Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information

Economic Theory

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 167-175

  Serrano, Roberto ^a   Yosha, Oved ^a,b  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030306233     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01212018     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Holmström, B., Myerson, R.: Efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information. Econometrica 51, 863-894 (1983)
2. Laffont, J.J.: On the welfare analysis of rational expectations equilibria with asymmetric information. Econometrica 53,1-29 (1985)
3. Osborne, M., Rubinstein A.: Bargaining and markets. San-Diego: Academic Press 1990
4. Peters, M.: On the efficiency of ex-ante and ex-post pricing institutions. Econ. Theory 2, 85-101 (1992)
5. Samuelson, L.: Disagreement in markets with matching and bargaining. Rev. Econ. Stud. 59, 177-185 (1992)
6. Serrano, R., Yosha, O.: Information revelation in a market with pairwise meetings: The one sided information case. Econ. Theory 3, 481-499 (1993)
7. Wolinsky, A.: Information revelation in a market with pairwise meetings. Econometrica 58, 1-23 (1990)