Constitutional nationalism and the logic of the wars in Yugoslavia

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 43, Issue 5, 1996, Pages 25-35

  Hayden, Robert M ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030238301     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.1996.11655695     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 5-6.
2. Ibid., p. 24.
3. Ibid., pp. 122-23.
4. Ibid., p. 47.
5. Ibid., p. 68.
6. Ibid., p. 133.
7. Robert M. Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics," Slavic Review 51 (1992): 655.
8. To my knowledge, no one has yet commented on the uniform application of the term "republic" to the former Yugoslav and Soviet Union states. Since the territories in question were labeled "republics" within these socialist federations, the usage may simply have been a carryover from the old days, and the states in question use the term to define themselves. Yet the disparity between the actual state structures and most definitions of "repub-lic" seems worth exploring. In essence, labeling Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Slovakia, or Kazakhstan "republics" obviates the need to look closely at what is going on within them. Perhaps a term like "national republics," comparable to "Islamic republics" or the now outmoded "people's republics," would be more useful.
9. Amendments in March 1989 to the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia effectively eliminated the autonomy of the two Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. While these amendments were driven by Serbian nationalism, they also addressed a bizarre constitutional structure in which these provinces had representation within Serbia and could block legislation in the republic, while republican authorities had no power to legislate over affairs within the provinces, even though the provinces were defined by the federal, republican, and provincial constitutions as "constituent parts" of the republic. Thus "autonomy" amounted to de facto independence coupled with provincial authority to obstruct legislation in the republican parliament. For these reasons, the claim by Serbian nationalist leaders that the 1989 amendments gave the republic jurisdiction over its entire territory had constitutional as well as nationalist logic. Clear statements of constitutional nationalism in Serbia awaited the adoption of a new constitution in 1990, and it is that constitution that is analyzed here.
10. Robert M. Hayden, "The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Imaginary Constitution for an Illusory 'Federation.'" Balkan Forum 2, 3 (1994): 77-91.
11. US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 762.
12. Robert M. Hayden, "The 1995 Agreements on Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Political Utility of a Constitutional Illusion," East European Constitutional Review 4, 4(1995): 59-68. This phrasing is actually a parody of democratic constitutionalism, because the Dayton constitution was not written by Bosnian citizens in a constituent assembly; does not require ratification by Bosnian citizens; and comes into force upon acceptance by the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia rather than by the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia.
13. Verena Stolcke, "Talking Culture: New Boundaries, New Rhetorics of Exclusion in Europe," Current Anthropology 36 (1995): 1-24.
14. Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert M. Hayden, "Orientalist Variations on the Theme 'Balkans': Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics," Slavic Review 51 (1992):1-15; Milica Bakic-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms and Their Reversals in the Former Yugoslavia," Slavic Review 54 (1995): 917-931; Maria Todorova, "The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention," Slavic Review 53 (1994): 453-82.
15. Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert M. Hayden, "Orientalist Variations on the Theme 'Balkans': Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics," Slavic Review 51 (1992):1-15; Milica Bakic-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms and Their Reversals in the Former Yugoslavia," Slavic Review 54 (1995): 917-931; Maria Todorova, "The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention," Slavic Review 53 (1994): 453-82.
16. Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert M. Hayden, "Orientalist Variations on the Theme 'Balkans': Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics," Slavic Review 51 (1992):1-15; Milica Bakic-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms and Their Reversals in the Former Yugoslavia," Slavic Review 54 (1995): 917-931; Maria Todorova, "The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention," Slavic Review 53 (1994): 453-82.
17. Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms."
18. Or perhaps the politically correct version of racism. See Stolcke, "Talking Culture." Thus, for example, Samuel Huntington's (in)famous "clash of civilizations" article would not likely have appeared in Foreign Affairs had it spoken instead of a "clash of races," as it probably would have during the 1950s. Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (1993): 27-49.
19. Or perhaps the politically correct version of racism. See Stolcke, "Talking Culture." Thus, for example, Samuel Huntington's (in)famous "clash of civilizations" article would not likely have appeared in Foreign Affairs had it spoken instead of a "clash of races," as it probably would have during the 1950s. Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (1993): 27-49.
20. Bruce Kapferer, Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988).
21. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, new edition (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1966).
22. Ibid., p. 230. Emphasis in original.
23. Since France is often presented as the assimilationist counter to German exclusionist models of the acquisition of citizenship, tying the French Revolution to the conquest of the state by the nation may seem questionable. However, as Stolcke points out with specific reference to France, the "fundamental assumption on which the assimilationist idea rests" is that "formal legal equality among citizens presupposes cultural homogeneity" ("Talking Culture," p. 9). The manifestation in nationalities law of the French antipathy to cultural pluralism is discussed by John Guendelsberger, "Access to Citizenship for Children Born Within the State to Foreign Parents," American Journal of Comparative Law 40 (1992): 379-429. For an argument that the concept of French citizenship is itself linked to "whites," see Daniel Segal and Richard Handler, "How European Is Nationalism?" Social Analysis 32 (1992): 1-15. Interestingly, the 1995 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) covenant on the rights of minorities was not signed by France, on the ground that there are no minorities in the country, a position with which two million Arabs may beg to differ.
24. Since France is often presented as the assimilationist counter to German exclusionist models of the acquisition of citizenship, tying the French Revolution to the conquest of the state by the nation may seem questionable. However, as Stolcke points out with specific reference to France, the "fundamental assumption on which the assimilationist idea rests" is that "formal legal equality among citizens presupposes cultural homogeneity" ("Talking Culture," p. 9). The manifestation in nationalities law of the French antipathy to cultural pluralism is discussed by John Guendelsberger, "Access to Citizenship for Children Born Within the State to Foreign Parents," American Journal of Comparative Law 40 (1992): 379-429. For an argument that the concept of French citizenship is itself linked to "whites," see Daniel Segal and Richard Handler, "How European Is Nationalism?" Social Analysis 32 (1992): 1-15. Interestingly, the 1995 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) covenant on the rights of minorities was not signed by France, on the ground that there are no minorities in the country, a position with which two million Arabs may beg to differ.
25. Since France is often presented as the assimilationist counter to German exclusionist models of the acquisition of citizenship, tying the French Revolution to the conquest of the state by the nation may seem questionable. However, as Stolcke points out with specific reference to France, the "fundamental assumption on which the assimilationist idea rests" is that "formal legal equality among citizens presupposes cultural homogeneity" ("Talking Culture," p. 9). The manifestation in nationalities law of the French antipathy to cultural pluralism is discussed by John Guendelsberger, "Access to Citizenship for Children Born Within the State to Foreign Parents," American Journal of Comparative Law 40 (1992): 379-429. For an argument that the concept of French citizenship is itself linked to "whites," see Daniel Segal and Richard Handler, "How European Is Nationalism?" Social Analysis 32 (1992): 1-15. Interestingly, the 1995 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) covenant on the rights of minorities was not signed by France, on the ground that there are no minorities in the country, a position with which two million Arabs may beg to differ.
26. Franjo Tudjman, Bespuća Povijesne Zbiljnosti (Zagreb: Nakladni Zavod Matice Hrvatske, 1990), p. 166.
27. Ibid., p. 139.
28. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 588-92.
29. The same supposition of voluntary departure has been applied to the Serbs of the Krajina, although the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has begun an investigation into charges against the Croats stemming from their actions in the Krajina, OMRI Daily Report (September 6, 1995).
30. Unless otherwise noted, figures on 1991 population distributions are from Ruža Petrović, "The National Composition of Yugoslavia's Population, 1991," Yugoslav Survey 1992 1 (1992): 3-23.
31. See Veljko Kadijević, Moje Vidjenje Raspada (Belgrade: Politika, 1993).
32. The polemics between Slovenia and Italy on this issue, and reports of the thousands who took Italian citizenship, are contained in Borba (August 9, August 16, and September 1, 1994).
33. Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, revised edition (London: Penguin, 1993).
34. Jovan Mirić, "Hrvatska Demokracija i Srpsko Pitanje," serial essay in sixteen installments, Borba (October 18-November 8, 1994).
35. The complementarity of these campaigns can be seen in the competing propaganda use made of the victims, such as Ljerka Fulgosi and Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Hundred Testimonies: The Moving Accounts of Croatian Displaced Persons and War Prisoners (Zagreb: Society of Croatian Professional Women and INA-Consulting, 1994), and Miroslav Stefanović and Milan Žegarac, Ka Drugoj Obali/Heading Towards the Opposite Bank (Novi Sad: Prometaj, 1992), Croat and Serb accounts, respectively, of expulsions from Slavonija. Somehow, the Croat accounts contain no mention of the expulsion of Serbs, and the Serb accounts contain no mention of the expulsion of Croats. The expulsion of Croats from Serb-controlled areas is documented reliably by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the UN's Special Rapporteur of the High Commission on Human Rights, who also reports Croat ethnic cleansing and expulsion of Serbs. See the UN's fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (1993-94).
36. The complementarity of these campaigns can be seen in the competing propaganda use made of the victims, such as Ljerka Fulgosi and Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Hundred Testimonies: The Moving Accounts of Croatian Displaced Persons and War Prisoners (Zagreb: Society of Croatian Professional Women and INA-Consulting, 1994), and Miroslav Stefanović and Milan Žegarac, Ka Drugoj Obali/Heading Towards the Opposite Bank (Novi Sad: Prometaj, 1992), Croat and Serb accounts, respectively, of expulsions from Slavonija. Somehow, the Croat accounts contain no mention of the expulsion of Serbs, and the Serb accounts contain no mention of the expulsion of Croats. The expulsion of Croats from Serb-controlled areas is documented reliably by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the UN's Special Rapporteur of the High Commission on Human Rights, who also reports Croat ethnic cleansing and expulsion of Serbs. See the UN's fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (1993-94).
37. The complementarity of these campaigns can be seen in the competing propaganda use made of the victims, such as Ljerka Fulgosi and Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Hundred Testimonies: The Moving Accounts of Croatian Displaced Persons and War Prisoners (Zagreb: Society of Croatian Professional Women and INA-Consulting, 1994), and Miroslav Stefanović and Milan Žegarac, Ka Drugoj Obali/Heading Towards the Opposite Bank (Novi Sad: Prometaj, 1992), Croat and Serb accounts, respectively, of expulsions from Slavonija. Somehow, the Croat accounts contain no mention of the expulsion of Serbs, and the Serb accounts contain no mention of the expulsion of Croats. The expulsion of Croats from Serb-controlled areas is documented reliably by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the UN's Special Rapporteur of the High Commission on Human Rights, who also reports Croat ethnic cleansing and expulsion of Serbs. See the UN's fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (1993-94).
38. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Tenth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (1995), p. 4.
39. Washington Post (May 5, 1995): A27.
40. Vreme (August 28, 1995): 8-11.
41. Telegraf (January 1995).
42. Vreme (February 27, 1995): 29-30.
43. Robert M. Hayden, "The Beginning of the End of Federal Yugoslavia: The Slovenian Amendment Crisis of 1989," University of Pittsburgh, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies no. 1001, 1992.
44. See generally Robert M. Hayden, "The Partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1990-93," RFE/RL Research Report 2, 22 (May 28, 1993): 1-14.
45. Statement delivered by Lord Carrington at the London Conference, August 26, 1992, London Conference document LC/R2.
46. Hayden, "The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
47. Situation of Human Rights on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, UN Document E/CN.4/1996/6, at 20.
48. New York Times (February 19, 1995): E6.
49. Boston Globe (September 21, 1995).
50. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Report of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs Pre-Election Assessment Delegation: Croatia, October 16, 1995 (Washington, DC).
51. OMRI Daily Report (October 23, 1995); BosNet VJESTI [on-line news service], October 23, 1995.
52. See New York Times (February 19, 1995): E2, (February 4, 1995): 4, (October 10, 1994): A3; Guardian Weekly (October 9, 1994): 19 [story from Le Monde]; Balkan War Report (February 1995): 7, and (December 1994-January 1995): 5-6; Borba (October 26, 1994): 2, and (November 9, 1994): 6.
53. See New York Times (February 19, 1995): E2, (February 4, 1995): 4, (October 10, 1994): A3; Guardian Weekly (October 9, 1994): 19 [story from Le Monde]; Balkan War Report (February 1995): 7, and (December 1994-January 1995): 5-6; Borba (October 26, 1994): 2, and (November 9, 1994): 6.
54. See New York Times (February 19, 1995): E2, (February 4, 1995): 4, (October 10, 1994): A3; Guardian Weekly (October 9, 1994): 19 [story from Le Monde]; Balkan War Report (February 1995): 7, and (December 1994-January 1995): 5-6; Borba (October 26, 1994): 2, and (November 9, 1994): 6.
55. See New York Times (February 19, 1995): E2, (February 4, 1995): 4, (October 10, 1994): A3; Guardian Weekly (October 9, 1994): 19 [story from Le Monde]; Balkan War Report (February 1995): 7, and (December 1994-January 1995): 5-6; Borba (October 26, 1994): 2, and (November 9, 1994): 6.
56. See New York Times (February 19, 1995): E2, (February 4, 1995): 4, (October 10, 1994): A3; Guardian Weekly (October 9, 1994): 19 [story from Le Monde]; Balkan War Report (February 1995): 7, and (December 1994-January 1995): 5-6; Borba (October 26, 1994): 2, and (November 9, 1994): 6.
57. See New York Times (February 19, 1995): E2, (February 4, 1995): 4, (October 10, 1994): A3; Guardian Weekly (October 9, 1994): 19 [story from Le Monde]; Balkan War Report (February 1995): 7, and (December 1994-January 1995): 5-6; Borba (October 26, 1994): 2, and (November 9, 1994): 6.
58. See New York Times (February 19, 1995): E2, (February 4, 1995): 4, (October 10, 1994): A3; Guardian Weekly (October 9, 1994): 19 [story from Le Monde]; Balkan War Report (February 1995): 7, and (December 1994-January 1995): 5-6; Borba (October 26, 1994): 2, and (November 9, 1994): 6.
59. See New York Times (February 19, 1995): E2, (February 4, 1995): 4, (October 10, 1994): A3; Guardian Weekly (October 9, 1994): 19 [story from Le Monde]; Balkan War Report (February 1995): 7, and (December 1994-January 1995): 5-6; Borba (October 26, 1994): 2, and (November 9, 1994): 6.
60. Dušan Janjić, "National Identities, Movements and Nationalism of Serbs and Albanians," Balkan Forum 3, 1 (1995): 19-84.
61. Günter Grass, The Call of the Toad (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1992).