 election, see Mike Oquaye, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992: A Dissenting View', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 259-75; and Adu Boahen, 'A Note on the Ghanaian Elections', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 277-80. See also, West Africa, 18-24 Jan. 1993, 52-3; 'A Winning Formula', Africa Report, 38, 1 (Jan./Feb. 1993), 44-6; and 'The Elections Controversy', Africa Report, 31, 1 (July/Aug. 1993), 33-5.
19. In May 1992, the PNDC lifted the ban on political parties that had been in place since 1982, and a timetable was set for presidential elections in November that year to be followed by parliamentary elections in December. The two strongest parties that emerged were the New Democratic Congress (NDC), led by Rawlings, which was an amalgamation of three smaller parties; and the New Patriotic Party (NPC) led by Adu Boahen. The ballotting for the election of the president was held on 3 November 1992, which was to be followed by ballotting for the parliamentary elections on December. However, the presidential ballot generated considerable controversy as charges of fraud and vote-rigging were laid by the other presidential candidates when it became evident that Rawlings would win. An international observer group, called in to monitor the elections, did note some problems, but pronounced the overall ballotting to be fair. Nevertheless, the other parties boycotted the parliamentary elections, which were held on 28 December 1992 (having been postponed from 8 December) resulting in a parliament that is dominated by Rawlings' NDC. See Jeff Haynes, 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects', Third World Quarterly, 14, 3 (1993), 451-67; and Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992', African Affairs, 92 (1993), 331-66. For more critical views on the 1992 election, see Mike Oquaye, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992: A Dissenting View', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 259-75; and Adu Boahen, 'A Note on the Ghanaian Elections', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 277-80. See also, West Africa, 18-24 Jan. 1993, 52-3; 'A Winning Formula', Africa Report, 38, 1 (Jan./Feb. 1993), 44-6; and 'The Elections Controversy', Africa Report, 31, 1 (July/Aug. 1993), 33-5.
20. In May 1992, the PNDC lifted the ban on political parties that had been in place since 1982, and a timetable was set for presidential elections in November that year to be followed by parliamentary elections in December. The two strongest parties that emerged were the New Democratic Congress (NDC), led by Rawlings, which was an amalgamation of three smaller parties; and the New Patriotic Party (NPC) led by Adu Boahen. The ballotting for the election of the president was held on 3 November 1992, which was to be followed by ballotting for the parliamentary elections on December. However, the presidential ballot generated considerable controversy as charges of fraud and vote-rigging were laid by the other presidential candidates when it became evident that Rawlings would win. An international observer group, called in to monitor the elections, did note some problems, but pronounced the overall ballotting to be fair. Nevertheless, the other parties boycotted the parliamentary elections, which were held on 28 December 1992 (having been postponed from 8 December) resulting in a parliament that is dominated by Rawlings' NDC. See Jeff Haynes, 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects', Third World Quarterly, 14, 3 (1993), 451-67; and Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992', African Affairs, 92 (1993), 331-66. For more critical views on the 1992 election, see Mike Oquaye, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992: A Dissenting View', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 259-75; and Adu Boahen, 'A Note on the Ghanaian Elections', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 277-80. See also, West Africa, 18-24 Jan. 1993, 52-3; 'A Winning Formula', Africa Report, 38, 1 (Jan./Feb. 1993), 44-6; and 'The Elections Controversy', Africa Report, 31, 1 (July/Aug. 1993), 33-5.
21. In May 1992, the PNDC lifted the ban on political parties that had been in place since 1982, and a timetable was set for presidential elections in November that year to be followed by parliamentary elections in December. The two strongest parties that emerged were the New Democratic Congress (NDC), led by Rawlings, which was an amalgamation of three smaller parties; and the New Patriotic Party (NPC) led by Adu Boahen. The ballotting for the election of the president was held on 3 November 1992, which was to be followed by ballotting for the parliamentary elections on December. However, the presidential ballot generated considerable controversy as charges of fraud and vote-rigging were laid by the other presidential candidates when it became evident that Rawlings would win. An international observer group, called in to monitor the elections, did note some problems, but pronounced the overall ballotting to be fair. Nevertheless, the other parties boycotted the parliamentary elections, which were held on 28 December 1992 (having been postponed from 8 December) resulting in a parliament that is dominated by Rawlings' NDC. See Jeff Haynes, 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects', Third World Quarterly, 14, 3 (1993), 451-67; and Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992', African Affairs, 92 (1993), 331-66. For more critical views on the 1992 election, see Mike Oquaye, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992: A Dissenting View', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 259-75; and Adu Boahen, 'A Note on the Ghanaian Elections', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 277-80. See also, West Africa, 18-24 Jan. 1993, 52-3; 'A Winning Formula', Africa Report, 38, 1 (Jan./Feb. 1993), 44-6; and 'The Elections Controversy', Africa Report, 31, 1 (July/Aug. 1993), 33-5.
22. In May 1992, the PNDC lifted the ban on political parties that had been in place since 1982, and a timetable was set for presidential elections in November that year to be followed by parliamentary elections in December. The two strongest parties that emerged were the New Democratic Congress (NDC), led by Rawlings, which was an amalgamation of three smaller parties; and the New Patriotic Party (NPC) led by Adu Boahen. The ballotting for the election of the president was held on 3 November 1992, which was to be followed by ballotting for the parliamentary elections on December. However, the presidential ballot generated considerable controversy as charges of fraud and vote-rigging were laid by the other presidential candidates when it became evident that Rawlings would win. An international observer group, called in to monitor the elections, did note some problems, but pronounced the overall ballotting to be fair. Nevertheless, the other parties boycotted the parliamentary elections, which were held on 28 December 1992 (having been postponed from 8 December) resulting in a parliament that is dominated by Rawlings' NDC. See Jeff Haynes, 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects', Third World Quarterly, 14, 3 (1993), 451-67; and Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992', African Affairs, 92 (1993), 331-66. For more critical views on the 1992 election, see Mike Oquaye, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992: A Dissenting View', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 259-75; and Adu Boahen, 'A Note on the Ghanaian Elections', African Affairs, 94 (1995), 277-80. See also, West Africa, 18-24 Jan. 1993, 52-3; 'A Winning Formula', Africa Report, 38, 1 (Jan./Feb. 1993), 44-6; and 'The Elections Controversy', Africa Report, 31, 1 (July/Aug. 1993), 33-5.
23. West Africa, 28 Feb.-6 March 1994, 365-6; Africa Report, 38, 5 (Sept./Oct. 1993), 70.
24. West Africa, 28 Feb.-6 March 1994, 365-6; Africa Report, 38, 5 (Sept./Oct. 1993), 70.
25. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic Series) 32, 2 (16 Feb.-15 March 1995), 12035.
26. West Africa, 28 Feb.-6 March 1994, 365-6.
27. For a discussion of the relationship between government and governance, see Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (eds.), Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner, 1992); and E. Otto-Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
28. For a discussion of the relationship between government and governance, see Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (eds.), Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner, 1992); and E. Otto-Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
29. Legitimisation is a process of converting political power into political authority. For a discussion of the relationship between power, authority and legitimacy, see Peter Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: John Wiley, 1964); and William Connolly (ed.), Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984).
30. Legitimisation is a process of converting political power into political authority. For a discussion of the relationship between power, authority and legitimacy, see Peter Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: John Wiley, 1964); and William Connolly (ed.), Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984).
31. See, for example, the address by Barber B. Conable, President of the World Bank in Reflections on Africa, Address by Barber B. Conable, President, the World Bank (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 1991); also, World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis To Sustainable Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989).
32. See, for example, the address by Barber B. Conable, President of the World Bank in Reflections on Africa, Address by Barber B. Conable, President, the World Bank (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 1991); also, World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis To Sustainable Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989).
33. For the full citation of these references, see note 3. An abbreviated version of the World Bank study on Ghana, by Ajay Chhibber and Chad Leechor, 'Ghana: 2000 and Beyond', appears in Finance and Development, 30, 3 (Sept. 1993), 24-7.
34. Ghana: 2000 and Beyond, 1-5; also, Chhibber and Leechor, 'Ghana', 24-5. Emphasis is placed on identifying the economic and social requirements of accelerated growth, based on the experiences of the Asian NICs: export-led growth and a dynamic private sector will drive Ghana's economic development, with mining, agricultural export, agro-processing, light manufacturing and related service industries as the main growth areas complemented by public investment in human development (education, literacy and health).
35. Ghana: 2000 and Beyond, 1-5; also, Chhibber and Leechor, 'Ghana', 24-5. Emphasis is placed on identifying the economic and social requirements of accelerated growth, based on the experiences of the Asian NICs: export-led growth and a dynamic private sector will drive Ghana's economic development, with mining, agricultural export, agro-processing, light manufacturing and related service industries as the main growth areas complemented by public investment in human development (education, literacy and health).
36. Ghana: 2000 and Beyond, chs.3, 4 and 5; also, Chhibber and Leechor, 'Ghana', 25-7.
37. Ghana: 2000 and Beyond, chs.3, 4 and 5; also, Chhibber and Leechor, 'Ghana', 25-7.
38. These issues are dicussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7 of Ghana: 2000 and Beyond.
39. For a fuller elaboration of this, see Nicholas Arditto-Barletta, 'Managing Development and the Transition', Paper for the Conference on Managing the World Economy of the Future: Lessons from the First Fifty Years After Bretton Woods (Institute for International Economics. Washington DC, 19-21 May 1994). See also Thomas Biersteker, 'Reducing the Role of the State: A Conceptual Exploration of IMF and World Bank Prescriptions', International Studies Quarterly, 34, 4 (1990), 477-92.
40. For a fuller elaboration of this, see Nicholas Arditto-Barletta, 'Managing Development and the Transition', Paper for the Conference on Managing the World Economy of the Future: Lessons from the First Fifty Years After Bretton Woods (Institute for International Economics. Washington DC, 19-21 May 1994). See also Thomas Biersteker, 'Reducing the Role of the State: A Conceptual Exploration of IMF and World Bank Prescriptions', International Studies Quarterly, 34, 4 (1990), 477-92.
41. A useful overview of the debate on the success of the Asian NICs is found in Bela Belassa, 'The Lessons of East Asian Development', Economic Development and Cultural Change 36, 3 (1988), s.273-s.290; Stephan Haggard, 'Alleviation, Markets, Poverty and Income Distribution: An Assessment of Neoliberal Claims', Ethics and International Affairs, 5 (1991), 175-96. Also, Ziya Onis, 'The Logic of the Development State', Comparative Politics (Oct. 1991), 109-26.
42. A useful overview of the debate on the success of the Asian NICs is found in Bela Belassa, 'The Lessons of East Asian Development', Economic Development and Cultural Change 36, 3 (1988), s.273-s.290; Stephan Haggard, 'Alleviation, Markets, Poverty and Income Distribution: An Assessment of Neoliberal Claims', Ethics and International Affairs, 5 (1991), 175-96. Also, Ziya Onis, 'The Logic of the Development State', Comparative Politics (Oct. 1991), 109-26.
43. A useful overview of the debate on the success of the Asian NICs is found in Bela Belassa, 'The Lessons of East Asian Development', Economic Development and Cultural Change 36, 3 (1988), s.273-s.290; Stephan Haggard, 'Alleviation, Markets, Poverty and Income Distribution: An Assessment of Neoliberal Claims', Ethics and International Affairs, 5 (1991), 175-96. Also, Ziya Onis, 'The Logic of the Development State', Comparative Politics (Oct. 1991), 109-26.
44. Biersteker, 'Reducing the Role of the State'; Robin Broad et al., 'Development: The Market is not Enough', Foreign Policy, 81 (Winter 1991), 144-62; Paul Mosley et al., Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy Based Lending (Vol 1. London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 11-21; Stephan Haggard and Tun-jen Cheng, 'State and Foreign Capital in the East Asian NICs', in Frederick C. Deyo (ed.), The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Baltimore: Cornell University Press, 1987), 84-135.
45. Biersteker, 'Reducing the Role of the State'; Robin Broad et al., 'Development: The Market is not Enough', Foreign Policy, 81 (Winter 1991), 144-62; Paul Mosley et al., Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy Based Lending (Vol 1. London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 11-21; Stephan Haggard and Tun-jen Cheng, 'State and Foreign Capital in the East Asian NICs', in Frederick C. Deyo (ed.), The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Baltimore: Cornell University Press, 1987), 84-135.
46. Biersteker, 'Reducing the Role of the State'; Robin Broad et al., 'Development: The Market is not Enough', Foreign Policy, 81 (Winter 1991), 144-62; Paul Mosley et al., Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy Based Lending (Vol 1. London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 11-21; Stephan Haggard and Tun-jen Cheng, 'State and Foreign Capital in the East Asian NICs', in Frederick C. Deyo (ed.), The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Baltimore: Cornell University Press, 1987), 84-135.
47. Biersteker, 'Reducing the Role of the State'; Robin Broad et al., 'Development: The Market is not Enough', Foreign Policy, 81 (Winter 1991), 144-62; Paul Mosley et al., Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy Based Lending (Vol 1. London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 11-21; Stephan Haggard and Tun-jen Cheng, 'State and Foreign Capital in the East Asian NICs', in Frederick C. Deyo (ed.), The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Baltimore: Cornell University Press, 1987), 84-135.
48. Onis, 'The Logic of the Development State', 109-26; Haggard, 'Alleviation', 175-96.
49. Onis, 'The Logic of the Development State', 109-26; Haggard, 'Alleviation', 175-96.
50. Ghana: 2000 and Beyond, x-xi.
51. See Alexander Gershenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York: Rinehart, 1944). See also Peter Evans and Deitrich Reuschemeyer, 'The State and Economic Transformation', in T. Skocpol (ed.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 44-7.
52. See Alexander Gershenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York: Rinehart, 1944). See also Peter Evans and Deitrich Reuschemeyer, 'The State and Economic Transformation', in T. Skocpol (ed.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 44-7.
53. See Alexander Gershenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York: Rinehart, 1944). See also Peter Evans and Deitrich Reuschemeyer, 'The State and Economic Transformation', in T. Skocpol (ed.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 44-7.
54. For arguments in a similar vein, see Evans and Reuschemeyer, 'The State and Economic Transformation'; Eboe Hutchful, 'Structural Adjustment and Political Regimes in Africa' (unpublished paper, 1990), 7-8; and Roger Tangri, 'The Politics of Government-Business Relations in Ghana', Journal of Modern African Studies 30, 1 (1992), 107.
55. For arguments in a similar vein, see Evans and Reuschemeyer, 'The State and Economic Transformation'; Eboe Hutchful, 'Structural Adjustment and Political Regimes in Africa' (unpublished paper, 1990), 7-8; and Roger Tangri, 'The Politics of Government-Business Relations in Ghana', Journal of Modern African Studies 30, 1 (1992), 107.
56. For arguments in a similar vein, see Evans and Reuschemeyer, 'The State and Economic Transformation'; Eboe Hutchful, 'Structural Adjustment and Political Regimes in Africa' (unpublished paper, 1990), 7-8; and Roger Tangri, 'The Politics of Government-Business Relations in Ghana', Journal of Modern African Studies 30, 1 (1992), 107.
57. See, for example, Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (New York: Schocken, 1968); and George A. Akerlof, 'The Market For Lemons', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 3 (1970), 488-500.
58. See, for example, Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (New York: Schocken, 1968); and George A. Akerlof, 'The Market For Lemons', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 3 (1970), 488-500.
59. Ghana: 2000 and Beyond, 90-91.
60. This statement is attributed to Deng Xio Ping and is reproduced in Ghana: 2000 and Beyond, 6.
61. Paul Kennedy, 'Political Barriers to African Capitalism', Journal of Modern African Studies, 32, 4 (1994), 191-213.
62. Ibid., 192-5.
63. This is the so-called 'liberty-growth' trade-off. The implication of this argument was that authoritarian government was necessary to promote economic growth in polarised societies characterised by instability. See, for example, Samuel P.: Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). For a critique of the liberty-growth trade-off proposition, see Charles R. Beitz, 'Democracy in Developing Societies', in Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue (eds.), Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), 177-208.
64. This is the so-called 'liberty-growth' trade-off. The implication of this argument was that authoritarian government was necessary to promote economic growth in polarised societies characterised by instability. See, for example, Samuel P.: Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). For a critique of the liberty-growth trade-off proposition, see Charles R. Beitz, 'Democracy in Developing Societies', in Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue (eds.), Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), 177-208.
65. This is the so-called 'liberty-growth' trade-off. The implication of this argument was that authoritarian government was necessary to promote economic growth in polarised societies characterised by instability. See, for example, Samuel P.: Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). For a critique of the liberty-growth trade-off proposition, see Charles R. Beitz, 'Democracy in Developing Societies', in Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue (eds.), Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), 177-208.
66. Ghana: 2000 and Beyond, 90, box 7.1.
67. Onis, 'The Logic of the Development State', 109-26.
68. Ghana: 2000 and Beyond, 90, box 7.1.
69. For more details on Ghanaian politics during this period, see Trevor Jones, Ghana's First Republic, 1960-66 (London: Metheun, 1976); Benjamin Amonoo, Ghana, 1957-66: The Politics of Institutional Dualism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981); James Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis and Policy Adjustment: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy Making in Ghana, 1982-1990 (Ph.D. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, 1993), ch.3. Also Bjorn Beckman, Organizing the Cocoa Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976), 70-107; and Naomi Chazan, 'Ghana: Problems of Governance and the Emergence of Civil Society', in Larry Diamond et al. (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1988), 121-32.
70. For more details on Ghanaian politics during this period, see Trevor Jones, Ghana's First Republic, 1960-66 (London: Metheun, 1976); Benjamin Amonoo, Ghana, 1957-66: The Politics of Institutional Dualism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981); James Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis and Policy Adjustment: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy Making in Ghana, 1982-1990 (Ph.D. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, 1993), ch.3. Also Bjorn Beckman, Organizing the Cocoa Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976), 70-107; and Naomi Chazan, 'Ghana: Problems of Governance and the Emergence of Civil Society', in Larry Diamond et al. (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1988), 121-32.
71. For more details on Ghanaian politics during this period, see Trevor Jones, Ghana's First Republic, 1960-66 (London: Metheun, 1976); Benjamin Amonoo, Ghana, 1957-66: The Politics of Institutional Dualism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981); James Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis and Policy Adjustment: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy Making in Ghana, 1982-1990 (Ph.D. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, 1993), ch.3. Also Bjorn Beckman, Organizing the Cocoa Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976), 70-107; and Naomi Chazan, 'Ghana: Problems of Governance and the Emergence of Civil Society', in Larry Diamond et al. (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1988), 121-32.
72. For more details on Ghanaian politics during this period, see Trevor Jones, Ghana's First Republic, 1960-66 (London: Metheun, 1976); Benjamin Amonoo, Ghana, 1957-66: The Politics of Institutional Dualism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981); James Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis and Policy Adjustment: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy Making in Ghana, 1982-1990 (Ph.D. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, 1993), ch.3. Also Bjorn Beckman, Organizing the Cocoa Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976), 70-107; and Naomi Chazan, 'Ghana: Problems of Governance and the Emergence of Civil Society', in Larry Diamond et al. (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1988), 121-32.
73. For more details on Ghanaian politics during this period, see Trevor Jones, Ghana's First Republic, 1960-66 (London: Metheun, 1976); Benjamin Amonoo, Ghana, 1957-66: The Politics of Institutional Dualism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981); James Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis and Policy Adjustment: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy Making in Ghana, 1982-1990 (Ph.D. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, 1993), ch.3. Also Bjorn Beckman, Organizing the Cocoa Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976), 70-107; and Naomi Chazan, 'Ghana: Problems of Governance and the Emergence of Civil Society', in Larry Diamond et al. (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1988), 121-32.
74. Social and political life in Ghana has been characterised by a wide array of associations - voluntary, occupational/class, gender, religious, regional and ethnic - formed to pursue the collective interests of their members.
75. British colonial economic policy did not permit the emergence of a fully fledged national dominant class with an economic base independent of the state. Instead, dependence on the state was nurtured during the colonial period, when, for example, land tenure policies were enacted to impede the growth of an indigenous land-owning class. See Rhoda Howard, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana (London: Croom Helm, 1978); and Chazan, 'Ghana', 121-32.
76. British colonial economic policy did not permit the emergence of a fully fledged national dominant class with an economic base independent of the state. Instead, dependence on the state was nurtured during the colonial period, when, for example, land tenure policies were enacted to impede the growth of an indigenous land-owning class. See Rhoda Howard, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana (London: Croom Helm, 1978); and Chazan, 'Ghana', 121-32.
77. The anti-colonial struggle in Ghana had, until the late 1940s, been the preserve of a small coastal-based intelligentsia under the banner of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). In 1949, Kwame Nkrumah broke away from the UGCC to form the Convention People's Party (CPP). For a fuller discussion of the divisions in Ghanaian politics during this period, see David E. Apter, Ghana in Transition (second revised edition, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972); and Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).
78. The anti-colonial struggle in Ghana had, until the late 1940s, been the preserve of a small coastal-based intelligentsia under the banner of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). In 1949, Kwame Nkrumah broke away from the UGCC to form the Convention People's Party (CPP). For a fuller discussion of the divisions in Ghanaian politics during this period, see David E. Apter, Ghana in Transition (second revised edition, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972); and Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).
79. See Roger Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana (New York: Praeger, 1969).
80. For a discussion of the role of distributional coalitions in Africa, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
81. Naomi Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983); Hutchful, 'Structural Adjustment', 8; and Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, 157-69.
82. Naomi Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983); Hutchful, 'Structural Adjustment', 8; and Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, 157-69.
83. Naomi Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983); Hutchful, 'Structural Adjustment', 8; and Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, 157-69.
84. For a fuller discussion of trade and exchange policies in Ghana during this period, see J. Clark Leith, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development in Ghana (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana (London: Heineman, 1978); and J. Dirck Styrker et al., Trade, Exchange Rate and Agricultural Pricing Policies in Ghana (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990).
85. For a fuller discussion of trade and exchange policies in Ghana during this period, see J. Clark Leith, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development in Ghana (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana (London: Heineman, 1978); and J. Dirck Styrker et al., Trade, Exchange Rate and Agricultural Pricing Policies in Ghana (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990).
86. For a fuller discussion of trade and exchange policies in Ghana during this period, see J. Clark Leith, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development in Ghana (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana (London: Heineman, 1978); and J. Dirck Styrker et al., Trade, Exchange Rate and Agricultural Pricing Policies in Ghana (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990).
87. Stryker et al., Trade; Leith, Foreign Trade Regimes.
88. Stryker et al., Trade; Leith, Foreign Trade Regimes.
89. Killick, Development Economics in Action; Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, ch.3.
90. Killick, Development Economics in Action; Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, ch.3.
91. The combination of an overvalued exchange rate, high tariffs, and import and price controls created a gap between the domestic price of a good and the true cost of importing or producing it. Anyone with access to imports at the overvalued exchange rate could sell the product on the domestic (parallel) market and make a windfall profit or 'rent'. This is precisely what happened in Ghana.
92. Although adjustment efforts had been made by previous governments' in Ghana, specifically by the NLC, Busia and Akuffo governments, these had largely been confined to short-term stabilisation, and the extent of market liberalisation had been extremely limited. See Kwesi Jonah, 'Changing Relations Between the IMF and the Government of Ghana, 1960-1987', in Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame Ninsin (eds.), The State, Development and Politics in Ghana (London: Codesria, 1989), 94-115; and Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, 132-42.
93. Although adjustment efforts had been made by previous governments' in Ghana, specifically by the NLC, Busia and Akuffo governments, these had largely been confined to short-term stabilisation, and the extent of market liberalisation had been extremely limited. See Kwesi Jonah, 'Changing Relations Between the IMF and the Government of Ghana, 1960-1987', in Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame Ninsin (eds.), The State, Development and Politics in Ghana (London: Codesria, 1989), 94-115; and Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, 132-42.
94. For an overview of Ghanaian politics under Rawlings, see Kevin Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor (London: MacMillan, 1992); Richard Jeffries, 'Ghana: The Political Economy of Personal Rule', in Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, John Dunn and Richard Rathbone (eds.), Contemporary West African States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 75-98; Eboe Hutchful, 'From "Revolution" to Monetarism: The Economics and Politics of the Adjustment Programme in Ghana', in Bonnie Campbell and John Loxley (eds.), Structural Adjustment in Africa (London: MacMillan, 1990), 92-131; and Baffour Agyeman-Duah, 'Ghana, 1982-6: The Politics of the PNDC', Journal of Modern African Studies, 25, 4 (1987), 613-42.
95. For an overview of Ghanaian politics under Rawlings, see Kevin Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor (London: MacMillan, 1992); Richard Jeffries, 'Ghana: The Political Economy of Personal Rule', in Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, John Dunn and Richard Rathbone (eds.), Contemporary West African States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 75-98; Eboe Hutchful, 'From "Revolution" to Monetarism: The Economics and Politics of the Adjustment Programme in Ghana', in Bonnie Campbell and John Loxley (eds.), Structural Adjustment in Africa (London: MacMillan, 1990), 92-131; and Baffour Agyeman-Duah, 'Ghana, 1982-6: The Politics of the PNDC', Journal of Modern African Studies, 25, 4 (1987), 613-42.
96. For an overview of Ghanaian politics under Rawlings, see Kevin Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor (London: MacMillan, 1992); Richard Jeffries, 'Ghana: The Political Economy of Personal Rule', in Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, John Dunn and Richard Rathbone (eds.), Contemporary West African States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 75-98; Eboe Hutchful, 'From "Revolution" to Monetarism: The Economics and Politics of the Adjustment Programme in Ghana', in Bonnie Campbell and John Loxley (eds.), Structural Adjustment in Africa (London: MacMillan, 1990), 92-131; and Baffour Agyeman-Duah, 'Ghana, 1982-6: The Politics of the PNDC', Journal of Modern African Studies, 25, 4 (1987), 613-42.
97. For an overview of Ghanaian politics under Rawlings, see Kevin Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor (London: MacMillan, 1992); Richard Jeffries, 'Ghana: The Political Economy of Personal Rule', in Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, John Dunn and Richard Rathbone (eds.), Contemporary West African States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 75-98; Eboe Hutchful, 'From "Revolution" to Monetarism: The Economics and Politics of the Adjustment Programme in Ghana', in Bonnie Campbell and John Loxley (eds.), Structural Adjustment in Africa (London: MacMillan, 1990), 92-131; and Baffour Agyeman-Duah, 'Ghana, 1982-6: The Politics of the PNDC', Journal of Modern African Studies, 25, 4 (1987), 613-42.
98. By the end of 1990, over 45,000 public service employees were made redundant plus 20,000 from state-owned enterprises. See Republic of Ghana, Enhancing the Human Impact of the Adjustment Programme, Report Prepared for the Sixth Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana (Accra, April 1991), 39.
99. By 1983, societal disengagement in Ghana involved not only a withdrawal from the state, but also a withdrawal from the formal economy. Naomi Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics and 'Ghana', provides detailed analyses of the forms and degrees of societal disengagement from the state in Ghana. See also, Hutchful, 'Structural Adjustment and Political Regimes', 12-15.
100. By 1983, societal disengagement in Ghana involved not only a withdrawal from the state, but also a withdrawal from the formal economy. Naomi Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics and 'Ghana', provides detailed analyses of the forms and degrees of societal disengagement from the state in Ghana. See also, Hutchful, 'Structural Adjustment and Political Regimes', 12-15.
101. See Matthew Martin, 'Adjustment and External Finance', in Donald Rothchild (ed.), Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1991), 247; Naomi Chazan, 'The Political Transformation of Ghana Under the PNDC', in Rothchild (ed.), Ghana, 33; A. Ahwireng-Obeng, 'Entrepreneural Revolution for the African Third World: The Case of Ghana', Canadian Journal of African Studies 9, 1 (1988), 19-35; and Republic of Ghana, A Programme of Structural Adjustment. Report Prepared for the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana (Accra, 1987), 26.
102. See Matthew Martin, 'Adjustment and External Finance', in Donald Rothchild (ed.), Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1991), 247; Naomi Chazan, 'The Political Transformation of Ghana Under the PNDC', in Rothchild (ed.), Ghana, 33; A. Ahwireng-Obeng, 'Entrepreneural Revolution for the African Third World: The Case of Ghana', Canadian Journal of African Studies 9, 1 (1988), 19-35; and Republic of Ghana, A Programme of Structural Adjustment. Report Prepared for the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana (Accra, 1987), 26.
103. See Matthew Martin, 'Adjustment and External Finance', in Donald Rothchild (ed.), Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1991), 247; Naomi Chazan, 'The Political Transformation of Ghana Under the PNDC', in Rothchild (ed.), Ghana, 33; A. Ahwireng-Obeng, 'Entrepreneural Revolution for the African Third World: The Case of Ghana', Canadian Journal of African Studies 9, 1 (1988), 19-35; and Republic of Ghana, A Programme of Structural Adjustment. Report Prepared for the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana (Accra, 1987), 26.
104. See Matthew Martin, 'Adjustment and External Finance', in Donald Rothchild (ed.), Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1991), 247; Naomi Chazan, 'The Political Transformation of Ghana Under the PNDC', in Rothchild (ed.), Ghana, 33; A. Ahwireng-Obeng, 'Entrepreneural Revolution for the African Third World: The Case of Ghana', Canadian Journal of African Studies 9, 1 (1988), 19-35; and Republic of Ghana, A Programme of Structural Adjustment. Report Prepared for the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana (Accra, 1987), 26.
105. Interview with the Chairman of the Ghana Investments Centre, July 1991. See also comments by Dr Ishan Kapur, IMF Division Chief, West Africa III, in Daily Graphic (Accra), 2 July 1991, 1.
106. The reasons for the private sector's lack of confidence included the mixed signals sent by the PNDC and the punitive actions taken against prominent business people in the early days of the 'revolution'. Interview with Silvio Capluongo, World Bank Resident Representative to Ghana, 11 July 1991. For an example of the mixed signals, see address by Fit Lt Rawlings at the National Investment Promotion Conference, Accra, 26-8 Feb. 1990, in The Investor (Ghana Investments Centre, Oct.-Dec. 1990), 5-8. For a good analysis of the relationship between the PNDC and private capital, see Tangri, 'The Politics of Government-Business Relations', 97-111.
107. The reasons for the private sector's lack of confidence included the mixed signals sent by the PNDC and the punitive actions taken against prominent business people in the early days of the 'revolution'. Interview with Silvio Capluongo, World Bank Resident Representative to Ghana, 11 July 1991. For an example of the mixed signals, see address by Fit Lt Rawlings at the National Investment Promotion Conference, Accra, 26-8 Feb. 1990, in The Investor (Ghana Investments Centre, Oct.-Dec. 1990), 5-8. For a good analysis of the relationship between the PNDC and private capital, see Tangri, 'The Politics of Government-Business Relations', 97-111.
108. In the capital markets, for example, the banking system was in need of a major overhaul and suffered from the public's lack of confidence as a result of the arbitrary demonetisation exercises that had been undertaken by the PNDC in 1982 and also by the Akuffo government in 1979. For a good account of the problems in Ghana's banking system, see Nii Kwaku Sowa, 'Financial Intermediation and Economic Development', in Hansen and Ninsin, The State, 116-36.
109. The major reason for this is that under the second IMF stand-by, sectoral credit controls were abolished, and given the commercial orientation of the country's banking system, the banks tended to favour domestic trade and import financing. See Cadman Atta Mills, Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: World Bank-EDI, 1989), 14-15.
110. By 1992 only 49 state enterprises out of a total of 350 had been divested. See Republic of Ghana, Investment Code (Accra: PNDC Law 116, 1985), 19-20; Tangri, 'The Politics of Government-Business Relations', 110.
111. By 1992 only 49 state enterprises out of a total of 350 had been divested. See Republic of Ghana, Investment Code (Accra: PNDC Law 116, 1985), 19-20; Tangri, 'The Politics of Government-Business Relations', 110.
112. Public investment amounted to only eight per cent of GDP and private investment, 8.9 per cent. The latter figure was mainly attributable to investment in gold mining. Republic of Ghana, Enhancing the Human Impact of the Adjustment Programme, Report Prepared for the Sixth meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana (Accra, 1991), annnex tables 1 and 2.
113. As Stephen Younger has shown, Ghana has suffered from the 'Dutch Disease' - a situation where a boom sector adversely affects other sectors of an economy. See Stephen Younger, 'Aid and the Dutch Disease: Macroeconomic Management When Everybody Loves You', World Development, 20, 11 (1992), 1587-97.
114. See Republic of Ghana, Economic Recovery Programme, 1984-86: Review of Progress in 1984 and Goals for 1985 and 1986, Report Prepared for the Second Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana (Accra 1984); and World Bank, Ghana: Public Expenditure Review. 1989-91, Report no. GH-7673 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990), 1.
115. See Republic of Ghana, Economic Recovery Programme, 1984-86: Review of Progress in 1984 and Goals for 1985 and 1986, Report Prepared for the Second Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana (Accra 1984); and World Bank, Ghana: Public Expenditure Review. 1989-91, Report no. GH-7673 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990), 1.
116. See Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, ch.5.
117. The task of ensuring state security was entrusted to Rawlings's close associate Capt. (Rtd) Kojo Tsikata. Incidents of repression were reported in the foreign press and in one of the few independent newpapers operating in the country at the time - the Ashanti Pioneer (Kumasi). See also, Agyeman-Duah, 'Ghana', 613-42; Amnesty International Report (London, 1984), 48-53.
118. The task of ensuring state security was entrusted to Rawlings's close associate Capt. (Rtd) Kojo Tsikata. Incidents of repression were reported in the foreign press and in one of the few independent newpapers operating in the country at the time - the Ashanti Pioneer (Kumasi). See also, Agyeman-Duah, 'Ghana', 613-42; Amnesty International Report (London, 1984), 48-53.
119. The task of ensuring state security was entrusted to Rawlings's close associate Capt. (Rtd) Kojo Tsikata. Incidents of repression were reported in the foreign press and in one of the few independent newpapers operating in the country at the time - the Ashanti Pioneer (Kumasi). See also, Agyeman-Duah, 'Ghana', 613-42; Amnesty International Report (London, 1984), 48-53.
120. In the earlier (stabilisation and rehabilitation) phases of its economic reforms, the PNDC had relied on 'shock treatment' - wide-ranging reforms that were speedily implemented - and its repressive capacity and autonomy allowed it to contain opposition and ignore demands from adversely affected groups. However, the political requirements and the mode of governance that sustain stabilisation measures are quite different from those required for sustaining structural adjustment. While the former essentially involves short-term crisis management, the latter involves longer term political confidence-building measures as a precondition for eliciting the desired supply responses - savings, investment and production. See Hutchful, 'From "Revolution" to Monetarism', 92-131; Jeffries, 'Leadership Commitment and Political Opposition to Structural Adjustment in Ghana', 157-71; Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, ch.5; West Africa, 12 Jan. 1987, 59.
121. In the earlier (stabilisation and rehabilitation) phases of its economic reforms, the PNDC had relied on 'shock treatment' - wide-ranging reforms that were speedily implemented - and its repressive capacity and autonomy allowed it to contain opposition and ignore demands from adversely affected groups. However, the political requirements and the mode of governance that sustain stabilisation measures are quite different from those required for sustaining structural adjustment. While the former essentially involves short-term crisis management, the latter involves longer term political confidence-building measures as a precondition for eliciting the desired supply responses - savings, investment and production. See Hutchful, 'From "Revolution" to Monetarism', 92-131; Jeffries, 'Leadership Commitment and Political Opposition to Structural Adjustment in Ghana', 157-71; Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, ch.5; West Africa, 12 Jan. 1987, 59.
122. In the earlier (stabilisation and rehabilitation) phases of its economic reforms, the PNDC had relied on 'shock treatment' - wide-ranging reforms that were speedily implemented - and its repressive capacity and autonomy allowed it to contain opposition and ignore demands from adversely affected groups. However, the political requirements and the mode of governance that sustain stabilisation measures are quite different from those required for sustaining structural adjustment. While the former essentially involves short-term crisis management, the latter involves longer term political confidence-building measures as a precondition for eliciting the desired supply responses - savings, investment and production. See Hutchful, 'From "Revolution" to Monetarism', 92-131; Jeffries, 'Leadership Commitment and Political Opposition to Structural Adjustment in Ghana', 157-71; Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, ch.5; West Africa, 12 Jan. 1987, 59.
123. In the earlier (stabilisation and rehabilitation) phases of its economic reforms, the PNDC had relied on 'shock treatment' - wide-ranging reforms that were speedily implemented - and its repressive capacity and autonomy allowed it to contain opposition and ignore demands from adversely affected groups. However, the political requirements and the mode of governance that sustain stabilisation measures are quite different from those required for sustaining structural adjustment. While the former essentially involves short-term crisis management, the latter involves longer term political confidence-building measures as a precondition for eliciting the desired supply responses - savings, investment and production. See Hutchful, 'From "Revolution" to Monetarism', 92-131; Jeffries, 'Leadership Commitment and Political Opposition to Structural Adjustment in Ghana', 157-71; Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, ch.5; West Africa, 12 Jan. 1987, 59.
124. This was designed to decentralise the machinery of government. Through this intiative, the government attempted to tap into existing patron-client networks in the rural areas and channel greater economic benefit to the rural communities through increases in producer prices, to cultivate the support of the supposed 'winners' in the adjustment process - the farmers. See Mike Oquaye, 'Democracy Without Political Parties: The Case of the District Assemblies', in K.A. Ninsin and F.K. Drah (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's
125. This was designed to decentralise the machinery of government. Through this intiative, the government attempted to tap into existing patron-client networks in the rural areas and channel greater economic benefit to the rural communities through increases in producer prices, to cultivate the support of the supposed 'winners' in the adjustment process - the farmers. See Mike Oquaye, 'Democracy Without Political Parties: The Case of the District Assemblies', in K.A. Ninsin and F.K. Drah (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 1993), 154-74; West Africa, 26 Dec. 1988, 2435.
126. For many urban-based groups, the district assemblies were reminiscent of the attempt by General Acheampong to create a 'Union Government' designed to include all segments of society in a nebulous corporate framework. The backlash this provoked led to the fall of Acheampong in July 1978 and his replacement by his second-in-command. Gen Akuffo. See Busumtwi-Sam, Economic Crisis, 142-3.
127. See F.K. Drah, 'Civil Society and the Transition to Pluralist Democracy', in Ninsin and Drah (eds.), Political Parties, 72-191.
128. Published results indicated that Rawlings received 58.3 per cent of the national vote compared with 30.4 per cent for his nearest rival, Adu Boahen; and Rawlings received over 50 per cent of the vote in nine out of the country's ten regions - the only exception being the Ashanti region, the home region of Adu Boahen. See West Africa, 16 Nov. 1992, 1963; also, Haynes, 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana?', 451-67. These results are disputed in Oquaye, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992', 259-75.
129. Published results indicated that Rawlings received 58.3 per cent of the national vote compared with 30.4 per cent for his nearest rival, Adu Boahen; and Rawlings received over 50 per cent of the vote in nine out of the country's ten regions - the only exception being the Ashanti region, the home region of Adu Boahen. See West Africa, 16 Nov. 1992, 1963; also, Haynes, 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana?', 451-67. These results are disputed in Oquaye, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992', 259-75.
130. Published results indicated that Rawlings received 58.3 per cent of the national vote compared with 30.4 per cent for his nearest rival, Adu Boahen; and Rawlings received over 50 per cent of the vote in nine out of the country's ten regions - the only exception being the Ashanti region, the home region of Adu Boahen. See West Africa, 16 Nov. 1992, 1963; also, Haynes, 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana?', 451-67. These results are disputed in Oquaye, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992', 259-75.
131. The absence of any credible alternative economic package would seem to indicate an acceptance by the leadership of those parties of the necessity, if not the desirability, of continuity of economic reforms. The only measurable points of departure were the promises made by some of the opposition parties, such as Adu Boahen's NPP, to incorporate the concerns of those sectors - private business and labour - that had suffered under the ERP. See West Africa. 26 Oct.-1 Nov. 1992, 1818; and New African, Feb. 1993, 17-18.
132. The absence of any credible alternative economic package would seem to indicate an acceptance by the leadership of those parties of the necessity, if not the desirability, of continuity of economic reforms. The only measurable points of departure were the promises made by some of the opposition parties, such as Adu Boahen's NPP, to incorporate the concerns of those sectors - private business and labour - that had suffered under the ERP. See West Africa. 26 Oct.-1 Nov. 1992, 1818; and New African, Feb. 1993, 17-18.
133. West Africa, 10-16 Jan. 1994, 31-4.
134. Republic of Ghana, Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Accra, 1992).
135. The conduct of the opposition both before and after the election presents a puzzle. They appear to have been caught between their fervent desire to see Rawlings out of power on the one hand, and their recognition of the necessity of maintaining good relations with the international financial institutions and Western donors which had publicly endorsed the NDC, on the other hand. The British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, for example, visited Ghana on 4 January 1993 and publicly indicated his government's endorsement of the results of the 1992 elections and its support of Rawlings and the NDC. For fuller details, see New African, Feb. 1993, 93, and 14 Jan. 1994, 38-9; Africa Confidential, 43, 4 Feb. 1993, 3-5; and Haynes. 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana?', 455-63.
136. The conduct of the opposition both before and after the election presents a puzzle. They appear to have been caught between their fervent desire to see Rawlings out of power on the one hand, and their recognition of the necessity of maintaining good relations with the international financial institutions and Western donors which had publicly endorsed the NDC, on the other hand. The British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, for example, visited Ghana on 4 January 1993 and publicly indicated his government's endorsement of the results of the 1992 elections and its support of Rawlings and the NDC. For fuller details, see New African, Feb. 1993, 93, and 14 Jan. 1994, 38-9; Africa Confidential, 43, 4 Feb. 1993, 3-5; and Haynes. 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana?', 455-63.
137. The conduct of the opposition both before and after the election presents a puzzle. They appear to have been caught between their fervent desire to see Rawlings out of power on the one hand, and their recognition of the necessity of maintaining good relations with the international financial institutions and Western donors which had publicly endorsed the NDC, on the other hand. The British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, for example, visited Ghana on 4 January 1993 and publicly indicated his government's endorsement of the results of the 1992 elections and its support of Rawlings and the NDC. For fuller details, see New African, Feb. 1993, 93, and 14 Jan. 1994, 38-9; Africa Confidential, 43, 4 Feb. 1993, 3-5; and Haynes. 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana?', 455-63.
138. The conduct of the opposition both before and after the election presents a puzzle. They appear to have been caught between their fervent desire to see Rawlings out of power on the one hand, and their recognition of the necessity of maintaining good relations with the international financial institutions and Western donors which had publicly endorsed the NDC, on the other hand. The British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, for example, visited Ghana on 4 January 1993 and publicly indicated his government's endorsement of the results of the 1992 elections and its support of Rawlings and the NDC. For fuller details, see New African, Feb. 1993, 93, and 14 Jan. 1994, 38-9; Africa Confidential, 43, 4 Feb. 1993, 3-5; and Haynes. 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana?', 455-63.
139. The PNDC's election victory was largely based on support from rural constituents, who, historically, have not formed a significant political force, despite their numerical majority in the country. The continued support of the country's economic backbone - the cocoa farmers - which the PNDC-NDC has enjoyed, is contingent on the maintenance of increases in real producer prices, and is thus transitory. And the vast majority of urban dwellers, especially the middle class, the most politically significant segment of the Ghanaian population, remain highly suspicious of the NDC.
140. West Africa, 31 July-6 Aug. 1995, 1197.
141. West Africa, 4 June 1995, 840-41. Although the demonstration was supposed to be a peaceful one, four people were killed and several others were injured. The strength of the opposition forced the government to replace the proposed VAT with a sales tax at the preexisting level of 15 per cent.
142. These losses had cost the government treasury over $120m and played a significant part in the large budget deficit of 1994.
143. West Africa, 28 Feb.-6 March, 1994, 365-6.
144. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic Series), 32, 2 (16 Feb.-15 March 1995), 12035-7.
145. The parasitic if not predatory relationship that governments in Ghana have had with the private sector has to be replaced with one that recognises mutual dependency. For example, expanded production in the private sector increases the tax base of the government, reduces transaction costs for other businesses in related areas of economic activity, and generates employment. As more people become employed they also become consumers, which in turn expands the market, stimulating further production, and generates greater tax revenues for government, etc.
146. See Blau, Exchange and Power; Connolly (ed.). Legitimacy and the State.
147. See Blau, Exchange and Power; Connolly (ed.). Legitimacy and the State.
148. Despite its overwhelming majority, the NDC has to a large extent indicated its willingness to respect constitutional checks and balances on the exercise of power. Since the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in January 1993, for example, there have been a number of constitutional rulings against the NDC, each of which the government has accepted. This is significant in view of the fact that previous democratically elected governments in Ghana - especially Nkrumah's CPP - disregarded such constitutional checks on the exercise of their power. For arguments that Ghana under the NDC is a de facto one-party state, see for example, Haynes, 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana?', 455-63.
149. There have been two instances where an incumbent government peacefully transferred power to another following an election in Ghana, but in each case the incumbent government was a military coalition which came to power after a coup and which was not itself running in the election. These were the NLC's transfer of power to Busia's PP after the 1969 elections; and the AFRC's hand-over to Limann's PNP after the J 979 elections. On elections in Ghana, See Ninsin, 'The Electoral System, Elections and Democracy in Ghana', in Ninsin and Drah (eds.), Political Parties, 175-91.