Common belief in monotonic epistemic logic

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 109-123

  Heifetz, Aviad ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Common belief; Common knowledge; Epistemic logic

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030268381     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(96)00812-8     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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4. M. Kaneko and T. Nagashima, Axiomatic indefinability of common knowledge in finitary logics, in: M. Bacharach, L.A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin and H. Shin, eds., Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1994).
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8. D. Monderer and D. Samet, Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs, Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 170-190.
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