The Puzzle of Nazi Modernism: Modern Technology and Ideological Consensus in an SS Factory at Auschwitz

Technology and Culture

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 527-570

  Allen, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030366056     PISSN: 0040165X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3107163     Document Type: Article

References (152)

1. Examples of scholarly work include Lucy Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians (Cambridge, 1981), p. 20; Hans Mommsen, "The Realization of the Unthinkable: The 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' in the Third Reich," in The Politics of Genocide, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld (London, 1986), pp. 97, 126; Saul Friedländer, introduction to Hitler und die Endlösung: "Es ist der Führers Wunsch . . .", by Gerald Fleming (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), p. xlv. More generally, see Richard Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York, 1989). The intellectual historian Ernst Nolte also alluded to "the uniqueness of a technological genocide" in the article that incited the "Historikerstreit," "Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 June 1986. Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New York, 1994), p. 7, deploys the same rhetoric in an American Historikerstreit. Not the precision of these statements but their ubiquity is interesting, that historians as far left as Mommsen and as far right as Nolte should share the same opinion about technology and Nazism, although none has ever really studied it.
2. Examples of scholarly work include Lucy Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians (Cambridge, 1981), p. 20; Hans Mommsen, "The Realization of the Unthinkable: The 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' in the Third Reich," in The Politics of Genocide, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld (London, 1986), pp. 97, 126; Saul Friedländer, introduction to Hitler und die Endlösung: "Es ist der Führers Wunsch . . .", by Gerald Fleming (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), p. xlv. More generally, see Richard Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York, 1989). The intellectual historian Ernst Nolte also alluded to "the uniqueness of a technological genocide" in the article that incited the "Historikerstreit," "Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 June 1986. Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New York, 1994), p. 7, deploys the same rhetoric in an American Historikerstreit. Not the precision of these statements but their ubiquity is interesting, that historians as far left as Mommsen and as far right as Nolte should share the same opinion about technology and Nazism, although none has ever really studied it.
3. Examples of scholarly work include Lucy Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians (Cambridge, 1981), p. 20; Hans Mommsen, "The Realization of the Unthinkable: The 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' in the Third Reich," in The Politics of Genocide, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld (London, 1986), pp. 97, 126; Saul Friedländer, introduction to Hitler und die Endlösung: "Es ist der Führers Wunsch . . .", by Gerald Fleming (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), p. xlv. More generally, see Richard Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York, 1989). The intellectual historian Ernst Nolte also alluded to "the uniqueness of a technological genocide" in the article that incited the "Historikerstreit," "Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 June 1986. Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New York, 1994), p. 7, deploys the same rhetoric in an American Historikerstreit. Not the precision of these statements but their ubiquity is interesting, that historians as far left as Mommsen and as far right as Nolte should share the same opinion about technology and Nazism, although none has ever really studied it.
4. Examples of scholarly work include Lucy Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians (Cambridge, 1981), p. 20; Hans Mommsen, "The Realization of the Unthinkable: The 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' in the Third Reich," in The Politics of Genocide, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld (London, 1986), pp. 97, 126; Saul Friedländer, introduction to Hitler und die Endlösung: "Es ist der Führers Wunsch . . .", by Gerald Fleming (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), p. xlv. More generally, see Richard Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York, 1989). The intellectual historian Ernst Nolte also alluded to "the uniqueness of a technological genocide" in the article that incited the "Historikerstreit," "Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 June 1986. Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New York, 1994), p. 7, deploys the same rhetoric in an American Historikerstreit. Not the precision of these statements but their ubiquity is interesting, that historians as far left as Mommsen and as far right as Nolte should share the same opinion about technology and Nazism, although none has ever really studied it.
5. Examples of scholarly work include Lucy Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians (Cambridge, 1981), p. 20; Hans Mommsen, "The Realization of the Unthinkable: The 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' in the Third Reich," in The Politics of Genocide, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld (London, 1986), pp. 97, 126; Saul Friedländer, introduction to Hitler und die Endlösung: "Es ist der Führers Wunsch . . .", by Gerald Fleming (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), p. xlv. More generally, see Richard Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York, 1989). The intellectual historian Ernst Nolte also alluded to "the uniqueness of a technological genocide" in the article that incited the "Historikerstreit," "Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 June 1986. Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New York, 1994), p. 7, deploys the same rhetoric in an American Historikerstreit. Not the precision of these statements but their ubiquity is interesting, that historians as far left as Mommsen and as far right as Nolte should share the same opinion about technology and Nazism, although none has ever really studied it.
6. Examples of scholarly work include Lucy Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians (Cambridge, 1981), p. 20; Hans Mommsen, "The Realization of the Unthinkable: The 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' in the Third Reich," in The Politics of Genocide, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld (London, 1986), pp. 97, 126; Saul Friedländer, introduction to Hitler und die Endlösung: "Es ist der Führers Wunsch . . .", by Gerald Fleming (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), p. xlv. More generally, see Richard Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York, 1989). The intellectual historian Ernst Nolte also alluded to "the uniqueness of a technological genocide" in the article that incited the "Historikerstreit," "Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 June 1986. Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New York, 1994), p. 7, deploys the same rhetoric in an American Historikerstreit. Not the precision of these statements but their ubiquity is interesting, that historians as far left as Mommsen and as far right as Nolte should share the same opinion about technology and Nazism, although none has ever really studied it.
7. Since this article was drafted there have been encouraging beginnings: Jean-Claude Pressac, Die Krematorien von Auschwitz: Die Technik des Massenmordes (München, 1993); and Robert-Jan van Pelt, "A Site in Search of a Mission," in Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp, ed. Yisrael Gutman and Michael Burnbaum (Bloomington, Ind., 1994), pp. 93-156.
8. Since this article was drafted there have been encouraging beginnings: Jean- Claude Pressac, Die Krematorien von Auschwitz: Die Technik des Massenmordes (München, 1993); and Robert-Jan van Pelt, "A Site in Search of a Mission," in Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp, ed. Yisrael Gutman and Michael Burnbaum (Bloomington, Ind., 1994), pp. 93-156.
9. Karl-Heinz Ludwig, Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf, 1974), pp. 53-63, 344-403; see also Karl-Heinz Ludwig "Vereinsarbeit im Dritten Reich 1933 bis 1945," in his Technik, Ingenieure und Gesellschaft: Geschichte des Vereins Deutscher Ingenieure, 1856-1981 (Düsseldorf, 1981), pp. 429-54, and "Widersprüchlichkeiten der technisch-wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaftsarbeit im Dritten Reich," Technikgeschichte 46 (1979): 245-54 . Another exception is Hans-Joachim Braun, "Fertigungsprozesse im deutschen Flugzeugbau, 1926-45," Technikgeschichte 57 (1990): 111-35.
10. Karl-Heinz Ludwig, Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf, 1974), pp. 53-63, 344-403; see also Karl-Heinz Ludwig "Vereinsarbeit im Dritten Reich 1933 bis 1945," in his Technik, Ingenieure und Gesellschaft: Geschichte des Vereins Deutscher Ingenieure, 1856-1981 (Düsseldorf, 1981), pp. 429-54, and "Widersprüchlichkeiten der technisch-wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaftsarbeit im Dritten Reich," Technikgeschichte 46 (1979): 245-54 . Another exception is Hans-Joachim Braun, "Fertigungsprozesse im deutschen Flugzeugbau, 1926-45," Technikgeschichte 57 (1990): 111-35.
11. Karl-Heinz Ludwig, Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf, 1974), pp. 53-63, 344-403; see also Karl-Heinz Ludwig "Vereinsarbeit im Dritten Reich 1933 bis 1945," in his Technik, Ingenieure und Gesellschaft: Geschichte des Vereins Deutscher Ingenieure, 1856-1981 (Düsseldorf, 1981), pp. 429-54, and "Widersprüchlichkeiten der technisch-wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaftsarbeit im Dritten Reich," Technikgeschichte 46 (1979): 245-54 . Another exception is Hans-Joachim Braun, "Fertigungsprozesse im deutschen Flugzeugbau, 1926-45," Technikgeschichte 57 (1990): 111-35.
12. Karl-Heinz Ludwig, Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf, 1974), pp. 53-63, 344-403; see also Karl-Heinz Ludwig "Vereinsarbeit im Dritten Reich 1933 bis 1945," in his Technik, Ingenieure und Gesellschaft: Geschichte des Vereins Deutscher Ingenieure, 1856-1981 (Düsseldorf, 1981), pp. 429-54, and "Widersprüchlichkeiten der technisch-wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaftsarbeit im Dritten Reich," Technikgeschichte 46 (1979): 245-54 . Another exception is Hans-Joachim Braun, "Fertigungsprozesse im deutschen Flugzeugbau, 1926-45," Technikgeschichte 57 (1990): 111-35.
13. For a different view of the historian's duties see Brooke Hindle, "Historians of Technology and the Context of History," in In Context: History and the History of Technology: Essays in Honor of Melvin Kranzberg, ed. Stephen Cutcliffe and Robert Post (Bethlehem, Pa., 1989), pp. 230-43. Hindle believes we have focused too much on the negative aspects of technology and reminds us that historians should not focus exclusively on the "dark side." Some very sophisticated historians of Nazism believe the exceptionalism of National Socialism should always be highlighted above its common roots in Western culture; e.g., Saul Friedländer, "West Germany and the Burden of the Past: The Ongoing Debate," Jerusalem Quarterly 42 (1987): 3-18. For a succinct review of this argument, see Charles Maier, "A Holocaust like the Others," in his The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 66-99.
14. For a different view of the historian's duties see Brooke Hindle, "Historians of Technology and the Context of History," in In Context: History and the History of Technology: Essays in Honor of Melvin Kranzberg, ed. Stephen Cutcliffe and Robert Post (Bethlehem, Pa., 1989), pp. 230-43. Hindle believes we have focused too much on the negative aspects of technology and reminds us that historians should not focus exclusively on the "dark side." Some very sophisticated historians of Nazism believe the exceptionalism of National Socialism should always be highlighted above its common roots in Western culture; e.g., Saul Friedländer, "West Germany and the Burden of the Past: The Ongoing Debate," Jerusalem Quarterly 42 (1987): 3-18. For a succinct review of this argument, see Charles Maier, "A Holocaust like the Others," in his The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 66-99.
15. For a different view of the historian's duties see Brooke Hindle, "Historians of Technology and the Context of History," in In Context: History and the History of Technology: Essays in Honor of Melvin Kranzberg, ed. Stephen Cutcliffe and Robert Post (Bethlehem, Pa., 1989), pp. 230-43. Hindle believes we have focused too much on the negative aspects of technology and reminds us that historians should not focus exclusively on the "dark side." Some very sophisticated historians of Nazism believe the exceptionalism of National Socialism should always be highlighted above its common roots in Western culture; e.g., Saul Friedländer, "West Germany and the Burden of the Past: The Ongoing Debate," Jerusalem Quarterly 42 (1987): 3-18. For a succinct review of this argument, see Charles Maier, "A Holocaust like the Others," in his The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 66-99.
16. See, e.g., Edwin Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession (Cleveland, 1971); Kendall Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton, N.J., 1978); Gerd Hortleder, Das Gesellschaftsbild des Ingenieurs: Zum politischen Verhalten der Technischen Intelligenz in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), and Ingenieure in der Industriegesellschaft: Zur Soziologie der Technik und der naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Intelligenz im öffentlichen Dienst und in der Industrie (Frankfurt am Main, 1973): Olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate 1870-1920 (Chicago, 1990), esp. pp. 55-58, for the careers of engineers as midlevel managers; Jürgen Kocka, Unternehmer in der deutschen Industrialisierung (Göttingen, 1975), pp. 56- 57. Ed Constant has also probed the ideology of engineering communities in "Science in Society: Petroleum Engineers and the Oil Fraternity in Texas, 1925-65," Social Studies of Science 19 (1989): 439-72.
17. See, e.g., Edwin Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession (Cleveland, 1971); Kendall Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton, N.J., 1978); Gerd Hortleder, Das Gesellschaftsbild des Ingenieurs: Zum politischen Verhalten der Technischen Intelligenz in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), and Ingenieure in der Industriegesellschaft: Zur Soziologie der Technik und der naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Intelligenz im öffentlichen Dienst und in der Industrie (Frankfurt am Main, 1973): Olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate 1870-1920 (Chicago, 1990), esp. pp. 55-58, for the careers of engineers as midlevel managers; Jürgen Kocka, Unternehmer in der deutschen Industrialisierung (Göttingen, 1975), pp. 56- 57. Ed Constant has also probed the ideology of engineering communities in "Science in Society: Petroleum Engineers and the Oil Fraternity in Texas, 1925-65," Social Studies of Science 19 (1989): 439-72.
18. See, e.g., Edwin Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession (Cleveland, 1971); Kendall Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton, N.J., 1978); Gerd Hortleder, Das Gesellschaftsbild des Ingenieurs: Zum politischen Verhalten der Technischen Intelligenz in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), and Ingenieure in der Industriegesellschaft: Zur Soziologie der Technik und der naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Intelligenz im öffentlichen Dienst und in der Industrie (Frankfurt am Main, 1973): Olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate 1870-1920 (Chicago, 1990), esp. pp. 55-58, for the careers of engineers as midlevel managers; Jürgen Kocka, Unternehmer in der deutschen Industrialisierung (Göttingen, 1975), pp. 56- 57. Ed Constant has also probed the ideology of engineering communities in "Science in Society: Petroleum Engineers and the Oil Fraternity in Texas, 1925-65," Social Studies of Science 19 (1989): 439-72.
19. See, e.g., Edwin Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession (Cleveland, 1971); Kendall Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton, N.J., 1978); Gerd Hortleder, Das Gesellschaftsbild des Ingenieurs: Zum politischen Verhalten der Technischen Intelligenz in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), and Ingenieure in der Industriegesellschaft: Zur Soziologie der Technik und der naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Intelligenz im öffentlichen Dienst und in der Industrie (Frankfurt am Main, 1973): Olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate 1870-1920 (Chicago, 1990), esp. pp. 55-58, for the careers of engineers as midlevel managers; Jürgen Kocka, Unternehmer in der deutschen Industrialisierung (Göttingen, 1975), pp. 56- 57. Ed Constant has also probed the ideology of engineering communities in "Science in Society: Petroleum Engineers and the Oil Fraternity in Texas, 1925-65," Social Studies of Science 19 (1989): 439-72.
20. See, e.g., Edwin Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession (Cleveland, 1971); Kendall Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton, N.J., 1978); Gerd Hortleder, Das Gesellschaftsbild des Ingenieurs: Zum politischen Verhalten der Technischen Intelligenz in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), and Ingenieure in der Industriegesellschaft: Zur Soziologie der Technik und der naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Intelligenz im öffentlichen Dienst und in der Industrie (Frankfurt am Main, 1973): Olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate 1870-1920 (Chicago, 1990), esp. pp. 55-58, for the careers of engineers as midlevel managers; Jürgen Kocka, Unternehmer in der deutschen Industrialisierung (Göttingen, 1975), pp. 56- 57. Ed Constant has also probed the ideology of engineering communities in "Science in Society: Petroleum Engineers and the Oil Fraternity in Texas, 1925-65," Social Studies of Science 19 (1989): 439-72.
21. See, e.g., Edwin Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession (Cleveland, 1971); Kendall Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton, N.J., 1978); Gerd Hortleder, Das Gesellschaftsbild des Ingenieurs: Zum politischen Verhalten der Technischen Intelligenz in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), and Ingenieure in der Industriegesellschaft: Zur Soziologie der Technik und der naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Intelligenz im öffentlichen Dienst und in der Industrie (Frankfurt am Main, 1973): Olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate 1870-1920 (Chicago, 1990), esp. pp. 55-58, for the careers of engineers as midlevel managers; Jürgen Kocka, Unternehmer in der deutschen Industrialisierung (Göttingen, 1975), pp. 56-57. Ed Constant has also probed the ideology of engineering communities in "Science in Society: Petroleum Engineers and the Oil Fraternity in Texas, 1925-65," Social Studies of Science 19 (1989): 439-72.
22. See, e.g., Edwin Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession (Cleveland, 1971); Kendall Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton, N.J., 1978); Gerd Hortleder, Das Gesellschaftsbild des Ingenieurs: Zum politischen Verhalten der Technischen Intelligenz in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), and Ingenieure in der Industriegesellschaft: Zur Soziologie der Technik und der naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Intelligenz im öffentlichen Dienst und in der Industrie (Frankfurt am Main, 1973): Olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate 1870-1920 (Chicago, 1990), esp. pp. 55-58, for the careers of engineers as midlevel managers; Jürgen Kocka, Unternehmer in der deutschen Industrialisierung (Göttingen, 1975), pp. 56- 57. Ed Constant has also probed the ideology of engineering communities in "Science in Society: Petroleum Engineers and the Oil Fraternity in Texas, 1925-65," Social Studies of Science 19 (1989): 439-72.
23. Richard Hirsh describes a similar situation among American electrical engineers, which he calls technological stasis. Technology and Transformation in the American Electric Utility Industry (Cambridge, 1989), p. 3.
24. There are many competing interpretations of the general concept of "modernity" and National Socialism. The most commonly accepted view since the 1960s has been that the Nazis were "antimodern"; that is, they were a great historical anachronism, the logical result of a society that had diverted from the course of the European Enlightenment. See Henry A. Turner, "Fascism and Modernization," in his Reappraisals of Fascism: New Viewpoints, (New York, 1975), pp. 117-40, and George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York, 1981). Another camp claims that Nazism is the logical end result of the Enlightenment itself: see, e.g., Max Horkheimer and Theodore W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York, 1989). Others argue more reasonably that modernity contains the potential to develop movements like National Socialism, but that National Socialism is not necessarily modernity's ineluctable outcome: see, for example, Detlev Peukert, "Alltag und Barbarei: Zur Normalität des Dritten Reiches," in Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zur Historisierung und Historikerstreit, ed. Dan Diner (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), pp. 51-61; Ronald Smelser, "How 'Modern' Were the Nazis? DAF Social Planning and the Modernization Question," German Studies Review 12 (1989): 135-72; Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989); Rainer Zitelmann, "Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne," in Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, ed. Ranier Zitelman et al. (Darmstadt, 1991), pp. 1-20. This literature is interesting and at times brilliant; I will not deal with it here because the authors tend to neglect modern technology and bureaucratic organization, although "industrialization" is always key to their definitions of modernization.
25. There are many competing interpretations of the general concept of "modernity" and National Socialism. The most commonly accepted view since the 1960s has been that the Nazis were "antimodern"; that is, they were a great historical anachronism, the logical result of a society that had diverted from the course of the European Enlightenment. See Henry A. Turner, "Fascism and Modernization," in his Reappraisals of Fascism: New Viewpoints, (New York, 1975), pp. 117-40, and George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York, 1981). Another camp claims that Nazism is the logical end result of the Enlightenment itself: see, e.g., Max Horkheimer and Theodore W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York, 1989). Others argue more reasonably that modernity contains the potential to develop movements like National Socialism, but that National Socialism is not necessarily modernity's ineluctable outcome: see, for example, Detlev Peukert, "Alltag und Barbarei: Zur Normalität des Dritten Reiches," in Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zur Historisierung und Historikerstreit, ed. Dan Diner (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), pp. 51-61; Ronald Smelser, "How 'Modern' Were the Nazis? DAF Social Planning and the Modernization Question," German Studies Review 12 (1989): 135-72; Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989); Rainer Zitelmann, "Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne," in Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, ed. Ranier Zitelman et al. (Darmstadt, 1991), pp. 1-20. This literature is interesting and at times brilliant; I will not deal with it here because the authors tend to neglect modern technology and bureaucratic organization, although "industrialization" is always key to their definitions of modernization.
26. There are many competing interpretations of the general concept of "modernity" and National Socialism. The most commonly accepted view since the 1960s has been that the Nazis were "antimodern"; that is, they were a great historical anachronism, the logical result of a society that had diverted from the course of the European Enlightenment. See Henry A. Turner, "Fascism and Modernization," in his Reappraisals of Fascism: New Viewpoints, (New York, 1975), pp. 117-40, and George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York, 1981). Another camp claims that Nazism is the logical end result of the Enlightenment itself: see, e.g., Max Horkheimer and Theodore W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York, 1989). Others argue more reasonably that modernity contains the potential to develop movements like National Socialism, but that National Socialism is not necessarily modernity's ineluctable outcome: see, for example, Detlev Peukert, "Alltag und Barbarei: Zur Normalität des Dritten Reiches," in Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zur Historisierung und Historikerstreit, ed. Dan Diner (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), pp. 51-61; Ronald Smelser, "How 'Modern' Were the Nazis? DAF Social Planning and the Modernization Question," German Studies Review 12 (1989): 135-72; Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989); Rainer Zitelmann, "Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne," in Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, ed. Ranier Zitelman et al. (Darmstadt, 1991), pp. 1-20. This literature is interesting and at times brilliant; I will not deal with it here because the authors tend to neglect modern technology and bureaucratic organization, although "industrialization" is always key to their definitions of modernization.
27. There are many competing interpretations of the general concept of "modernity" and National Socialism. The most commonly accepted view since the 1960s has been that the Nazis were "antimodern"; that is, they were a great historical anachronism, the logical result of a society that had diverted from the course of the European Enlightenment. See Henry A. Turner, "Fascism and Modernization," in his Reappraisals of Fascism: New Viewpoints, (New York, 1975), pp. 117-40, and George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York, 1981). Another camp claims that Nazism is the logical end result of the Enlightenment itself: see, e.g., Max Horkheimer and Theodore W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York, 1989). Others argue more reasonably that modernity contains the potential to develop movements like National Socialism, but that National Socialism is not necessarily modernity's ineluctable outcome: see, for example, Detlev Peukert, "Alltag und Barbarei: Zur Normalität des Dritten Reiches," in Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zur Historisierung und Historikerstreit, ed. Dan Diner (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), pp. 51-61; Ronald Smelser, "How 'Modern' Were the Nazis? DAF Social Planning and the Modernization Question," German Studies Review 12 (1989): 135-72; Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989); Rainer Zitelmann, "Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne," in Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, ed. Ranier Zitelman et al. (Darmstadt, 1991), pp. 1-20. This literature is interesting and at times brilliant; I will not deal with it here because the authors tend to neglect modern technology and bureaucratic organization, although "industrialization" is always key to their definitions of modernization.
28. There are many competing interpretations of the general concept of "modernity" and National Socialism. The most commonly accepted view since the 1960s has been that the Nazis were "antimodern"; that is, they were a great historical anachronism, the logical result of a society that had diverted from the course of the European Enlightenment. See Henry A. Turner, "Fascism and Modernization," in his Reappraisals of Fascism: New Viewpoints, (New York, 1975), pp. 117-40, and George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York, 1981). Another camp claims that Nazism is the logical end result of the Enlightenment itself: see, e.g., Max Horkheimer and Theodore W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York, 1989). Others argue more reasonably that modernity contains the potential to develop movements like National Socialism, but that National Socialism is not necessarily modernity's ineluctable outcome: see, for example, Detlev Peukert, "Alltag und Barbarei: Zur Normalität des Dritten Reiches," in Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zur Historisierung und Historikerstreit, ed. Dan Diner (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), pp. 51-61; Ronald Smelser, "How 'Modern' Were the Nazis? DAF Social Planning and the Modernization Question," German Studies Review 12 (1989): 135-72; Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989); Rainer Zitelmann, "Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne," in Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, ed. Ranier Zitelman et al. (Darmstadt, 1991), pp. 1-20. This literature is interesting and at times brilliant; I will not deal with it here because the authors tend to neglect modern technology and bureaucratic organization, although "industrialization" is always key to their definitions of modernization.
29. There are many competing interpretations of the general concept of "modernity" and National Socialism. The most commonly accepted view since the 1960s has been that the Nazis were "antimodern"; that is, they were a great historical anachronism, the logical result of a society that had diverted from the course of the European Enlightenment. See Henry A. Turner, "Fascism and Modernization," in his Reappraisals of Fascism: New Viewpoints, (New York, 1975), pp. 117-40, and George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York, 1981). Another camp claims that Nazism is the logical end result of the Enlightenment itself: see, e.g., Max Horkheimer and Theodore W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York, 1989). Others argue more reasonably that modernity contains the potential to develop movements like National Socialism, but that National Socialism is not necessarily modernity's ineluctable outcome: see, for example, Detlev Peukert, "Alltag und Barbarei: Zur Normalität des Dritten Reiches," in Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zur Historisierung und Historikerstreit, ed. Dan Diner (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), pp. 51-61; Ronald Smelser, "How 'Modern' Were the Nazis? DAF Social Planning and the Modernization Question," German Studies Review 12 (1989): 135-72; Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989); Rainer Zitelmann, "Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne," in Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, ed. Ranier Zitelman et al. (Darmstadt, 1991), pp. 1-20. This literature is interesting and at times brilliant; I will not deal with it here because the authors tend to neglect modern technology and bureaucratic organization, although "industrialization" is always key to their definitions of modernization.
30. There are many competing interpretations of the general concept of "modernity" and National Socialism. The most commonly accepted view since the 1960s has been that the Nazis were "antimodern"; that is, they were a great historical anachronism, the logical result of a society that had diverted from the course of the European Enlightenment. See Henry A. Turner, "Fascism and Modernization," in his Reappraisals of Fascism: New Viewpoints, (New York, 1975), pp. 117-40, and George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York, 1981). Another camp claims that Nazism is the logical end result of the Enlightenment itself: see, e.g., Max Horkheimer and Theodore W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York, 1989). Others argue more reasonably that modernity contains the potential to develop movements like National Socialism, but that National Socialism is not necessarily modernity's ineluctable outcome: see, for example, Detlev Peukert, "Alltag und Barbarei: Zur Normalität des Dritten Reiches," in Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zur Historisierung und Historikerstreit, ed. Dan Diner (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), pp. 51-61; Ronald Smelser, "How 'Modern' Were the Nazis? DAF Social Planning and the Modernization Question," German Studies Review 12 (1989): 135-72; Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989); Rainer Zitelmann, "Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne," in Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, ed. Ranier Zitelman et al. (Darmstadt, 1991), pp. 1-20. This literature is interesting and at times brilliant; I will not deal with it here because the authors tend to neglect modern technology and bureaucratic organization, although "industrialization" is always key to their definitions of modernization.
31. See David Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States (Baltimore, 1984), and Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany (Oxford, 1994).
32. See David Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States (Baltimore, 1984), and Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany (Oxford, 1994).
33. Richard Grün, "Mensch und Technik" Zement 30 (1941): 637. On modern bureaucratic organization, see
34. James Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society (Cambridge, 1986);
35. Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, 1977) and
36. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, 1990), esp. pp. 393-592, which contain his comparisons of managerial structures in Germany with the United States;
37. Jürgen Kocka, Die Angestellten in der deutschen Geschichte, 1850-1980 (Göttingen, 1981),
38. and Unternehmensverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel Siemens, 1847-1914: Zum Verhältnis von Kapitalismus und Bürokratie in der deutschen Industrialisierung (Stuttgart, 1969).
39. What could be more indicative than Henry Ford's own autobiography with Samuel Crowther, My Life and Work (Garden City, N.J., 1922)? Translated, Mein Leben und Werk (Leipzig, 1923) was a best-seller. Its popularity was not due primarily to Ford's own anti-Semitism; nevertheless, some Nazis promoted Fordist production as commensurable with their racial aims. See Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm (New York, 1989), pp. 284-94.
40. What could be more indicative than Henry Ford's own autobiography with Samuel Crowther, My Life and Work (Garden City, N.J., 1922)? Translated, Mein Leben und Werk (Leipzig, 1923) was a best-seller. Its popularity was not due primarily to Ford's own anti-Semitism; nevertheless, some Nazis promoted Fordist production as commensurable with their racial aims. See Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm (New York, 1989), pp. 284-94.
41. What could be more indicative than Henry Ford's own autobiography with Samuel Crowther, My Life and Work (Garden City, N.J., 1922)? Translated, Mein Leben und Werk (Leipzig, 1923) was a best-seller. Its popularity was not due primarily to Ford's own anti-Semitism; nevertheless, some Nazis promoted Fordist production as commensurable with their racial aims. See Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm (New York, 1989), pp. 284-94.
42. On the RKF in general see Robert Koehl, RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-45: A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom (Cambridge, 1957); Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik: Die Zusammenarbeit von Wehrmacht, Wirtschaft und SS (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), esp. pp. 83-114; and Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung: Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung (Frankfurt am Main, 1993). See also the catalogue of an exhibit prepared in Berlin by the Stabshauptamt RKF in which the WVHA took part, Planung und Aufbau im Osten: Erläuterungen und Skizzen zum ländlichen Aufbau in den neuen Ostgebieten (Berlin, 1941).
43. On the RKF in general see Robert Koehl, RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-45: A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom (Cambridge, 1957); Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik: Die Zusammenarbeit von Wehrmacht, Wirtschaft und SS (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), esp. pp. 83-114; and Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung: Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung (Frankfurt am Main, 1993). See also the catalogue of an exhibit prepared in Berlin by the Stabshauptamt RKF in which the WVHA took part, Planung und Aufbau im Osten: Erläuterungen und Skizzen zum ländlichen Aufbau in den neuen Ostgebieten (Berlin, 1941).
44. On the RKF in general see Robert Koehl, RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-45: A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom (Cambridge, 1957); Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik: Die Zusammenarbeit von Wehrmacht, Wirtschaft und SS (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), esp. pp. 83-114; and Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung: Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung (Frankfurt am Main, 1993). See also the catalogue of an exhibit prepared in Berlin by the Stabshauptamt RKF in which the WVHA took part, Planung und Aufbau im Osten: Erläuterungen und Skizzen zum ländlichen Aufbau in den neuen Ostgebieten (Berlin, 1941).
45. On the RKF in general see Robert Koehl, RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-45: A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom (Cambridge, 1957); Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik: Die Zusammenarbeit von Wehrmacht, Wirtschaft und SS (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), esp. pp. 83-114; and Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung: Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung (Frankfurt am Main, 1993). See also the catalogue of an exhibit prepared in Berlin by the Stabshauptamt RKF in which the WVHA took part, Planung und Aufbau im Osten: Erläuterungen und Skizzen zum ländlichen Aufbau in den neuen Ostgebieten (Berlin, 1941).
46. Mechtild Rössler, "'Area Research' and 'Spatial Planning' from the Weimar Republic to the German Federal Republic: Creating a Society with a Spatial Order under National Socialism," in Science, Technology, and National Socialism, ed. Mark Walker and Monika Renneberg (Cambridge, 1994), p. 135. Hans Kammler, 8 January 1942, "Bericht des Amtes II-Bauten über die Arbeiten im Jahre 1941," U.S. Holocaust Museum, microfilm, RG-11.001M.03: roll 19. (This film is from the KGB Secret Archive in Moscow OSOBIY, where the signature is 502-1-13. Hereinafter these documents will be cited by the U.S. Holocaust Museum's film number and roll number, with the Russian call number in parentheses.) NO-495, Oswald Pohl to various administration offices, 19 January 1942, "Organization of the Administration." (These documents are from the NO, NI, or NG series used at the Nürnberg war crimes trials where eighteen WVHA officers were tried in Case IV vs. Oswald Pohl et al. Some documents were never given such codes and are cited by their location in Defense Document Books or Prosecution Document Books, by the name of the defendant. I cite courtroom testimony according to the page number of the Protocol [where translated into English] or Protokoll [German]. Copies of the trial records can be found in the Bundesarachiv Koblenz, the U.S. National Archives, and numerous other repositories.) For further evidence of the dedication of the WVHA to building plans in the East, see Heinrich Himmler to Pohl, 31 January 1942, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK) NS19/2065; Pohl to Himmler, 14 January 1941, National Archives Microfilms Collections, Captured German Documents Record Group T-976, Records of the SS Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt, roll 1: frame 612- 24 (hereafter cited as T-976/roll #: frame #). Pohl ambitiously declared that the WVHA would provide 100 percent of the SS's needs.
47. Mechtild Rössler, "'Area Research' and 'Spatial Planning' from the Weimar Republic to the German Federal Republic: Creating a Society with a Spatial Order under National Socialism," in Science, Technology, and National Socialism, ed. Mark Walker and Monika Renneberg (Cambridge, 1994), p. 135. Hans Kammler, 8 January 1942, "Bericht des Amtes II-Bauten über die Arbeiten im Jahre 1941," U.S. Holocaust Museum, microfilm, RG-11.001M.03: roll 19. (This film is from the KGB Secret Archive in Moscow OSOBIY, where the signature is 502-1-13. Hereinafter these documents will be cited by the U.S. Holocaust Museum's film number and roll number, with the Russian call number in parentheses.) NO-495, Oswald Pohl to various administration offices, 19 January 1942, "Organization of the Administration." (These documents are from the NO, NI, or NG series used at the Nürnberg war crimes trials where eighteen WVHA officers were tried in Case IV vs. Oswald Pohl et al. Some documents were never given such codes and are cited by their location in Defense Document Books or Prosecution Document Books, by the name of the defendant. I cite courtroom testimony according to the page number of the Protocol [where translated into English] or Protokoll [German]. Copies of the trial records can be found in the Bundesarachiv Koblenz, the U.S. National Archives, and numerous other repositories.) For further evidence of the dedication of the WVHA to building plans in the East, see Heinrich Himmler to Pohl, 31 January 1942, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK) NS19/2065; Pohl to Himmler, 14 January 1941, National Archives Microfilms Collections, Captured German Documents Record Group T-976, Records of the SS Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt, roll 1: frame 612-24 (hereafter cited as T-976/roll #: frame #). Pohl ambitiously declared that the WVHA would provide 100 percent of the SS's needs.
48. Quote from NO-1224, questionnaire filled out by Pohl, 24 June 1932, "Why Am I a National Socialist and an SA Man?" NO-2343, affidavit of Oswald Pohl.
49. Dr. Leo Volk, 4 September 1941, "Stichworte zu den Ausführungen des Gruppenführers für die Ansprache bei der Amtschefsitzung," T-976/35: 1018-29.
50. Enno Georg, Die Wirtschaftlichen Unternehmungen der SS (Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 70-72.
51. Volk. See also Johannes Tuchel, Konzentrationslager: Organisationsgeschichte und Funktion der "Inspektion der Konzentrationslager" 1934-38 (Boppard am Rhein, 1991), pp. 267-70, and Georg, pp. 60-61.
52. NO-736, NO-527, Dr. Paul Johannes Wenner, 18 January 1944, "Profit Analysis: Suggestion for Putting the W-Enterprises on a Sound Cost Price Footing." NO-519, Max Horn to Pohl, "Arbeiten die Ghettobetriebe wirtschaftlich?" 24 January 1944. NO-542, Walter Salpeter, from 1939, "Tasks, Organization and Finance Plan of Office III (W) in the Economic and Administrative Main Office of the RFSS." Pohl to Reichskommissar für die Preisbildung, 19 September 1941, "Erklaerung nach Par 22 KWVO der dem Hauptamt Verwaltung und Wirtschaft angeschlossenen Gesellschaften," T-976/3: 84-87. See also unsigned, undated report from 1943, T-976/ 7:167-214.
53. NO-736, NO-527, Dr. Paul Johannes Wenner, 18 January 1944, "Profit Analysis: Suggestion for Putting the W-Enterprises on a Sound Cost Price Footing." NO-519, Max Horn to Pohl, "Arbeiten die Ghettobetriebe wirtschaftlich?" 24 January 1944. NO-542, Walter Salpeter, from 1939, "Tasks, Organization and Finance Plan of Office III (W) in the Economic and Administrative Main Office of the RFSS." Pohl to Reichskommissar für die Preisbildung, 19 September 1941, "Erklaerung nach Par 22 KWVO der dem Hauptamt Verwaltung und Wirtschaft angeschlossenen Gesellschaften," T-976/3: 84-87. See also unsigned, undated report from 1943, T-976/ 7:167-214.
54. NO-1044, Salpeter, undated annual report on the year 1939 of the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt für Ernährung und Verpflegung. Oswald Pohl testimony, Protokoll: 1713-16, 610. See also Georg, p. 55.
55. NO-1043, anonymous report, undated from 1940, probably by Bobermin, "Generaltreuhaender für Baustofferzeugungsstaetten im Ostraum im Jahre 1940."
56. NO-1016, Leo Volk, "Organisation und Aufgaben der Amtsgruppe W," T-976/ 1:188-92. Protokoll: p. 58. Prosecutor Robins stated that this report was written for Leo Volk by Heinz Fanslau NO-1016 includes a cover letter by Fanslau, who sent the manifesto in Volk's absence, but it is unclear whether Fanslau wrote the document. Most likely the two collaborated.
57. Wilhelm Karius to Hans Baier, 25 March 1944, T-976/1:217. Oswald Pohl to Hans Baier, 10 June 1937, "Nachwuchs für SS-Verwaltungsführer," Berlin Document Center (hereafter BDC), SS Personal Akten Hans Baier.
58. Jeffry Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 156-61. The origins of this conservative anticapitalism in the traditions of the German Beamtentum and its appeal to the new middle class in Germany is analyzed by Jürgen Kocka, Die Angestellten in der deutschen Geschichte (n. 9 above), pp. 142-70, esp. p. 164.
59. Jeffry Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 156-61. The origins of this conservative anticapitalism in the traditions of the German Beamtentum and its appeal to the new middle class in Germany is analyzed by Jürgen Kocka, Die Angestellten in der deutschen Geschichte (n. 9 above), pp. 142-70, esp. p. 164.
60. BDC, SS Personal Akte Leo Volk, and affidavit of Gerhard Hoffman, Defense Document Book of Leo Volk.
61. NI-11324, NI-11325, Pohl to RFSS, 4 September 1941, "Abgabe von treuhänderisch verwalteten Ziegeleien"; see also NO-1043 (n. 19 above).
62. Hermann Kaienburg, "Vernichtung durch Arbeit" Der Fall Neuengamme. Die Wirtschaftsbestrebungen der SS und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Existenzbedingungen der KZ-Gefangenen (Bonn, 1990), pp. 90-112, 423-23.
63. Protokoll: 1543.
64. On the range of motives in modernization see Hounshell (n. 8 above). On SS failures and modern technology, see affidavit of Roman Fuerth, Defense Document Book of Karl Mummenthey.
65. Müller (n. 11 above), pp. 49-82, 87. NI-6341, Walter Salpeter to Emil Meyer, Dresdner Bank, 4 January 1940, and NI-7866, August Frank to Pohl, 2 September 1942. See also Dresdner Bank, Volk und Wirtschaft im ehemaligen Polen: Nur zur persönlichen Information! (Berlin, 1939). Regarding Golleschau, see Richard Göbel to Ostdeutsche Baustoffwerke (ODBW), 16 May 1942, Panstwowe Muzeum w Oswiecimiu: D-AuIII/Golleschau, Band 2a (hereafter references to sources from the Polish Auschwitz Museum will be cited as PMO Band [volume]); unsigned, 15 January 1943. "Entwicklung des Aktienkapitals," PMO Band 2a; J. S. Fischer, 31 December 1941, "Prüfung der Jahresabschluss," BAK NS3/1286. The reasons for confiscating the factory are unclear. Göbel to ODBW, 16 May 1942, PMO Band 2a shows that various stocks were deposited in banks in Warsaw, Basel, Viene, Beilitz, and Amsterdam.
66. On Bobermin's ideological commitment see NO-1043 (n. 19 above), NO-1008, Bobermin to Pohl, 3 July 1941, "Entwurf eines Schreibens an den RFSS, betr. Abgabe von treuhänderisch verwalteten Ost-Ziegeleien," and testimony of Oswald Pohl, Protokoll: 1707. For biographical details, see BDC Personal Akte Hanns Bobermin; NO-1566, Affidavit of Hanns Bobermin. On Bobermin's service to the RKF, see NI-11327, Bobermin to Hohberg, 22 December 1941, "Tätigkeit und Geschäftsergebnis der Ostdeutsche Baustoffwerke GmbH 1941"; NO-1012, Pohl's order of 28 June 1941. On his technological enthusiasm and anticapitalism, see NO-1006, Bobermin to Baier, 2 April 1944, "Taking over of brickworks Bonarka."
67. NO-1043 (n. 19 above); Bobermin to Gôbel, 7 December 1943, "Organverhältnis-Steuerentrichtung," PMO Band 2; NI-11327, Bobermin to Hohberg, 22 December 1941, "Tätigkeit und Geschäftsergebnis der Ostdeutsche Baustoffwerke GmbH 1941."
68. Chandler, Scale and Scope (n. 9 above), p. 15: "The modern industrial firm can be denned as a collection of operating units, each with its own specific facilities and personnel, whose combined resources and activities are coordinated, monitored, and allocated by a hierarchy of middle and top managers. It is the existence of this hierarchy that makes the activities and operations of the whole enterprise more than the sum of its operating units." See also Beniger (n. 9 above), p. 257.
69. "Gutachten über die Golleschauer Portland-Zement-Fabrik A.G. Schema einer Gestehungskostenberechnung Voraussichtliche Zement-Kosten und Erlöse," BAK NS3/164, 23 October 1990. The report is unsigned but initialed Vk (Volk)/Sla (Slamal, an Oberingenieur of a German cement factory)/Scha (probably Schrameck).
70. IbId.
71. Compare Tilla Siegel and Thomas von Freyberg, Industrielle Rationalisierung unter dem Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), pp. 35-36, 77-90.
72. Richard Grün (n. 9 above): 634-45. The ideals expressed by Grün remained current into the postwar era, which only reinforces the point that the SS acted upon a broad consensus within German industry. See Siegel and von Freyberg, p. 50, quote from Kurt Pentzlin. Pentzlin studied rational methods of mass production in Germany and America and worked for the rationalization of the armaments industry during the Third Reich. He founded a Reichsausschuss für Arbeitsstudien (Reich Committee for the Study of Work) after 1945, and had this to say in 1949: "the civilization into which we have now entered can no longer do without technological progress . . . the negros say: Six days a week you should rest, and you should also not work on the seventh if possible. Unfortunately, the claims of civilization have forced the inhabitants of countries with culture to intensive labor without, however, killing off the work philosophy of the negro in them. . . . Time and again we must overcome this tension both among manual laborers and among intellectual workers if rationalization is to have its proper success."
73. Grün: 635, 636. Compare Richard Grün, "Der deutsche Bauernhof," Zement 28 (1939): 699-701.
74. On postwar adulation of Grün, see G. Haegermann, F. Keil, O. Mundhenke, L. Pistor, and E. Schott, Deutscher Zement, 1852-1952: Im Gedenkjahr des Deutschen Zementes 1952 (Bauverlag, 1952), pp. 70-85. On Grün's leading role in wartime industry, see any of various announcements in Zement, 1941-44 (after which it was cancelled due to paper shortages). Grün is mentioned by Herf (n. 22 above), pp. 208-12, and is as good an example as any of the deep failure of Herf's effort to understand modernity and technical work. Grün and those like him were filled with the sense of progress they gained from National Socialism, not its promise of reaction, as Herf implies. Herf s main point is that engineers like Grün provided a key ideological bridge to Nazism. They undertook to reconcile German romanticism and Enlightenment rationality. They gave "spiritual" status to technology, thus enabling the nation to engage in the work of rearmament while believeing this to be an expression of German "will" and other nonsense promoted by the Nazis. This "crisis of German ideology" is a false dilemma, however. The commitment of many German engineers to romanticism was real. It seems to me, however, mistaken to postulate a deep intellectual crisis, based on the perceived contradiction between romanticism and technical rationality, that threatened to hamstring the Nazi regime. When one examines the actual work world of German engineers, it appears that contradictions between romanticism, irrationality, and technological work caused few sleepless nights and did little to impair their intellectual work. The automatic, thoughtless, and thus irrational association of modernization with social progress and the betterment of mankind is one of the oldest legacies of the Enlightenment. Likewise the association of technical progress with nation building. Grün and his contemporaries took this for a matter of course as the ultimate legitimating foundation of their work. They divined in Nazism a political movement that would once again promote industrialization and propel Germany one step further on that ineluctable path toward future progress, "even over corpses." See Jürgen Kocka, Unternehmer in der deutschen Industrialisierung (n. 5 above), pp. 56-57, who lists this belief in the mission of industrialization as one of the main motives for German capitalists in the industrial revolution.
75. On postwar adulation of Grün, see G. Haegermann, F. Keil, O. Mundhenke, L. Pistor, and E. Schott, Deutscher Zement, 1852-1952: Im Gedenkjahr des Deutschen Zementes 1952 (Bauverlag, 1952), pp. 70-85. On Grün's leading role in wartime industry, see any of various announcements in Zement, 1941-44 (after which it was cancelled due to paper shortages). Grün is mentioned by Herf (n. 22 above), pp. 208-12, and is as good an example as any of the deep failure of Herf's effort to understand modernity and technical work. Grün and those like him were filled with the sense of progress they gained from National Socialism, not its promise of reaction, as Herf implies. Herf s main point is that engineers like Grün provided a key ideological bridge to Nazism. They undertook to reconcile German romanticism and Enlightenment rationality. They gave "spiritual" status to technology, thus enabling the nation to engage in the work of rearmament while believeing this to be an expression of German "will" and other nonsense promoted by the Nazis. This "crisis of German ideology" is a false dilemma, however. The commitment of many German engineers to romanticism was real. It seems to me, however, mistaken to postulate a deep intellectual crisis, based on the perceived contradiction between romanticism and technical rationality, that threatened to hamstring the Nazi regime. When one examines the actual work world of German engineers, it appears that contradictions between romanticism, irrationality, and technological work caused few sleepless nights and did little to impair their intellectual work. The automatic, thoughtless, and thus irrational association of modernization with social progress and the betterment of mankind is one of the oldest legacies of the Enlightenment. Likewise the association of technical progress with nation building. Grün and his contemporaries took this for a matter of course as the ultimate legitimating foundation of their work. They divined in Nazism a political movement that would once again promote industrialization and propel Germany one step further on that ineluctable path toward future progress, "even over corpses." See Jürgen Kocka, Unternehmer in der deutschen Industrialisierung (n. 5 above), pp. 56-57, who lists this belief in the mission of industrialization as one of the main motives for German capitalists in the industrial revolution.
76. "Entwicklung des Aktienkapitals" (n. 28 above).
77. G. Haegermann et al., pp. 86-87. For industrial advocates during the Nazi period see Wilhelm Anselm, Erwin Meissner, and Kurt Stöcke, Die Arbeit im Zementwerk (Berlin, 1942) pp. 4-9; Friedrich Wecke, Zement (Dresden, 1942), pp. 14-16.
78. G. Haegermann et al., pp. 86-87. For industrial advocates during the Nazi period see Wilhelm Anselm, Erwin Meissner, and Kurt Stöcke, Die Arbeit im Zementwerk (Berlin, 1942) pp. 4-9; Friedrich Wecke, Zement (Dresden, 1942), pp. 14-16.
79. Jürgen Kocka, Die Angestellten in der deutschen Geschichte (n. 9 above), pp. 51-63. For his analysis of paternalism as a modern managerial strategy (as opposed to feudal tradition) see Unternehmer in der deutschen Industrialisierung, pp. 56-57, 77-82.
80. Jürgen Kocka, Die Angestellten in der deutschen Geschichte (n. 9 above), pp. 51-63. For his analysis of paternalism as a modern managerial strategy (as opposed to feudal tradition) see Unternehmer in der deutschen Industrialisierung, pp. 56-57, 77-82.
81. Walter Salpeter, "Die Aufgabe der Generaltreuhandverwaltung beschlagnahmter polnischer Ziegeleien," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 303.
82. For example, the largest single investment Volk recommended (450,000 RM) was for Mahltrocknungsanlagen, or drying rotary mills, an elegant and revolutionary innovation adopted by the cement industry at that time which eliminated, among other things, transport work traditionally done by manual laborers. See Volk, "Gutachten" (n. 32 above).
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid. Göbel, numerous occasions, "Wochenberichte," PMO Band 2a.
85. Compare Robert Lesley, History of the Portland Cement Industry (Chicago, 1924) pp. 113-14. On crushers, see Friedrich Wecke, ABC der Zementtechnik (Berlin, 1944), pp. 17-20, 99-101, 181-84.
86. Compare Robert Lesley, History of the Portland Cement Industry (Chicago, 1924) pp. 113-14. On crushers, see Friedrich Wecke, ABC der Zementtechnik (Berlin, 1944), pp. 17-20, 99-101, 181-84.
87. Volk, "Gutachten."
88. Hans Hohberg to Pohl, 27 February 1941, "Zementfabrik Golleschau und Zementfabrik Saturn," BAK NS3/164.
89. Pohl, testimony (n. 18 above). Kaienburg (n. 25 above), pp. 90-97.
90. Ludwig, Technik und Ingenieure (n. 3above), esp. pp. 150-60, and "Widersprüchlichkeiten" (n. 3 above) 245-54. Compare Gerd Hortleder (n. 5 above), pp. 96- 102.
91. Ludwig, Technik und Ingenieure (n. 3above), esp. pp. 150-60, and "Widersprüchlichkeiten" (n. 3 above) 245-54. Compare Gerd Hortleder (n. 5 above), pp. 96-102.
92. Salpeter to Pohl, 8 May 1940, "Organisation des Amtes III A," Bundesarchiv Potsdam (BAP), Microfilm Collection PL5, "Verfahren gegen Gerhard Maurer," roll #42055 (hereafter cited as BAP, PL5:roll #). In five originally planned Werkzentralen, the technical managers were all civilians except for one, centered in Kalisch.
93. Fischer (n. 28 above); Bobermin to Gobel, 23 December 1942, PMO Band 2a; BDC, Partei Kanzlei Correspondence Dipl. Ing. Richard Göbel; BDC NSDAP Mitgliedskarte (Gaukartei).
94. See any of the many letters between Göbel and Klinker-Zementfabrik management in Posen, PMO, Band 2 and Band 2a, e.g., Göbel to ODBW, 16 May 1942; Bobermin to Göbel, 30 May 1942.
95. Michael Prinz, Vom Mittelstand zum Volksgenossen: Die Entwicklung des sozialen Status der Angestellten von der Weimarer Republik bis zum Ende der NS-Zeit (München, 1986), pp. 134-36, 175-81, 229-36.
96. On general sympathy for state settlements, see "Privatindustrie und sozialer Wohnungsbau," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 425; Ernst-Hubert Kraemer, "Der ostpreußische Wirtschafts-und Siedlungsaufbau," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 277; Hermann Röchling, "Heimstättensiedlung als Staatsnotwendigkeit: Lehre des Saarkampfes," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 180-82. But for resistance to state intervention in industrial policies of settlement at individual factories, see "Geschäftsbericht für 31/12/43" BAK NS3/829, pp. 124-42, and Anselm et al. (n. 39 above). See also "Leistungund Sozialarbeit der Zementindustrie," Zement 27 (1941): 179-80; Georg Reuter, "Mensch und Maschine im künftigen Ziegelwerk," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 66 (1942): 274-75; "Wohnungsbau in Deutschland," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 64 (1940): 61-62: "Der soziale Wohnungsbau und sein Baustoffbedarf," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 118-20; E. Vogler, "Der Betriebsführer im sozialen Wohnungsbau," Wirtschaftsblatt der Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Berlin 39 (1941). This commitment to paternalistic care of German workers was by no means a function of Nazism, nor did it disappear after them. See the celebratory postwar work by Haegermann et al. (n. 37 above), pp. 111-13.
97. On general sympathy for state settlements, see "Privatindustrie und sozialer Wohnungsbau," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 425; Ernst-Hubert Kraemer, "Der ostpreußische Wirtschafts-und Siedlungsaufbau," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 277; Hermann Röchling, "Heimstättensiedlung als Staatsnotwendigkeit: Lehre des Saarkampfes," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 180-82. But for resistance to state intervention in industrial policies of settlement at individual factories, see "Geschäftsbericht für 31/12/43" BAK NS3/829, pp. 124-42, and Anselm et al. (n. 39 above). See also "Leistungund Sozialarbeit der Zementindustrie," Zement 27 (1941): 179-80; Georg Reuter, "Mensch und Maschine im künftigen Ziegelwerk," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 66 (1942): 274-75; "Wohnungsbau in Deutschland," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 64 (1940): 61-62: "Der soziale Wohnungsbau und sein Baustoffbedarf," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 118-20; E. Vogler, "Der Betriebsführer im sozialen Wohnungsbau," Wirtschaftsblatt der Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Berlin 39 (1941). This commitment to paternalistic care of German workers was by no means a function of Nazism, nor did it disappear after them. See the celebratory postwar work by Haegermann et al. (n. 37 above), pp. 111-13.
98. On general sympathy for state settlements, see "Privatindustrie und sozialer Wohnungsbau," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 425; Ernst-Hubert Kraemer, "Der ostpreußische Wirtschafts-und Siedlungsaufbau," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 277; Hermann Röchling, "Heimstättensiedlung als Staatsnotwendigkeit: Lehre des Saarkampfes," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 180-82. But for resistance to state intervention in industrial policies of settlement at individual factories, see "Geschäftsbericht für 31/12/43" BAK NS3/829, pp. 124-42, and Anselm et al. (n. 39 above). See also "Leistungund Sozialarbeit der Zementindustrie," Zement 27 (1941): 179-80; Georg Reuter, "Mensch und Maschine im künftigen Ziegelwerk," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 66 (1942): 274-75; "Wohnungsbau in Deutschland," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 64 (1940): 61-62: "Der soziale Wohnungsbau und sein Baustoffbedarf," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 118-20; E. Vogler, "Der Betriebsführer im sozialen Wohnungsbau," Wirtschaftsblatt der Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Berlin 39 (1941). This commitment to paternalistic care of German workers was by no means a function of Nazism, nor did it disappear after them. See the celebratory postwar work by Haegermann et al. (n. 37 above), pp. 111-13.
99. On general sympathy for state settlements, see "Privatindustrie und sozialer Wohnungsbau," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 425; Ernst-Hubert Kraemer, "Der ostpreußische Wirtschafts-und Siedlungsaufbau," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 277; Hermann Röchling, "Heimstättensiedlung als Staatsnotwendigkeit: Lehre des Saarkampfes," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 180-82. But for resistance to state intervention in industrial policies of settlement at individual factories, see "Geschäftsbericht für 31/12/43" BAK NS3/829, pp. 124-42, and Anselm et al. (n. 39 above). See also "Leistungund Sozialarbeit der Zementindustrie," Zement 27 (1941): 179-80; Georg Reuter, "Mensch und Maschine im künftigen Ziegelwerk," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 66 (1942): 274-75; "Wohnungsbau in Deutschland," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 64 (1940): 61-62: "Der soziale Wohnungsbau und sein Baustoffbedarf," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 118-20; E. Vogler, "Der Betriebsführer im sozialen Wohnungsbau," Wirtschaftsblatt der Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Berlin 39 (1941). This commitment to paternalistic care of German workers was by no means a function of Nazism, nor did it disappear after them. See the celebratory postwar work by Haegermann et al. (n. 37 above), pp. 111-13.
100. On general sympathy for state settlements, see "Privatindustrie und sozialer Wohnungsbau," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 425; Ernst-Hubert Kraemer, "Der ostpreußische Wirtschafts-und Siedlungsaufbau," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 277; Hermann Röchling, "Heimstättensiedlung als Staatsnotwendigkeit: Lehre des Saarkampfes," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 180-82. But for resistance to state intervention in industrial policies of settlement at individual factories, see "Geschäftsbericht für 31/12/43" BAK NS3/829, pp. 124-42, and Anselm et al. (n. 39 above). See also "Leistungund Sozialarbeit der Zementindustrie," Zement 27 (1941): 179-80; Georg Reuter, "Mensch und Maschine im künftigen Ziegelwerk," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 66 (1942): 274-75; "Wohnungsbau in Deutschland," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 64 (1940): 61-62: "Der soziale Wohnungsbau und sein Baustoffbedarf," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 118-20; E. Vogler, "Der Betriebsführer im sozialen Wohnungsbau," Wirtschaftsblatt der Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Berlin 39 (1941). This commitment to paternalistic care of German workers was by no means a function of Nazism, nor did it disappear after them. See the celebratory postwar work by Haegermann et al. (n. 37 above), pp. 111-13.
101. On general sympathy for state settlements, see "Privatindustrie und sozialer Wohnungsbau," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 425; Ernst-Hubert Kraemer, "Der ostpreußische Wirtschafts-und Siedlungsaufbau," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 277; Hermann Röchling, "Heimstättensiedlung als Staatsnotwendigkeit: Lehre des Saarkampfes," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 180-82. But for resistance to state intervention in industrial policies of settlement at individual factories, see "Geschäftsbericht für 31/12/43" BAK NS3/829, pp. 124-42, and Anselm et al. (n. 39 above). See also "Leistungund Sozialarbeit der Zementindustrie," Zement 27 (1941): 179-80; Georg Reuter, "Mensch und Maschine im künftigen Ziegelwerk," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 66 (1942): 274-75; "Wohnungsbau in Deutschland," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 64 (1940): 61-62: "Der soziale Wohnungsbau und sein Baustoffbedarf," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 118-20; E. Vogler, "Der Betriebsführer im sozialen Wohnungsbau," Wirtschaftsblatt der Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Berlin 39 (1941). This commitment to paternalistic care of German workers was by no means a function of Nazism, nor did it disappear after them. See the celebratory postwar work by Haegermann et al. (n. 37 above), pp. 111-13.
102. On general sympathy for state settlements, see "Privatindustrie und sozialer Wohnungsbau," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 425; Ernst-Hubert Kraemer, "Der ostpreußische Wirtschafts-und Siedlungsaufbau," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 277; Hermann Röchling, "Heimstättensiedlung als Staatsnotwendigkeit: Lehre des Saarkampfes," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 180-82. But for resistance to state intervention in industrial policies of settlement at individual factories, see "Geschäftsbericht für 31/12/43" BAK NS3/829, pp. 124-42, and Anselm et al. (n. 39 above). See also "Leistungund Sozialarbeit der Zementindustrie," Zement 27 (1941): 179-80; Georg Reuter, "Mensch und Maschine im künftigen Ziegelwerk," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 66 (1942): 274-75; "Wohnungsbau in Deutschland," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 64 (1940): 61-62: "Der soziale Wohnungsbau und sein Baustoffbedarf," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 118-20; E. Vogler, "Der Betriebsführer im sozialen Wohnungsbau," Wirtschaftsblatt der Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Berlin 39 (1941). This commitment to paternalistic care of German workers was by no means a function of Nazism, nor did it disappear after them. See the celebratory postwar work by Haegermann et al. (n. 37 above), pp. 111-13.
103. On general sympathy for state settlements, see "Privatindustrie und sozialer Wohnungsbau," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 425; Ernst-Hubert Kraemer, "Der ostpreußische Wirtschafts-und Siedlungsaufbau," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 277; Hermann Röchling, "Heimstättensiedlung als Staatsnotwendigkeit: Lehre des Saarkampfes," Siedlung und Wirtschaft 17 (1935): 180-82. But for resistance to state intervention in industrial policies of settlement at individual factories, see "Geschäftsbericht für 31/12/43" BAK NS3/829, pp. 124-42, and Anselm et al. (n. 39 above). See also "Leistungund Sozialarbeit der Zementindustrie," Zement 27 (1941): 179-80; Georg Reuter, "Mensch und Maschine im künftigen Ziegelwerk," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 66 (1942): 274-75; "Wohnungsbau in Deutschland," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 64 (1940): 61-62: "Der soziale Wohnungsbau und sein Baustoffbedarf," Tonindustrie-Zeitung: Fach- und Wirtschaftsblatt für die Industrie der Steine und Erden 65 (1941): 118-20; E. Vogler, "Der Betriebsführer im sozialen Wohnungsbau," Wirtschaftsblatt der Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Berlin 39 (1941). This commitment to paternalistic care of German workers was by no means a function of Nazism, nor did it disappear after them. See the celebratory postwar work by Haegermann et al. (n. 37 above), pp. 111-13.
104. Göbel to Bobermin, 28 December 1942, "Zementlieferung für die Waffen SS," PMO Band 2a.
105. 56 Bobermin to Göbel, 7 December 1942, "Organverhältnis-Steuerentrichtung," Klinker Hauptverwaltung to Göbel, 20 and 21 December 1943, and Göbel to Klinker Hauptverwaltung, 29 December, 1943, PMO Band 2.
106. Richard Göbel to Bobermin, 21 May 1942, PMO Band 2a.
107. NO-1566, affidavit of Hanns Bobermin; affidavit of Richard Goebel, Supplementary Defense Document Book of Hanns Bobermin.
108. Himmler to Richard Glücks, 26 January 1942, BDC Hängeordner 643. See also Arno Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? (New York, 1988); Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, 1941-45 (Stuttgart, 1978) pp. 199-222; Falk Pingel, Häftlinge unter SS-Herrschaft: Widerstand, Selbstbehauptung und Vernichtung im Konzentrationslager (Hamburg, 1978), p. 119. By mid- 1942, the massive influx of Soviet prisoners had halted with the stalled German invasion. Furthermore, few of the millions of prisoners in German camps remained alive. Most had starved or died of diseases related to the poor conditions of the POW camps.
109. Himmler to Richard Glücks, 26 January 1942, BDC Hängeordner 643. See also Arno Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? (New York, 1988); Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, 1941-45 (Stuttgart, 1978) pp. 199-222; Falk Pingel, Häftlinge unter SS-Herrschaft: Widerstand, Selbstbehauptung und Vernichtung im Konzentrationslager (Hamburg, 1978), p. 119. By mid- 1942, the massive influx of Soviet prisoners had halted with the stalled German invasion. Furthermore, few of the millions of prisoners in German camps remained alive. Most had starved or died of diseases related to the poor conditions of the POW camps.
110. Himmler to Richard Glücks, 26 January 1942, BDC Hängeordner 643. See also Arno Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? (New York, 1988); Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, 1941-45 (Stuttgart, 1978) pp. 199-222; Falk Pingel, Häftlinge unter SS-Herrschaft: Widerstand, Selbstbehauptung und Vernichtung im Konzentrationslager (Hamburg, 1978), p. 119. By mid-1942, the massive influx of Soviet prisoners had halted with the stalled German invasion. Furthermore, few of the millions of prisoners in German camps remained alive. Most had starved or died of diseases related to the poor conditions of the POW camps.
111. Göbel to Bobermin, 16 May 1942, PMO Band 2a.
112. Telegram to Golleschau from Berlin, 20 June 1942, PMO Band 2a.
113. Bobermin to Göbel, 23 December 1942, PMO Band 2a.
114. Compare Dietrich Eichholtz and Joachim Lehmann, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft: Band 2, 1941-43 (Berlin, 1985), p. 235, and Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des "Ausländer-Einsatzes" in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reichs (Bonn, 1986), pp. 270-71. For numbers of concentration camp prisoners in industrial labor, see Miroslav Karny, "SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs Hauptamt: Verwalter der KZ-Häftlingsarbeitskräfte und Zentrale des SS-Wirtschaftskonzerns," in Deutsche Wirtschaft: Zwangsarbeit von KZ-Häftlingen für Industrie und Behörden, ed. Ludwig Eiber et al. (Hamburg, 1991), p. 165. On industrial rationalization, see Lutz Budraß and Manfred Grieger, "Die Moral der Effizienz: Die Beschäftigung von KZ-Häftlingen am Beispiel des Volkswagenwerks und der Henschel Flugzeug-Werke," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Heft 2 (1993): 89-135, and Rainer Fröbe, "Der Arbeitseinsatz von KZ-Häftlingen und die Perspective der Industrie, 1943-1945," in Europe und der "Reichseinsatz": ausländische Zivilarbeiter, kriegsgefangene, und KZ-Häftlinge in Deutscheland, 1938-1945, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Essen, 1991), pp. 351-83. See also an article published in the very Journal that Georg Schlesinger founded to promote Taylorism in the German context: W. Mohr, "Betrieblicher Einsatz der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte," Werkstaatstechnik und Werksleiter 37 (1943): 379-82. The best short version of the reaction of private industry to prison labor is Ulrich Herbert, "Arbeit und Vernichtung: Ökonomisches Interesse und Primat der 'Weltanschauung' im Nationalsozialismus," in Diner (n. 7 above), pp. 198-236.
115. Compare Dietrich Eichholtz and Joachim Lehmann, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft: Band 2, 1941-43 (Berlin, 1985), p. 235, and Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des "Ausländer-Einsatzes" in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reichs (Bonn, 1986), pp. 270-71. For numbers of concentration camp prisoners in industrial labor, see Miroslav Karny, "SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs Hauptamt: Verwalter der KZ-Häftlingsarbeitskräfte und Zentrale des SS-Wirtschaftskonzerns," in Deutsche Wirtschaft: Zwangsarbeit von KZ-Häftlingen für Industrie und Behörden, ed. Ludwig Eiber et al. (Hamburg, 1991), p. 165. On industrial rationalization, see Lutz Budraß and Manfred Grieger, "Die Moral der Effizienz: Die Beschäftigung von KZ-Häftlingen am Beispiel des Volkswagenwerks und der Henschel Flugzeug-Werke," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Heft 2 (1993): 89-135, and Rainer Fröbe, "Der Arbeitseinsatz von KZ-Häftlingen und die Perspective der Industrie, 1943-1945," in Europe und der "Reichseinsatz": ausländische Zivilarbeiter, kriegsgefangene, und KZ-Häftlinge in Deutscheland, 1938-1945, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Essen, 1991), pp. 351-83. See also an article published in the very Journal that Georg Schlesinger founded to promote Taylorism in the German context: W. Mohr, "Betrieblicher Einsatz der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte," Werkstaatstechnik und Werksleiter 37 (1943): 379-82. The best short version of the reaction of private industry to prison labor is Ulrich Herbert, "Arbeit und Vernichtung: Ökonomisches Interesse und Primat der 'Weltanschauung' im Nationalsozialismus," in Diner (n. 7 above), pp. 198-236.
116. Compare Dietrich Eichholtz and Joachim Lehmann, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft: Band 2, 1941-43 (Berlin, 1985), p. 235, and Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des "Ausländer-Einsatzes" in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reichs (Bonn, 1986), pp. 270-71. For numbers of concentration camp prisoners in industrial labor, see Miroslav Karny, "SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs Hauptamt: Verwalter der KZ-Häftlingsarbeitskräfte und Zentrale des SS-Wirtschaftskonzerns," in Deutsche Wirtschaft: Zwangsarbeit von KZ-Häftlingen für Industrie und Behörden, ed. Ludwig Eiber et al. (Hamburg, 1991), p. 165. On industrial rationalization, see Lutz Budraß and Manfred Grieger, "Die Moral der Effizienz: Die Beschäftigung von KZ-Häftlingen am Beispiel des Volkswagenwerks und der Henschel Flugzeug-Werke," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Heft 2 (1993): 89-135, and Rainer Fröbe, "Der Arbeitseinsatz von KZ-Häftlingen und die Perspective der Industrie, 1943-1945," in Europe und der "Reichseinsatz": ausländische Zivilarbeiter, kriegsgefangene, und KZ-Häftlinge in Deutscheland, 1938-1945, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Essen, 1991), pp. 351-83. See also an article published in the very Journal that Georg Schlesinger founded to promote Taylorism in the German context: W. Mohr, "Betrieblicher Einsatz der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte," Werkstaatstechnik und Werksleiter 37 (1943): 379-82. The best short version of the reaction of private industry to prison labor is Ulrich Herbert, "Arbeit und Vernichtung: Ökonomisches Interesse und Primat der 'Weltanschauung' im Nationalsozialismus," in Diner (n. 7 above), pp. 198-236.
117. Compare Dietrich Eichholtz and Joachim Lehmann, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft: Band 2, 1941-43 (Berlin, 1985), p. 235, and Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des "Ausländer-Einsatzes" in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reichs (Bonn, 1986), pp. 270-71. For numbers of concentration camp prisoners in industrial labor, see Miroslav Karny, "SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs Hauptamt: Verwalter der KZ-Häftlingsarbeitskräfte und Zentrale des SS-Wirtschaftskonzerns," in Deutsche Wirtschaft: Zwangsarbeit von KZ-Häftlingen für Industrie und Behörden, ed. Ludwig Eiber et al. (Hamburg, 1991), p. 165. On industrial rationalization, see Lutz Budraß and Manfred Grieger, "Die Moral der Effizienz: Die Beschäftigung von KZ-Häftlingen am Beispiel des Volkswagenwerks und der Henschel Flugzeug-Werke," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Heft 2 (1993): 89-135, and Rainer Fröbe, "Der Arbeitseinsatz von KZ-Häftlingen und die Perspective der Industrie, 1943-1945," in Europe und der "Reichseinsatz": ausländische Zivilarbeiter, kriegsgefangene, und KZ-Häftlinge in Deutscheland, 1938-1945, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Essen, 1991), pp. 351-83. See also an article published in the very Journal that Georg Schlesinger founded to promote Taylorism in the German context: W. Mohr, "Betrieblicher Einsatz der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte," Werkstaatstechnik und Werksleiter 37 (1943): 379-82. The best short version of the reaction of private industry to prison labor is Ulrich Herbert, "Arbeit und Vernichtung: Ökonomisches Interesse und Primat der 'Weltanschauung' im Nationalsozialismus," in Diner (n. 7 above), pp. 198-236.
118. Compare Dietrich Eichholtz and Joachim Lehmann, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft: Band 2, 1941-43 (Berlin, 1985), p. 235, and Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des "Ausländer-Einsatzes" in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reichs (Bonn, 1986), pp. 270-71. For numbers of concentration camp prisoners in industrial labor, see Miroslav Karny, "SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs Hauptamt: Verwalter der KZ-Häftlingsarbeitskräfte und Zentrale des SS-Wirtschaftskonzerns," in Deutsche Wirtschaft: Zwangsarbeit von KZ-Häftlingen für Industrie und Behörden, ed. Ludwig Eiber et al. (Hamburg, 1991), p. 165. On industrial rationalization, see Lutz Budraß and Manfred Grieger, "Die Moral der Effizienz: Die Beschäftigung von KZ-Häftlingen am Beispiel des Volkswagenwerks und der Henschel Flugzeug-Werke," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Heft 2 (1993): 89-135, and Rainer Fröbe, "Der Arbeitseinsatz von KZ-Häftlingen und die Perspective der Industrie, 1943-1945," in Europe und der "Reichseinsatz": ausländische Zivilarbeiter, kriegsgefangene, und KZ-Häftlinge in Deutscheland, 1938-1945, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Essen, 1991), pp. 351-83. See also an article published in the very Journal that Georg Schlesinger founded to promote Taylorism in the German context: W. Mohr, "Betrieblicher Einsatz der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte," Werkstaatstechnik und Werksleiter 37 (1943): 379-82. The best short version of the reaction of private industry to prison labor is Ulrich Herbert, "Arbeit und Vernichtung: Ökonomisches Interesse und Primat der 'Weltanschauung' im Nationalsozialismus," in Diner (n. 7 above), pp. 198-236.
119. Compare Dietrich Eichholtz and Joachim Lehmann, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft: Band 2, 1941-43 (Berlin, 1985), p. 235, and Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des "Ausländer-Einsatzes" in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reichs (Bonn, 1986), pp. 270-71. For numbers of concentration camp prisoners in industrial labor, see Miroslav Karny, "SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs Hauptamt: Verwalter der KZ-Häftlingsarbeitskräfte und Zentrale des SS-Wirtschaftskonzerns," in Deutsche Wirtschaft: Zwangsarbeit von KZ-Häftlingen für Industrie und Behörden, ed. Ludwig Eiber et al. (Hamburg, 1991), p. 165. On industrial rationalization, see Lutz Budraß and Manfred Grieger, "Die Moral der Effizienz: Die Beschäftigung von KZ-Häftlingen am Beispiel des Volkswagenwerks und der Henschel Flugzeug-Werke," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Heft 2 (1993): 89-135, and Rainer Fröbe, "Der Arbeitseinsatz von KZ-Häftlingen und die Perspective der Industrie, 1943-1945," in Europe und der "Reichseinsatz": ausländische Zivilarbeiter, kriegsgefangene, und KZ-Häftlinge in Deutscheland, 1938-1945, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Essen, 1991), pp. 351-83. See also an article published in the very Journal that Georg Schlesinger founded to promote Taylorism in the German context: W. Mohr, "Betrieblicher Einsatz der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte," Werkstaatstechnik und Werksleiter 37 (1943): 379-82. The best short version of the reaction of private industry to prison labor is Ulrich Herbert, "Arbeit und Vernichtung: Ökonomisches Interesse und Primat der 'Weltanschauung' im Nationalsozialismus," in Diner (n. 7 above), pp. 198-236.
120. Compare Dietrich Eichholtz and Joachim Lehmann, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft: Band 2, 1941-43 (Berlin, 1985), p. 235, and Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des "Ausländer-Einsatzes" in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reichs (Bonn, 1986), pp. 270-71. For numbers of concentration camp prisoners in industrial labor, see Miroslav Karny, "SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs Hauptamt: Verwalter der KZ-Häftlingsarbeitskräfte und Zentrale des SS-Wirtschaftskonzerns," in Deutsche Wirtschaft: Zwangsarbeit von KZ-Häftlingen für Industrie und Behörden, ed. Ludwig Eiber et al. (Hamburg, 1991), p. 165. On industrial rationalization, see Lutz Budraß and Manfred Grieger, "Die Moral der Effizienz: Die Beschäftigung von KZ-Häftlingen am Beispiel des Volkswagenwerks und der Henschel Flugzeug-Werke," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Heft 2 (1993): 89-135, and Rainer Fröbe, "Der Arbeitseinsatz von KZ-Häftlingen und die Perspective der Industrie, 1943-1945," in Europe und der "Reichseinsatz": ausländische Zivilarbeiter, kriegsgefangene, und KZ-Häftlinge in Deutscheland, 1938-1945, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Essen, 1991), pp. 351-83. See also an article published in the very Journal that Georg Schlesinger founded to promote Taylorism in the German context: W. Mohr, "Betrieblicher Einsatz der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte," Werkstaatstechnik und Werksleiter 37 (1943): 379-82. The best short version of the reaction of private industry to prison labor is Ulrich Herbert, "Arbeit und Vernichtung: Ökonomisches Interesse und Primat der 'Weltanschauung' im Nationalsozialismus," in Diner (n. 7 above), pp. 198-236.
121. Bericht über die bei der Gesellschaft für Textil- und Lederverwertung mbH vorgenommenen Prüfung der Jahresabschlüsse zum 31. Dezember 1943, T-976/24:003-050. NO-1221, Fritz. Lechler, Annual Report of the Textil- und Lederverwertung GmbH, Dachau, 28 June 1941. Others outside the SS shared the perception that this prison industry was modern. See for example the undated report by Amtsrat Scheck of the Deutscher Rechnungshof, Vermerk über die Gesellschaft für Textil- und Lederverwertung mbH. Dachau und Ravensbrück. BAP 23.01:5636.
122. Bericht über die bei der Gesellschaft für Textil- und Lederverwertung mbH vorgenommenen Prüfung der Jahresabschlüsse zum 31. Dezember 1943, T-976/24:003-050. NO-1221, Fritz. Lechler, Annual Report of the Textil- und Lederverwertung GmbH, Dachau, 28 June 1941. Others outside the SS shared the perception that this prison industry was modern. See for example the undated report by Amtsrat Scheck of the Deutscher Rechnungshof, Vermerk über die Gesellschaft für Textil- und Lederverwertung mbH. Dachau und Ravensbrück. BAP 23.01:5636.
123. Bericht über die bei der Gesellschaft für Textil- und Lederverwertung mbH vorgenommenen Prüfung der Jahresabschlüsse zum 31. Dezember 1943, T-976/24:003-050. NO-1221, Fritz. Lechler, Annual Report of the Textil- und Lederverwertung GmbH, Dachau, 28 June 1941. Others outside the SS shared the perception that this prison industry was modern. See for example the undated report by Amtsrat Scheck of the Deutscher Rechnungshof, Vermerk über die Gesellschaft für Textil- und Lederverwertung mbH. Dachau und Ravensbrück. BAP 23.01:5636.
124. Kögel (no first name given), signed off by Karl Bischoff, 16 October 1942, "Aktenvermerk Zugmaschine," RG-11.001M.03:19 (502-1-18).
125. See for example Verwaltung Posen to Göbel, 3 July 1943, "Beschaffung eines elektr. beheizbaren Muffelofens"; Golleschau to Klinker-Zement, 15 December 1943; "Klinker Zement to Firma Lokomotiv- Feldbahn- und Maschinen-Industrie F.W. Budich AG," 11 September 1943, and Golleschau to Klinker, 15 December 1943, PMO Band 2.
126. Göbel to Bobermin, 7 September 1942, PMO Band 2a.
127. Göbel recorded numbers of prisoners in his workforce in numerous monthly reports from 1942 and 1943, and his numbers match those of the SDG: PMO Band 1, 2, and 2a. Because of an immunization record of Hans Nierzwicki, "Kommando Golleschau," PMO Band 1, we have some idea who made up the SS staff at the Kommando, though the list is not comprehensive. The Kommandoführer's post and the SDG's post were transitory, and there is no reason to believe that the guards were permanent posts. See also Jerzy Frackiewicz, "Das Nebenlager Golleschau," Hefte von Auschwitz 9 (1966): 107, who estimates the total strength of the Kommando staff at forty men, and lists the factory's lower-level management. I am grateful to Teresa Amiel of the U.S. Holocaust Museum, who helped me compare the Polish and German versions of this article.
128. Göbel to Klinker Zement, 5 July 1943, "Häftlingsentgelt," PMO Band 2. Hans Mirbeth to Schutzhaftlagerführer of KL Auschwitz, "Bericht über das Kommando Golleschau," 2 May 1943, PMO Band 3. The division of labor was: Quarries (2 shifts) 4 a.m. to 1 p.m., 1 p.m. to 11 p.m. Stone crusher (2 shifts) 6 a.m. to 3 p.m., 3 p.m. to midnight Coal silo (3 shifts) 3 a.m. to 2 p.m., 2 p.m. to 10 p.m., 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. Coal boiler (1 shift) 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. Packing (2 shifts) 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. Woodshop (1 shift) 6 a.m. to 5 p.m. Lime kiln (3 shifts) 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., 2 p.m. to 10 p.m., 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. Costs were estimated at 21.30 RM per ton, much more than the 15.76 RM that Volk had optimistically predicted in 1940. Göbel to Klinker Zement, 22 September 1943, "Selbstkostenpreis je 1 to. Zement," PMO Band 2. See Göbel's production forms for 1942-43 in PMO Band 2 and Band 2a. The collection contains no factory records from 1944. They were either destroyed or, more likely, simply lost - if they were kept at all.
129. Göbel to Klinker, 29 March 1943, and telegram of same day, PMO Band 2a. The Kommandoführer at this time was not Mirbeth but Hans Picklapp. He was known to torture prisoners and to set his dog Asta on them. He reportedly took part in executions and threw a young Jew from a second story window. He kept no records that have survived in the Auschwitz collections, so little is known about the Kommando during his brief tenure, which lasted probably from July of 1942, when the first prisoners arrived, to March of 1943, when Mirbeth replaced him. Frackiewicz, pp. 104, 107.
130. Condemnation of inhumane, efficiency-minded managers is an almost obligatory rhetorical feint in the minor genre of Nazi labor camp case studies. I would not have pushed my analysis beyond this rhetorical level had I not been spurred on by the comments of Michal McMahon and Herbert Mehrtens, for which I thank them.
131. Göbel to Klinker Zement, 5 July 1943.
132. Mirbeth, "Bericht über das Kommando Golleschau," 16 July 1943, PMO Band 3.
133. See the compendium of biographies on concentration camp commanders by Tom Segev, Soldaten des Bösen: Zur Geschichte der KZ-Kommandanten (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1992).
134. Mirbeth, "Bericht über das Kommando Golleschau," 16 July 1943, PMO Band 3. These arguments are reiterated constantly in his monthly reports of 1943 and 1944.
135. Mirbeth, "Bericht über das Kommando Golleschau," especially 7 August 1943, PMO Band 3. For work-related deaths, most from being hit by falling rock during blasting or quarrying, see any of several accident reports in the SDG (Sanitätsdienstgrad, the German label for the medical orderlies), PMO Band 1.
136. Göbel to Bobermin, 28 December 1942, "Häftlingseinsatz," PMO Band 2a, and Göbel to KL Auschwitz, 4 July 1944, "Nachtrag zum Bericht über das Arbeitslager für die Zeit von 1.6 bis 30.6.44," PMO Band 3.
137. On the prisoner workforce, see Göbel's monthly production reports (n. 44 above). On the company store, see Göbel to Bobermin, 28 December 1942, "Zementlieferung," and Göbel, "Wertmässige Aufstellung und Gliederung der Umsätze," PMO Band 2a. On the SS's praise for Göbel's paternalism toward civilians, see Erich Otto to Kurt Wisselink, 8 January 1944, "Bericht über die Betreuung der Gefolgschaft der Golleschauer Portland Zementfabrik AG" and Wisselink's report, T-976/18: 96-37A.
138. "Bericht über die Arbeitstage," 25 August 1943, and subsequent letter to all Aussenlager, 26 January 1944, PMO Band 3. For an example of Göbel's barbs, see Göbel to KL Auschwitz, 4 July 1944, "Nachtrag zum Bericht über das Arbeitslager für die Zeit von 1.6 bis 30.6.44," PMO Band 3.
139. Mirbeth was replaced in October 1944. Lagerkommandant Auschwitz III, Schwarz, "Kommandierung" to Golleschauer, Althammer, 1 October 1944, PMO Band 3.
140. Enno Lolling (chief doctor for the concentration camps within the WVHA), 2 April 1944, "Monatsbericht und Wochenmeldung"; 1. Lagerarzt Au III to Aussenlager, 5 April 1944; Lolling order of 7 April 1944; Standortarzt Auschwitz to all Zweiglagern, 4 January 1944; Standortarzt Auschwitz an alle Lagerärzte und SDG, 24 November 1943; Standortarzt to all SDG, "Meldungen zum Monatsbericht über den Sanitätsdienst," 16 November 1943; and Christian Wirths to all SDGs, 15 October 1943, PMO Band 1. Regarding the modernity of these practices it is worth comparing concentration camp management to those innovations of William P. Shinn for Andrew Carnegie. As Alfred Chandler writes in The Visible, Hand (n. 9 above), "Shinn's major achievement was the development of statistical data needed for coordination and control. . . Shinn did this in part by introducing 'the voucher system of account-ing' which, though it had long been used by railroads . . . was not [yet] in general use in manufacturing concerns. By this method, each department listed the amount and cost of materials and labor used on each order as it passed through the subunit. Such information permitted Shinn to send Carnegie monthly statements and, in time, even daily ones providing data on the costs of ore, limestone, coal, coke, pig iron, spiegel, molds, refractories, repairs, fuel, and labor for each ton of rails pro-duced(p. 267). Compare this to the similar methods but different subject of the WVHA Office Group D: "Death announcements were ordered alphabetically in a well equipped cellar room . . . I performed this activity daily. Later I was put in an office room with [the leader of Office D1], where I did easy office work. Later 1 collected the incoming population reports, that came by mail from the individual concentration camps. I collated these together by the following criteria: age of prisoners, entry date, population, history of transfers, cases of death, special cases of 'special treatment' [systematic extermination] . . . My activities collating the populations of camps were collected into a general statistical report every month and then . . . as 'secret' sent to the Reichsführer-SS after receiving the signature of [Richard] Glücks [Chief of Office Group D and Inspector of Concentration Camps]." Cited in Tuchel, Konzentrationslager (n. 16 above), p. 28 286-; see also pp. 286- 89.
141. Enno Lolling (chief doctor for the concentration camps within the WVHA), 2 April 1944, "Monatsbericht und Wochenmeldung"; 1. Lagerarzt Au III to Aussenlager, 5 April 1944; Lolling order of 7 April 1944; Standortarzt Auschwitz to all Zweiglagern, 4 January 1944; Standortarzt Auschwitz an alle Lagerärzte und SDG, 24 November 1943; Standortarzt to all SDG, "Meldungen zum Monatsbericht über den Sanitätsdienst," 16 November 1943; and Christian Wirths to all SDGs, 15 October 1943, PMO Band 1. Regarding the modernity of these practices it is worth comparing concentration camp management to those innovations of William P. Shinn for Andrew Carnegie. As Alfred Chandler writes in The Visible, Hand (n. 9 above), "Shinn's major achievement was the development of statistical data needed for coordination and control. . . Shinn did this in part by introducing 'the voucher system of account- ing' which, though it had long been used by railroads . . . was not [yet] in general use in manufacturing concerns. By this method, each department listed the amount and cost of materials and labor used on each order as it passed through the subunit. Such information permitted Shinn to send Carnegie monthly statements and, in time, even daily ones providing data on the costs of ore, limestone, coal, coke, pig iron, spiegel, molds, refractories, repairs, fuel, and labor for each ton of rails pro- duced(p. 267). Compare this to the similar methods but different subject of the WVHA Office Group D: "Death announcements were ordered alphabetically in a well equipped cellar room . . . I performed this activity daily. Later I was put in an office room with [the leader of Office D1], where I did easy office work. Later 1 collected the incoming population reports, that came by mail from the individual concentration camps. I collated these together by the following criteria: age of prisoners, entry date, population, history of transfers, cases of death, special cases of 'special treatment' [systematic extermination] . . . My activities collating the populations of camps were collected into a general statistical report every month and then . . . as 'secret' sent to the Reichsführer-SS after receiving the signature of [Richard] Glücks [Chief of Office Group D and Inspector of Concentration Camps]." Cited in Tuchel, Konzentrationslager (n. 16 above), p. 28 286-; see also pp. 286-89.
142. Mirbeth, "Bericht über das Kommando Golleschau," 1 October 1944, PMO Band 3.
143. H. Kaufmann, "Monatsbericht über den Sanitätsdienst" 24 November 1944, and "Statistik der Fuss- und Handkranken für die Zeit vom 5.10-24.11.1944," PMO Band 1.
144. H. Kaufmann, "Monatsbericht über den Sanitätsdienst" 24 November 1944, and "Statistik der Fuss- und Handkranken für die Zeit vom 5.10-24.11.1944," PMO Band 1.
145. Copy of Hans Wünsch, Chefarzt, Res.-Laz. III, Liegnitz, undated, "Über eine einfache zweckmässige Heissluftentlausungsanlage," PMO Band 1. The article was originally written for mobile field troops, not concentration camps. See also SDG data 3 July 1943, PMO Band 1; BDC, Misc. SS file Rudolf Köhler. Frackiewicz (n. 68 above) states that Köhler was assigned to Golleschau to oversee the technical management of the camp, but this is not borne out by his BDC file, nor by the traces left of his activity at Golleschau.
146. Danuta Czech, who has tried to reconstruct an exact calendar of daily events at the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex, documents the arrival of sick prisoners from the Golleschau camp in Birkenau. See, e.g., Auschwitz Chronicle 1939-45 (New York, 1990), p. 576. The chance that any sick prisoners were not exterminated is small, but details are unavailable partly because prisoners were killed in large batches.
147. Mirbeth, "Bericht über das Kommando Golleschau," 10 May 1944, PMO Band 3.
148. Mirbeth, "Bericht über das Kommando Golleschau," 7 August 1944, PMO Band 3, and memo with unrecognizable signature from Au. III, 1 April 1944, PMO Band 3, which states that prisoners are only to receive 350g of bread - with "only" underlined.
149. Mirbeth, February 1944, "Bericht über das Kommando Golleschau," Band 3.
150. Affidavit of Richard Goebel (n. 58 above).
151. Kommandof. to Schutzhaftlagerf. KL Au. III, 20 April 1944, "Meldung wegen Wachvergehen," PMO Band 3.
152. For examples in the WVHA see Michael Allen, inverted c sign Engineers and Modern Managers in the SS: The Business Administration Main Officeinverted c sign (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1995), pp. 207-21, 442-65.