Antitrust and Business Activity: The First Quarter Century

Business History Review

Volumn 70, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 363-401

  Bittlingmayer, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030344345     PISSN: 00076805     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3117242     Document Type: Article

References (118)

1. The vast literature on the rise of the trasts and the modern corporation defies summary. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), treats the development of new structures; Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (Baltimore, Md., 1955). provides a useful early and Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law and Politics (Cambridge, U.K., 1988), a useful recent treatment of the political and legal reaction to the rise of the trusts; Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (London, 1976), Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "The Development of Modern Management Structures in the U.S. and U.K.," in The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays Toward a Historical Theory of Big Business, ed. Thomas K. McCraw, (Boston, Mass., 1988) and Tony Freyer, "The Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative Business Structure, and the Rule of Reason: America and Great Britain, 1880-1920," Iowa Law Review 74 (July 1989): 991-1017, emphasize the legal attacks on loose business forms as a factor in the development of modern managerial structures in the U.S.
2. The vast literature on the rise of the trasts and the modern corporation defies summary. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), treats the development of new structures; Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (Baltimore, Md., 1955). provides a useful early and Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law and Politics (Cambridge, U.K., 1988), a useful recent treatment of the political and legal reaction to the rise of the trusts; Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (London, 1976), Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "The Development of Modern Management Structures in the U.S. and U.K.," in The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays Toward a Historical Theory of Big Business, ed. Thomas K. McCraw, (Boston, Mass., 1988) and Tony Freyer, "The Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative Business Structure, and the Rule of Reason: America and Great Britain, 1880-1920," Iowa Law Review 74 (July 1989): 991-1017, emphasize the legal attacks on loose business forms as a factor in the development of modern managerial structures in the U.S.
3. The vast literature on the rise of the trasts and the modern corporation defies summary. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), treats the development of new structures; Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (Baltimore, Md., 1955). provides a useful early and Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law and Politics (Cambridge, U.K., 1988), a useful recent treatment of the political and legal reaction to the rise of the trusts; Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (London, 1976), Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "The Development of Modern Management Structures in the U.S. and U.K.," in The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays Toward a Historical Theory of Big Business, ed. Thomas K. McCraw, (Boston, Mass., 1988) and Tony Freyer, "The Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative Business Structure, and the Rule of Reason: America and Great Britain, 1880-1920," Iowa Law Review 74 (July 1989): 991-1017, emphasize the legal attacks on loose business forms as a factor in the development of modern managerial structures in the U.S.
4. The vast literature on the rise of the trasts and the modern corporation defies summary. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), treats the development of new structures; Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (Baltimore, Md., 1955). provides a useful early and Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law and Politics (Cambridge, U.K., 1988), a useful recent treatment of the political and legal reaction to the rise of the trusts; Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (London, 1976), Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "The Development of Modern Management Structures in the U.S. and U.K.," in The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays Toward a Historical Theory of Big Business, ed. Thomas K. McCraw, (Boston, Mass., 1988) and Tony Freyer, "The Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative Business Structure, and the Rule of Reason: America and Great Britain, 1880-1920," Iowa Law Review 74 (July 1989): 991-1017, emphasize the legal attacks on loose business forms as a factor in the development of modern managerial structures in the U.S.
5. The vast literature on the rise of the trasts and the modern corporation defies summary. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), treats the development of new structures; Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (Baltimore, Md., 1955). provides a useful early and Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law and Politics (Cambridge, U.K., 1988), a useful recent treatment of the political and legal reaction to the rise of the trusts; Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (London, 1976), Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "The Development of Modern Management Structures in the U.S. and U.K.," in The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays Toward a Historical Theory of Big Business, ed. Thomas K. McCraw, (Boston, Mass., 1988) and Tony Freyer, "The Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative Business Structure, and the Rule of Reason: America and Great Britain, 1880-1920," Iowa Law Review 74 (July 1989): 991-1017, emphasize the legal attacks on loose business forms as a factor in the development of modern managerial structures in the U.S.
6. The vast literature on the rise of the trasts and the modern corporation defies summary. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), treats the development of new structures; Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (Baltimore, Md., 1955). provides a useful early and Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law and Politics (Cambridge, U.K., 1988), a useful recent treatment of the political and legal reaction to the rise of the trusts; Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (London, 1976), Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "The Development of Modern Management Structures in the U.S. and U.K.," in The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays Toward a Historical Theory of Big Business, ed. Thomas K. McCraw, (Boston, Mass., 1988) and Tony Freyer, "The Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative Business Structure, and the Rule of Reason: America and Great Britain, 1880-1920," Iowa Law Review 74 (July 1989): 991-1017, emphasize the legal attacks on loose business forms as a factor in the development of modern managerial structures in the U.S.
7. William E. Kovacic, "Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration," Iowa Law Review 74 (July 1989): 1105-1150, shows the episodic nature of antitrust for large-firm deconcentration.
8. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (Chicago, Ill., 1976), 39.
9. George J. Stigler, "Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger," American Economic Review (May 1950). Reprinted in George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Chicago, Ill., 1968).
10. George J. Stigler, "Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger," American Economic Review (May 1950). Reprinted in George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Chicago, Ill., 1968).
11. The idea is due to Ronald Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica n.s. 4 (1937): 386-405.
12. Lewis H. Haney, Business Organization and Combination (New York, 1914).
13. Chandler, "The Development of Modern Management Structures;" Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy, and Freyer, "The Sherman Antitrust Act."
14. Chandler, "The Development of Modern Management Structures;" Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy, and Freyer, "The Sherman Antitrust Act."
15. Chandler, "The Development of Modern Management Structures;" Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy, and Freyer, "The Sherman Antitrust Act."
16. Lester G. Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation and Competition (Cambridge, U.K., 1987); and Michael Gort, "An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers," Quarterly Journal of Economics 83 (November 1969): 624-642.
17. Lester G. Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation and Competition (Cambridge, U.K., 1987); and Michael Gort, "An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers," Quarterly Journal of Economics 83 (November 1969): 624-642.
18. For example, the following faculty members at the University of Chicago signed a letter in 1952 urging repeal of the fair-trade laws: Ward Bowman, Milton Friedman, H. G. Lewis, L. A. Metzler, Margaret Reid and T. W. Schultz. Listed in Thomas R. Overstreet Jr., Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence (Washington, D.C. 1983), 8.
19. These developments are summarized by Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York, 1978): and Posner, Antitrust Law.
20. These developments are summarized by Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York, 1978): and Posner, Antitrust Law.
21. The idea of a competitive equilibrium is made precise by the theory of the "core." Economic applications of core theory to a variety of circumstances, including industries with fixed costs, were pioneered by Lester G. Telser, Competition, Collusion and Game Theory (Chicago, Ill., 1972); and Lester G. Telser, Economic Theory and the Core (Chicago, Ill., 1978). William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge, U.K., 1982), contains a less theoretical treatment. Lester G. Telser, "Genesis of the Sherman Act," in Research in Finance, ed. Robert G. Lanzilotti and Yoram C. Peles (Greenwich, Conn., 1984), and Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation, discuss developments at the turn of the century in light of this theory. George Bittlingmayer, "Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case," Journal of Law and Economics 25 (October 1982): 201-299: and George Bittlingmayer, "Did Antitrust Policies Cause the Great Merger Wave?" Journal of Law and Economics 28 (April 1985): 77-118, covers various aspects of the economic issues and provides an application to the cartel in Addyston and to the Great Merger Wave. George Bittlingmayer, "The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute," Law and Social Inquiry 14 (Fall 1989): 739-762, discusses economic and policy implications, with particular reference to the common law of restraints of trade and the judicial interpretation of antitrust law over time.
22. The idea of a competitive equilibrium is made precise by the theory of the "core." Economic applications of core theory to a variety of circumstances, including industries with fixed costs, were pioneered by Lester G. Telser, Competition, Collusion and Game Theory (Chicago, Ill., 1972); and Lester G. Telser, Economic Theory and the Core (Chicago, Ill., 1978). William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge, U.K., 1982), contains a less theoretical treatment. Lester G. Telser, "Genesis of the Sherman Act," in Research in Finance, ed. Robert G. Lanzilotti and Yoram C. Peles (Greenwich, Conn., 1984), and Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation, discuss developments at the turn of the century in light of this theory. George Bittlingmayer, "Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case," Journal of Law and Economics 25 (October 1982): 201-299: and George Bittlingmayer, "Did Antitrust Policies Cause the Great Merger Wave?" Journal of Law and Economics 28 (April 1985): 77-118, covers various aspects of the economic issues and provides an application to the cartel in Addyston and to the Great Merger Wave. George Bittlingmayer, "The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute," Law and Social Inquiry 14 (Fall 1989): 739-762, discusses economic and policy implications, with particular reference to the common law of restraints of trade and the judicial interpretation of antitrust law over time.
23. The idea of a competitive equilibrium is made precise by the theory of the "core." Economic applications of core theory to a variety of circumstances, including industries with fixed costs, were pioneered by Lester G. Telser, Competition, Collusion and Game Theory (Chicago, Ill., 1972); and Lester G. Telser, Economic Theory and the Core (Chicago, Ill., 1978). William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge, U.K., 1982), contains a less theoretical treatment. Lester G. Telser, "Genesis of the Sherman Act," in Research in Finance, ed. Robert G. Lanzilotti and Yoram C. Peles (Greenwich, Conn., 1984), and Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation, discuss developments at the turn of the century in light of this theory. George Bittlingmayer, "Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case," Journal of Law and Economics 25 (October 1982): 201-299: and George Bittlingmayer, "Did Antitrust Policies Cause the Great Merger Wave?" Journal of Law and Economics 28 (April 1985): 77-118, covers various aspects of the economic issues and provides an application to the cartel in Addyston and to the Great Merger Wave. George Bittlingmayer, "The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute," Law and Social Inquiry 14 (Fall 1989): 739-762, discusses economic and policy implications, with particular reference to the common law of restraints of trade and the judicial interpretation of antitrust law over time.
24. The idea of a competitive equilibrium is made precise by the theory of the "core." Economic applications of core theory to a variety of circumstances, including industries with fixed costs, were pioneered by Lester G. Telser, Competition, Collusion and Game Theory (Chicago, Ill., 1972); and Lester G. Telser, Economic Theory and the Core (Chicago, Ill., 1978). William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge, U.K., 1982), contains a less theoretical treatment. Lester G. Telser, "Genesis of the Sherman Act," in Research in Finance, ed. Robert G. Lanzilotti and Yoram C. Peles (Greenwich, Conn., 1984), and Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation, discuss developments at the turn of the century in light of this theory. George Bittlingmayer, "Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case," Journal of Law and Economics 25 (October 1982): 201-299: and George Bittlingmayer, "Did Antitrust Policies Cause the Great Merger Wave?" Journal of Law and Economics 28 (April 1985): 77-118, covers various aspects of the economic issues and provides an application to the cartel in Addyston and to the Great Merger Wave. George Bittlingmayer, "The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute," Law and Social Inquiry 14 (Fall 1989): 739-762, discusses economic and policy implications, with particular reference to the common law of restraints of trade and the judicial interpretation of antitrust law over time.
25. The idea of a competitive equilibrium is made precise by the theory of the "core." Economic applications of core theory to a variety of circumstances, including industries with fixed costs, were pioneered by Lester G. Telser, Competition, Collusion and Game Theory (Chicago, Ill., 1972); and Lester G. Telser, Economic Theory and the Core (Chicago, Ill., 1978). William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge, U.K., 1982), contains a less theoretical treatment. Lester G. Telser, "Genesis of the Sherman Act," in Research in Finance, ed. Robert G. Lanzilotti and Yoram C. Peles (Greenwich, Conn., 1984), and Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation, discuss developments at the turn of the century in light of this theory. George Bittlingmayer, "Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case," Journal of Law and Economics 25 (October 1982): 201-299: and George Bittlingmayer, "Did Antitrust Policies Cause the Great Merger Wave?" Journal of Law and Economics 28 (April 1985): 77-118, covers various aspects of the economic issues and provides an application to the cartel in Addyston and to the Great Merger Wave. George Bittlingmayer, "The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute," Law and Social Inquiry 14 (Fall 1989): 739-762, discusses economic and policy implications, with particular reference to the common law of restraints of trade and the judicial interpretation of antitrust law over time.
26. The idea of a competitive equilibrium is made precise by the theory of the "core." Economic applications of core theory to a variety of circumstances, including industries with fixed costs, were pioneered by Lester G. Telser, Competition, Collusion and Game Theory (Chicago, Ill., 1972); and Lester G. Telser, Economic Theory and the Core (Chicago, Ill., 1978). William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge, U.K., 1982), contains a less theoretical treatment. Lester G. Telser, "Genesis of the Sherman Act," in Research in Finance, ed. Robert G. Lanzilotti and Yoram C. Peles (Greenwich, Conn., 1984), and Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation, discuss developments at the turn of the century in light of this theory. George Bittlingmayer, "Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case," Journal of Law and Economics 25 (October 1982): 201-299: and George Bittlingmayer, "Did Antitrust Policies Cause the Great Merger Wave?" Journal of Law and Economics 28 (April 1985): 77-118, covers various aspects of the economic issues and provides an application to the cartel in Addyston and to the Great Merger Wave. George Bittlingmayer, "The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute," Law and Social Inquiry 14 (Fall 1989): 739-762, discusses economic and policy implications, with particular reference to the common law of restraints of trade and the judicial interpretation of antitrust law over time.
27. The idea of a competitive equilibrium is made precise by the theory of the "core." Economic applications of core theory to a variety of circumstances, including industries with fixed costs, were pioneered by Lester G. Telser, Competition, Collusion and Game Theory (Chicago, Ill., 1972); and Lester G. Telser, Economic Theory and the Core (Chicago, Ill., 1978). William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge, U.K., 1982), contains a less theoretical treatment. Lester G. Telser, "Genesis of the Sherman Act," in Research in Finance, ed. Robert G. Lanzilotti and Yoram C. Peles (Greenwich, Conn., 1984), and Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation, discuss developments at the turn of the century in light of this theory. George Bittlingmayer, "Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case," Journal of Law and Economics 25 (October 1982): 201-299: and George Bittlingmayer, "Did Antitrust Policies Cause the Great Merger Wave?" Journal of Law and Economics 28 (April 1985): 77-118, covers various aspects of the economic issues and provides an application to the cartel in Addyston and to the Great Merger Wave. George Bittlingmayer, "The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute," Law and Social Inquiry 14 (Fall 1989): 739-762, discusses economic and policy implications, with particular reference to the common law of restraints of trade and the judicial interpretation of antitrust law over time.
28. The idea of a competitive equilibrium is made precise by the theory of the "core." Economic applications of core theory to a variety of circumstances, including industries with fixed costs, were pioneered by Lester G. Telser, Competition, Collusion and Game Theory (Chicago, Ill., 1972); and Lester G. Telser, Economic Theory and the Core (Chicago, Ill., 1978). William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge, U.K., 1982), contains a less theoretical treatment. Lester G. Telser, "Genesis of the Sherman Act," in Research in Finance, ed. Robert G. Lanzilotti and Yoram C. Peles (Greenwich, Conn., 1984), and Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation, discuss developments at the turn of the century in light of this theory. George Bittlingmayer, "Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case," Journal of Law and Economics 25 (October 1982): 201-299: and George Bittlingmayer, "Did Antitrust Policies Cause the Great Merger Wave?" Journal of Law and Economics 28 (April 1985): 77-118, covers various aspects of the economic issues and provides an application to the cartel in Addyston and to the Great Merger Wave. George Bittlingmayer, "The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute," Law and Social Inquiry 14 (Fall 1989): 739-762, discusses economic and policy implications, with particular reference to the common law of restraints of trade and the judicial interpretation of antitrust law over time.
29. See William Sjostrom, "Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of Monopoly and Empty Core Models," Journal of Political Economy 97 (October 1989): 1160-1179, and Stephen Craig Pirrong, "An Application of the Theory of the Core to the Study of Ocean Shipping Markets," Journal of Law and Economics 35 (April 1992): 89-131. Herbert Hovenkamp, "The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition," Iowa Law Review 74 (July 1989): 1019-1065, takes up the apparent simultaneous abandonment by the law of defenses for cartels and the adoption by economists of the neoclassical competitive model. He argues that thinking on the Sherman act was influenced by prevailing "economic ideology." It seems possible, however, that economists' views also adapt to prevailing ideology, or less charitably, to politics.
30. See William Sjostrom, "Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of Monopoly and Empty Core Models," Journal of Political Economy 97 (October 1989): 1160-1179, and Stephen Craig Pirrong, "An Application of the Theory of the Core to the Study of Ocean Shipping Markets," Journal of Law and Economics 35 (April 1992): 89-131. Herbert Hovenkamp, "The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition," Iowa Law Review 74 (July 1989): 1019-1065, takes up the apparent simultaneous abandonment by the law of defenses for cartels and the adoption by economists of the neoclassical competitive model. He argues that thinking on the Sherman act was influenced by prevailing "economic ideology." It seems possible, however, that economists' views also adapt to prevailing ideology, or less charitably, to politics.
31. See William Sjostrom, "Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of Monopoly and Empty Core Models," Journal of Political Economy 97 (October 1989): 1160-1179, and Stephen Craig Pirrong, "An Application of the Theory of the Core to the Study of Ocean Shipping Markets," Journal of Law and Economics 35 (April 1992): 89-131. Herbert Hovenkamp, "The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition," Iowa Law Review 74 (July 1989): 1019-1065, takes up the apparent simultaneous abandonment by the law of defenses for cartels and the adoption by economists of the neoclassical competitive model. He argues that thinking on the Sherman act was influenced by prevailing "economic ideology." It seems possible, however, that economists' views also adapt to prevailing ideology, or less charitably, to politics.
32. Chandler, The Visible Hand, 137-143 and 31.5-336; and Thomas K. McCraw, "Rethinking the Trust Question," in Regulation in Perspective, ed. Thomas K. McCraw (Boston, Mass., 1981), 12-15.
33. Chandler, The Visible Hand, 137-143 and 31.5-336; and Thomas K. McCraw, "Rethinking the Trust Question," in Regulation in Perspective, ed. Thomas K. McCraw (Boston, Mass., 1981), 12-15.
34. Fred S. McChesney, "Be True to Your School: Contrasting Chicago Approaches to Antitrust and Regulation," Cato Journal 10 (Winter 1991): 775-798.
35. McCraw, "Rethinking the Trust Question," 6.
36. Robert S. Pindyck, "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature 29 (September 1991): 1141. Avinash K. Dixit and Robert S. Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty (Princeton, N.J., 1994) survey the literature on uncertainty and investment.
37. Robert S. Pindyck, "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature 29 (September 1991): 1141. Avinash K. Dixit and Robert S. Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty (Princeton, N.J., 1994) survey the literature on uncertainty and investment.
38. Wesley Clair Mitchell, Business Cycles (Berkeley, Calif., 1913) 85; Ining Fisher, The Stock Market Crash - And After (New York, 1930), 101, 106 and 110; Kenneth Roose, The Economics of Recession find Revival: An Interpretation of 1937-38 (New Haven, Conn., 1954), chap. 4; and Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton, N.J., 1963), 495-496.
39. Wesley Clair Mitchell, Business Cycles (Berkeley, Calif., 1913) 85; Ining Fisher, The Stock Market Crash - And After (New York, 1930), 101, 106 and 110; Kenneth Roose, The Economics of Recession find Revival: An Interpretation of 1937-38 (New Haven, Conn., 1954), chap. 4; and Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton, N.J., 1963), 495-496.
40. Wesley Clair Mitchell, Business Cycles (Berkeley, Calif., 1913) 85; Ining Fisher, The Stock Market Crash - And After (New York, 1930), 101, 106 and 110; Kenneth Roose, The Economics of Recession find Revival: An Interpretation of 1937-38 (New Haven, Conn., 1954), chap. 4; and Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton, N.J., 1963), 495-496.
41. Wesley Clair Mitchell, Business Cycles (Berkeley, Calif., 1913) 85; Ining Fisher, The Stock Market Crash - And After (New York, 1930), 101, 106 and 110; Kenneth Roose, The Economics of Recession find Revival: An Interpretation of 1937-38 (New Haven, Conn., 1954), chap. 4; and Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton, N.J., 1963), 495-496.
42. Christine Romer, "The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression," Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (August 1990): 597-624, makes this argument for the effects of the 1929 crash.
43. Some judges explicitly recognized the courts' susceptibility to political influence. In his famous dissent in Northern Securities, Holmes accused the majority of pandering to political pressure: "Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because
44. Hovenkamp, "The Sherman Act," and Mark F. Grady, "Toward a Positive Theory of Antitrust," Economic Inquiry 30 (April 1992): 225-241. Thomas Hazlett, "The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-examined," Economic Inquiry 30 (April 1992): 263- 276, argues that the Sherman Act was passed to deflect attention from the McKinley Tariff.
45. Hovenkamp, "The Sherman Act," and Mark F. Grady, "Toward a Positive Theory of Antitrust," Economic Inquiry 30 (April 1992): 225-241. Thomas Hazlett, "The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-examined," Economic Inquiry 30 (April 1992): 263- 276, argues that the Sherman Act was passed to deflect attention from the McKinley Tariff.
46. Hovenkamp, "The Sherman Act," and Mark F. Grady, "Toward a Positive Theory of Antitrust," Economic Inquiry 30 (April 1992): 225-241. Thomas Hazlett, "The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-examined," Economic Inquiry 30 (April 1992): 263-276, argues that the Sherman Act was passed to deflect attention from the McKinley Tariff.
47. Mitchell, Business Cycles, 51, emphasizes uncertainty about the gold standard in 1893 and cites a number of contemporaries, including Taussig and Carnegie. Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, chap. 3, also discuss this period, as well as the 1896 free silver debate.
48. Mitchell, Business Cycles, 51, emphasizes uncertainty about the gold standard in 1893 and cites a number of contemporaries, including Taussig and Carnegie. Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, chap. 3, also discuss this period, as well as the 1896 free silver debate.
49. George Bittlingmayer, "Price Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case," in Research in Law and Economics 5, ed. Richard O. Zerbe, (1983), discusses the case in detail.
50. Haney, Business Organization and Combination, 215.
51. See Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry, 1895-1956 (Princeton, N.J., 1959), App. C, 154-162. Bittlingmayer, "Did Antitrust Policies Cause the Great Merger Wave?" sifts through the arguments and data.
52. See Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry, 1895-1956 (Princeton, N.J., 1959), App. C, 154-162. Bittlingmayer, "Did Antitrust Policies Cause the Great Merger Wave?" sifts through the arguments and data.
53. Griggs in March of 1899. Quoted in William Letwin, Law and Public Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act (New York, 1965), 140.
54. U.S. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel, 115 Fed. 610 (1902), filed 8 May 1899.
55. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 405.
56. Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, 139-141. The worldwide growth in the stock of gold no doubt had a favorable effect, but the sluggish growth of per capita income in the U.K. over the same period suggests that real factors such as the antitrust climate may have influenced real growth either directly, or indirectly through the allocation of gold supplies across countries.
57. The reaction of the financial markets is covered in Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography (New York, 1931), 237-238 and 244-246; William Henry Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1961); Letwin, Law and Public Policy, 196; and Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 417. In contrast, Kennedy's 22 November 1963 assassination was marked by a decline that day, but recovery above previous levels when trading resumed.
58. The reaction of the financial markets is covered in Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography (New York, 1931), 237-238 and 244-246; William Henry Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1961); Letwin, Law and Public Policy, 196; and Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 417. In contrast, Kennedy's 22 November 1963 assassination was marked by a decline that day, but recovery above previous levels when trading resumed.
59. The reaction of the financial markets is covered in Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography (New York, 1931), 237-238 and 244-246; William Henry Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1961); Letwin, Law and Public Policy, 196; and Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 417. In contrast, Kennedy's 22 November 1963 assassination was marked by a decline that day, but recovery above previous levels when trading resumed.
60. The reaction of the financial markets is covered in Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography (New York, 1931), 237-238 and 244-246; William Henry Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1961); Letwin, Law and Public Policy, 196; and Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 417. In contrast, Kennedy's 22 November 1963 assassination was marked by a decline that day, but recovery above previous levels when trading resumed.
61. Pringle, Roosevelt, 253 and 264.
62. Gary D. Libecap, "The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust," Economic Inquiry 30 (April 1992): 242-262; and Donald J. Boudreaux and Thomas J. DiLorenzo, "Antitrust before the Sherman Act," in The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: A Public-Choice Perspective, ed. Fred S. McChesney and William F. Shughart II (Chicago, Ill., 1995) analyze the rise of the Chicago packers and the political fallout.
63. Gary D. Libecap, "The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust," Economic Inquiry 30 (April 1992): 242-262; and Donald J. Boudreaux and Thomas J. DiLorenzo, "Antitrust before the Sherman Act," in The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: A Public-Choice Perspective, ed. Fred S. McChesney and William F. Shughart II (Chicago, Ill., 1995) analyze the rise of the Chicago packers and the political fallout.
64. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 430.
65. The Wall Street Journal, 12 August 1903, p. 1, discussed the charges, but dismissed them.
66. Stock data here and below are from Alfred Cowles 3rd andAssociates, Common-Stock Indexes (Bloomington, Ind., 1939).
67. Bruce Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly: The Standard Oil Cases, 1890-1911 (Westport, Conn., 1979), chap. 5, chronicles the unsuccessful efforts of the oil industry interests and others to have the federal government bring charges against Standard.
68. Ralph W. Hidy and Muriel E. Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 1882-1911: History of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) (New York, 1955), Table 52, 683.
69. Hidy and Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, chap. 23.
70. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to the Present (Washington, D.C. 1975) Series M138-M139.
71. This fine was overturned in July of 1908. Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly, 139.
72. Pringle, Roosevelt, 434; and George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1958), 219-220.
73. Pringle, Roosevelt, 434; and George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1958), 219-220.
74. Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility, 311; and Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly, 140.
75. Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility, 311; and Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly, 140.
76. Joseph Bucklin Bishop. Theodore Roosevelt and His Time: Shown in His Own Letters (New York, 1920).
77. Arthur M. Johnson, "Antitrust Policy in Transition, 1908: Ideal and Reality," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48 (1961): 415-434; and Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction, 228-285, provide the background on the Hepburn Bill.
78. Arthur M. Johnson, "Antitrust Policy in Transition, 1908: Ideal and Reality," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48 (1961): 415-434; and Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction, 228-285, provide the background on the Hepburn Bill.
79. "When permanent chairman Henry Cabot Lodge referred to Roosevelt by name in a keynote address as 'the most abused and most popular man in the United States today,' the convention exploded with a spontaneous demonstration of support for him, interspersed with chants of 'Four, Four, Four Years More.' The demonstration lasted forty- seven minutes." Donald F. Anderson, William Howard Taft: A Conservatives Conception of the Presidency (Ithaca, N.Y., 1973), 38.
80. See Pringle, Roosevelt, 445, on the first episode and Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility, 314, on the second. Judge Gary and Frick claimed that U.S. Steel's acquisition of Tennessee Coal and Iron would save it from bankruptcy, Roosevelt later claimed he replied, "that while I could not advise them to take the action proposed, I felt it no public duty of mine to interpose any objection." Both episodes gave him political trouble later.
81. See Pringle, Roosevelt, 445, on the first episode and Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility, 314, on the second. Judge Gary and Frick claimed that U.S. Steel's acquisition of Tennessee Coal and Iron would save it from bankruptcy, Roosevelt later claimed he replied, "that while I could not advise them to take the action proposed, I felt it no public duty of mine to interpose any objection." Both episodes gave him political trouble later.
82. In Loewe v. Lawlor, discussed in Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 223-224.
83. New Yort Times, 23 Sept. 1911, p. 2 col. 2; New fork Times, 24 Sept. 1911, p. 1 col. 7; Pringie, Roosevelt, 669.
84. New Yort Times, 23 Sept. 1911, p. 2 col. 2; New fork Times, 24 Sept. 1911, p. 1 col. 7; Pringie, Roosevelt, 669.
85. New Yort Times, 23 Sept. 1911, p. 2 col. 2; New fork Times, 24 Sept. 1911, p. 1 col. 7; Pringie, Roosevelt, 669.
86. Paolo E. Coletta, The Presidency of William Howard Taft (Lawrence, Kans., 1973), 159. U.S. Steel had qualified as a "good trust" in Roosevelt's eyes, and Roosevelt claimed that Taft himself had approved of the merger when he was in Roosevelt's cabinet. The suit contributed to the split in the Republican party that led Taft and Roosevelt each to enter the race against Wilson in 1912. Mowry, Era of Roosevelt, 291.
87. Paolo E. Coletta, The Presidency of William Howard Taft (Lawrence, Kans., 1973), 159. U.S. Steel had qualified as a "good trust" in Roosevelt's eyes, and Roosevelt claimed that Taft himself had approved of the merger when he was in Roosevelt's cabinet. The suit contributed to the split in the Republican party that led Taft and Roosevelt each to enter the race against Wilson in 1912. Mowry, Era of Roosevelt, 291.
88. Anderson, Taft, 82.
89. Wall Street Journal, 7 Oct. 1911, p. 1 col. 4.
90. Quoted in Mowry, Era of Roosevelt, 288.
91. Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 369, n. 58, quoting correspondence of Frank Vanderlip.
92. Mitchell, Business Cycles, 85. John Bates Clark (after whom a prestigious economics prize was named) and John Maurice Clark also claimed that "breaking up too many corporations at once would be highly disturbing in the realm of business." John Bates Clark and John Maurice Clark, The Control of Trusts (New York, 1912), 44.
93. Mitchell, Business Cycles, 85. John Bates Clark (after whom a prestigious economics prize was named) and John Maurice Clark also claimed that "breaking up too many corporations at once would be highly disturbing in the realm of business." John Bates Clark and John Maurice Clark, The Control of Trusts (New York, 1912), 44.
94. After his defeat, Taft did however write a defense of the 1911 court decisions and argued against changing the antitrust law. William Howard Taft, The Antitrust Act and the Supreme Court (1914).
95. Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 116.
96. Indeed, Brandeis' muckraking on the trust issue, in articles and a popular book, Other People's Money and How Bankers Use It, helped set the stage for the Federal Reserve Act, which was viewed as an effort to rein in Wall Street, and for the 1914 antitrust legislation. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 114.
97. Indeed, Brandeis' muckraking on the trust issue, in articles and a popular book, Other People's Money and How Bankers Use It, helped set the stage for the Federal Reserve Act, which was viewed as an effort to rein in Wall Street, and for the 1914 antitrust legislation. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 114.
98. The year 1913 also marked the temporary modification of the New Jersey corporation laws through the so-called Seven Sisters Act, which Wilson signed in January 1913 while still governor of New Jersey. It was repealed in 1920. Henry P. Seager and Charles A. Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems (New York, 1929), 362-365.
99. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 116.
100. Ray Strannard Baker, Womlrow Wilson: Life and Letters (New York, 1968), 367. The event was hailed as the "surrender of the Money Trust."
101. Quoted in McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 118.
102. Detailed histories of these two pieces of legislation appear in Seager and Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems, chap. 20, and McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 114-135.
103. Detailed histories of these two pieces of legislation appear in Seager and Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems, chap. 20, and McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 114-135.
104. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 126.
105. The "bad news principle" is due to Ben S. Bernanke, "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment," Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (Feb. 1983): 85-106.
106. Wall Street Journal 1 Oct. 1911, p. 1 col. 4; and Pringle, Roosevelt, 669.
107. Wall Street Journal 1 Oct. 1911, p. 1 col. 4; and Pringle, Roosevelt, 669.
108. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Stephen Salsbury, Pierre S. du Pont and the Making of the Modern Corporation (New York, 1971), 113 and generally 112-119.
109. National Civic Federation, Department of Regulation of Industrial Corporations, The Trust Problem: Opinions of 16,000 Representative Americans (New York, 1912), 9, 11 and 276.
110. Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 204, n. 34, cites Vanderlip to Stillman, 3 Feb. 1910, 3 June 1910, 17 Oct. 1911; Stillman to Vanderlip, 16 Sept. 1910; Vanderlip to Lyman J. Gage, 28 Feb. 1910; Frank A. Vanderlip Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.
111. Robert F. Himmelberg, The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Business, Government, and the Trade Association Issue, 1921-1933 (New York, 1976), 5-20.
112. Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, 231-232.
113. Himmelberg, Origins, 7.
114. Himmelberg, Origins, 93.
115. I discuss the 1920s policies at greater length in George Bittlingmayer, "The 1920s Boom, the Great Crash, and After," working paper, Graduate School of Management, University of California, Davis, 1995.
116. George Bittlingmayer, "Output and Stock Prices When Antitrust Is Suspended: The Effects of the NIRA," in The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: A Public-Choice Perspective, ed. Fred S. McChesney and William F. Shughart II (Chicago, Ill., 1995) covers the NIRA and analyses its economic and financial effects.
117. George Bittlingmayer, "Stock Returns, Real Activity and the Trust Question," Journal of Finance 47 (Dec. 1992): 1701-1730, offers a brief historical treatment of this period, as well as an extended statistical investigation of the stock market effects of antitrust enforcement for 1904-1944.
118. George Bittlingmayer, "Industry Investment and Regulation," working paper, Graduate School of Management, University of California, Davis, 1995.