NHS contracts: An agency approach

Health Economics

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 341-352

  Levaggi, Rosella ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENOA   (Italy)

^b Museo di Fisica e Meteo sismologia 'G Sanguineti G Leonardini'   (Italy)

Author keywords

Internal market; Purchaser provider relationship

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; ECONOMIC ASPECT; ECONOMICS; FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT; GAME; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH SERVICE; HIGH RISK BEHAVIOR; HUMAN; METHODOLOGY; NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; STATISTICAL MODEL; STATISTICS; UNITED KINGDOM;

CONTRACT SERVICES; ECONOMIC COMPETITION; EFFICIENCY, ORGANIZATIONAL; GAME THEORY; GREAT BRITAIN; HEALTH CARE REFORM; HEALTH SERVICES NEEDS AND DEMAND; HUMANS; MODELS, ECONOMIC; RISK-TAKING; STATE MEDICINE;

EID: 0030180206     PISSN: 10579230     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1050(199607)5:4<341::AID-HEC196>3.0.CO;2-7     Document Type: Article

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