The politics of transparent and opaque communities

Polity

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-26

  Hill, Greg ^a  

^a Seattle Office of Management and Planning   (United States)

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EID: 0030240053     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3235273     Document Type: Article

References (99)

1. 1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences," in G. D. H. Cole, ed. and trans., The Social Contract and Discourses (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1950), pp. 148-49.
2. 2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," in Cole, ed. and trans., The Social Contract and Discourses, p. 177.
3. 3. See especially Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988); Marshall Berman, The Politics of Authenticity (New York: Atheneum, 1980); and Ronald Grimsley, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Study in Self-Awareness (Cardiff, Wales: The University of Wales Press, 1961).
4. 3. See especially Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988); Marshall Berman, The Politics of Authenticity (New York: Atheneum, 1980); and Ronald Grimsley, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Study in Self-Awareness (Cardiff, Wales: The University of Wales Press, 1961).
5. 3. See especially Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988); Marshall Berman, The Politics of Authenticity (New York: Atheneum, 1980); and Ronald Grimsley, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Study in Self-Awareness (Cardiff, Wales: The University of Wales Press, 1961).
6. 4. See, for example, Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
7. 4. See, for example, Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
8. 5. "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," pp. 235-37.
9. 6. See, for example, Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, ch. 3.
10. 7. For reasons that will become clear later, the payoffs in game one, and in the two games that follow, are expressed in terms of utility rather than in goods or money.
11. 8. This claim, i.e., that a "multitude of passions" is not a necessary condition of social conflict, is intended as a conventional game-theoretic response to Rousseau's assertion that the strife Hobbes finds in nature is due to the social passions he has imported therein. See "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," pp. 222-23.
12. 9. See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 6. For a different but still sympathetic treatment of conditional cooperation as a rational strategy within a single-play prisoner's dilemma game, see M. Howard, Paradoxes o Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971); and Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For an even-handed assessment of the issues surrounding the strategy of conditional cooperation, see Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, Game Theory (London: Roufledge, 1995), pp. 162-64.
13. 9. See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 6. For a different but still sympathetic treatment of conditional cooperation as a rational strategy within a single-play prisoner's dilemma game, see M. Howard, Paradoxes o Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971); and Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For an even-handed assessment of the issues surrounding the strategy of conditional cooperation, see Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, Game Theory (London: Roufledge, 1995), pp. 162-64.
14. 9. See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 6. For a different but still sympathetic treatment of conditional cooperation as a rational strategy within a single-play prisoner's dilemma game, see M. Howard, Paradoxes o Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971); and Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For an even-handed assessment of the issues surrounding the strategy of conditional cooperation, see Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, Game Theory (London: Roufledge, 1995), pp. 162-64.
15. 9. See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 6. For a different but still sympathetic treatment of conditional cooperation as a rational strategy within a single-play prisoner's dilemma game, see M. Howard, Paradoxes o Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971); and Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For an even-handed assessment of the issues surrounding the strategy of conditional cooperation, see Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, Game Theory (London: Roufledge, 1995), pp. 162-64.
16. 10. An evolutionary argument of this kind can be found in R. L. Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," Quarterly Review of Biology, 46 (1971): 35-57. Remaining faithful to the unwitting character of Rousseau's early humans, who lack the cunning necessary to "choose a strategy," requires recourse to a process like natural selection in explaining why one disposition prevails instead of another. By the same token, according to Rousseau, these early humans had been "taught by experience" that those they encounter are, like themselves, motivated by self-interest, so they are almost ready to begin thinking strategically.
17. 11. Hobbes's own view is actually more complicated. See David Gauthier, Moral Dealing (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 129-49.
18. 12. This objection is raised in Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, Game Theory, pp. 162-64.
19. 13. Rousseau, "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," p. 148.
20. 14. Rousseau, "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," p. 148.
21. 15. One could insist that a necessary condition of a genuine prisoner's dilemma is that each player's intended course of action remains hidden from the other. Since I am not arguing that Rousseau found a solution to the prisoner's dilemma game so defined, I have no objection to those who would prefer to call the games discussed here quasi-prisoner's dilemma games.
22. 16. For simplicity, I ignore the inadvertent "exploitation" that occurs when only one conditional cooperator mistakes the other for an unconditional defector.
23. 17. Computing the threshold probability of recognition at which conditional cooperation becomes the rational strategy begins by calculating the expected utility payoffs of the two strategies. The expected payoff of the strategy of unconditional defection is given by the following equation: U = NM + (1 - N)PM + (1 - N)(1 - P)E, (1) where U = expected payoff of unconditional defection, N = probability of interacting with another unconditional defector, M = payoff to each player in mutual defection outcome, 1 - N = probability of interacting with a conditional cooperator, P = probability that a conditional cooperator will recognize an unconditional defector and so defect, 1 - P = probability that a conditional cooperator will not recognize an unconditional defector, will cooperate, and be exploited, and E = payoff to player who defects when the other player cooperates. The expected payoff of the strategy of conditional cooperation is given by the following equation: C = (1 - N)PA + (1 - N)(1 - P)M + NPM + N(1 - P)D, (2) where C = expected payoff of conditional cooperation, 1 - N = probability of interacting with a conditional cooperator, P = probability that players will recognize each other's character, A = payoff to each player in the mutual cooperation outcome, 1 - P = probability that players will not recognize each other's character, M = payoff to each player in the mutual defection outcome, N = probability of interacting with an unconditional defector, and D = payoff to cooperating player when the other player defects. Given these equations for determining the expected benefits of unconditional defection (U) and conditional cooperation (C), the threshold probability of recognition is that value for P (the probability of recognition) such that C exceeds U by a marginal amount. (Bear in mind that, given the stipulation in note 16 above, the value of P is the same in both equations.)
24. 18. Given the equations in note 17, it is necessarily the case that the expected benefits of conditional cooperation increase as the probability of recognition, i.e., the degree of transparency, increases.
25. 19. Hobbes stressed the importance of uncertainty in compelling people to renounce self-restraint in favor of self-assertion. Thus, the difference between Hobbes and Rousseau on this point concerns not so much the consequences of transparent intentions as their prevalence. See Leviathan, ch. 13.
26. 20. It is important to add that the disutility of violent death cannot be infinite if we are to be able to compute the expected utility payoffs of alternative strategies. Although equating violent death with infinite negative utility may seem attractive at first glance, it implies that human beings never risk this outcome, which is contrary to the facts. If the disutility of violent death is not infinite, then, strictly speaking, men do not have to be perfectly transparent, if by this we mean their intentions can never be misconstrued, in order for conditional cooperation to be a rational strategy.
27. 21. This point is developed in considerable detail in John Charvet, The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Also see N. J. H. Dent, Rousseau (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), ch. 6.
28. 21. This point is developed in considerable detail in John Charvet, The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Also see N. J. H. Dent, Rousseau (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), ch. 6.
29. 22. The strategic importance of involuntary facial expressions is discussed in Robert H. Frank, Passions within Reason (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), ch. 6.
30. 23. Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (London: John Wiley, 1976); The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Roben Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
31. 23. Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (London: John Wiley, 1976); The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Roben Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
32. 23. Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (London: John Wiley, 1976); The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Roben Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
33. 24. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, pp. 10-21; and Elliot Sober, "Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas," Economics and Philosophy, 8 (1992): 127-39.
34. 24. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, pp. 10-21; and Elliot Sober, "Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas," Economics and Philosophy, 8 (1992): 127-39.
35. 25. The consequences of perfect and imperfect monitoring are discussed in Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Moskherjee, "Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action," American Political Science Review, 81 (1987): 129-54.
36. 26. The consequences of shirking (or, defection below a certain threshold) are explored in Rudolf Schuessler, "Threshold Effects and the Decline of Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34 (1990): 476-94.
37. 27. This is a prominent theme in many of Rousseau's works, but particularly in "The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences," and the "Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre," in Allan Bloom, ed. and trans., Politics and the Arts (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960). Starobinski discusses Rousseau's use of the contrast between rural and urban life in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, pp. 346-49.
38. 27. This is a prominent theme in many of Rousseau's works, but particularly in "The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences," and the "Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre," in Allan Bloom, ed. and trans., Politics and the Arts (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960). Starobinski discusses Rousseau's use of the contrast between rural and urban life in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, pp. 346-49.
39. 28. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, Allan Bloom, ed. and trans. (New York: Basic Books, 1979), pp. 213-14. For Rousseau, trouble arises not because each of us prefers himself to others, or even because each person wishes others would defer to him. Rather, conflicts develop because we keep these desires secret, pursuing them by guile and deceit. See Emile, p. 352.
40. 28. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, Allan Bloom, ed. and trans. (New York: Basic Books, 1979), pp. 213-14. For Rousseau, trouble arises not because each of us prefers himself to others, or even because each person wishes others would defer to him. Rather, conflicts develop because we keep these desires secret, pursuing them by guile and deceit. See Emile, p. 352.
41. 29. David Hirshleifer and Eric Rasmusen, "Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 12 (1989): 87-106.
42. 30. "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," p. 270. In the "Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre," pp. 34-47, Rousseau complains that Moliere's plays have raised the costs of being regarded as an innocent dupe.
43. 30. "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," p. 270. In the "Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre," pp. 34-47, Rousseau complains that Moliere's plays have raised the costs of being regarded as an innocent dupe.
44. 31. For a discussion of the effect that the presence of unconditional cooperators has on the strategic environment, see Peter Danielson, Artificial Morality (London: Routledge, 1992).
45. 32. The economics of acquiring costly information concerning the character of one's prospective collaborators is formalized in Frank, Passions within Reason, appendix.
46. 33. For a different view, see Marc D. Hauser, "Costs of Deception," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 89 (1992): 12137-39. See also Frank, Passions within Reason, chs. 4-6.
47. 33. For a different view, see Marc D. Hauser, "Costs of Deception," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 89 (1992): 12137-39. See also Frank, Passions within Reason, chs. 4-6.
48. 34. "A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences," p. 149. While I have stressed the consequences of deception for those who are deceived (given the paper's focus on the instrumental aspects of transparency and opacity), Rousseau is, of course, also interested in the deceiver's self-inflicted wounds. Consider, for example, Rousseau's characterization of the actor who, while specializing in the "traffic of oneself," in actuality "annihilates himself," in the "Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre," pp. 79-81. Also, see Emile, p. 244.
49. 34. "A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences," p. 149. While I have stressed the consequences of deception for those who are deceived (given the paper's focus on the instrumental aspects of transparency and opacity), Rousseau is, of course, also interested in the deceiver's self-inflicted wounds. Consider, for example, Rousseau's characterization of the actor who, while specializing in the "traffic of oneself," in actuality "annihilates himself," in the "Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre," pp. 79-81. Also, see Emile, p. 244.
50. 34. "A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences," p. 149. While I have stressed the consequences of deception for those who are deceived (given the paper's focus on the instrumental aspects of transparency and opacity), Rousseau is, of course, also interested in the deceiver's self-inflicted wounds. Consider, for example, Rousseau's characterization of the actor who, while specializing in the "traffic of oneself," in actuality "annihilates himself," in the "Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre," pp. 79-81. Also, see Emile, p. 244.
51. 35. The human capacity not only to conceal, but also to explain away, i.e., rationalize, defection casts doubt on optimistic accounts of the prospects for spontaneous cooperation. A similar point is made in Howard Margolis, Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 185, fn. 18.
52. 36. This expectation is so prevalent among game theorists that it is called the "Folk Theorem."
53. 37. I use the term "rational egoist" loosely here and mean by it people moved by amour de soi.
54. 38. Rousseau, "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," p. 241.
55. 39. See Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation, ch. 5.
56. 40. As Rousseau puts it, "every intended injury becomes an affront; because besides the hurt . . . the party injured was certain to find in it a contempt for his person," in "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," p. 242.
57. 41. See note 17 above.
58. 42. I assume fixed information costs for simplicity. A more sophisticated model of information costs can be found in Frank, Passions within Reason, pp. 266-69. In computing the threshold probability of recognition with fixed information costs, these costs are simply subtracted from the expected payoffs of the two strategies described in note 17 above.
59. 43. This dynamic element is at work in all of the games I am considering.
60. 44. "Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," p. 225. See also p. 223.
61. 45. Emile, especially pp. 221-53.
62. 46. Compare Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation, pp. 112-21.
63. 47. This conclusion necessarily follows from the game-theoretic definitions here given to amour-propre and compassion in relation to amour de soi.
64. 48. See note 17 above.
65. 49. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on Political Economy," in Cole, ed. and trans., The Social Contract and Discourses, p. 306.
66. 50. These results follow only if a more egalitarian distribution of wealth reduces the strength of human envy. For a criticism of this assumption, see Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), ch. 8.
67. 51. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract," in Cole, ed. and trans., The Social Contract and Discourses, pp. 17-18. See also p. 103.
68. 52. "A Discourse on Political Economy," p. 299.
69. 53. See Frank, Passions within Reason, pp. 266-69.
70. 54. "Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre," pp. 58-59, and 127.
71. 55. In addition to this solution, which is discussed below, Rousseau also recommends an education that will enable citizens to penetrate the guises of their neighbors. In particular, he commends the study of history, for the best historians pursue a person everywhere, leaving "no moment of respite, no nook where he can avoid the spectator's piercing eye." Emile, p. 240.
72. 56. Emile, p. 237.
73. 57. "Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre," pp. 58-59.
74. 58. "Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre," p. 59.
75. 59. Quoted in Jean Starobinski, "The Political Thought of Jean Jacques Rousseau," in Rousseau's Political Writings, ed. Alan Ritter and Julia Conaway Bondanella (New York: Norton, 1988), p. 231.
76. 60. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Considerations on the Government of Poland," in Jean Jacques Rousseau: Political Writings, ed. and trans. Frederick Watkins (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), p. 244.
77. 61. Rousseau goes so far as to suggest that a public committee should keep "a roster of those peasants who are distinguished for good conduct ... for the proper fulfillment of all the duties of their station," in "Considerations on the Government of Poland," p. 253.
78. 62. "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," p. 177.
79. 63. "Considerations on the Government of Poland," p. 179.
80. 64. See, for example, the passage cited in note 60. It is important to bear in mind that Rousseau's reference to the feeling of being watched is an exception. Typically, Rousseau does not mention the mere feeling of being observed when he is describing the conditions favorable to civic virtue. For example, he recommends that young Polish nobles should grow up "under the eyes of their fellow citizens," that administrators should act "under the eyes of the legislator," and that the representatives of the people should conduct the state's business "under the eyes of their constituents." See Starobinski, "The Political Thought of Jean Jacques Rousseau," p. 231. See also Rousseau's remarks cited in notes 58, 59, 62, 63, and especially 69.
81. 65. A good explanation of this phenomenon can be found in Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), ch. 7. An alternative account of a similar process, in which the self takes the view of a "generalized other" that represents "the attitude of the whole community," is outlined by George Herbert Mead in Mind, Self, & Society (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934), Vol. I, pp. 152-64. See also Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), ch. 4.
82. 65. A good explanation of this phenomenon can be found in Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), ch. 7. An alternative account of a similar process, in which the self takes the view of a "generalized other" that represents "the attitude of the whole community," is outlined by George Herbert Mead in Mind, Self, & Society (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934), Vol. I, pp. 152-64. See also Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), ch. 4.
83. 65. A good explanation of this phenomenon can be found in Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), ch. 7. An alternative account of a similar process, in which the self takes the view of a "generalized other" that represents "the attitude of the whole community," is outlined by George Herbert Mead in Mind, Self, & Society (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934), Vol. I, pp. 152-64. See also Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), ch. 4.
84. 66. Quoted in Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, p. 95.
85. 67. Starobinski, Rousseau, pp. 96-97; emphasis in the original.
86. 68. Starobinski, Rousseau, p. 97. Cf. C. Fred Alford, who claims that "Rousseau wishes to eliminate difference per se - that is, the otherness of the other, the existence of other wills." See Alford, The Self in Social Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p 156.
87. 68. Starobinski, Rousseau, p. 97. Cf. C. Fred Alford, who claims that "Rousseau wishes to eliminate difference per se - that is, the otherness of the other, the existence of other wills." See Alford, The Self in Social Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p 156.
88. 68. Starobinski, Rousseau, p. 97. Cf. C. Fred Alford, who claims that "Rousseau wishes to eliminate difference per se - that is, the otherness of the other, the existence of other wills." See Alford, The Self in Social Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p 156.
89. 69. "Considerations on the Government of Poland," p. 245.
90. 70. Although Michael Taylor exaggerates in saying that "politics is the study of ways of solving collective action problems," such problems comprise an important subject of political inquiry. See Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation, p. 20.
91. 71. I am alluding to Rousseau's distinction between the "general will" and "the will of all" in chapter III of The Social Contract. The general will is portrayed as a solution to the problem of collective action in W. G. Runciman and A. K. Sen, "Games, Justice and the General Will," Mind (October 1965): 554-62.
92. 72. "A Discourse on Political Economy," p. 307. Rousseau's conception of citizenship extends beyond a solution to collective action problems; the education of citizens is not just a matter of teaching people how to cooperate in order to best achieve their antecedent ends. Rather, Rousseau's civic education is intended to give rise to new, common interests, which people acquire as they come to regard themselves as citizens. The difference between these two kinds of interest is discussed in Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 168-70.
93. 72. "A Discourse on Political Economy," p. 307. Rousseau's conception of citizenship extends beyond a solution to collective action problems; the education of citizens is not just a matter of teaching people how to cooperate in order to best achieve their antecedent ends. Rather, Rousseau's civic education is intended to give rise to new, common interests, which people acquire as they come to regard themselves as citizens. The difference between these two kinds of interest is discussed in Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 168-70.
94. 73. "Geneva Manuscript," in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1978), p. 160. In the "Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre," Rousseau asks, "What more advantageous treaty could one conclude than one obliging the whole world, excepting himself, to be just, so that everyone will faithfully render unto him what is due him, while he renders to no one what he owes?" p. 24.
95. 73. "Geneva Manuscript," in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1978), p. 160. In the "Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre," Rousseau asks, "What more advantageous treaty could one conclude than one obliging the whole world, excepting himself, to be just, so that everyone will faithfully render unto him what is due him, while he renders to no one what he owes?" p. 24.
96. 74. The surveillance state as a "design of subtle coercion" is examined in Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage, 1977), pp. 221-24.
97. 75. Quoted in James Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 197. The "terror" experienced by Rousseau was, perhaps, precisely what Robespierre had in mind when he concluded that without terror, "virtue is impotent." Quoted in Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy, p. 157. This line of interpretation is pursued in J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1960).
98. 75. Quoted in James Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 197. The "terror" experienced by Rousseau was, perhaps, precisely what Robespierre had in mind when he concluded that without terror, "virtue is impotent." Quoted in Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy, p. 157. This line of interpretation is pursued in J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1960).
99. 75. Quoted in James Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 197. The "terror" experienced by Rousseau was, perhaps, precisely what Robespierre had in mind when he concluded that without terror, "virtue is impotent." Quoted in Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy, p. 157. This line of interpretation is pursued in J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1960).