Global governance and the "New" political conditionality

Global Governance

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 377-400

  Uvin, Peter ^a   Biagiotti, Isabelle ^b  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030305425     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-002-03-90000006     Document Type: Review

References (52)

1. Peter Uvin, "Do as I Say, Not as I Do: The Limits of Political Conditionality", in Georg Sørensen, ed., Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass, European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes, 1993).
2. Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," International Organization 36, no. 2 (spring 1982): 185-206.
3. Charles Lipson, "Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?" International Organization 45, no. 4 (autumn 1991): 495-538.
4. Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law: A Concise Introduction, 2d ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1991), p. 35; Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, "International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda," American Journal of International Law 87, no. 2 (April 1993): 223.
5. Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law: A Concise Introduction, 2d ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1991), p. 35; Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, "International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda," American Journal of International Law 87, no. 2 (April 1993): 223.
6. During the last decade or so, the International Court of Justice has extended the notion of customary law by declaring that the UN Charter, and most of the Geneva Conventions on humanitarian law, "are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of adherence by some but not all States does not arise": Theodor Meron, "War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law," American Journal of International Law 88, no. 76 (January 1994): 79. In this more progressive interpretation of custom, states are told that certain elements of international law are so fundamental that they apply to all of them, even if they have not signed the formal legal instruments to that effect and have not followed the rules.
7. Burley, "International Law and International Relations Theory," p. 223; Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (December 1988): 379-396.
8. Burley, "International Law and International Relations Theory," p. 223; Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (December 1988): 379-396.
9. See Mark Robinson, ed., "Towards Democratic Governance," IDS Bulletin 26, no. 1 (April 1995); Olav Stokke, ed., Aid and Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass, European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes, 1995); Sørensen, Political Conditionality.
10. See Mark Robinson, ed., "Towards Democratic Governance," IDS Bulletin 26, no. 1 (April 1995); Olav Stokke, ed., Aid and Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass, European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes, 1995); Sørensen, Political Conditionality.
11. See Mark Robinson, ed., "Towards Democratic Governance," IDS Bulletin 26, no. 1 (April 1995); Olav Stokke, ed., Aid and Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass, European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes, 1995); Sørensen, Political Conditionality.
12. Abdullai Ahmed An-Na'Im, "Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights," in An-Na'Im and Francis M. Deng, eds., Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990).
13. Nico Schrijver, "The Use of Economic Sanctions by the UN Security Council: An International Law Perspective," in Harry H. G. Post, ed., International, Law and Armed Conflict (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994). Since 1993, sanctions have been adopted against Iraq (after its invasion of Kuwait), all successor states of the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Libya, Liberia, Haiti, and the UNITA in Angola.
14. Felice D. Gaer, "Reality Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN," in Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, eds., NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996).
15. David P. Forsythe, "The UN and Human Rights at Fifty: An Incremental but Incomplete Revolution," Global Governance 1, no. 3 (September-December 1995): 313.
16. David P. Forsythe, "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (fall 1990): 435; see also Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy 87 (1992); Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights in the New World Order," World Policy Journal 9, no. 2 (1992): 249-277.
17. David P. Forsythe, "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (fall 1990): 435; see also Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy 87 (1992); Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights in the New World Order," World Policy Journal 9, no. 2 (1992): 249-277.
18. David P. Forsythe, "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (fall 1990): 435; see also Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy 87 (1992); Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights in the New World Order," World Policy Journal 9, no. 2 (1992): 249-277.
19. Katarina Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights, Study for the Danish Center of Human Rights (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989).
20. Levi, Contemporary International Law, p. 184.
21. See Thomas M. Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," American Journal of International Law 86, no. 46 (1992); the author presents a stimulating and highly optimistic overview of the strength of the norms in favor of democratic governance.
22. Domingo E. Acevedo, "The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy," in Lori F. Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), p. 121 ff.
23. UNDP, Human Development Report 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
24. Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," pp. 66-68.
25. Mohammed Bedjaoui, ed., International Law: Achievements and Prospects (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), p. 458.
26. John P. Mason, "A.I.D.'s Experience with Democratic Initiatives: A Review of Regional Programs in Legal Institution Building," USAID Program Evaluation Discussion Paper no. 10, Washington, D.C., February 1990.
27. Tom H. Carothers, "Recent Experience with Democratic Promotion," IDS Bulletin 26, no. 2 (April 1995): 63.
28. S. Golub, "Assessing and Enhancing the Impact of Democratic Development Projects: A Practitioner's Perspective," Studies in Comparative International Development 28, no. 1 (spring 1993): 57.
29. Michael Moore, "Promoting Good Government by Supporting Institutional Development?" IDS Bulletin 26, no. 2 (April 1995).
30. OECD, "DAC Orientations on Participatory Development and Good Governance," OECD Working Papers no. 2, Paris, 1994.
31. USAID, Record of Success Advancing Democracy, Internet (gopher:// gaia.info.usaid.gov:70/II/ promoting_demo), 1995.
32. Michele Wozniak Schimpp, Aid and Democratic Development: A Synthesis of Literature and Experience, Internet (gopher://gaia.info.usaid.gov:70/II/ promoting_demo/docs/iss_brief), USAID, May 1992.
33. Acevedo, "The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response," pp. 135-136.
34. Schrijver, "The Use of Economic Sanctions by the UN Security Council"; Acevedo, "The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response, p. 137.
35. Schrijver, "The Use of Economic Sanctions by the UN Security Council"; Acevedo, "The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response, p. 137.
36. Mark Robinson, "Strengthening Civil Society in Africa: The Role of Foreign Political Aid," IDS Bulletin 26, no. 2 (April 1995).
37. Golub, "Assessing and Enhancing the Impact of Democratic Development Projects."
38. Joan Nelson, with S. J. Eglington, "Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid?" Overseas Development Council, Policy Essay no. 4, Washington, D.C., 1992.
39. World Bank, Good Governance (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1995), p. 23.
40. "Statement of G. Mennem Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs," Congressional Hearings, 1963, pp. 610, 625.
41. Markus G. Raskin and Allen R. Wilcox, "The United States, International War and the Preservation of Human Rights: The Control of Arms," in Natalie Kaufman Hevener, ed., The Dynamics of Human Rights in United States Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1983), p. 140.
42. UNDP, Human Development Report 1995 (New York: UN, 1995), tables 14, 31. In 1985 and 1992, the rich countries spent $479 and $416 per person for defense, while the low-developed countries spent $13 and $17 respectively. The other developing-country groupings all spent less than $75 per capita. In 1985, defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 5 percent for the rich countries and 3 percent for all the poor countries. In both groupings, however, there were countries that spent significantly more.
43. United Nations Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, "Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Members of the Security Council by 10% and Utilization of Part of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries," Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 1975).
44. David J. Louscher, "The Rise of Military Sales as a US Foreign Policy Instrument," Orbis (1976): 934.
45. Thalif Deen, "Disarmament: UN Official Says Arms Lobby Infiltrates World Body," Inter-Press Service Harare, 22 March 1995.
46. Edward A. Kolodziej, Making and Marketing Arms: The French Experience and Its Implications for the International System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
47. UNDP, Human Development Report 1992 (New York: UN, 1992).
48. Nicole Bail, "Pressing for Peace: Can Aid Induce Reform?" Overseas Development Council, Policy Essay no. 6, Washington, D.C., 1992.
49. Theodore McNelly, "The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution," Armed Forces and Societies (1986): 85.
50. Though, in the modern definition of custom (outlined in note 5), the human rights regime can be said to have customary value.
51. Stephen J. Stedman, "The New Interventionists," Foreign Policy 72, no. 1 (1993): 4.
52. See, for example, Sahr John Kpundeh, Democratization in Africa: African Views, African Voices (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992).