Term-limit logic: Paradigms and paradoxes

Polity

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 119-139

  Kurfirst, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0030242172     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3235277     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. 1. Terry Considine, author of Colorado's successful 1990 term-limit initiative, claims that the term-limit movement of the 1990s is patterned after the Progressives' program for effecting the direct election of the federal Senate. Both deploy the citizen initiative on a state-by-state basis in order to generate enough pressure in Congress for a constitutional amendment that will "level the playing field" by applying the reform uniformly across the states. Considine even refers to term-limit reformism as the "Colorado idea" in recollection of the Progressives' "Wisconsin idea" (see Ronald Elving, "Congress Braces for Fall-out from State Measures," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, September 29, 1990, pp. 3144-46). However, the Supreme Court's recent invalidation of state-imposed congressional term limits has rendered moot the strategy of electing a Congress in which the majority of representatives have terms limited by their states.
2. 1. Terry Considine, author of Colorado's successful 1990 term-limit initiative, claims that the term-limit movement of the 1990s is patterned after the Progressives' program for effecting the direct election of the federal Senate. Both deploy the citizen initiative on a state-by-state basis in order to generate enough pressure in Congress for a constitutional amendment that will "level the playing field" by applying the reform uniformly across the states. Considine even refers to term-limit reformism as the "Colorado idea" in recollection of the Progressives' "Wisconsin idea" (see Ronald Elving, "Congress Braces for Fall-out from State Measures," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, September 29, 1990, pp. 3144-46). However, the Supreme Court's recent invalidation of state-imposed congressional term limits has rendered moot the strategy of electing a Congress in which the majority of representatives have terms limited by their states.
3. 2. It should be noted that the recall was defended by Progressives as an institutional guarantee against the prospect of weak or corrupt legislators remaining unchallenged in offices that now had longer terms.
4. 3. See Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
5. 4. Quoted in the transcript of the National Civic League's "Term-Limit Symposium," held at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, November 12, 1991 (Denver: National Civic League, 1991), panel 4, p. 32.
6. 5. Mark Petracca, "The Poison of Professional Politics," Cato Institute Policy Analysis, 151, May 10, 1991, p. 1-31.
7. 6. Robert Struble, Jr., and Z. W. Jahre, "Rotation in Office: Rapid but Restricted to the House," PS: Political Science and Politics, 24 (March 1991): 36.
8. 7. See James Harrington's The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) in The Political Works of James Harrington, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (London, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1977), especially pp. 248-49 and 287, where the hematological metaphor can be found. Also instructive on the matter of legislative rotation are Harrington's The Prerogative of Popular Government (1658), p. 473, and The Art of Law giving (1659), pp. 612-13 and 685, in the Pocock collection.
9. 7. See James Harrington's The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) in The Political Works of James Harrington, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (London, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1977), especially pp. 248-49 and 287, where the hematological metaphor can be found. Also instructive on the matter of legislative rotation are Harrington's The Prerogative of Popular Government (1658), p. 473, and The Art of Law giving (1659), pp. 612-13 and 685, in the Pocock collection.
10. 7. See James Harrington's The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) in The Political Works of James Harrington, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (London, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1977), especially pp. 248-49 and 287, where the hematological metaphor can be found. Also instructive on the matter of legislative rotation are Harrington's The Prerogative of Popular Government (1658), p. 473, and The Art of Law giving (1659), pp. 612-13 and 685, in the Pocock collection.
11. 8. See Michael J. Malbin, "Federalists and Antifederalists: The Term-Limitation Debate at the Founding," in Limiting Legislative Terms, ed. Gerald Benjamin and Michael J. Malbin (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992), pp. 53-62; Mark P. Petracca, "Rotation in Office: The History of an Idea," also in Benjamin and Malbin, pp. 19-51; and Charles R. Kesler, "Bad Housekeeping: The Case Against Congressional Term Limitations," Policy Review, 53 (Summer 1990): 20-25.
12. 8. See Michael J. Malbin, "Federalists and Antifederalists: The Term-Limitation Debate at the Founding," in Limiting Legislative Terms, ed. Gerald Benjamin and Michael J. Malbin (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992), pp. 53-62; Mark P. Petracca, "Rotation in Office: The History of an Idea," also in Benjamin and Malbin, pp. 19-51; and Charles R. Kesler, "Bad Housekeeping: The Case Against Congressional Term Limitations," Policy Review, 53 (Summer 1990): 20-25.
13. 8. See Michael J. Malbin, "Federalists and Antifederalists: The Term-Limitation Debate at the Founding," in Limiting Legislative Terms, ed. Gerald Benjamin and Michael J. Malbin (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992), pp. 53-62; Mark P. Petracca, "Rotation in Office: The History of an Idea," also in Benjamin and Malbin, pp. 19-51; and Charles R. Kesler, "Bad Housekeeping: The Case Against Congressional Term Limitations," Policy Review, 53 (Summer 1990): 20-25.
14. In their introduction to The Essential Antifederalist (Boston: University Press of America, 1985), W. B. Allen and Gordon Lloyd crystallize the populist basis of the Antifederalist philosophy: When we hear the claim that our representatives are drawn from a minority of the population, that they operate in a manner which is independent of the people, and that the Congress does not represent the broad cross-section of interests which it is supposed to represent, we are in fact repeating the Antifederalist critique of the scheme of representation found in the Constitution. (p. xiv)
15. 9. George F. Will, Restoration: Congress, Term Limits, and the Recovery of Deliberative Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 141.
16. 10. See Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., America's Constitutional Soul (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
17. 11. Will, Restoration, pp. 110-11.
18. 12. Will, Restoration, p. 142.
19. 13. Will, Restoration, p. 142.
20. 14. Will, Restoration, pp. 127-28.
21. 15. See ch. four of Will's Restoration, "'Like a Strong Wind': Love of Country and Respect for Congress," pp. 169-231, and his "Term Limits," in The Politics and Law of Term Limits, ed. Edward H. Crane and Roger Pilon (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 1994), pp. 16 and 20-21.
22. 15. See ch. four of Will's Restoration, "'Like a Strong Wind': Love of Country and Respect for Congress," pp. 169-231, and his "Term Limits," in The Politics and Law of Term Limits, ed. Edward H. Crane and Roger Pilon (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 1994), pp. 16 and 20-21.
23. 16. Will, "Term Limits," p. 231.
24. 17. See Trudy Pearce, Term Limitation: The Return to a Citizen Legislature (Langley, VA: Americans to Limit Congressional Terms, 1990), pp. 4-7; and Edward H. Crane, "Six and Twelve: The Case for Serious Term Limits," National Civic Review, 80 (Summer 1991): 248-55.
25. 17. See Trudy Pearce, Term Limitation: The Return to a Citizen Legislature (Langley, VA: Americans to Limit Congressional Terms, 1990), pp. 4-7; and Edward H. Crane, "Six and Twelve: The Case for Serious Term Limits," National Civic Review, 80 (Summer 1991): 248-55.
26. 18. James L. Payne, The Culture of Spending: Why Congress Lives Beyond Our Means (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1991), pp. 176-81.
27. 19. Payne, The Culture of Spending, p. 175.
28. 20. Payne, The Culture of Spending, p. 180.
29. 21. See Will, Restoration, p. 84.
30. 22. Edward H. Crane, "Reclaiming the Political Process," in Market Liberalism: A Paradigm for the 21st Century, ed. David Boaz and Edward H. Crane (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 1993), p. 53.
31. 23. Crane, "Reclaiming the Political Process," pp. 60, 62.
32. 24. See Amy Young, "The Money Behind the Movement," Common Cause Magazine, Summer 1993, pp. 37-41; Stuart Rothenberg, "How Term Limits Became a National Phenomenon," State Legislatures, 18 (January 1992): 35-36; David J. Olson, "Term Limits Fail in Washington: The 1991 Battleground," in Benjamin and Malbin, Limiting Legislative Terms, p. 65-96; and Gary W. Copeland, "Term Limitations and Political Careers in Oklahoma: In, Out, Up, or Down," also in Limiting Legislative Terms, pp. 139-57.
33. 24. See Amy Young, "The Money Behind the Movement," Common Cause Magazine, Summer 1993, pp. 37-41; Stuart Rothenberg, "How Term Limits Became a National Phenomenon," State Legislatures, 18 (January 1992): 35-36; David J. Olson, "Term Limits Fail in Washington: The 1991 Battleground," in Benjamin and Malbin, Limiting Legislative Terms, p. 65-96; and Gary W. Copeland, "Term Limitations and Political Careers in Oklahoma: In, Out, Up, or Down," also in Limiting Legislative Terms, pp. 139-57.
34. 24. See Amy Young, "The Money Behind the Movement," Common Cause Magazine, Summer 1993, pp. 37-41; Stuart Rothenberg, "How Term Limits Became a National Phenomenon," State Legislatures, 18 (January 1992): 35-36; David J. Olson, "Term Limits Fail in Washington: The 1991 Battleground," in Benjamin and Malbin, Limiting Legislative Terms, p. 65-96; and Gary W. Copeland, "Term Limitations and Political Careers in Oklahoma: In, Out, Up, or Down," also in Limiting Legislative Terms, pp. 139-57.
35. 24. See Amy Young, "The Money Behind the Movement," Common Cause Magazine, Summer 1993, pp. 37-41; Stuart Rothenberg, "How Term Limits Became a National Phenomenon," State Legislatures, 18 (January 1992): 35-36; David J. Olson, "Term Limits Fail in Washington: The 1991 Battleground," in Benjamin and Malbin, Limiting Legislative Terms, p. 65-96; and Gary W. Copeland, "Term Limitations and Political Careers in Oklahoma: In, Out, Up, or Down," also in Limiting Legislative Terms, pp. 139-57.
36. 25. Will, "Term Limits," p. 19.
37. 26. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come," New York Times, October 29, 1991, p. A-22.
38. 27. On the impact of term limits on legislative professionalism, see Michael J. Malbin and Gerald Benjamin, "Legislatures After Term Limits," in Benjamin and Malbin, Limiting Legislative Terms, pp. 209-21; and John R. Hibbing, "Careerism in Congress: For Better or for Worse?," in Congress Reconsidered, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 5th edition (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993). Alan Rosenthal claims that any "difference in the level of specialization or expertise" will be "subtle" at best ("The Effects of Term Limits on Legislature: A Comment," in Benjamin and Malbin, Limiting Legislative Terms, p. 206).
39. 27. On the impact of term limits on legislative professionalism, see Michael J. Malbin and Gerald Benjamin, "Legislatures After Term Limits," in Benjamin and Malbin, Limiting Legislative Terms, pp. 209-21; and John R. Hibbing, "Careerism in Congress: For Better or for Worse?," in Congress Reconsidered, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 5th edition (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993). Alan Rosenthal claims that any "difference in the level of specialization or expertise" will be "subtle" at best ("The Effects of Term Limits on Legislature: A Comment," in Benjamin and Malbin, Limiting Legislative Terms, p. 206).
40. 27. On the impact of term limits on legislative professionalism, see Michael J. Malbin and Gerald Benjamin, "Legislatures After Term Limits," in Benjamin and Malbin, Limiting Legislative Terms, pp. 209-21; and John R. Hibbing, "Careerism in Congress: For Better or for Worse?," in Congress Reconsidered, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 5th edition (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993). Alan Rosenthal claims that any "difference in the level of specialization or expertise" will be "subtle" at best ("The Effects of Term Limits on Legislature: A Comment," in Benjamin and Malbin, Limiting Legislative Terms, p. 206).
41. 28. Malbin and Benjamin, "Legislatures After Term Limits," p. 216.
42. 29. Malbin and Benjamin, "Legislatures After Term Limits," p. 216.
43. 30. Malbin and Benjamin, "Legislatures After Term Limits," p. 217.
44. 31. Larry Sabato, "New South Governors and the Governorship," in Contemporary Southern Politics, ed. James F. Lea (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), pp. 206-08.
45. 32. See Charles M. Price, "The Guillotine Comes to California: Term-Limit Politics in the Golden State," in Benjamin and Malbin, Limiting Legislative Terms, p. 132.
46. 33. Malbin and Benjamin suggest that governors might take the lead in rebuilding the party organization, thereby filling a vacuum created by the inability of legislative leaders, "to build or maintain strong campaign committees." They speculate further that one consequence of such a turn of events is that governors could emerge as "legislative leaders" themselves ("Legislatures After Term Limits," pp. 217-18).
47. 34. See Norman Ornstein, "The Permanent Democratic Congress," The Public Interest, 100 (Summer 1990): 25.
48. 35. Lamar Alexander, Pat Buchanan, Robert Dornan, Steve Forbes, and Phil Gramm. Buchanan promised to fight for term limits on federal judges as well.
49. 36. Colorado has already begun to look ahead to the 1998 congressional campaign in this regard. In October of 1995, a citizen initiative was filed which would place every candidate's position on term limits directly on the ballot beside their names and party affiliation. Incumbent state and federal legislatures who voted against term limits would have the words "violated voter instruction on term limits" placed next to their names on the 1998 ballot, should this measure be approved by Colorado voters in 1996. Non-incumbent candidates will be required to sign a pledge to support term limits if elected or have "declined to take pledge to support term limits" listed prominently alongside their names and affiliations.
50. 37. Quoted in The Orlando Sentinel, December 10, 1995, p. A-10.
51. 38. The Orlando Sentinel, December 10, 1995, p. A-10.
52. 39. See Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edition (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), pp. 148-51, and his "Divided Government in the American States: A Byproduct of Legislative Professionalism?," American Political Science Review, 88 (June 1994): 304-16.
53. 39. See Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edition (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), pp. 148-51, and his "Divided Government in the American States: A Byproduct of Legislative Professionalism?," American Political Science Review, 88 (June 1994): 304-16.
54. 40. Fiorina, Divided Government, p. 150.
55. 41. For an intriguing analysis of how legislative behavior can be adjusted in response to term limits, see Michael K. Moore and Rebekah Herrick, "Rethinking Congressional Careers: The Changing Behavioral Implications of Career Path Selection," Southeastern Political Review, 23 (June 1995): 205-30.
56. 42. The setback in Mississippi in November 1995 came on the heels of a significant success for the term-limit movement. One month earlier, Louisiana's voters adopted a term-limit constitutional amendment put to a referendum by the state legislature, not by citizen initiative.